Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present

by Michael B. Oren, Norman Dietz (Narrator)

This is the first comprehensive history of America's involvement in the Middle East from George Washington to George W. Bush. From the first cannonballs fired by American warships at North African pirates to the conquest of Falluja by the Marines, and from the early American explorers who probed the sources of the Nile to the diplomats who strove for Arab-Israeli peace, the United States has been dramatically involved in the Middle East. For well over two centuries, American statesmen, merchants, and missionaries, both men and women, have had a profound impact on the shaping of this crucial region. Yet their story has never been told-until now. Drawing on thousands of government documents and personal letters, this book reconstructs the diverse and remarkable ways in which Americans have interacted with this alluring yet often hostile land stretching from Morocco to Iran and from the Persian Gulf to the Bosporus. Covering over 230 years of history, Power, Faith, and Fantasy is an indispensable work for anyone interested in understanding the roots of America's Middle East involvement today. "This is a wonderfully rich and thought-provoking history." -Library Journal Starred Review

Genres: History, Middle East, Nonfiction, Politics, American History, Israel, Religion

Audio CD

First published January 1, 2007

About the author

Michael Bornstein Oren is an American-Israeli diplomat, essayist, historian, novelist, and politician. He is a former Israeli ambassador to the United States (2009–2013), former member of the Knesset for the Kulanu party and a former Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Office.
Oren has written books, articles, and essays on Middle Eastern history and foreign affairs, and is the author of the New York Times best-selling Ally: My Journey Across the American-Israeli Divide, Power, Faith and Fantasy, and Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, which won the Los Angeles Times History Book of the Year Award and the National Jewish Book Award. Oren has taught at Harvard, Yale, and Georgetown universities in the United States and at Ben-Gurion and Hebrew universities in Israel. He was a Distinguished Fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and a contributing editor to The New Republic. The Forward named Oren one of the five most influential American Jews, and The Jerusalem Post listed him as one of the world's ten most influential Jews.
Oren retired as ambassador to the United States in 2013, and was replaced by Ron Dermer. In the 2015 Israeli election, Oren was elected to the Knesset for the Kulanu party.

Reviews

[K · Rating 5 out of 5]

Once again I find myself giving Michael Oren five stars and warning people away from his book. Five stars for a thoroughly researched and highly informative read, to be sure. But expect a pretty long slog.

This ambitious tome describes the interactions between the United States and the Middle East from the point of the United States' inception, starting with the Barbary Wars. Oren uses the themes of power (the U.S. wanted control, initially in terms of wanting to pass through the region safe from pirates but gradually in other areas as well), faith (the desire on the part of the U.S. to missionize in the Middle East and to restore the Jews to their homeland in Palestine for religious reasons), and fantasy (the often unrealistic image Americans have had of the Middle East as depicted in the Arabian Nights) to categorize the various interactions between the U.S. and the Middle East. He notes that, although much has changed, all three themes remain relevant to U.S.-Middle East relations.

One of the problems with reading a long and detailed book like this is that it's hard to know how much of the information you've retained, and will retain over time. In the meantime, though, I feel accomplished for having finished it and have a temporary illusion of being a well-informed person on this topic. That's worth something, I suppose. I also think that Obama and other government officials who want insight into the craziness that is the Middle East and some of America's missteps in the region would benefit from reading this book carefully.

[Terry Cornell · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read Oren's book 'Six Days of War' about the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, back in the days before Goodreads. Loved the book, and it explains much about the modern day Middle East. Granted Oren is a American born Israeli, but he I believe he presented the facts in an objective fashion.

This book is a presentation of America's involvement in the Middle East through the three areas mentioned in the title. First, political/diplomacy efforts. Second, through Christian mission, and Jewish resettlement. Third, through Americans fictional presentation of that part of the world through literature and film. It does start with 1776, and by present it means through the Presidency of George W. Bush and the our involvements post-9/11. Oren does a masterful job of research and interweaving these three approaches through this history of the Middle East. A great book for anyone interested in the basics of the Middle East and American involvement there.

[Khader · Rating 1 out of 5]

A very superficial, one-sided and biased "analysis" of the United States involvement in the middle-east. The motivation of the middle-eastern people's resistance to the U.S.'s attempts to exploit the region are never explored. Instead, the native people of the middle east are presented as savages that are intent on conflicting with the United-States for no particular reason, with the United-States motives being portrayed as an altruistic superpower intent on enlightening the world, which is extremely naive.

For a better understanding of the middle-east, I would recommend the less widely available "Sowing the Wind", by John Keay.

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 5 out of 5]

Michael B. Oren's Power, Faith and Fantasy recounts America's long, fraught relationship with the Muslim world, from independence to the Iraq War. Oren (a former Israeli Ambassador to the US) argues that the American-Middle Eastern nexus is nothing new, and has far deeper roots in our history than is often acknowledged. Some of the arguments he makes feel like a stretch, but it's true enough that there's a lot more to untangle here than the familiar of oil and terrorism. American sailors fought the Barbary Pirates in the North Africa, while writers like Herman Melville and Mark Twain explored the Holy Land; American soldiers-of-fortune plied their trade in Egypt and Turkey while missionaries spread the gospel to Palestine and Lebanon. All the while, Oren argues, Americans entertained varying shades of fantasy about the Middle East, as a beautiful but barbaric land overflowing with violence and terrorism, needing to be rescued by their virtuous, muscular Christian Democracy. The book's pace inevitably quickens as the 20th Century nears, with Oren discussing American influences on the Zionist movement, Theodore Roosevelt's saber-rattling in Morocco and Woodrow Wilson's ill-fated peacemaking (America was offered a "mandate" of Turkish lands in Anatolia and Armenia at Versailles) and how America's growing economic and military domination, along with its dependence on oil, caused it to become the region's predominant power. Oren sketches this portrait not only through personalities and political events but by looking at media depictions of the "Orient"; from Melville and Twain's writings to films like The Sheik and Lawrence of Arabia and even popular music, all of which perpetrated stereotypes and projected fantasies rather than affording real understanding. The book becomes less balanced as it nears the present day, with Oren (perhaps not surprisingly) finding much to sympathize with in America's embrace of Israel and little enough to admire in modern Arab states. But he's on point showing how fraught, disputatious and generally harmful the relationship has been to both the United States and its Arab counterparts...and how the combination of Power, Faith and Fantasy outlined in the title has prevented true understanding and cooperation. An excellent work.

[Shirin Abdel Rahman · Rating 2 out of 5]

كاتب امريكى مرموق إلا ان صهيونته قضت على حياديته، فمن اول فصل و هو يتمعن في التركيز على نقائض العرب و بربريتهم و يجعل منها صفات اصيلة في شخصيتهم نتيجة لدينهم المتعصب.
فعرب شمال إفريقيا همج و بربر و يتاخذون من البيض عبيد و قراصنة، العثمانيون همج ماديون و يضطهدون الأقليات مع التركيز على ما يدعى مذابح الأرمن دون الأخذ في الاعتبار خيانة الأقليات للاتراك في الحرب العالمية الاولى، فهو يدافع عن الأرمن طول الخط.
تخرج من الكتاب بعدة نقاط :
1- عكس الإنجليز و الفرنسيس الأمريكان يؤمنون بالتبشير بدينهم أما عن طريق إنشاء مدارس او علاقات تجارية.
2- التبشير لن ينجح في بلاد العرب فحتى مسيحى الشرق بقوا على مارونيتهم او ارذوزكيتهم.
3- غالبية مبعوثى الشرق الأوسط يهود لأن الأمريكان مقتنعون بحياديتهم بما أنهم ليسوا مسيحيون او مسلمون.
4- النفط النفط هو أساس العلاقات العربية الأمريكية.
5- الصهيونية و المال اليهودى محرك اساسى و عامل ضغط يظهر واضحا في اى قرار ضد اسرائيل.
6- عرب امريكا كغثاء السيل لا قيمة اقتصادية او حتى اجتماعية.
7- العرب خانوا الدولة العثمانية و لورانس العرب قائد التقسيم و توزيع البلاد.
8- لا يغير الله قوم حتى يغيروا ما بانفسهم.
9- العرب أهل شقاق و نفاق و بلاد صراعات.
10- الاقتصادية معيار للقوة.
و اخيرا كتاب حرب الأيام الست يوم كيبور يعتبر جزء ثان للكتاب

[Saadiq Wolford · Rating 3 out of 5]

Michael Oren must be a horrible lay. I say this because only a horrible lay could take a subject as rife with passion and controversy as America's involvement in the Middle East and make it a mind-numbingly dull read.

Furthermore, while the book's subtitle is "America in the Middle East from 1776 to the Present", Oren only spends the last 20% of the book discussing the last 70 years of history (the period in which I was most interested), stating outright that he did so because there are many other books that cover the subject in detail. A bit more truth in advertising would have helped me adjust my expectations accordingly.

Despite this disappointment and the fact that I gave up on the book twice before finishing it, Oren does cover a lot of new historical ground here, and it substantially increased the context in which I form my own thoughts about the Middle East and America's actions there.

[Eliseus · Rating 1 out of 5]

ثقيل على اليد؛ وعلى القلب!


اختبار حقيقي للصبر، يكابد القارئ مشقة السير على خطى الأمريكي، الحالم ثم المؤمن ثم القوي، ويستلهم عِبَر الطريق التي جعلت منه وسيطا ومحررا وصانع سلام!


كتب بفوقية وصفاقة، وظَّف لسرد تاريخ يحتفي بالوجود الأمريكي في المنطقة، توليفة مريعة من تقاليد الاستشراق والدعاية الإمبريالية والأفكار الصهيونية.

[عمر الحمادي · Rating 4 out of 5]

كتاب تاريخي دسم ومشوق جداً في تاريخ علاقة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بمنطقة الشرق الأوسط خلال القرون الثلاثة الماضية.

من الطرافة التاريخية أن ملك المغرب في عام ١٧٨٦ أجبر الكونجرس الأمريكي على أن يطلب من "جيفرسون" أن يتفاوض معه تجنباً للحرب والغارات البحرية على السفن الأمريكية في البحر المتوسط، ليكون أول ملك في العالم يعترف باستقلال الولايات المتحدة وأول زعيم مسلم يوقع معاهدة رسمية مع الجمهوية الناشئة، واضطر الأمريكان إلى دفع إتاوة إلى تونس والجزائر من أجل تأمين سفنهم.

استمد الأمريكان تصورهم عن سحر الشرق من الإنجيل وكتاب ألف ليلة وليلة، وصدر عندهم نحو ثلاثين كتاب عن مصر في الربع الأول من القرن ال١٩، وسميت أربع مدن أمريكية باسم القاهرة وثلاثة مدن بغداد والمدينة، وسميت مدينتان مكة وواحدة حلب والجزائر، لكن صُدم الرحالة الأمريكان مثل "ليديارد" بما رأوه على أرض الواقع من تخلف ورجعية مثلتها المناطق العربية الخاضعة للحكم العثماني.

سادت في أوساط الكنائس الإنجليكانية في أمريكا منذ القرن التاسع عشر فكرة إعادة اليهود إلى فلسطين من أجل التعجيل بعودة المسيح، تناقض الموقف الأمريكي من الاستعمار الأوروبي للعالم والذي كان يتناقض مع أساس قيام الولايات المتحدة التي تحررت من سطوة وعبودية أوروبا، ولم يكن كثيرٌ من الأمريكيين يؤيدون مشاركة بلادهم في ذلك السباق الاستعماري، فندد الفيلسوف "وليام جيمس" بالداروينية الاجتماعية التي تبرر غزو الشعوب والدول الأجنبية، وكان بعض القساوسة يؤيدون قيادة أمريكا لحملة انتزاع الأراضي المقدسة من سيطرة المسلمين.

[Rahadyan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Since my conversion to Islam more than a decade ago, I am wont to approach any book of this subject matter and scope with skepticism. While the author Michael B. Oren certainly has the credentials for this, he is also Israel's current ambassador to the United States.

The section of the book that deals with the nascent United States of the 18th century up to the influences of the then-major world powers in the first half of the 20th century seem unassailably objective. I honestly expected Mr. Oren to try to justify some of the events connected to the creation of the state of Israel, but he simply reports them. I was prepared to react with outrage to how the era from World War II to the dawning years of the 21st century was portrayed, but I found it balanced.

Given the ongoing strife in the region, its history is still being written.

I highly recommend this book for its readability and its scholarship. I plan to read Mr. Oren's The Six Day War and any future works of his.

[jordan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Few fields have been as well plowed as that of Middle East studies. Indeed, the ever expanding shelf in the bookstore on the topic groans under the weight of a torrent of new works, many which might be charitably described as derivative of already existing work. What a thrill then when a new book appears covering otherwise undisturbed ground!

Michael Oren's excellent "Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present" is such a book. Instead of covering familiar subjects, Mr. Oren offers an insightful study of an area few consider, America's relationship to the Middle East in the 19th Century. Many will surely wonder at how any author can squeeze more than 600 pages - not including footnotes and bibliography -- over a topic that you might suspect could be covered in scant pages. Such is the wonderful surprise that Oren offers. In gripping prose that will be familiar with those who have already read his definitive history of the Six Day War, Oren traces America's involvement in the Middle East and North Africa all the way back to the Revolutionary War period.

Philosophically and temperamentally committed to avoiding "old world entanglements" Thomas Jefferson, first as Washington's Secretary of State and then as President, confronts the question of what to do about American shipping seized by the petty north African Berber and Arab kingdoms. The Middle East a lucrative market, European states pay tribute to these states in exchange for "protection" a notion offensive to many early American statesman. Thus, having first resisted the creation of a standing navy, Jefferson reverses course in order to protect American shipping interests. Thus begins US involvement in the region.

The study of this period provides much data of interest. To take one example, Oren cites an early treaty with a north African Muslim state, signed when many of the Framers still lived, stating categorically that the United States was "not a Christian nation." Likewise interesting, the American legation in Tangiers stands as the countries oldest.

Oren follows the story through the 19th Century and the US involvement with the Ottoman Empire. Through it all, he likewise discusses the concept of "Restorationism," that a Jewish State should be created in the area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, an idea with deep roots in American Protestantism. Indeed, readers who think themselves knowledgeable about diplomatic history, Zionism, and the Middle East, will likely find great surprise in learning about American missionary stations built for the very purpose of teaching Jews agricultural skills, well before Theodore Herzl's efforts. Marshalling considerable evidence, Oren argues that the US commitment to the notion of a Jewish state indeed far proceeds Israel's birth in 1948. Time and again one hears that America's relationship with Israel arises out of some nefarious political cabal warping national interest, in contrast Oren shows how such the heart of the relationship lies deep in America culture and character. Further to his credit, Oren flies through the modern period, ground well covered in other books.

Many of the issues covered will have a familiar ring to 21st century ears, such as presidents torn between cleaving to stabilizing power or siding with American ideals. Indeed, one often finds themselves wishing that Oren wrote prior to the invasion of Iraq, thus giving decision makers some much needed perspective. Nonetheless, readers will find themselves thrilled at all they can learn in this important work.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am giving this 3 stars solely based on the amount of information included. Here is why it doesn't get a better rating.

The book starts with the very interesting Barbary Wars when the United States was brand new. It discusses the impacts that the pirates from Northern Africa had on the formation of our Navy and foreign policy.

After that there is 200 pages of discussion on missionaries and the schools and hospitals they built. This is also somewhat interesting, but I don't think so many of the different missionaries needed to be covered and quoted. There was some discussion of how the natives felt about the missionaries, but I would have preferred more of that than the elicit descriptions of the actual people and their quotes.

This problem persists throughout the book. When we arrive at WWI there is a discussion on the discovery of oil and the Americans involved. Only one paragraph discusses the small communities that these oil companies created and almost nothing about the Saudi populations reaction. Maybe that information doesn't exist, but I am pretty sure it does because I have read about it in other books.

The author then covers the last 30 years in about 100 pages, which he explains that there is so much information already available. He should have stopped there. At times he clearly states where Israel and America have gone against previously stated policies or actions, but then at the end of each chapter he actual makes it seem as though the policy is successful. His section on Reagan is the most blatant, Reagan stumbled through the Middle East during his presidency, but at the end he gives Reagan credit.

I just think there should have been more direct discussion of the impact of the oil companies and more criticism of Israel for some of their responses and our failure to pressure them.

I am not saying that Michael Oren doesn't try to be unbiased, but I felt in many cases, regardless of the politics more details are needed. For a 600 page book I shouldn't need to refer to other books.

But the thing that bothered me the most was his defense of Israel's assertation after occupying the West Bank and Gaza as just following the Post WWII guidelines. The part that is missed is that so much of the problems we face today is because of the restorationist movements existence at all. For a book that covers this much history, to act like the first 150 years was just meant to be misses the point of his own book.

Also, Michael Oren is currently the Israeli ambassador to the US. Take that how you want.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well-written and well-researched.

However, the book's main weakness is that it doesn't cover the era of the 20th century to today very well. Oren excuses himself by saying that plenty of works already exist on the subject, and only writes as much as is needed. Arguably, this is the section most readers will be interested in the most, and it, while decent, fails to deliver. And besides, the stories of American romantics and adventurers got repetitive and boring after a while, and you start to ask "who cares?" and "of what possible significance are they?"

As the book plunges into the 20th century it becomes less adequate. Oren explains that he does not feel obligated to give more than a brief survey of events in the Cold War and after simply because plenty of works are already availble on the subject. Maybe I'm being unfair, but this just seems like academic laziness to me. But even before the post-1948 survey, the desire to chronicle what happened seems to overwhelm any incisive interpretation. The significance of oil in shaping relations and policy is definitely described, but it seems like it deserves a more prominent place. Also, Oren makes this grand claim in the final pages of the book: "On balance, Americans historically brought far more beneficence than avarice to the Middle East and caused significantly less harm than good." Does the history of US relations with Middle Eastern states really support that analysis? How would one factor in US bolstering of dictatorial regimes in places like Saudi Arabia? Or the overturning of a nationalist Iranian government by the CIA? Oren's own history shows how little Americans actually understood about the region and its people, even as they attempted to shape its future. It seems unlikely that a basically imperial perspective could also coincidentally be the basis for a good policy that put the people of the Middle East first. Oren seems to be falling into the trap that he describes in his book. His final judgment oddly seems to reinforce the myths about the American role in the region as a champion of enlightenment. It understates how much US policy was driven fundamentally by what all states are driven by: strategic interests and demand for economic resources.

In chapter 5 Oren discusses the Greek revolution of 1821. Oren states that the Greeks were fighting for democracy and the US was in a dilemma between supporting a fledging democracy and its financial interest that depended on good relations with the Ottoman Empire. The truth is that the US had very little influence in the region at the time. Instead England, France, and Russia were fighting for influence in the new country (England won eventually). Also the Greek revolution was not for democracy but it had religious and ethnic motives. It was a revolt of (mostly Greek speaking) Orthodox Christians against a Muslim government. Early on the Greeks slaughtered all Muslims and Jews in Peloponese. Apparently, the slaughter was so extensive that our schoolbooks could not ignore it but described it as a "justified" over-reaction to long centuries of Ottoman suppression. In addition, the first governments of Greece were quite autocratic and even constitutional monarchy did not become stable until after 1860. So you may say, does it matter that Oren botched one event. Yes, it does.

There are a couple of significant weaknesses though, not the least of which is a problem with historical accuracy. In covering the early history between the U.S. and the Barbary States, Mr. Oren is correct to categorize Jefferson's conflict as a "de facto" war, but when looking at the 2nd War he specifically states that "Nearly three months passed before he [President Madison] went to Congress and asked for - and promptly received - a formal declaration of war." The problem is, that there was no formal declaration of war, but rather an authorization to use force. This is a rather key difference, and one which makes the reader question just how precise the author is actually being.

Another example, albeit less important, is when Mr. Oren discusses the national anthem and declares "Only after the Battle of Fort McHenry in the War of 1812 were the lyrics revised by their author Francis Scott Key." In fact, the "Star Spangled Banner" and "When the Warrior Returns" are two different poems, or sets of lyrics, which Francis Scott Key wrote to the tune of "The Anacreon Song" (a.k.a. "To Anacreon in Heaven"), an old English drinking tune. Mr. Oren also indicates that the song was written in honor of Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge, but other sources indicate that it was in honor of Charles Stewart and not William Bainbridge.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Power, Faith and Fantasy is a wonderful look at how the United States and the Middle East (includes North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Turkey and Iraq/Iran) as their relations progressed from 1776 to the most recent invasion of Iraq and Iran. Oren works through varying degrees of complexity to unravel the relations and power struggles between the United States and the Middle East as they evolved through motives of faith to the fantasy that drew travelers into the region. The book begins with the Barbary pirates and the United States attempt to take a moral stand against them and ends with the same analogy against Islamic terrorism. Overall the circular picture the book presents is well served. What is probably most interesting for those who know a little about this time is the extent to which American missionaries were involved in faith efforts throughout the Middle East. The book works in great detail up until World War II and then the speed version of that time period is given. It covers enough of the major highlights but it should be said it does not have the depth the rest of the book has. Overall Oren delivers another well researched and written book that stays on topic and provides new insights into an expanding area of scholarship.

[xhxhx · Rating 3 out of 5]

A rather old-fashioned book. A series of picaresque narratives of Americans doing American things in strange foreign lands. The natives don't get a serious treatment. Not worth reading on anything after 1948 -- the last hundred 0r so pages of the book -- but amusing and readable on everything before that.

[Wafaa Wasfi · Rating 1 out of 5]

من أسوأ الكتب علي الاطلاق لانه لم يكتب بحيادية بل تظهر فيه مدي الكره وعدم الموضوعية لبلدان الشرق الأوسط عامة ومصر خاصة.
لا مانع لدي ولا غضاضة في أن اقرا علي سلبيات وطني ولكن عندما ينتقد سياسي إسرائيلي بارز معاملة المصريين للمرأة ويصفها بالعبودية وفي نفس الوقت يصور أمريكا بأنها بلد الحريات وذلك في الوقت التي كان ينص دستورها علي معاملة العبد كالماشية فهذا دليل واضح علي توجه صريح لديه

[Elaine Skinner · Rating 4 out of 5]

I enjoy watching shows like The Unit, Seal Team, NCIS, FBI, Jack Ryan, etc… The Middle East is mentioned often and I found myself recognizing names, countries, and events with no real context. I decided I needed to learn about the Middle East and America. I watched a few documentaries while this book sat on my shelf for a few weeks. I’ll admit I was intimidated but come to find out the book is VERY accessible.

It took me a month and a half to read. There is sooooo much information, at times there seemed to be quiet a bit irrelevant information, but I do not have the necessary knowledge to say exactly how much was filler! A lot of my questions were answered. Was it always about oil? Exactly when did the US come to the Middle East? How long has terrorism been an issue? Why is America hated and reviled across the Gulf? Why did Americ supply arms and support to nations that we then went to war with? What role did the Soviet Union/Russia play in these events?

I learned things I’d never heard before. The American Civil War led to massive changes in the Middle East which sounded odd to me at first. I had no idea that so many Universities in the Middle East had been funded and ran by Americans and that we supposedly taught them the idea of nationalism which led to many issues later on.

My biggest concern is the authors unrelenting view that American had altruistic motives up until WWll and even then the US was basically trying to be the good guys. I’m going to do some more research, read a few more books, and see if that opinion holds weight. But as it stands I thought this book was very well written and informative. The author listed so many citations I can’t help but believe the book to be very factual.

[Brian Griffith · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book starts out slow and gradually gains velocity. Its heavy focus on the first century and a half of US history allows for story telling about many individual soldiers, missionaries, or adventurers who went to the Middle East. Then the entanglements grow more complicated, and the momentum of events builds. By the 1980s, the writing is a fairly breathless rush of momentous events. It's good to have it all flash before your eyes like this, but it's little more than a stream of headlines. Through the whole big story, Oren highlights what has been noble in America's efforts, while always including critical views. He does an excellent job of capturing America's part in the rise of Israel, and the difficult choices Americans made in response to a rising tragedy, as Jewish refugees fled from the bonfire of anti-Semitic Europe into the frying pan of an anti-colonial Middle East. As for recent conflicts, Oren seems cautious in judging his contemporaries. He seems to feel that presenting the big picture of the past will provide balance, and the present will be judged by future works of history. I would have liked to see more on America's relations with Saudi Arabia, and a greater discussion of the issues in political or military control of religious movements.

[Robert Morris · Rating 2 out of 5]

Well that went off the rails quickly. I very much enjoyed the majority of this book. The last 100 pages or so were a complete waste of time.

I realized after I had bought the book that the author, Michael Oren, was the Israeli Ambassador to the US between 2009 and 2013. Going to an actual political actor for historical perspective is generally not such a great idea. Best to stick to their memoirs, a set of which I believe Oren has recently published. But for the majority of the book, I think Oren manages to see beyond the perspective of his country. His objectivity was occasionally quite impressive. For example, his telling of the events of 1948 doesn't look at Israel's founders through rose tinted glasses, he mentions the terrorism, and he suggests that they were responsible for much of the escalation of the crisis.

Oren is right that the subject, US relations with the Middle East, deserves a broader survey. For most of the book he ably serves up fascinating characters, delightful anecdotes and interesting theories. I was impressed by the extent of US influence on the formation of the Egyptian military in the 19th century. He doesn't adequately support some of his most interesting suggestions, such as the link between Arab nationalism and US missionary universities, and the threat of Barbary Piracy and the success of the campaign for the US Constitution, but they are interesting things to think about. All in all I enjoyed the book, all the way from the Revolution to the end of World War II.

Beyond that point, pretty much from Israel's founding, the book is basically useless. It's an extended apologia/ endorsement of Israeli policy, and the aspects of US policy that Israel likes. There are some interpretations here that were completely new to me. Apparently Carter and Clinton weren't all that useful for the big steps forward in the peace process during their administrations, the Israelis already had it handled. All those billions of dollars we've transferred to the Egyptians over the years to keep Camp David alive are apparently an afterthought. It's all a bit ridiculous. I haven't read an account of the George W. Bush's Iraq war this uncritical and glowing since 2005. This book dates from 2007.

In Oren's defense, before he embarks on the post-1948 survey, he does mention that it's less useful than the rest of the book. His explanation is that the archives aren't open yet, but I think it's also an inability, conscious or unconscious, to see beyond the attitudes and goals he spent his career shaping and pushing. I would have given this book a four or five star review if it had ended with World War II.

There was one other thing I wanted to mention. This book shares an emphasis with Simon Sebag Montefiore's Jerusalem book, which I also mostly enjoyed. A lot of time is spent covering how undeveloped Palestine was before the Jewish settlers got there. Much of the book is made up of the accounts of US travelers to the Holy Land and other areas in the Middle East. These are sometimes presented in their own words, sometimes by the author. With what feels like every single figure, Oren makes sure to emphasize how crappy they found everything. It's carefully couched in tut-tuting about those nasty 19th century racists, but I find Oren's protests half-hearted. He's chosen to present these aspects of these accounts, over and over again, and in preference to other aspects. This is a classy way of doing it, but it's also kind of a sneaky way of advancing a troubling claim I often see in pro-Israel literature: "Before Israel, there wasn't really anything there..."

If I recall correctly, Montefiore actually claims in his book that the only reason there are as many Palestinians as there are is because of late 19th and early 20th century development in the area brought about by Jewish settlers. This may very well be true. And I also buy that Israel has been a better steward of its lands than the Ottomans and the British were before them. But I don't like the implications of advancing this claim.

Palestine was a mess before Jewish settlement, not because of Jewish virtue but because it was in a pre-modern state. Centuries of neglect alternating with oppression from the Turks were not going to yield Switzerland. If you're going to argue, or just subtly imply, as these historians have, that "our guys" have a better right to the land because their technology was more sophisticated, and they had Imperial might working for them rather than against them, then you've got to follow the thought through. Isn't this just a 21st century burden of the "white man's burden"? Isn't this a sneaky endorsement of 19th century imperialism at it's worst? If Palestine should be subjugated for failing to win the game of development, shouldn't all of Africa as well?

It's thinking like that that brought us to the two largest catastrophes described in this book, World Wars I and II. I can forgive Oren for the professionally mandated waste of time that the last part of this book is. I'm not so sure I can forgive him for seeming to endorse that old timey "white man's burden" kind of thinking.

[Mays Habeeb · Rating 3 out of 5]

قرات منه 158 صفحة وهو ملخص بسيط مترجم الى اللغة العربية عن مؤسسة كلمة .. صار عندي فضول ان اقرا الكتاب بالكامل باللغة الانكليزية بالمستقبل .. امريكا في بدايتها كانت في الشرق الاوسط ليس بقوتها العسكرية وانما ب المبشرين البروتستانت و ب مبعوثيها الدبلوماسيين . الكتاب يوضح ان المشجع والداعم الرئيسي لإعادة اليهود الى أرضهم الموعودة هي الولايات المتحدة الامريكية ..

[Charissa · Rating 5 out of 5]

Everything we all need to know about our relationship with the Middle East (if you happen to be American). Crucial reading in these times.

[Mohammed omran · Rating 1 out of 5]

As Arab we don’t like American the killers in Iraq Syria.

[Gary Hall · Rating 5 out of 5]

I started reading this back in April, whilst reading a couple other books. Because of the current Gaza War and the diversity of opinion about it, I started this in the middle, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and then went back and read the first half. Although there is probably no book out there that satisfactorily answers all our questions about the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, this book as as good as any, particularly if you are American and want to know how we ended up hitching our wagon to Israel. The answer is not as straightforward as one might think. Does it have a bias? That's tough, because I was looking for bias, as the author is an Israeli historian and politician. But he actually does a pretty good job of telling it like it is (or WAS). It's quite a slog, but worth the effort.

[Sharanya Sarathy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Surprisingly engaging for such a long history book. Also uncannily timely given the current escalation in the Israel-Palestine conflict. One critique I had is the amount of detail the author goes into from 1700-1930, which is fine -- but he then speeds through 1930-2007 which is where I would have appreciated some more detail to understand the current situations there. However, it was extremely educating and a great leaping off point! Highly recommend if you enjoy/are interested in reading history.

[Greg Holman · Rating 4 out of 5]

I actually learned several things I didn't know that went on behind the scenes in the Middle East. It's fascinating how integral Israel is in the region, and also how the U.S. actually became allies with it. I will always love 43 as my president, but I wish he had fired Rumsfeld!

[Ajay · Rating 3 out of 5]

Power, Faith, and Fantasy argues that America's entanglement with the Middle East did not begin with oil. It begins in 1776. American sailors were fighting Barbary pirates in North Africa within a decade of independence. American missionaries were building universities in Beirut and Cairo before the Civil War. Civil War veterans were training Egyptian armies in the 1870s. American doctors were treating Saudi kings in the 1920s. To understand this highly consequential relationship, we need to go back to the beginning.

Michael B. Oren, a historian and former Israeli ambassador to the United States, organizes his history of American failure in the Middle East as the result of a pattern of military overreach, evangelical naivety, and romantic fantasy. But by framing American engagement as a long pattern of failure and delusion, Oren misses a more interesting story of mutual influence, unrealized potential, and unintended consequences.

When this book was published, Mearsheimer and Walt had recently released their influential paper on the Israel Lobby, which argued that America's deep entanglement in the Middle East, and its unconditional support for Israel, was a modern anomaly produced by organized domestic political pressure, often working against American strategic interests. Oren's book is, among other things, a rebuttal. By tracing American involvement back to 1776, he is making the implicit case that this entanglement is not a 20th-century distortion but something older than the Constitution itself. On the historical facts, he's largely right. Whether that history explains Washington's current posture toward Israel is a different question entirely, and one he doesn't ask.

The book's opening section, covering the Barbary Wars, is its strongest. These are America's first international conflicts after independence, rarely examined in history class, and Oren reconstructs them with genuine energy. The new republic, stripped of British naval protection the moment it declared independence, suddenly found its merchant ships vulnerable to corsair raids from Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco. Between 1785 and 1793 alone, Algiers seized thirteen American vessels and held over a hundred sailors for ransom.

What Oren captures well is how this crisis forced a constitutional reckoning. Jeffersonian Republicans, suspicious of standing armies and navies as instruments of tyranny, initially argued that if Mediterranean trade required a navy, perhaps America should simply withdraw. But the Mediterranean trade accounted for nearly 15% of all United States exports. Losing access to it threatened not just wealthy merchants but the livelihoods of workers and farmers far removed from the sea. The Federalists countered that a nation without a navy was a nation without sovereignty.

To convince an isolationist, agrarian republic to fund an expensive navy, Federalist printers and pamphleteers published lurid accounts of American sailors enslaved in Algiers and Tripoli. Captivity narratives were ghostwritten by Federalist printers working from soldiers' letters, emphasizing the horror of being chained, beaten, stripped of their liberty, and forced into hard labor. The sensationalist press campaign shifted public opinion, the Naval Act of 1794 passed, and the first frigates of the U.S. Navy were built.

What the mercantile, federalist elites did not anticipate was the weapon they had handed to the abolitionist movement. Early abolitionists immediately seized on the hypocrisy the captivity narratives exposed. Leaders like Benjamin Franklin would ask: how could a nation express such righteous fury over a few hundred sailors enslaved abroad while holding hundreds of thousands of human beings in brutal, hereditary chattel slavery at home? By elevating liberty to mobilize opinion against Muslim corsairs, American elites inadvertently energized the abolitionist movement which would succeed in abolishing the slave trade in the early 1800s.

There are two places where Oren overreaches. The first is his attempt to draw a straight line from Barbary corsairs to modern Islamic terrorism, a connection that is historically thin and shaped by the post-9/11 moment in which the book was written. The second is a more persistent issue; throughout the book Arab and North African peoples are characterized as barbarians and slavers, defined by discord and hypocrisy. Whether this reproduces the bias of Oren's sources or reflects his own, the effect is the same.

The history here is considerably more complex than Oren's narrative. The "Barbary pirates" were not a monolithic Muslim force: in the 1600s, hundreds of English and Dutch captains brought advanced European sailing technology to North Africa and led corsair fleets. Many "turned Turk," but they were European by birth and training. The most vivid example is Jan Janszoon, a Dutch privateer who took the name Murat Reis and was elected Grand Admiral (President) of the independent pirate republic of Salé in Morocco. His fleet of pirates would raid for slaves as far away as Ireland and Iceland. The Barbary States maintained formal registries of captives, issued safe-passage documents to nations that paid tribute, and negotiated ransoms through established diplomatic channels. This was a multi-ethnic, bureaucratic protection racket.

Still, the book fails to explain how a young United States could take on the established navies of North Africa. What's missing here is the backstory of American colonies which had once been the maritime heart of the British Empire's shipbuilding sector, blessed with old-growth timber that few nations could match. By the Revolution, one-third of all ships in the British merchant fleet were American-built. When the U.S. broke away, it retained this industrial capacity and skilled workforce. The result was a class of heavy frigates built from ultra-dense oak, fitted with long 24-pound guns, and capable of overpowering any corsair in open ocean combat. However, despite that strength, this was not a war fought in the deep Atlantic. The Barbary corsairs operated in the shallow, reef-choked coastal waters of North Africa. The American super-frigates had deep drafts and could not safely chase the agile, shallow-draft Barbary xebecs into the reefs without running aground. The USS Philadelphia did exactly that while blockading Tripoli, and its 307-man crew was enslaved.

With no bases or supply chains in the region, the US navy survived logistically through an alliance with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The march on Derna tells a similar story. William Eaton's plan was reckless by any measure. He would build a private army in Egypt, march it across the North African desert, overthrow the ruling Pasha, and install the Pasha's exiled older brother, Hamet Karamanli, as a US-friendly replacement. He only had eight American marines. The other five hundred soldiers that followed him were mercenaries motivated by the prospect of gold and plunder. Oren views this campaign as America's first experiment with regime change abroad. Running out of food and water in the desert, mutiny was barely avoided. The starving army that arrived outside Derna in April 1805 took the city in a battle that would be immortalized in the Marine Corps Hymn "to the shores of Tripoli." Yet, the Americans never reached Tripoli. American diplomats in Tripoli negotiated a separate peace treaty with the Pasha that paid a ransom for the Philadelphia's crew and abandoned Hamet Karamanli entirely. The war ended not with victory but with continued tribute payments and an ally abandoned to face the Pasha's revenge.

The entire justification for building the navy and waging war was that paying tribute was too expensive and too degrading for a sovereign republic. However, Oren doesn't let us know that when the final accounts were tallied, the United States had spent considerably more on the war than it would ever have paid in tribute to keep its ships sailing safely.

Reading Oren's account of the Barbary Wars, a question forms that the book never addresses: if the Barbary States were so dangerous and so disruptive to Mediterranean trade, why did Britain, with nearly 800 warships, pay tribute for centuries?

For Britain and France, paying the Barbary tribute was not humiliating. It was a competitive weapon. Both empires could absorb the protection payments and understood what those payments accomplished: any nation that could not afford tribute had its shipping raided, its insurance rates driven up, and its merchants priced out of Mediterranean trade. Denmark, Sweden, the Italian States, and the newly independent United States were all targets of a system that preserved Anglo-French commercial dominance. When the Barbary States attacked the young United States' shipping, they were encouraged by British leaders resentful of the newly independent nation. American merchants had sailed these waters freely under British protection for generations and experienced their sudden vulnerability as an affront to their dignity as citizens of a sovereign republic. That wounded sense of entitlement, rather than any rational cost-benefit calculation, is what drove the United States to fight rather than pay. However, once the US fought the Barbary States, the other powers couldn't tolerate paying either. This is what led Britain and the Netherlands to launch the Anglo-Dutch Bombardment of Algiers in 1816, framing it as a humanitarian crusade to end Christian slavery. Those same justifications would drive France's invasion and colonization of Algeria in 1830.

With American trade in the Mediterranean secured in the Barbary Wars, the primary theme of America's relationship with the Middle East shifted from "Power" to "Faith" for a century. Following the Second Great Awakening, waves of American Protestant missionaries arrived in Istanbul, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Cairo, convinced that communities would convert eagerly when presented with pure American Protestantism. They didn't realize that converting a Muslim from Islam carried the death penalty under Ottoman law or that Eastern Christians fiercely resented the implication that their centuries-old traditions were defective. After decades of effort, American missionaries achieved virtually no conversions in the Middle East.

To stay in the region, the missionaries pivoted to providing education, medicine, and the first modern printing presses. They established the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut in 1866 (later the American University of Beirut), Robert College in Istanbul, and the American University in Cairo. These schools offered instruction in modern sciences, mathematics, English, and Western administrative methods. The Americans failed completely to create a Protestant Middle East, but in the process they built the intellectual infrastructure for an Arab cultural renaissance. And by educating a generation of local elites in Western concepts of self-determination and nationalism, American missionaries sowed the seeds for the eventual end of Ottoman rule.

When the Civil War ended in 1865, thousands of trained officers, engineers, and combat veterans were suddenly unemployed, bored, or political liabilities in their own country. Khedive Ismail, the ruler of Egypt, wanted to build a world-class army to break from Ottoman control and project Egyptian power into Sudan and Ethiopia. He needed military experts from a country with no colonial ambitions in Africa. With the quiet approval of General William T. Sherman, Egypt would recruit many American officers between 1869 and 1878 to build the Egyptian Military Academy. These institutions would be instrumental in fostering the 1919 revolution against British rule and would educate Nasser, Sadat, and the other leaders of 20th century Arab Nationalism.

Oren follows one consequential thread from this missionary history through to World War One: the deep sympathy missionaries developed for Christian minorities. Over a century, American missionary networks built a genuine constituency in America for the political cause of Christian secessionism from Ottoman rule: funding separatist movements, documenting repression, and lobbying Washington on behalf of Balkan and Anatolian minorities. When the Ottoman Empire, threatened with dismemberment by European powers during WWI, responded with genocide against Armenian Christians, it was American missionaries who brought the scale of the atrocity to an American public that might otherwise never have known. American charities raised tens of millions of dollars for survivors.

At Versailles, the Western powers proposed an American Mandate for Armenia: making the United States legally and militarily responsible for occupying and defending an Armenian state in Anatolia against both the Turkish nationalist movement and an expansionist Soviet Union, requiring an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 troops indefinitely. Oren's account of this episode is one of the book's most valuable contributions, because it reframes a familiar historical moment entirely. The standard narrative has it that a cynical Senate rejected Wilson's League of Nations, plunging America into isolationism, leaving a weakened League unable to prevent the catastrophe of World War Two. But the senators who voted against the League were also voting on whether to commit American troops to indefinite occupation of Anatolia. The American public that had funded Near East Relief (charity for the suffering Armenian Christians) drew a clear line between wanting to protect religious minorities and fighting never-ending wars. Oren misses the irony here: the missionary networks that had spent a century advocating for Armenian and Greek self-determination had helped fracture a diverse empire, but were unwilling to fight to defend them from the violent consequences.

After the war, the Spanish Flu spread across the globe, reaching the Arabian Peninsula and killing one of Ibn Saud's favorite sons. Help came from American doctors who had been building a quiet presence in the Middle East for years. Dr. Paul Harrison, a Johns Hopkins-trained surgeon, treated hundreds of members of the royal family and ordinary citizens. In 1923, Dr. Louis Dame treated Ibn Saud himself for a serious illness. That care left a deep personal gratitude. Years later, when Ibn Saud considered who should explore and develop Arabia's oil reserves, he chose America. The ARAMCO concession and the US-Saudi alliance that followed were built on a mix of anti-colonial goodwill and the trust earned by doctors. Oren records this story, but doesn't highlight the theme that soft power built America's most consequential alliance in the modern Middle East.

The book's third section examines the orientalist fantasy: the vision of the Middle East as a land of biblical grandeur corrupted by backwardness, populated by peoples incapable of self-governance, filtered through travel writing, diplomacy, and popular culture from The Sheik to Lawrence of Arabia. This is the book's least compelling section, not because the subject is unimportant but because Edward Said and others have covered Orientalism more rigorously.

More damaging is a structural absence throughout the book: we almost never hear from Arab, Turkish, or Persian voices. Local populations appear as objects of observation. What did Ottoman officials make of the American missionaries? What did Egyptian students think of their American teachers? What did Ibn Saud's doctors mean to the people they treated, beyond the political alliance they later enabled? The book that could answer these questions would be far richer than the one Oren wrote.

The book's single biggest omission is Iran. Oren neglects the story of Howard Baskerville, an American teacher in Tabriz who died fighting for the Iranian Constitutional Revolution in 1909, a story that would have fit his themes perfectly. Leaving it out is an editorial choice that guides the reader away from the possibilities for cooperation, peace, and mutual admiration between America and the Middle East. America squandered immeasurable goodwill in Iran when it overthrew Mosaddegh, and covering this early history would have helped establish what was lost.

On the creation of Israel and the events after 1948, Oren's pro-Israel bias becomes more visible and his account less reliable. Readers should treat this last section of the book with particular caution. I found significant factual errors and mischaracterizations in his narrative of the Nakba and Israel-Arab conflicts.

Power, Faith, and Fantasy is a book worth reading. Oren convincingly demonstrates that America's relationship with the Middle East is older and deeper than most Americans understand. But read it with your own questions ready, because the most interesting history lies beneath the surface of the narrative Oren chose to tell.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

A brilliant book that even well-versed students of US-ME history will find interesting and new. I thought this book might be a brief overview of relations up to WWII and then a more in-depth look at the well-treaded post-WWII history, but it was actually the opposite. Oren shows a rich and deep set of entanglements that have had unexpected influences on both sides' histories. The first half of the book gets you to about 1900, and it's full of fascinating themes and subjects: missionaries, American schools in the Middle East, explorers, antiquarians, restorationism (an early form of Christian Zionism), trade, the Barbary pirate episodes, the growth of Egyptian cotton during the US Civil War, American cultural fascination with this area, tension with the Ottoman Empire, support for Jewish or Christian minorities in Muslim lands, etc.

To make sense of all this, Oren helpfully divides up US motivations in seeing and acting in the ME into three categories. 1. Power: the US has involved itself in the ME for reasons of power politics and economics. The earliest version of this was the decades-long campaign to open the Mediterranean to trade free of pirate interference. Oren's discussion of this crisis as a foundational moment of America identity (and the federal state) is fascinating. Power, however, was largely a latecomer to US connections to the ME. Early contacts with the region were far more likely to come from faith and fantasy. American missionaries are in many ways the heroes of this book: they journeyed to the region and met with almost no success in conversion but eventually became agents of spreading American culture and education, especially through the many missionary schools set up throughout the region. The Middle East always remained salient in American thinking because of its religious importance, and the US often found itself interfering in Ottoman affairs to protest the treatment of religious minorities.

Lastly, fantasy motivated these contacts from the beginning. The "Orient" always held an aura of mystery, sexual energy, adventure, even barbarism that attracted explorers, writers, traders, and even statesmen. It was funny how consistency let down these travelers were; they found the region to be dirty and backwards, its cities small and squalid, the holy sites underwhelming, and the governments petty and tyrannical. This dialectic of expectation and disappointment deeply shaped American interaction with the region. For the last half century, however, Americans have probably held a more negative, less fantasized (although not necessarily more accurate) view of the ME than their ancestors did.

This book is pretty darn long, but if you want a readable, entertaining look at cultural, political, and religious contacts between us and the ME, this is the best book I have found. Sometimes the stories of travelers and missionaries start to get a little repetitive, but he shows how they really mattered in the broader scheme of US history in the ME. Oren concludes that the balance sheet of US relations with the region is actually positive and that it is still possible to build on that legacy. For example, the US was central to dismantling post WWII European imperialism in the ME, helping Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Algeria escape the imperialist yoke. I also want to commend Oren for having an awesome vocabulary and teaching me at least 30 new words.

[Said Mahmood kasany · Rating 5 out of 5]

كتاب مهم وثمين بالمعلومات والأحداث والشخصيات التي لعبت دور في تاريخ الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط بدأ من سنوات الإستقلال الأمريكي وحتى سقوط بغداد عام ٢٠٠٣. المثير في الكتاب موسوعية المؤلف في سرد الشخصيات والإحاطة بجوانبها وتفاصيلها الصغيرة. كتاب لمن يريد أن يفهم العقلية الأمريكية وتعاملها مع الشرق الأوسط، ونظرتهم لها. كتاب بالفعل كبير وضخم يغطي جوانب متعددة من الشرق الأوسط.

[Dolly · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have had this book on my to-read list for a long, long, long time (almost 7 years). But due to the length of the book and the density of the subject matter (not to mention my aversion to history books that have bored me to tears in the past), I just never seemed to want to read it. I even checked out the book once or twice, but ended up returning it before I got around to it.

But I've really taken to listening to audiobooks in the car during my daily commute. Some drives are longer than others, but I still get a good half-hour or so of listening each day. So when I discovered that our local library had an audio CD version of this book, I jumped at the chance. It's 22 (that's right, twenty-two!) discs long, so it still took over a month to get through the whole thing, but on the whole, I was glad I took the plunge.

The narrative is certainly dry in parts, but for the most part, I was enthralled by the story. The descriptions of violence were quite graphic at times, but on the whole, I could listen to the book even with our girls in the car with me. Ususally they just ignored it and read their own books, but sometimes we'd talk about the historical period being discussed.

Both of our girls are studying Colonial times in school, so the earlier sections were quite relevant to their studies. We were all surprised at how much America was involved in the Middle East from its very inception.

new words: inchoate, internecine

[Christopher · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an immensely fascinating study of U.S.-Middle Eastern relations starting in 1776 and roughly ending in 2006-2007. Oren not only writes passionately and convincingly about U.S. military and diplomatic interactions with the region, but also about the humanitarian and missionary work that private citizens did in the region, which had a far greater impact upon U.S. relations in the Middle East pre-1914 than one might think. I especially find it ironic that the Zionist movement and Arabian Nationalist movement, as documented by Oren, had roots either in America or in the American-styled universities set up throughout the Middle East. I was very tempted to give this book five stars, but I didn't because it seems that, at times, Oren moves too quickly through certain passages without really identifying their importance until much later. This is especially true in regards to chapters and sections dealing with world fairs and the like that featured Middle Eastern exhibits. Oren claims that these exhibits had an impact on American's perceptions of the region, but doesn't give any good examples of that impact. But, that is only a minor inconvenience compared to the quality of the rest of the book. In short, this is a great book for anyone interested in a general history of U.S.-Middle Eastern relations.

[Stephen Coates · Rating 4 out of 5]

Following the War of Independence, US ships, without the protection previously provided by the Royal Navy, were frequently captured by the fiefdoms in North Africa with their crews held for ransom, ransoms which were consuming an increasing proportion of the fledgling country's federal budget. In 1788, then future US presidents Jefferson and Adams asked the Tripoli ambassador in London about the attacks, noting that the USA had (then) never had a quarrel with the Moslem world, the ambassador replied, "because the Koran gives us permission to do so". In response, the US established a navy which, in a series of missions recaptured its merchant ships and freed its enslaved sailors. Thus began American engagement with the middle east.

This very thoroughly researched book chronicles American involvement with this part of the world from its independence until the present, at times benevolent and at other times less so. It covers that various competing objectives of supporting anti-colonial movements, colonising Christian communities that the American perceived as not following the true path, hence American universities in that part of the world, and of furthering American economic interests. For those seeking to understand the long history to American involvement in the Middle East, this is an essential read.