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The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe
Modern-day Europeans by the millions proudly trace back their national identities to the Celts, Franks, Gauls, Goths, Huns, or Serbs - or some combination of the various peoples who inhabited, traversed, or pillaged their continent more than a thousand years ago. According to Patrick Geary, this is historical nonsense. The idea that national character is fixed for all time in a simpler, distant past is groundless, he argues in this unflinching reconsideration of European nationhood. Few of the peoples that many Europeans honor as sharing their sense of ''nation'' had comparably homogeneous identities; even the Huns, he points out, were firmly united only under Attila's ten-year reign.
Geary dismantles the nationalist myths about how the nations of Europe were born. Through rigorous analysis set in lucid prose, he contrasts the myths with the actual history of Europe's transformation between the fourth and ninth centuries - the period of grand migrations that nationalists hold dear. The nationalist sentiments today increasingly taken for granted in Europe emerged, he argues, only in the nineteenth century. Ironically, this phenomenon was kept alive not just by responsive populations - but by complicit scholars.
Ultimately, Geary concludes, the actual formation of European peoples must be seen as an extended process that began in antiquity and continues in the present. The resulting image is a challenge to those who anchor contemporary antagonisms in ancient myths - to those who claim that immigration and tolerance toward minorities despoil ''nationhood.'' As Geary shows, such ideologues - whether Le Pens who champion ''the French people born with the baptism of Clovis in 496'' or Milosevics who cite early Serbian history to claim rebellious regions--know their myths but not their history.
The Myth of Nations will be intensely debated by all who understood that a history that does not change, that reduces the complexities of many centuries to a single, eternal moment, isn't history at all.
Geary dismantles the nationalist myths about how the nations of Europe were born. Through rigorous analysis set in lucid prose, he contrasts the myths with the actual history of Europe's transformation between the fourth and ninth centuries - the period of grand migrations that nationalists hold dear. The nationalist sentiments today increasingly taken for granted in Europe emerged, he argues, only in the nineteenth century. Ironically, this phenomenon was kept alive not just by responsive populations - but by complicit scholars.
Ultimately, Geary concludes, the actual formation of European peoples must be seen as an extended process that began in antiquity and continues in the present. The resulting image is a challenge to those who anchor contemporary antagonisms in ancient myths - to those who claim that immigration and tolerance toward minorities despoil ''nationhood.'' As Geary shows, such ideologues - whether Le Pens who champion ''the French people born with the baptism of Clovis in 496'' or Milosevics who cite early Serbian history to claim rebellious regions--know their myths but not their history.
The Myth of Nations will be intensely debated by all who understood that a history that does not change, that reduces the complexities of many centuries to a single, eternal moment, isn't history at all.
216 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2001
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985 people want to read
About the author
Patrick J. Geary
69 books38 followersPatrick J. Geary is an American medieval historian and Professor of Western Medieval History at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 45 reviews
November 19, 2018
The book describes the genesis of different people in Europe and the related "mythology" used for justification the national states building in Europe the 19th century and beyond. It is surprising how such a slim volume can summarise so many details. It slightly rushes through the genesis of Slavic tribes, but for the rest it is impressive in its precision.
To demonstrate how the historiography affects and being affected by our convictions and beliefs, he brings the example of Zulu tribe and its history written by a missionary in the 19th century. He reveals how his sketch was affected by the Biblical story of Exodus rather than the actual facts.
Homogeneous ethnic group Nguni never existed l. They rather like Germans had meaning as linguistic designation, never as political cultural or social grouping. There were no migration anymore than one accept the legends of gothic migration from Scandinavia or Frankish wandering from Danube to Rhine. Rather groups that would in time become Zulu emerged from the indigenous population of the area. Migration stories are means of projecting mythic founding charters onto 19th century polities.
It would require the second reading for me to write a proper review. So for now I would just leave another quote:
"Both large hegemonic states and in aspiring independence movements, claims that ‘we have always been a people’ actually are appeals to become a people - appeals not grounded in history but rather attempts to create history."
To demonstrate how the historiography affects and being affected by our convictions and beliefs, he brings the example of Zulu tribe and its history written by a missionary in the 19th century. He reveals how his sketch was affected by the Biblical story of Exodus rather than the actual facts.
Homogeneous ethnic group Nguni never existed l. They rather like Germans had meaning as linguistic designation, never as political cultural or social grouping. There were no migration anymore than one accept the legends of gothic migration from Scandinavia or Frankish wandering from Danube to Rhine. Rather groups that would in time become Zulu emerged from the indigenous population of the area. Migration stories are means of projecting mythic founding charters onto 19th century polities.
It would require the second reading for me to write a proper review. So for now I would just leave another quote:
"Both large hegemonic states and in aspiring independence movements, claims that ‘we have always been a people’ actually are appeals to become a people - appeals not grounded in history but rather attempts to create history."
December 11, 2008
The Myth of Nations is the third book in my "trilogy" of Late Antique histories, the first two being Frontiers of the Roman Empire and Barbarian Tides. Unlike these titles, the current book is not an academic work. Instead, Geary's audience is the general reader with an interest in history (p. 185). Beyond that, he wants to argue that modern national identities are the products of 18th and 19th century European state-building. In reality, identity (whether "constitutional" or "organic") is a concept always in flux, and, in Late Antiquity (say, AD 400-800), things were exceptionally fluid.
I don't have too much to say about the book. Geary's main point - Ethnogenesis is a process of the present and the future as much as it is of the past. No efforts of romantics, politicians, or social scientists can preserve once and for all some essential soul of a people or a nation. Nor can any effort ensure that nations, ethnic groups, and communities of today will not vanish utterly in the future. The past may have set the parameters within which one can build the future, but it cannot determine what that future must be. Peoples of Europe...are processes formed and reformed by history, not the atomic structures of history itself (p. 174) - is one I'm in agreement with, by and large.
I'd recommend this book to anyone interested in the period but who hasn't done much reading about Late Antiquity. You can get an idea of one of the more contentious issues in current academe and a guide to further reading. Readers with a more extensive background in the period will find a nice summation but nothing new.
I don't have too much to say about the book. Geary's main point - Ethnogenesis is a process of the present and the future as much as it is of the past. No efforts of romantics, politicians, or social scientists can preserve once and for all some essential soul of a people or a nation. Nor can any effort ensure that nations, ethnic groups, and communities of today will not vanish utterly in the future. The past may have set the parameters within which one can build the future, but it cannot determine what that future must be. Peoples of Europe...are processes formed and reformed by history, not the atomic structures of history itself (p. 174) - is one I'm in agreement with, by and large.
I'd recommend this book to anyone interested in the period but who hasn't done much reading about Late Antiquity. You can get an idea of one of the more contentious issues in current academe and a guide to further reading. Readers with a more extensive background in the period will find a nice summation but nothing new.
March 9, 2008
I should start by saying I don't think this is a bad book. I just find Geary's argument flawed, and as such disagree with his conclusion.
In sum, Geary argues that the medieval territories that now comprise contemporary European nations did not view themselves as bound to each other, and consequently it is erroneous to speak of the "nation" of England (or France, or Germany, or Greece) during ancient and medieval time periods. With the 18th century the concept of a "nation" was developed, and these formerly disconnected territories became fused together into unified entities tied together by common social, political, economic, and cultural ties. These new nations, Geary argues, invented myths about their national foundations extending back centuries -- false myths, as Geary put it, because the process of organizing themselves as nations only occurred much later.
I believe Geary is correct to say that before the 18th Century territories in present day European countries were not bound to each other by any sort of national consciousness, but were rather just disconnected principalities, fifedoms, and other similar small territories. I believe Geary is correct to assert that the concept of nationalism and the nations that accompanied it were constructs of the 18th Century. Where his argument breaks down, however, is his contention that after this point European nations all automatically saw themselves as unified (and invented national myths accordingly). Some European nations do not view themselves this way, but instead see themselves as a set of smaller social and cultural units without strong ties to each other who just happen to be stuck together under one political state.
Geary draws his examples of small territories that fused into one larger nation primarily from France and England. And in the case of these two nations his argument holds up well. Both were groups of smaller territories. Both have unified through different historical events and processes into nations with unifying ties bonding their citizens into French and English nationalities. But, to cite a counterexample, this process of unifying as a nation is much weaker in Germany than in France or England. There are many territories that have been stuck together in the nation of Germany. During the second half of the 19th Century, the beginnings of a national consciousness flourished in the German state. This national consciousness was, however, considerably dampened by the prolonged viscousness of World War I. After this war, when Germany was badly wounded but not broken, nationalism became a strong force again as (among other historical processes) a reaction against the Great Depression and against the ineptitude of the Weimar government. This redoubled strength of nationalism in Germany culminated in World War II, which utterly devastated Germany and left the concept of nationalism cast out of the German consciousness. Even today people who live in the different territories of Germany generally do not see strong ties unifying their territories to each other. When the Berlin Wall was demolished and East and West Germany formally reunited, many Germans on both sides of the Wall were apprehensive about what this reunification might mean. Even today, many do not view reunification as a positive development. And even with the occasional flurry of nationalism (such as occurred when Berlin hosted the World Cup in 2006), Germany is still one of the least nationalistic nations in the world.
Another counterexample is Greece. The ancient territory of Macedonia covers the modern political state of Macedonia and extends into what is now northern Greece. There is a phrase one hears regularly in Greece that "Macedonia will always be Greek." However the people who populate the modern political state of Macedonia are not ethnically Greek, but rather are drawn from the Albanian ethnicity.
Geary argues that, since the Greeks consider Macedonia to be Greek, nationalistic Greeks clearly want to add the modern political state of Macedonia to Greek territory. The Greeks in fact want to do no such thing -- they are not massing their army on Greece's northern border to invade and take control of Macedonia. They do not consider the current inhabitants of Macedonia to be ethnically Greek. What the Greeks object to is the use of the name "Macedonia" to identify the political state to their north. Because the ancient territory of Macedonia extended into northern Greece, and some ancient Greek heroes (notably Alexander the Great) came from Greek Macedonia, the people of Greece regard the names "Macedonia" and "Macedonian" to be a part of their cultural heritage. But they do not consider the Albanian-descended inhabitants of the modern state of Macedonia to be tied to their heritage, and as such do not want to add them to the modern nation of Greece. Consequently Geary's notion that nationalistic ideas rooted in ancient history are driving Greece to make the modern state of Macedonia part of Greece is inaccurate.
While Geary's argument hold up for some nations such as France and England, counterexamples such as Germany and Greece cause me to reject his argument that nations all look to their ancient history to invent a story of nationality that binds their territories together. Some nations do no such thing.
In sum, Geary argues that the medieval territories that now comprise contemporary European nations did not view themselves as bound to each other, and consequently it is erroneous to speak of the "nation" of England (or France, or Germany, or Greece) during ancient and medieval time periods. With the 18th century the concept of a "nation" was developed, and these formerly disconnected territories became fused together into unified entities tied together by common social, political, economic, and cultural ties. These new nations, Geary argues, invented myths about their national foundations extending back centuries -- false myths, as Geary put it, because the process of organizing themselves as nations only occurred much later.
I believe Geary is correct to say that before the 18th Century territories in present day European countries were not bound to each other by any sort of national consciousness, but were rather just disconnected principalities, fifedoms, and other similar small territories. I believe Geary is correct to assert that the concept of nationalism and the nations that accompanied it were constructs of the 18th Century. Where his argument breaks down, however, is his contention that after this point European nations all automatically saw themselves as unified (and invented national myths accordingly). Some European nations do not view themselves this way, but instead see themselves as a set of smaller social and cultural units without strong ties to each other who just happen to be stuck together under one political state.
Geary draws his examples of small territories that fused into one larger nation primarily from France and England. And in the case of these two nations his argument holds up well. Both were groups of smaller territories. Both have unified through different historical events and processes into nations with unifying ties bonding their citizens into French and English nationalities. But, to cite a counterexample, this process of unifying as a nation is much weaker in Germany than in France or England. There are many territories that have been stuck together in the nation of Germany. During the second half of the 19th Century, the beginnings of a national consciousness flourished in the German state. This national consciousness was, however, considerably dampened by the prolonged viscousness of World War I. After this war, when Germany was badly wounded but not broken, nationalism became a strong force again as (among other historical processes) a reaction against the Great Depression and against the ineptitude of the Weimar government. This redoubled strength of nationalism in Germany culminated in World War II, which utterly devastated Germany and left the concept of nationalism cast out of the German consciousness. Even today people who live in the different territories of Germany generally do not see strong ties unifying their territories to each other. When the Berlin Wall was demolished and East and West Germany formally reunited, many Germans on both sides of the Wall were apprehensive about what this reunification might mean. Even today, many do not view reunification as a positive development. And even with the occasional flurry of nationalism (such as occurred when Berlin hosted the World Cup in 2006), Germany is still one of the least nationalistic nations in the world.
Another counterexample is Greece. The ancient territory of Macedonia covers the modern political state of Macedonia and extends into what is now northern Greece. There is a phrase one hears regularly in Greece that "Macedonia will always be Greek." However the people who populate the modern political state of Macedonia are not ethnically Greek, but rather are drawn from the Albanian ethnicity.
Geary argues that, since the Greeks consider Macedonia to be Greek, nationalistic Greeks clearly want to add the modern political state of Macedonia to Greek territory. The Greeks in fact want to do no such thing -- they are not massing their army on Greece's northern border to invade and take control of Macedonia. They do not consider the current inhabitants of Macedonia to be ethnically Greek. What the Greeks object to is the use of the name "Macedonia" to identify the political state to their north. Because the ancient territory of Macedonia extended into northern Greece, and some ancient Greek heroes (notably Alexander the Great) came from Greek Macedonia, the people of Greece regard the names "Macedonia" and "Macedonian" to be a part of their cultural heritage. But they do not consider the Albanian-descended inhabitants of the modern state of Macedonia to be tied to their heritage, and as such do not want to add them to the modern nation of Greece. Consequently Geary's notion that nationalistic ideas rooted in ancient history are driving Greece to make the modern state of Macedonia part of Greece is inaccurate.
While Geary's argument hold up for some nations such as France and England, counterexamples such as Germany and Greece cause me to reject his argument that nations all look to their ancient history to invent a story of nationality that binds their territories together. Some nations do no such thing.
October 13, 2020
Oči su mi otpale.
Sranje, jedni veliko sranje od knjige i autora.
Još 1 podsetnik koliko su Ameri površni i objašnjenje zašto nikada ne praktikujem njihovu literaturu.
Zdravo, doviđenja, nikada više.
Sranje, jedni veliko sranje od knjige i autora.
Još 1 podsetnik koliko su Ameri površni i objašnjenje zašto nikada ne praktikujem njihovu literaturu.
Zdravo, doviđenja, nikada više.
August 24, 2017
I definitely liked it, and it pretty much shook my entire perception of peoplehood - reading the brief section on the Bulgars and how they had split from the Avars is totally and utterly unlike anything I was taught in school in terms of the origins of the Bulgars. Being Bulgarian, this really caused me to reconsider everything I was taught about our historical continuity as a people - a concept which really is quite ridiculous. Geary does a great job in describing the fluidity of identity and how ethnicity or peoplehood is a construct, that "peoples" are heterogenous units, constantly evolving and amalgamating, sometimes disappearing altogether in the course of history.
The writing was excellent, and I felt the book was an appropriate length. What I would have liked to hear more is how exactly the notion of nationhood was formed in the 18th and 19th centuries, and how historians manipulated and reinterpreted history for their political purposes. But I guess he indirectly tells us that, because the peoples of the Late Antiquity themselves invented genealogies and histories to consolidate and validate their political power. In reality this has always happened and will continue to happen, and it is important for us Europeans (and all peoples, really) to realize the mechanics of ethnogenesis and not to be fooled by nationalist rhetoric. Not that I necessarily have a quarrel with nationalism as such, but I do object to the politicizing and manipulation of history as is so often observed within such political groups.
This book also reminded me why history and the study of history is important - history means a lot in terms of our self-identification, and it's important to be informed when political leaders use and abuse history for their own aims. It's important that historians speak out on issues such as these and break down illusions of the past that can be extremely harmful.
The reason I'm giving a three-star rating and not a four-star, is that I found the middle section a bit dull, to be honest. The fusion of barbarians and Romans was described in too much detail for a layman like me, and I had difficulty keeping up sometimes. What that really tells me is that I should step up my game and learn some more about my history - something which this book has inspired me to do.
The writing was excellent, and I felt the book was an appropriate length. What I would have liked to hear more is how exactly the notion of nationhood was formed in the 18th and 19th centuries, and how historians manipulated and reinterpreted history for their political purposes. But I guess he indirectly tells us that, because the peoples of the Late Antiquity themselves invented genealogies and histories to consolidate and validate their political power. In reality this has always happened and will continue to happen, and it is important for us Europeans (and all peoples, really) to realize the mechanics of ethnogenesis and not to be fooled by nationalist rhetoric. Not that I necessarily have a quarrel with nationalism as such, but I do object to the politicizing and manipulation of history as is so often observed within such political groups.
This book also reminded me why history and the study of history is important - history means a lot in terms of our self-identification, and it's important to be informed when political leaders use and abuse history for their own aims. It's important that historians speak out on issues such as these and break down illusions of the past that can be extremely harmful.
The reason I'm giving a three-star rating and not a four-star, is that I found the middle section a bit dull, to be honest. The fusion of barbarians and Romans was described in too much detail for a layman like me, and I had difficulty keeping up sometimes. What that really tells me is that I should step up my game and learn some more about my history - something which this book has inspired me to do.
May 18, 2019
Eigentlich ein sehr interessantes Thema und spannender Buchtitel. Jedoch schweift der Autor an mehreren Stellen vom eigentlichen Thema ab. So ist der Exkurs über die Zulus fast gänzlich irrelevant. Es werden viele Ansätze angeschnitten, jedoch nicht wirklich ausgeführt. Geary versucht den Nationalismus zu erklären und als ein falscher Grundsatz darstellen zu lassen. Jedoch führt er seine Argumentationsstränge nicht vollkommen zu ende und so verliert Geary sich ein bisschen in seiner eigenen These. Betrachtet man das Buch nur als Informationsquelle über die Nachfolgerreiche des Römischen Imperiums so hat das Buch durchaus seine informativen und interessanten Seiten. Leider beschränkt sich dies jedoch auf höchstens die hälfte der Seiten.
Grundsätzlich sollte es ja so sein, dass man in einer Arbeit etwas erforschen will. Für Geary ist es aber von Anfang an klar, dass Ethnien und Völker reine Erfindungen sind.
Auch eine mangelnde Begriffserklärungen muss hier erwähnt werden:
-Erklärt den Begriff Nationalismus nicht. Hroch geht da sehr differenziert dahinter, auch Kappeler sagt, dass er den Begriff nur in seiner negativen Tendenz verwenden will. Geary tut nichts dergleichen
-Erklärt auch andere Begriffe nicht direkt bzw. dessen Verwendung (Restauration, Transformation, v.a. Barbaren: wer gehört dazu?!)
-Sehr vereinfachend, in Römer und Barbaren einzuteilen
-Begriffe wie „ethnisch“ und „Volk“ braucht er in verschiedenen Bedeutungen, ohne das zu erklären
Abschliessend kann festgehalten werden, dass das Themenfeld durchaus spannend ist, jedoch Geary zu wenig daraus gemacht hat.
Grundsätzlich sollte es ja so sein, dass man in einer Arbeit etwas erforschen will. Für Geary ist es aber von Anfang an klar, dass Ethnien und Völker reine Erfindungen sind.
Auch eine mangelnde Begriffserklärungen muss hier erwähnt werden:
-Erklärt den Begriff Nationalismus nicht. Hroch geht da sehr differenziert dahinter, auch Kappeler sagt, dass er den Begriff nur in seiner negativen Tendenz verwenden will. Geary tut nichts dergleichen
-Erklärt auch andere Begriffe nicht direkt bzw. dessen Verwendung (Restauration, Transformation, v.a. Barbaren: wer gehört dazu?!)
-Sehr vereinfachend, in Römer und Barbaren einzuteilen
-Begriffe wie „ethnisch“ und „Volk“ braucht er in verschiedenen Bedeutungen, ohne das zu erklären
Abschliessend kann festgehalten werden, dass das Themenfeld durchaus spannend ist, jedoch Geary zu wenig daraus gemacht hat.
May 7, 2013
Patrick Geary’s Myth of Nations endeavors to prove that the national definitions of European nations are inaccurate due to the fluid nature of early European people groups. Further he hopes to establish these definitions as political and racial in origin while shining a light on the role of historians in crafting this inaccurate narrative from the past. This misinterpretation of the past, Geary postulates, has been co-opted by nationalistic movements, which have “summoned millions of people into the streets and sent millions more to their graves.” (Geary, 13) In light of this, Geary intends to present an overview of a new understanding of European people while exposing the roots of modern ethnic nationalism.
To this end, Geary spends the first chapter of the book exploring ethnic nationalism in modern day Europe. He presents a Europe full of “imagined communities”; nations created by a psychological and mental phenomena, rather than an actual ethnic tie to the past. This first chapter sets the stage for chapters two through five. Geary sets out to explore the origins of the categories Europeans have defined themselves with, specifically by demonstrating the fluid people groups of Europe from the 5th century B.C.E up through Late Antiquity. He then moves on to examine the development of nations through the Middle Ages. Finally the sixth chapter plays clean up with a comparison of the development of the Zulu national history to the development of Europe’s. Geary lays out his book in this manner to explain how political nationalism is a recent phenomena; an idea that would have rung hollow for communities in the past.1 He pays special attention to the role of historians in the development of this.
Primarily, Geary concerns himself with the work of contemporary historians or older ancient and medieval texts such as Herodotus. Geary rarely cites the nineteenth century historians he is critiquing, instead touching on them broadly. This is fine since he is primarily concerned with the effects of these histories instead of their specific contents. His most extensive exploration of a specific history is A.T. Bryant’s Olden Times in Zululand and Natal in the concluding chapter.
With the exception of the ancient Greco-Roman texts, Geary looks to European texts, an implication of Geary’s interest in Eurocentrism in history. Geary looks at Europeanist historians as the primary causers of the nationalistic school of history stating that they have validated the attempts of military commanders “by constructing a continuous linear story of the peoples of Europe.” (Geary, 157) This touches on an important theme throughout Geary’s book; the duty of the historian. Geary implies the work of a historian should not be to develop a master narrative, but instead to understand the fluid nature of social units and the political nature of primary sources.
Geary handles sources well and his overall theme has interesting implications for historians. Unfortunately, Geary draws a lot of criticism from his obvious ideological bent. His blatant approach could alienate some historians who would certainly feel implicated by Geary’s thesis. However, Geary doesn’t intend his history to be popular and is well resigned to it being a bitter pill. “Historians have a duty to speak out, even if they are certain to be ignored.” (Geary, 14) Geary makes an excellent case for the fluidity of European people groups and provides a better approach to understanding primary sources. Problems arise in the book mostly when the breadth of Geary’s brush becomes obvious. As Geary admits, this book is intended for general audiences and thus lacks a degree of scholastic rigor. Hundreds of years fly by in the course of two sentences. Further, Geary’s targeting of historians as primary actors in ethnic nationalism is a little dubious. This idea could easily be reversed showing historians as individuals influenced by the zeitgeist of ethnic nationalism permeating their time. Still, that doesn’t excuse the role of historians in nation myth building and Geary provides the tool set he believes will steer historians away from this in a comprehensive and coherent fashion. There are certainly lessons students of history can take from Geary.
To this end, Geary spends the first chapter of the book exploring ethnic nationalism in modern day Europe. He presents a Europe full of “imagined communities”; nations created by a psychological and mental phenomena, rather than an actual ethnic tie to the past. This first chapter sets the stage for chapters two through five. Geary sets out to explore the origins of the categories Europeans have defined themselves with, specifically by demonstrating the fluid people groups of Europe from the 5th century B.C.E up through Late Antiquity. He then moves on to examine the development of nations through the Middle Ages. Finally the sixth chapter plays clean up with a comparison of the development of the Zulu national history to the development of Europe’s. Geary lays out his book in this manner to explain how political nationalism is a recent phenomena; an idea that would have rung hollow for communities in the past.1 He pays special attention to the role of historians in the development of this.
Primarily, Geary concerns himself with the work of contemporary historians or older ancient and medieval texts such as Herodotus. Geary rarely cites the nineteenth century historians he is critiquing, instead touching on them broadly. This is fine since he is primarily concerned with the effects of these histories instead of their specific contents. His most extensive exploration of a specific history is A.T. Bryant’s Olden Times in Zululand and Natal in the concluding chapter.
With the exception of the ancient Greco-Roman texts, Geary looks to European texts, an implication of Geary’s interest in Eurocentrism in history. Geary looks at Europeanist historians as the primary causers of the nationalistic school of history stating that they have validated the attempts of military commanders “by constructing a continuous linear story of the peoples of Europe.” (Geary, 157) This touches on an important theme throughout Geary’s book; the duty of the historian. Geary implies the work of a historian should not be to develop a master narrative, but instead to understand the fluid nature of social units and the political nature of primary sources.
Geary handles sources well and his overall theme has interesting implications for historians. Unfortunately, Geary draws a lot of criticism from his obvious ideological bent. His blatant approach could alienate some historians who would certainly feel implicated by Geary’s thesis. However, Geary doesn’t intend his history to be popular and is well resigned to it being a bitter pill. “Historians have a duty to speak out, even if they are certain to be ignored.” (Geary, 14) Geary makes an excellent case for the fluidity of European people groups and provides a better approach to understanding primary sources. Problems arise in the book mostly when the breadth of Geary’s brush becomes obvious. As Geary admits, this book is intended for general audiences and thus lacks a degree of scholastic rigor. Hundreds of years fly by in the course of two sentences. Further, Geary’s targeting of historians as primary actors in ethnic nationalism is a little dubious. This idea could easily be reversed showing historians as individuals influenced by the zeitgeist of ethnic nationalism permeating their time. Still, that doesn’t excuse the role of historians in nation myth building and Geary provides the tool set he believes will steer historians away from this in a comprehensive and coherent fashion. There are certainly lessons students of history can take from Geary.
July 17, 2016
Većina rečenica iz sledećeg teksta je prepisana iz knjige. Ja sam ih samo malo sredio kako bih dobio kompaktan tekst.
Nacionalizam je tvorevina romantizma 19. veka u kombinaciji sa „naučnom“ istorijom i indoevropskom filologijom. Nema tu ničeg drevnog. Pogleda na prošlost je zamagljen istorijskim istraživanjima u poslednja dva veka. Nacionalističke istorije se pre temelje na političkim i kulturnim shvatanjima autora koji ih pišu nego na stvarnim činjenicama.
Nacionalističke metode obuhvataju najpre proučavanje jezika, a onda i kulture i istorije dotičnog naroda koja sprovodi mala grupa „probuđenih“ intelektualaca. Prvo se pronađe zvanični jezik koji govori politički moćna grupa ili stanovništvo nekog velikog grada. Onda se on nametne ostalom stanovništvu preko državnog školskog sistema preko koga se prenosi i ideologija. Ovim su ugušeni mnogi jezici a jezičke granice su postale mnogo čvršće. Narod je po ovoj logici bio narod i pre nego što je to i znao, a jezik je istovremeno najdublja realnost ovog nepromenjenog identiteta. Ali, u početku jezik se nije nužno poklapao sa drugim kulturnim tradicijama, kao što je izgled odeće, nakit, grnčarija ili oružje. Bilo je više naroda nego jezika, razlike među njima često nisu bile velike. Ovi narodi u početku svojih osvajanja nisu predstavljali većinu ni u svojim državama.
Posle filologije dolazi etnoarheologija. Jednom kada se mogla lingvistički odrediti lokacija „naroda“, na arheolozima je ostalo da pronađu, i, često, našteluju fizičke dokaze kulturnih specifičnosti određenog naroda. Kada su nastali, ovi narodi su morali da dobiju, to jest stvore, sopstvenu istoriju koja je jednako stara i slavna kao što je bila, na primer rimska. Ali u nedostatku svojih, morali su da prihvate rimske poglede na sopstvenu istoriju. U rimsko vreme autori su pokušavali da istorije „novih“ naroda inkorporiraju u „univerzalnu“ istoriju koja je tada jedino mogla biti rimska. Tako su na primer prihvaćena imena Franci i Alemani (germanske reči) kojima su prvo jedino Rimljani nazivali ove grupe. Takođe, Srbi, Hrvati i Bugari nisu slovenske reči.
Proces nastanka naroda počinje tako što ratnički lider uspeva kroz niz pobeda da privuče druge ratnike. Banda postaje vojska. Vojska može da preživi samo stalnim osvajanjima i inkorporacijom svojih žrtava u vojne snage. Tada, u ključnom trenutku, ova vojska se pretvara u narod kroz stvaranje pravne i institucionalne strukture i možda, polaže pravo na specijalno božansko poreklo. Oni mogu biti novoformirani, ali vuku svoju legitimnost na osnovu prava da predstavljaju obnavljanje stare tradicije.
Kada se ustanovi ovakva istorija, grupa „patriota“ prenosi i širi ideje ovakvih naučnika u društvu; i konačno, dolazi faza u kojoj nacionalni pokret dostiže svoju kulminaciju među masama. Obrazovanje odradi ostalo.
Imena naroda mogu nam delovati poznato posle hiljadu godina, ali društvena, kulturna i poltička realnost koja je stajala iza ovih imena bila je radikalno drugačija od onog što danas predstavlja. Bili su to potpuno drugi narodi. Sa stalnim promenama vazalnosti, međusobnim brakovima, transformacijama i pripajanjima, mešanjem, izgleda da su od svega ostala samo imena, a ona su mogla da dobiju različit sadržaj u različito vreme.
Kada se savremeni nacionalisti pozivaju na istoriju, njihova ideja istorije je statična: oni gledaju onaj trenutak primarne akvizicije, kada je „njihov narod“ najpre stigao u ostatke Rimskog carstva (u slučaju Evrope), utvrdio svoju teritoriju i svoj nacionalni identitet. Nakon ovih perioda primarne akvizicije za njih seobe, invazije i politička asimiliranja postaju nelegitimni.
Ali istorijski proces nikad nije završen i tako mora biti. Istorija je nelinearna. Proces promene nije se završio sa stvaranjem današnjih država. Kao što je to bilo oduvek promene će se dešavati i ubuduće. Istorija nikad nije gotova.
Sve me ovo podseća na priču o tome kako nacionalisti i fašisti biraju dokle gledaju čistotu naroda. Jedan kaže: „Do devetog kolena“. A drugi: „Ne može. Toliko nemam ni ja. Ajmo do petog.“
Nacionalizam je tvorevina romantizma 19. veka u kombinaciji sa „naučnom“ istorijom i indoevropskom filologijom. Nema tu ničeg drevnog. Pogleda na prošlost je zamagljen istorijskim istraživanjima u poslednja dva veka. Nacionalističke istorije se pre temelje na političkim i kulturnim shvatanjima autora koji ih pišu nego na stvarnim činjenicama.
Nacionalističke metode obuhvataju najpre proučavanje jezika, a onda i kulture i istorije dotičnog naroda koja sprovodi mala grupa „probuđenih“ intelektualaca. Prvo se pronađe zvanični jezik koji govori politički moćna grupa ili stanovništvo nekog velikog grada. Onda se on nametne ostalom stanovništvu preko državnog školskog sistema preko koga se prenosi i ideologija. Ovim su ugušeni mnogi jezici a jezičke granice su postale mnogo čvršće. Narod je po ovoj logici bio narod i pre nego što je to i znao, a jezik je istovremeno najdublja realnost ovog nepromenjenog identiteta. Ali, u početku jezik se nije nužno poklapao sa drugim kulturnim tradicijama, kao što je izgled odeće, nakit, grnčarija ili oružje. Bilo je više naroda nego jezika, razlike među njima često nisu bile velike. Ovi narodi u početku svojih osvajanja nisu predstavljali većinu ni u svojim državama.
Posle filologije dolazi etnoarheologija. Jednom kada se mogla lingvistički odrediti lokacija „naroda“, na arheolozima je ostalo da pronađu, i, često, našteluju fizičke dokaze kulturnih specifičnosti određenog naroda. Kada su nastali, ovi narodi su morali da dobiju, to jest stvore, sopstvenu istoriju koja je jednako stara i slavna kao što je bila, na primer rimska. Ali u nedostatku svojih, morali su da prihvate rimske poglede na sopstvenu istoriju. U rimsko vreme autori su pokušavali da istorije „novih“ naroda inkorporiraju u „univerzalnu“ istoriju koja je tada jedino mogla biti rimska. Tako su na primer prihvaćena imena Franci i Alemani (germanske reči) kojima su prvo jedino Rimljani nazivali ove grupe. Takođe, Srbi, Hrvati i Bugari nisu slovenske reči.
Proces nastanka naroda počinje tako što ratnički lider uspeva kroz niz pobeda da privuče druge ratnike. Banda postaje vojska. Vojska može da preživi samo stalnim osvajanjima i inkorporacijom svojih žrtava u vojne snage. Tada, u ključnom trenutku, ova vojska se pretvara u narod kroz stvaranje pravne i institucionalne strukture i možda, polaže pravo na specijalno božansko poreklo. Oni mogu biti novoformirani, ali vuku svoju legitimnost na osnovu prava da predstavljaju obnavljanje stare tradicije.
Kada se ustanovi ovakva istorija, grupa „patriota“ prenosi i širi ideje ovakvih naučnika u društvu; i konačno, dolazi faza u kojoj nacionalni pokret dostiže svoju kulminaciju među masama. Obrazovanje odradi ostalo.
Imena naroda mogu nam delovati poznato posle hiljadu godina, ali društvena, kulturna i poltička realnost koja je stajala iza ovih imena bila je radikalno drugačija od onog što danas predstavlja. Bili su to potpuno drugi narodi. Sa stalnim promenama vazalnosti, međusobnim brakovima, transformacijama i pripajanjima, mešanjem, izgleda da su od svega ostala samo imena, a ona su mogla da dobiju različit sadržaj u različito vreme.
Kada se savremeni nacionalisti pozivaju na istoriju, njihova ideja istorije je statična: oni gledaju onaj trenutak primarne akvizicije, kada je „njihov narod“ najpre stigao u ostatke Rimskog carstva (u slučaju Evrope), utvrdio svoju teritoriju i svoj nacionalni identitet. Nakon ovih perioda primarne akvizicije za njih seobe, invazije i politička asimiliranja postaju nelegitimni.
Ali istorijski proces nikad nije završen i tako mora biti. Istorija je nelinearna. Proces promene nije se završio sa stvaranjem današnjih država. Kao što je to bilo oduvek promene će se dešavati i ubuduće. Istorija nikad nije gotova.
Sve me ovo podseća na priču o tome kako nacionalisti i fašisti biraju dokle gledaju čistotu naroda. Jedan kaže: „Do devetog kolena“. A drugi: „Ne može. Toliko nemam ni ja. Ajmo do petog.“
January 22, 2018
It's an obligatory classic for anyone taking a real interest in history. I haven't read it in my undergrad years, as the Polish historiography has its own excellent classic title covering the same subject area (see Świt narodów europejskich). Now, it pleases me to see that the English-speaking world has also produced an accessible study on this subject. It shows to a lay reader that the so-called nations as we understand them today are relatively recent phenomena, and that the historical reality was far removed from what nationalistic myths try to sell us today. It's such a pity that those who would benefit from this book the most will most probably never read it.
March 9, 2012
Wonderful incisive look at the changing ideas of nationhood which disputes any idea of fixed national identities stemming from some distant past.
“When contemporary nationalists appeal to history, their notion of history is static: they look to the moment of primary acquisition, when ‘their people,’ first arriving in the ruins of the Roman Empire, established their sacred territory and their national identity. This is the very antithesis of history. The history of European peoples in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages is not the story of a primordial moment but of a continuous process. It is the story of political appropriation and manipulation of inherited names and//representations of pasts to create a present and a future. It is a history of constant change, of radical discontinuities, and of political and cultural zigzags, masked by the repeated re-appropriation of old words to define new realities.” 156-7
“When contemporary nationalists appeal to history, their notion of history is static: they look to the moment of primary acquisition, when ‘their people,’ first arriving in the ruins of the Roman Empire, established their sacred territory and their national identity. This is the very antithesis of history. The history of European peoples in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages is not the story of a primordial moment but of a continuous process. It is the story of political appropriation and manipulation of inherited names and//representations of pasts to create a present and a future. It is a history of constant change, of radical discontinuities, and of political and cultural zigzags, masked by the repeated re-appropriation of old words to define new realities.” 156-7
December 6, 2025
Amei como o autor quebra várias ideias que os discursos nacionalistas estabeleceram para dizer que um povo é "puro", baseado em uma manipulação da idade média.
Estudar nacionalismo é sempre meio 🤯🤯🤯 mas ainda acho que teria aproveitado mais o livro se não tivesse lido pra uma prova, por isso não 5 estrelas, mas ainda assim excelente livro sobre o tema.
Estudar nacionalismo é sempre meio 🤯🤯🤯 mas ainda acho que teria aproveitado mais o livro se não tivesse lido pra uma prova, por isso não 5 estrelas, mas ainda assim excelente livro sobre o tema.
July 1, 2010
Very good book on the strange modern idea of nationalism.
What is a nation? It is an idea, mostly a lie that philologists made up, and then political states took to "legitimize" their power and justify "reclaiming" land that "rightfully" belongs to them.
This is why I like Thucydides so much. He is so honest. "You are weak. I am strong. Therefore, I will kill you and take your land. Goodbye."
What is a nation? It is an idea, mostly a lie that philologists made up, and then political states took to "legitimize" their power and justify "reclaiming" land that "rightfully" belongs to them.
This is why I like Thucydides so much. He is so honest. "You are weak. I am strong. Therefore, I will kill you and take your land. Goodbye."
July 10, 2012
An interesting take, especially in light of books I've read since such as Leithart's Defending Constantine.
January 3, 2016
This book was a great source of thoughts. And a liberating read.
April 8, 2024
Geary, here, offers an essential rebuttal to primordialist historians of nationalism, who posit that "nations" and "nationalism" as we know them today existed in the pre-modern era. Rather, as he sets out, this is the result of 18th and 19th century distortions (p.13, 15).
The opening chapter sets out the key errors of such assumptions, looking at how such:
'pseudohistory assumes, first, that the peoples of Europe are distinct, stable and objectively identifiable social and cultural units, and that they are distinguished by language, religion, custom, and national character, which are unambiguous and immutable. These people were supposedly formed either in some impossibly remote moment of prehistory, or else the process of ethnogenesis took place at some moment during the Middle Ages, but then ended for all time' (p.11).
This belief in some magical moment of "primary acquisition", as Geary calls it in the book, is still a central component of popular thinking today, demonstrating how ingrained such national-ised modes of thinking about history have become. Yet, this (as has been documented elsewhere by scholars like Anthony Smith) history was primarily written to serve the interests of European nationalist political projects. Geary sketches the development of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica and other similar projects in early modernity, looking at how these served the interests of romantic and cultural nationalist ideologists like Herder, who sought to project their contemporaneous readings of history into the past (most frequently the early medieval era), primarily through association of names, making the mistake of assuming that because shared names remain stable throughout history, then sense of peoplehood should too (p.13).
However, Geary notes how no such 'common national identity unite[d] the high and low, lord and peasant, into a deeply felt community of interest' (p.19). As John Armstrong has written elsewhere, where any such identity that might tenously be called "national" did exist at all in Europe, this was entirely amongst the elite of societies and, though projected onto their subjects, did not actually persist in the minds of the majority of ordinary people.
The problem with this is, of course, that all 'peoples inhabit areas that contain other ethnic minorities, and most also have members living as minorities living within areas dominated by other peoples. As a result, demands for political autonomy based on ethnic identity will inevitably lead to border conflicts, suppression of minority rights, and civil strife' (p.4). One might argue that this isn't so much the case in supposed "civic" nations like the UK and France, yet even civic nationalism inherently contains a cultural component, given it seeks to preserve specific borders and thus presupposes a "natural" line (both physically and figuratively) between "us" and "them". Geary acknowledges as much when he observes the resurgence of xenophobia in France (p.5). These are critical observations by Geary, and any serious attempt to defend a primordialist position must grapple with the arguments he puts forward in the opening chapters.
Yet, after the introduction and first chapter, the majority of Geary's book is taken up with an examination of pre-modern historiography that is only really peripheral to the arguments he makes in the opening sections. Looking at how Roman, then post-Roman, ethnographers like Herodotus characterised various peoples within and without the Roman Empire. To be sure, there are some useful observations here - like the assertion various groups had distinct modes of traits and customs yet this doesn't necessarily mean they constituted a distinct "people" on account of such things (p.48), as well as the important disclaimer that Roman commentators may have 'delighted in commenting on distinctions of dress and hairstyle, but, again, this may correspond more to Roman interests in classification than in accuracy in observation' (p.76) - but Geary never really links this long exposition back to his opening arguments. It is almost as if he is writing a book within a book, without ever adequately stringing the two together.
Nevertheless, the first part of the book remains essential reading for scholars of nationalism, as we must consistently remain aware of contemporary attempts to obscure the past in service of political and cultural goals. The difficulty remains that such ways of thinking are still so entrenches. As Geary notes, unfortunately: 'We are trapped in the very historical process we are attempting to study' (p.41).
The opening chapter sets out the key errors of such assumptions, looking at how such:
'pseudohistory assumes, first, that the peoples of Europe are distinct, stable and objectively identifiable social and cultural units, and that they are distinguished by language, religion, custom, and national character, which are unambiguous and immutable. These people were supposedly formed either in some impossibly remote moment of prehistory, or else the process of ethnogenesis took place at some moment during the Middle Ages, but then ended for all time' (p.11).
This belief in some magical moment of "primary acquisition", as Geary calls it in the book, is still a central component of popular thinking today, demonstrating how ingrained such national-ised modes of thinking about history have become. Yet, this (as has been documented elsewhere by scholars like Anthony Smith) history was primarily written to serve the interests of European nationalist political projects. Geary sketches the development of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica and other similar projects in early modernity, looking at how these served the interests of romantic and cultural nationalist ideologists like Herder, who sought to project their contemporaneous readings of history into the past (most frequently the early medieval era), primarily through association of names, making the mistake of assuming that because shared names remain stable throughout history, then sense of peoplehood should too (p.13).
However, Geary notes how no such 'common national identity unite[d] the high and low, lord and peasant, into a deeply felt community of interest' (p.19). As John Armstrong has written elsewhere, where any such identity that might tenously be called "national" did exist at all in Europe, this was entirely amongst the elite of societies and, though projected onto their subjects, did not actually persist in the minds of the majority of ordinary people.
The problem with this is, of course, that all 'peoples inhabit areas that contain other ethnic minorities, and most also have members living as minorities living within areas dominated by other peoples. As a result, demands for political autonomy based on ethnic identity will inevitably lead to border conflicts, suppression of minority rights, and civil strife' (p.4). One might argue that this isn't so much the case in supposed "civic" nations like the UK and France, yet even civic nationalism inherently contains a cultural component, given it seeks to preserve specific borders and thus presupposes a "natural" line (both physically and figuratively) between "us" and "them". Geary acknowledges as much when he observes the resurgence of xenophobia in France (p.5). These are critical observations by Geary, and any serious attempt to defend a primordialist position must grapple with the arguments he puts forward in the opening chapters.
Yet, after the introduction and first chapter, the majority of Geary's book is taken up with an examination of pre-modern historiography that is only really peripheral to the arguments he makes in the opening sections. Looking at how Roman, then post-Roman, ethnographers like Herodotus characterised various peoples within and without the Roman Empire. To be sure, there are some useful observations here - like the assertion various groups had distinct modes of traits and customs yet this doesn't necessarily mean they constituted a distinct "people" on account of such things (p.48), as well as the important disclaimer that Roman commentators may have 'delighted in commenting on distinctions of dress and hairstyle, but, again, this may correspond more to Roman interests in classification than in accuracy in observation' (p.76) - but Geary never really links this long exposition back to his opening arguments. It is almost as if he is writing a book within a book, without ever adequately stringing the two together.
Nevertheless, the first part of the book remains essential reading for scholars of nationalism, as we must consistently remain aware of contemporary attempts to obscure the past in service of political and cultural goals. The difficulty remains that such ways of thinking are still so entrenches. As Geary notes, unfortunately: 'We are trapped in the very historical process we are attempting to study' (p.41).
March 19, 2025
Firstly, the identity and history of nations and how it changes is a topic of great controversy, especially in Central-Europe. Talking about these will generate no small amount of love and hate from both sides. One just has to look at any kind of Facebook post about a random Central European country or landmark. Neighbours will start commenting about how ridiculous the one side is and how they see it from their perspective. I have long established in myself that Central European identities and interpretations of history are generally mutually exclusive as partially such identities and histories were created to differentiate the given country from their neighbours. This is an unfortunate situation, but again, just look at any kind of Facebook post about historical castles in the Carpathian basin.
After reading Geary's book, I think he's on the right track. (noting that this book was first published in 2001 and I have not read any more recent book from him on this.) Establishing that many of these identities are constructed artificially and rooted in Judeo-Christian and alternatively in Roman examples is very important. As we saw, it is the same for European examples, as for let's say the Zulus of Southern Africa. Most were created to help the ruling class cement their might and control of society without exception. For many hundreds of years, this is imparted through education in the various nation-states to shape the latest generations. There's absolutely no difference on the big picture how it was done in France, Germany or in the successor states of the Habsburg Empire after WWI.
I of course tremendously enjoyed the description and chain of thought about the barbarian kingdoms on the territory of the western roman empire. I have already read many books on this topic and I'm fascinated by their history, the changes in identity as described by Geary and how it is still very relevant today. This book is a great introductory material on the topic of "etnogenesis" of people, nations and identities. To be absolutely great, he could expand the material with objective reviews of current identities of contemporary nations. But at the same time I realize that would invite a lot of controversy, as mentioned above. Anyway, I enjoyed this book very much and can absolutely recommend. Contrary to the cover, which is a Hungarian historical painting "Honfoglalás" from Munkácsy, there's very little about the Hungarian or other contemporary identities. This covers more the etnogenesis of the barbarian kingdoms of the franks, the longobards, the visigoths and other similar people of the late antiquity period.
After reading Geary's book, I think he's on the right track. (noting that this book was first published in 2001 and I have not read any more recent book from him on this.) Establishing that many of these identities are constructed artificially and rooted in Judeo-Christian and alternatively in Roman examples is very important. As we saw, it is the same for European examples, as for let's say the Zulus of Southern Africa. Most were created to help the ruling class cement their might and control of society without exception. For many hundreds of years, this is imparted through education in the various nation-states to shape the latest generations. There's absolutely no difference on the big picture how it was done in France, Germany or in the successor states of the Habsburg Empire after WWI.
I of course tremendously enjoyed the description and chain of thought about the barbarian kingdoms on the territory of the western roman empire. I have already read many books on this topic and I'm fascinated by their history, the changes in identity as described by Geary and how it is still very relevant today. This book is a great introductory material on the topic of "etnogenesis" of people, nations and identities. To be absolutely great, he could expand the material with objective reviews of current identities of contemporary nations. But at the same time I realize that would invite a lot of controversy, as mentioned above. Anyway, I enjoyed this book very much and can absolutely recommend. Contrary to the cover, which is a Hungarian historical painting "Honfoglalás" from Munkácsy, there's very little about the Hungarian or other contemporary identities. This covers more the etnogenesis of the barbarian kingdoms of the franks, the longobards, the visigoths and other similar people of the late antiquity period.
January 8, 2020
Egyfelől A nemzetek mítosza „pusztán” egy remek könyv arról a történelmi fekete lyukról, ami a Nyugat-Római Birodalom felbomlása és a nagy keresztény államok megjelenése között ásítozik legtöbbünk fejében. Ez az a periódus, amikor az ilyen-olyan barbárok közösségei gyökeret vertek Európában, kereszténnyé váltak, és nekiálltak betölteni a latin civilizáció összeomlása után keletkezett hiátust. Nos, nagyon tanulságos, most legalább tudom, kik is azok a vandálok – azon túl, hogy édesapa szerint ők karcolták össze a kocsink ajtaját. De ettől azért még nem dobnék hátast. Másfelől viszont…
Geary az egész elé rittyent egy frenetikus bevezetést, amivel tudomásomra hozza, mik azok a kortárs jelenségek, amelyek egészen konkrétan ezekből a zűrzavaros évszázadokból vezethetők le. Olyan első harminc-negyven oldal ez, hogy halleluja és heuréka – végig az volt az érzésem, mintha Geary helyettem beszélne, megfogalmazná azt, amire magam is mintha gondoltam volna, csak épp nem tudtam eddig világosan megfogalmazni. Adomány az ilyen szöveg, bár illik ilyenkor megvizsgálni, nem csak én látom-e a szövegbe azt, amiről olvasni akarok. (Amúgy: azt hiszem, nem.) Aztán persze jön a masszív értekezés a római polgárságról, a barbár gensről, átláthatatlan népmozgásokról, de ekkor már érdekelve vagyok. Figyelek.
Elképesztően aktuális téma ez. Ma, amikor az iszlám gyökerű vallási intoleranciára a nyugati államok paradox módon nem vallási, hanem nacionalista intoleranciával felelnek*, érdemes szem előtt tartani, mennyire egy tőről fakad ez a két jelenség. Egyikük a Koránból, másikuk valamiféle nemzeti őstörténetből merít ideológiai igazolást – de hasonlítanak abban, hogy legfeljebb közvetett kapcsolatban állnak azok valódi tartalmával. Mindketten előnyben részesítik a kézzelfogható tények helyett a szubjektumokat, így hatástalanok ellenük a racionális érvek. És végezetül: mindkettejük végső érve a terrorizmus. Úgyhogy jó lesz figyelni.
* Még azok az államok is – most nem jut eszembe a nevük –, akik nincsenek közvetlen kapcsolatban a terrorizmussal.
Geary az egész elé rittyent egy frenetikus bevezetést, amivel tudomásomra hozza, mik azok a kortárs jelenségek, amelyek egészen konkrétan ezekből a zűrzavaros évszázadokból vezethetők le. Olyan első harminc-negyven oldal ez, hogy halleluja és heuréka – végig az volt az érzésem, mintha Geary helyettem beszélne, megfogalmazná azt, amire magam is mintha gondoltam volna, csak épp nem tudtam eddig világosan megfogalmazni. Adomány az ilyen szöveg, bár illik ilyenkor megvizsgálni, nem csak én látom-e a szövegbe azt, amiről olvasni akarok. (Amúgy: azt hiszem, nem.) Aztán persze jön a masszív értekezés a római polgárságról, a barbár gensről, átláthatatlan népmozgásokról, de ekkor már érdekelve vagyok. Figyelek.
Elképesztően aktuális téma ez. Ma, amikor az iszlám gyökerű vallási intoleranciára a nyugati államok paradox módon nem vallási, hanem nacionalista intoleranciával felelnek*, érdemes szem előtt tartani, mennyire egy tőről fakad ez a két jelenség. Egyikük a Koránból, másikuk valamiféle nemzeti őstörténetből merít ideológiai igazolást – de hasonlítanak abban, hogy legfeljebb közvetett kapcsolatban állnak azok valódi tartalmával. Mindketten előnyben részesítik a kézzelfogható tények helyett a szubjektumokat, így hatástalanok ellenük a racionális érvek. És végezetül: mindkettejük végső érve a terrorizmus. Úgyhogy jó lesz figyelni.
* Még azok az államok is – most nem jut eszembe a nevük –, akik nincsenek közvetlen kapcsolatban a terrorizmussal.
February 6, 2020
This book is not just about the medieval origins of Europe. This book is about misguided uses of those origins by writers from the Romantic period onward who craved a definable essence for their respective nations in order to craft political programs geared toward autonomy, and about far less forgivable survivals of such politically motivated manipulations of history by modern demagogues whose number has frighteningly increased since this book was published in 2002.
Peoples are not a constant. Human history is predicated on change and the criteria for membership in human groups are constantly reevaluated and renegotiated as sociopolitical exigencies arise and recede. In Late Antique Europe, one's identity as "Roman" or "barbarian" had more to do with law than language, let alone genetics or actual common descent, and with local political realities and necessities. Names given to groups changed their meanings quickly, and all of this is just as true today.
This is a potent aid for correcting our understandings of history and ethnicity, and nearly twenty years on from its publication in a time less plagued by the rise of demagogues and fears of migration, it should read like a thunderbolt dispelling any legitimacy to nationalist readings and manipulations of history. It did for me, and I hope it does for you.
Peoples are not a constant. Human history is predicated on change and the criteria for membership in human groups are constantly reevaluated and renegotiated as sociopolitical exigencies arise and recede. In Late Antique Europe, one's identity as "Roman" or "barbarian" had more to do with law than language, let alone genetics or actual common descent, and with local political realities and necessities. Names given to groups changed their meanings quickly, and all of this is just as true today.
This is a potent aid for correcting our understandings of history and ethnicity, and nearly twenty years on from its publication in a time less plagued by the rise of demagogues and fears of migration, it should read like a thunderbolt dispelling any legitimacy to nationalist readings and manipulations of history. It did for me, and I hope it does for you.
May 23, 2020
“The history of European peoples in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages is not the story of a primordial moment but of a continuous process. It is the story of political appropriation and manipulation of inherited names and representations of pasts to create a present and a future.”
As Geary states in his “Suggestions for Further Reading,” this is a book intended for a general audience rather than an academic one. His argument about the fluidity of European ethnogenesis is compelling but feels groundless: the references to his source material are sparse and there is no complete bibliography anywhere (and really, there’s no excuse for that no matter who the audience). Throughout there is a feeling of “throwing the gauntlet”--this is clearly meant to be the first word on the subject, not the last.
In 2022 the book will see its 20 year anniversary--perhaps a revised 2nd edition is currently in the works?
3 stars.
As Geary states in his “Suggestions for Further Reading,” this is a book intended for a general audience rather than an academic one. His argument about the fluidity of European ethnogenesis is compelling but feels groundless: the references to his source material are sparse and there is no complete bibliography anywhere (and really, there’s no excuse for that no matter who the audience). Throughout there is a feeling of “throwing the gauntlet”--this is clearly meant to be the first word on the subject, not the last.
In 2022 the book will see its 20 year anniversary--perhaps a revised 2nd edition is currently in the works?
3 stars.
October 6, 2023
4 stelle su 5
Un saggio molto carino, semplice e di veloce lettura che esplora i concetti di "popolo", "nazione", "nazionalismo", "identità culturale" così come venivano concepiti tra la Tarda antichità e l'Alto Medioevo, con l'obiettivo particolare di smentire le tesi dei politici nazionalisti contemporanei che vedono nel loro "popolo puro" tracce di antiche origini, ignari del fatto che questo supposto parallelismo tra passato e presente è storicamente infondato.
Lettura divulgativa adatta anche ai non addetti ai lavori, anche se a volte si danno per scontati fatti storici la cui conoscenza è forse necessaria per comprendere pienamente il discorso di Geary.
Consigliato agli appassionati di storia medievale e, come nel mio caso, anche come testo a scelta per esami universitari su questo periodo storico.
Un saggio molto carino, semplice e di veloce lettura che esplora i concetti di "popolo", "nazione", "nazionalismo", "identità culturale" così come venivano concepiti tra la Tarda antichità e l'Alto Medioevo, con l'obiettivo particolare di smentire le tesi dei politici nazionalisti contemporanei che vedono nel loro "popolo puro" tracce di antiche origini, ignari del fatto che questo supposto parallelismo tra passato e presente è storicamente infondato.
Lettura divulgativa adatta anche ai non addetti ai lavori, anche se a volte si danno per scontati fatti storici la cui conoscenza è forse necessaria per comprendere pienamente il discorso di Geary.
Consigliato agli appassionati di storia medievale e, come nel mio caso, anche come testo a scelta per esami universitari su questo periodo storico.
February 25, 2025
Odlična knjiga priznanega zgodovinarja, ki postavi na glavo številne nacionalistične predpostavke o zgodovini evropskih narodov. Avtor lucidno razkrinka mit o narodih kot nespremenljivih entitetah, katerih korenine segajo nepretrgano od antike do danes. S tem pokaže, da so nacionalne identitete rezultat dolgotrajnih procesov, prepletenih z družbenimi, političnimi in kulturnimi spremembami, ne pa naravne konstante, ki bi obstajale skozi vse čase. Knjiga ponuja poglobljen in kritičen vpogled v zgodovinopisje zgodnjega srednjega veka ter osvetljuje, kako so se skozi stoletja oblikovale in reinterpretirale predstave o narodih. Gre za nujno branje za vse, ki želijo razumeti genezo nacionalnih identitet in se izogniti poenostavljenim interpretacijam preteklosti.
March 3, 2023
"When contemporary nationalists appeal to history, their notion of history is static: The look to the moment of primary acquisition, when "their people" first arriving...established their sacred territory and their national identity. This is the very antithesis of history." p. 156
"No efforts of romantics, politicians, or social scientists can preserve once and for all some essential soul of a people or nation. Nor can any effort ensure that nations, ethnic groups, and communities of today will not vanish utterly in the future. The past may have set the parameters within which one can build a future, but it cannot determine what that future must be." p. 174
"No efforts of romantics, politicians, or social scientists can preserve once and for all some essential soul of a people or nation. Nor can any effort ensure that nations, ethnic groups, and communities of today will not vanish utterly in the future. The past may have set the parameters within which one can build a future, but it cannot determine what that future must be." p. 174
March 1, 2021
fine overview of the medieval past, accessible for those of us who actively try not to know about Europe and worthwhile project of showing the malleability of nationhood. maybe a little too much certainty when he's telling us "what really happened" when his project is undermining far-right certainties of an imagined past, and I think there is more to be said about nationhood and cultural/political identities of oppressed peoples vs. those in power, but also the book is less than 200 pages. an interesting read, but best with a generous pinch of salt, as with all history.
June 7, 2018
Anderson, Gellner ve hatta Hobsbawm'dan sonra milliyetçilik(ler) üzerine okuduğum en doyurucu metinlerden biri Geary'nin çalışması. Yer yer fazlasıyla detaya boğulmakla birlikte, modern zamanları anlamak için muhakkak ama muhakkak Ortaçağ'a da bakmak gerektiğini öne sürüyor. Modern anlamda ulus formasyonunun oluşumunu ve bunun antik dönemler üzerinden meşrulaştırılmasını mit kavramı üzerinden ele alıyor "Uluslar Miti ve Avrupa'nın Kökenleri". Tarih üzerine kafa yormak için iyi bir egzersiz.
December 7, 2024
Good explanation of how modern nationalist myths are thrust upon ancient history, especially when it comes to the barbarian “invasions” of the Roman Empire in the 4th-6th centuries. highly reccomend for anyone who wants a good understanding of the origins of nationalism and how founding myths are used to unite/control others. VERY relevant today.
November 5, 2017
The introductory and concluding chapters are of greatest relevance. It should be noted, however, that much of Anderson's argument in the intervening chapters is conducted subtextually and is, therefore, weakened. A sound introduction to some key themes but not a complete capstone.
April 6, 2019
Unromantic, and rightly so.
May 3, 2019
3,5
Confuso se você não tem conhecimento prévio e massante em grande parte do livro, mas bastante informativo sobre a formação das nações étnicas (européias).
Confuso se você não tem conhecimento prévio e massante em grande parte do livro, mas bastante informativo sobre a formação das nações étnicas (européias).
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February 12, 2024Read for class
May 10, 2025
3.7/5
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