The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

by Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology--that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its parts. Using Plato's Meno as a starting point, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that it is less valuable than generally assumed. The book will appeal to students and professional philosophers in epistemology.

Genres: Philosophy

234 pages, Hardcover

First published August 20, 1999

Reviews

[Cassidy Brinn]

Kvanvig argues that knowledge is not more valuable than any subset of its parts, such as true belief, or (gettiered) justified true belief. [sidenote: I think it's one of the wonders of human thought that Gettier managed to get his name made into a widely accepted verb by publishing a three page essay! just sayin...] So Kvanvig brings us this sorrowful news but then hastens to tell us that, rather than fall into despair, burn all our epistemology books and dance naked in the flames with a bottle of rum, we should comfort ourselves with the fact that understanding is indeed more valuable than any subset of its parts. Why? Because understanding doesn't come in isolated bullet points like knowledge, it requires coherence between a bunch of related beliefs. And, more important for his style of argumentation, a subject needn't "assuage Gettier" in order to achieve understanding. Understanding is Gettier-proof. [seriously! anyone outside of analytic epistemology must think we are all lunatic cult members...]

I agree with critics who argue that Kvanvig went all wrong on his descripion of understanding - for instance, with his insistence that understanding is factive. However, I don't think that's the primary weakness of the book. The problem is the structure. He zooms through all the major attempts to prove that knowledge has more value than any subset of its parts, dismissing each one with what he considers its fatal flaws. Then he concludes, having come this far, we may responsibly assume that all such attempts will fail. That's not impressive technique. Look at history, sometimes the truth just takes a long time to come out! You can't make an argument in philosophy based on your own exhaustion. And if Kvanvig were honest with himself, he would realize that he knows that. After all, look at his argument against Hartry Field's idea that it's impossible to resolve which is more important: maximizing truth or minimizing falsehoods. Kvanvig chastises him by pointing out that difficulty does not imply impossibility. Yet that's exactly the argument he trots out in favor of the impossibility of finding a value for knowledge over that of its subparts!

Moreover, such an argumentative structure makes it far too easy to ignore his important suggestion that understanding is valuable and worthy of our attention. For if you can find a single flaw in any of his previous refutations of other philosophers then one is no longer obligated to consider the value of understanding, but will go right on battling about the value of knowledge. I applaud efforts to widen the perspective of epistemologists, but I don't think he has found the most convincing way to do so.