Game Theory with Applications to Economics

by James W. Friedman

This comprehensive new text is an excellent introduction to game theory, acessible to undergraduate and graduate students with a moderate background in mathematics. Using examples from both economics and politics, it covers cooperative and non-cooperative game theory illustrating the breadth
and depth of its influence on economics. The book begins with an introduction to the subject, followed by a chapter on two-person zero-sum games with (Nash) noncooperative equilibrium for n-person noncooperative games, touching on both uniqueness of equilibrium and on games of incomplete
information. Middle chapters treat the most recent material on noncooperative supergames and trigger strategy equilibria, cooperation supported by self-enforcing agreements, and refinements of the Nash noncooperative equilibrium such as perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Later
chapters cover two person cooperative games and solution concepts for cooperative games having transferable utility. The final chapter deals with the generalizations of the core and the Shapley value to nontransferable utility games. Realistic examples and problems from economic literature appear
in every chapter, illustrating the wide scope of the theory's applications in economics.

Genres: Economics

264 pages, Hardcover

First published March 6, 1986