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No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam
On April 30, 1975, when U.S. helicopters pulled the last soldiers out of Saigon, the question Had American and Vietnamese lives been lost in vain? When the city fell shortly thereafter, the answer was clearly yes. The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam -- signed by Henry Kissinger in 1973, and hailed as "peace with honor" by President Nixon -- was a travesty. In No Peace, No Honor, Larry Berman reveals the long-hidden truth in secret documents concerning U.S. negotiations that Kissinger had sealed -- negotiations that led to his sharing the Nobel Peace Prize. Based on newly declassified information and a complete North Vietnamese transcription of the talks, Berman offers the real story for the first time, proving that there is only one word for Nixon and Kissinger's actions toward the United States' former ally, and the tens of thousands of soldiers who fought and betrayal. On April 30, 1975, when U.S. helicopters pulled the last soldiers out of Saigon, the question Had American and Vietnamese lives been lost in vain? When the city fell shortly thereafter, the answer was clearly yes. The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam -- signed by Henry Kissinger in 1973, and hailed as "peace with honor" by President Nixon -- was a travesty. In No Peace, No Honor, Larry Berman reveals the long-hidden truth in secret documents concerning U.S. negotiations that Kissinger had sealed -- negotiations that led to his sharing the Nobel Peace Prize. Based on newly declassified information and a complete North Vietnamese transcription of the talks, Berman offers the real story for the first time, proving that there is only one word for Nixon and Kissinger's actions toward the United States' former ally, and the tens of thousands of soldiers who fought and betrayal.
334 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2001
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About the author
Larry Berman
22 books14 followersLarry Berman (PhD, Princeton) is Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Davis, and founding Dean of the Georgia State Honors College.
His books include Zumwalt: The Life and Times of Admiral Elmo Russell "Bud" Zumwalt Jr. (2012), Perfect Spy: The incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An (2007), No Peace, No Honor (2001), Lyndon Johnson War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (1989), and Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (1982). Berman is currently researching for his next book, A Slow Walk with Death: The Lingering Effects of Agent Orange.
His books include Zumwalt: The Life and Times of Admiral Elmo Russell "Bud" Zumwalt Jr. (2012), Perfect Spy: The incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An (2007), No Peace, No Honor (2001), Lyndon Johnson War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (1989), and Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (1982). Berman is currently researching for his next book, A Slow Walk with Death: The Lingering Effects of Agent Orange.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
July 15, 2017
Recently I read and reviewed "Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam" by H.R. McMaster. It is a detailed account of how the Vietnam conflict was Americanized.
Berman's book is a detailed account of how the Vietnam conflict was un-Americanized. It's title could have been "Dereliction of Duty: Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and the Lies that Led Out of Vietnam."
Berman's book is a detailed account of how the Vietnam conflict was un-Americanized. It's title could have been "Dereliction of Duty: Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and the Lies that Led Out of Vietnam."
October 3, 2017
Many historians would have you believe that Richard Nixon and especially Henry Kissinger were peacemakers who made a good faith effort to salvage the Vietnam War, only to be betrayed by Congress and domestic opposition. Larry Berman's No Peace, No Honor explodes that persistent, pernicious myth from the foundations upward. Berman offers an in-depth look at the peace talks, with Kissinger, Le Duc Tho and assorted South Vietnamese officials butting heads without making any significant progress; the portrait of futility and stubbornness on all sides is extremely scathing. But the harshest verdict by far falls falls upon Kissinger and Nixon, whom Berman shows only wanting to prolong the Vietnam War long enough to shore up Nixon's reelection, arranging a face-saving peace deal, then washing their hands of an ally who, whatever their political failings, had fought alongside the United States for over a decade believing its promises of aide, alliance and support. For many readers this won't be news, but as long as the Cult of Kissinger remains with us it's worthwhile to be reminded how devious he and his boss could be.
May 13, 2024
A critical and well-written work.
Most of the book focuses on the secret negotiations between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. Berman ably shows how closely the North Vietnamese followed American politics and the American peace movement. He also describes the importance of political calculations when it came to the Nixon White House’s decisions on war and peace, and how hard they tried to sideline Thieu’s government. The book is critical of Nixon and Kissinger, and Berman’s mildest treatment is actually given to Thieu. The book also covers McGovern’s talks with the North Vietnamese, which, while less well known than Anna Chennault’s, also came close to illegality.
Berman is, of course, critical of Nixon and Kissinger and notes their cynicism, but he never really explains what a better peace deal would have looked like, given the political realities they operated under (the North Vietnamese were often just as cynical, too, and as ruthless) Thieu knew that Nixon and Kissinger viewed him as expendable, as Berman himself admits. On a related note, there is little discussion of the impact the antiwar movement had on Nixon and Kissinger’s thinking, or what impact the international scene had. Berman does note this in passing, but doesn’t really dive into it in depth. Some critics of the war argue that the Thieu government was illegitimate, but Berman never examines that argument. The text has no footnotes.
A big part of Berman’s argument is the idea that Nixon expected the peace to fail, but the evidence is circumstantial and this point often seems speculative. He argues that neither Nixon nor Kissinger ever expected a genuine peace, and were prepared to continue American involvement indefinitely after the signing of a peace. The narrative, however, doesn’t really support this, and the book is mostly a conventional picture of Nixon and Kissinger striving for the least worst agreement they could get. Berman writes that Nixon and Kissinger expected North Vietnam to quickly violate the armistice and that this would allow them to intervene militarily again. He contends that Nixon planned for an indefinite stalemate where the US would keep supporting Thieu. The book does not, however, mention Nixon’s signing of the Case-Church amendment that prohibited US military activity in southeast Asia unless he secured explicit approval from Congress in advance (Nixon did lobby to extend the deadline, but Republicans relented) Here Nixon surrendered his own discretion so he could avoid a dilemma about intervention, and conveniently blame Congress if the communists took over. How exactly Nixon would have circumvented this obstacle in his supposed plans for indefinitely continuing the war is never explained. Berman also writes that Nixon “almost certainly planned on vetoing any possible moves by Congress to terminate the war.” This argument isn’t detailed, either.
Berman also writes that Watergate destroyed Nixon’s public support, “and thus all chance for him to continue bombing after a peace agreement was signed.” Would America have supported Nixon in continuing the bombing, however? That, too, seems doubtful. “Although it is difficult to believe that public opinion would have supported renewed bombing for long, even without Watergate, Nixon most likely did intend to give it a try.” He does note instances in 1973 when Nixon considered resuming bombing, and writes that Watergate sapped him of the will to go through with it.
Still, a thorough and well-researched work.
Most of the book focuses on the secret negotiations between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. Berman ably shows how closely the North Vietnamese followed American politics and the American peace movement. He also describes the importance of political calculations when it came to the Nixon White House’s decisions on war and peace, and how hard they tried to sideline Thieu’s government. The book is critical of Nixon and Kissinger, and Berman’s mildest treatment is actually given to Thieu. The book also covers McGovern’s talks with the North Vietnamese, which, while less well known than Anna Chennault’s, also came close to illegality.
Berman is, of course, critical of Nixon and Kissinger and notes their cynicism, but he never really explains what a better peace deal would have looked like, given the political realities they operated under (the North Vietnamese were often just as cynical, too, and as ruthless) Thieu knew that Nixon and Kissinger viewed him as expendable, as Berman himself admits. On a related note, there is little discussion of the impact the antiwar movement had on Nixon and Kissinger’s thinking, or what impact the international scene had. Berman does note this in passing, but doesn’t really dive into it in depth. Some critics of the war argue that the Thieu government was illegitimate, but Berman never examines that argument. The text has no footnotes.
A big part of Berman’s argument is the idea that Nixon expected the peace to fail, but the evidence is circumstantial and this point often seems speculative. He argues that neither Nixon nor Kissinger ever expected a genuine peace, and were prepared to continue American involvement indefinitely after the signing of a peace. The narrative, however, doesn’t really support this, and the book is mostly a conventional picture of Nixon and Kissinger striving for the least worst agreement they could get. Berman writes that Nixon and Kissinger expected North Vietnam to quickly violate the armistice and that this would allow them to intervene militarily again. He contends that Nixon planned for an indefinite stalemate where the US would keep supporting Thieu. The book does not, however, mention Nixon’s signing of the Case-Church amendment that prohibited US military activity in southeast Asia unless he secured explicit approval from Congress in advance (Nixon did lobby to extend the deadline, but Republicans relented) Here Nixon surrendered his own discretion so he could avoid a dilemma about intervention, and conveniently blame Congress if the communists took over. How exactly Nixon would have circumvented this obstacle in his supposed plans for indefinitely continuing the war is never explained. Berman also writes that Nixon “almost certainly planned on vetoing any possible moves by Congress to terminate the war.” This argument isn’t detailed, either.
Berman also writes that Watergate destroyed Nixon’s public support, “and thus all chance for him to continue bombing after a peace agreement was signed.” Would America have supported Nixon in continuing the bombing, however? That, too, seems doubtful. “Although it is difficult to believe that public opinion would have supported renewed bombing for long, even without Watergate, Nixon most likely did intend to give it a try.” He does note instances in 1973 when Nixon considered resuming bombing, and writes that Watergate sapped him of the will to go through with it.
Still, a thorough and well-researched work.
July 28, 2015
Tough to read account of a painful, painful moment in American history. Nixon's continual rhetorical emphasis on his strength and "peace with honor" reveals his weakness, and his desire to have peace at any cost, including abandoning the South Vietnamese. No wonder the North Vietnamese stonewalled all through the peace negotiations.
March 21, 2022
Well researched, very enlightening, awesome book! Never knew the real story of the end of the Vietnam war
for us and South Vietnam until now. Wow!
for us and South Vietnam until now. Wow!
July 23, 2019
Coverage of the Vietnam War from the military angle is pretty easy to come by, but for a change of pace I decided to read a book that almost entirely ignores the war itself, except as the context for the protracted diplomatic game (both formal and secret) aimed at ending the US involvement in Vietnam while still preserving face for the United States in general and the Nixon administration in particular.
This book discusses both the formal and the secret negotiations in detail, but the secret negotiations drove the formal outcome and as such are the meat of the story. The three key factions involved were (1) the North Vietnamese, whose confidence in the strength of their long-term strategic position put them firmly in the driver's seat, (2) the South Vietnamese, who had no hope of survival without American military support yet refused to concede anything to the North Vietnamese via diplomacy, knowing that it would only prolong their inevitable moment of defeat, and (3) the Americans, who because of domestic anti-war pressure combined with Nixon's hatred of communism were faced with the seemingly impossible twin goal of extracting America from the war while still ensuring the survival of an independent South Vietnam.
The most intriguing thing about this story is that the American side had definitive goals, as defined by Nixon, but its negotiations were primarily performed by Henry Kissinger, who is presented here as an enigmatic rogue agent far more interested in personal glory than in faithfully carrying out Nixon's directives. Both Nixon and Kissinger come across as paranoid, duplicitous schemers who ultimately deserved all the disgrace that they earned via their association with each other.
This book discusses both the formal and the secret negotiations in detail, but the secret negotiations drove the formal outcome and as such are the meat of the story. The three key factions involved were (1) the North Vietnamese, whose confidence in the strength of their long-term strategic position put them firmly in the driver's seat, (2) the South Vietnamese, who had no hope of survival without American military support yet refused to concede anything to the North Vietnamese via diplomacy, knowing that it would only prolong their inevitable moment of defeat, and (3) the Americans, who because of domestic anti-war pressure combined with Nixon's hatred of communism were faced with the seemingly impossible twin goal of extracting America from the war while still ensuring the survival of an independent South Vietnam.
The most intriguing thing about this story is that the American side had definitive goals, as defined by Nixon, but its negotiations were primarily performed by Henry Kissinger, who is presented here as an enigmatic rogue agent far more interested in personal glory than in faithfully carrying out Nixon's directives. Both Nixon and Kissinger come across as paranoid, duplicitous schemers who ultimately deserved all the disgrace that they earned via their association with each other.
December 3, 2024
A well researched and documented expose of a truly shameful period in our past and how we lied and betrayed South Vietnam. It is also an expose of how truly inept Kissinger was as a "diplomat". A joke.
May 16, 2013
Very interesting and detailed. As a professional negotiator, it seemed that the author had unrealistic expectations for how Kissinger should have conducted the negotiations. Labor negotiations are nowhere near as complex as diplomatic negotiations to end a war, but even in labor talks, Berman's ideal of complete transparency is beyond naive.
Interesting peak behind the curtains to an intriguing time.
Interesting peak behind the curtains to an intriguing time.
July 30, 2011
Outstanding. Berman takes the complexity of the Vietnam issue and makes it an easy read. He tackles the tough issues of Nixon's good cop/bad cop with Kissinger, peace through esculation, and the people of S. Vietnam. If you agree or disagree with Berman's conclusions - it is a good read.
March 5, 2009
As more records are released and research done we are finding out that some administrations have been more deceitful and self-serving than Americans are wont to believe.
October 30, 2012
excellent learning tool about the government of the war.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews