Beating the Fascists?: The German Communists and Political Violence 1929–1933

by Eve Rosenhaft

In this book Eve Rosenhaft examines the involvement of Communists in political violence during the years of Hitler's rise to power in Germany (1929–33). Specifically, she aims to account for their participation in `street-fighting' or 'gang-fighting' with National Socialist storm-troopers. The origins of this conflict are examined at two levels. First Dr Rosenhaft analyses the official policy of the Communist Party towards fascism and Nazism, and the special anti-fascist and self-defence organizations which it developed. Among the aspects of Communist policy that are explored are the relation between the international confrontation between Communists and Social Democrats as claimants to lead the left, and the implications of this dispute in German politics; the ideological difficulties in the implementation of Communist policy in a period of economic dislocation; and the organizational problems posed by the fight against fascism. Dr Rosenhaft then explores the attitudes and experience of the Communist rank and file engaged in the struggle against fascism, concentrating on the city of Berlin, where a fierce contest for control of the streets was waged.

Genres: History, Germany

292 pages, Paperback

First published September 30, 1983

Reviews

[Nathaniel Flakin · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is a sociological study of Communist street violence in the last years of the Weimar Republic. In 1929-33, the Communist Party of Germany became a massive force — it was the largest party in Berlin, for example, with 37% of votes. Yet the KPD did not have the social force that this number would suggest. It wanted to be a party of industrial workers organized in factory cells. Yet after 1929, the economic crisis put over 6 million people out of work, and the KPD became a party of unemployed workers organized in their neighborhoods. As a result, confrontations with Nazis and police became much more common than industrial actions. We tend to think of barricade fighting as the most dangerous form of political action. But as one KPD official quoted in this book put it: "Unfortunately, even the average politically active worker ... prefers a one-percent risk of falling in battle ... to a ninety-nine percent certainty of being dismissed by his employer for striking illegally and then being put on the blacklist."

When we hear about this period, Communist and Nazi violence is often presented as more or less symmetrical. In reality, though, it made a huge difference that Nazis were financed by big capital and at least tolerated (if not openly supported) by police. The SA was made up of professional thugs, whereas Communist street fighters were mostly workers defending themselves as best they could. The KPD has a huge variety of self-defense organizations, which this book describes in great detail. In the face of systematic Nazi terrorism, many rank-and-file KPD members were pushing for red terro. I was surprised to learn that a Central Committee resolution against "individual terror," and in favor of "mass terror," provoked angry reactions in the base.

I got this book because it has a chapter about the shooting on Richardstraße in Neukölln in 1931. It was very interesting to see how at least three different, competing communist self-defense organizations carried out the action against a Nazi tavern.

Now I've read the whole book, and I learned a lot, but for me it has two big problems. The writing is hopelessly convoluted and dry – I guess that is what the academy considers "serious." More importantly, the central policies of the KPD under Stalin and his German agent Ernst Thälmann are not investigated. The Stalinists proclaimed that social democrats were "social fascists," which made any kind of united front possible, except for the chimeric "united front from below." The author traces in great detail how these policies were adjusted over time, but never questions them. The central question, when looking at this period, is whether a united front policy could have beaten the Nazis. Unfortunately, this goes unexplored, and we are left with a mess of boring statistics.

[Lewis Weinstein · Rating 1 out of 5]

There might be some useful nuggets in this book, but it is much too hard to find them.