The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice

by Peter Carruthers

Do animals have moral rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the animal rights movement, whose opinion has held moral sway in recent years, Peter Carruthers here claims that they do not. He explores a variety of moral theories, arguing that animals lack direct moral significance. This provocative but judiciously argued book will appeal to all those interested in animal rights, whatever their initial standpoint. It will also serve as a lively introduction to ethics, demonstrating why theoretical issues in ethics actually matter.

Genres: Philosophy, Academic

224 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1992

Reviews

[Kathleen · Rating 1 out of 5]

Carruthers' argument is basically only rational beings have rights, only humans are rational, therefore animals have no rights. Also, animals experience pain and suffering, but the are not able to think in a second-order way about their pain and suffering, which makes their pain and suffering non-conscious and therefore A-OK. Furthermore, "common-sense morality" is good with hunting, factory farming, and animal testing and so any acceptable moral theory about the treatment of animals must also be good with them. Because he adheres to the notion of reflective equilibrium, he requires moral reasoning to confirm how ordinary people already behave. Which makes no sense to me whatsoever. If the thing that makes humans supposedly morally superior to animals is our capacity to reason, then it would seem like reasoning about moral issues should be unconstrained by ordinary behavior, which is often not rational (and deeply immoral). Also, it seems to me that the whole point of moral inquiry would be to answer a question without presuming an answer from the outset. If you ask the question, "do animals have rights?" but begin from the position, "no, because we don't ordinarily think they do." and require any acceptable moral theory to conform to that view, you are neither asking a question nor engaging in moral reasoning. You are merely using something that looks like reasoning to confirm your preconceived notions. That's not philosophy, it's sophistry.

[Dayton Martindale · Rating 1 out of 5]

Intellectually shoddy, ethically grotesque. There’s potential for some interesting theoretical discussion but he doesn’t take it anywhere. Essentially, and I don’t exaggerate, he argues that any ethical theory that tells us to consider the interests of nonhuman animals on par with those of humans must be wrong because that is too implausible. Not an actual argument!

Anyway, one of the best arguments for animal rights is that whenever philosophers attempt to seriously argue against it, they come up with obvious bullshit.

[Lea · Rating 1 out of 5]

Bizarre, just bizarre. The only positive thing I can say about this book is that it's easy to read - which makes the argumentative flaws all the more obvious.

I guess, another positive thing I got to say is that I give Carruthers credit for being one of the few philosophers engaging in the issues of animal rights and arguing against them. I mean, he does it poorly but he sure does try to do it.

[Peter Russel · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very convincing contractualist argument. The well written foundation sets out criteria for a valid ethical theory to the animal issue, then examines utilitarianism and contractualism in turn, concludes contractualism's superior position and answers critiques of the theory's normative output. The book is technical, but it's well within the reach of any interested reader and provides both a great overview of ethics as philosophy as well as a detailed answer to the Animal Issue.

[泽原 陈 · Rating 1 out of 5]

The author's argument is basically that there's nothing wrong with cruelty to animals because I don't think it's wrong, and it's wrong to abuse babies, the elderly, the disabled because I think it's wrong. I'm not an extreme animal protectionist, I'm not even a vegetarian, but I simply can't accept the author's illogical argument.
According to the author, a person is wrong to abuse animals because the abuse reflects his bad character, and this reaction occurs, because there is the connection between the empathy for animals and the empathy for people in this person's culture, and this person accepts the connection (in other words, the connection is accidental, empirical, and can be removed). The authors also argue that when a person sympathizes with animals, it consumes the attention he needs to sympathize with humans. Since only humans have a moral status, the duty to empathize with humans trumps empathy for animals. Based on the premise above, we can conclude that responsible contractualists should constantly and publicly abuse animals, let all humans get used to this abuse and let all humans eliminate that empathy connection, so that humans can devote all their attention to empathy for humans .
The author certainly did not draw this conclusion (perhaps without thinking carefully about his own illogical views), because it would make his theory completely contradict common-sense beliefs and fail to achieve a the Reflective equilibrium.
What's even more ridiculous is the author's astonishing belief that the basis for feeling pain is being aware of one's own experience of pain, as if I wouldn't feel pain without thinking about the circumstances of my injury. Of course, the author himself realized his stupidity and corrected his point of view in a later paper (SUFFERING WITHOUT SUBJECTIVITY). It's a pity that the author doesn't realize that almost all the ideas in his book are ridiculous.
It's a pity I can't give this book minus five stars.

[Yana · Rating 1 out of 5]

A good book for studying animal etics but also a real pain in the ass, for christ sake normally I would read this ammount of pages in a day!

[Clara · Rating 3 out of 5]

fue ub libro que hizo lo que necesitaba hacer. explico la cuestion de los derechos morales de animales y hablo de una teaoria moral. por supesto no lo disfrute, pero supe eso cuando lo elegi