Neither Brain Nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory

by W. Teed Rockwell

In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory—which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name)—and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems. Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST).

Genres: Philosophy

231 pages, Paperback

First published August 1, 2005

Reviews

[Joshua Stein · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rockwell is a good writer, and it is clear that he is having the most fun with the actual writing during the first few chapters of the book. They are written aggressively, critiquing some of the bigger names in contemporary philosophy of mind. I'm not entirely sure that all of Rockwell's criticisms are on the mark, or even entirely fair, but the points that he is making are important, and should be taken seriously by those in the field. The writing does require a certain level of proficiency with the technical literature, particular the philosophers that Rockwell was trained on: Rorty, Sellars, and Quine. Given Rockwell's heavy references to Dewey, some familiarity with Dewey, as well, might be in order, but Rockwell does spend more time spelling out Dewey's positions and quoting him at length.

As far as the content of the book, there is really one strong point of criticism: While Rockwell does a good job at articulating and criticizing the major positions in philosophy of mind and epistemology for the first 170 pages, it isn't until the end of the book, really the final chapter, that he truly presents something unique, interesting, and insightful. I'm not trying to talk folks off of the book, because it is a wonderful read, but my point is that the actual about of Rockwell that is in the book, as opposed to "Rockwell-on-Dewey" or "Rockwell-on-Sellars" is pretty minimal, up until about the single journal article's worth of writing on Dynamic Systems Theory at the end. In a sense, that's too bad. Because that part of the book is powerful, thoughtful, and brilliant.

In a sense, Rockwell is never going to think of his work as independent from the pragmatist tradition, and perhaps one of the vices of philosophers is noting how deeply situated they are in their own philosophical tradition. It is often a huge boon, as it allows for a much better discussion, but it can also be a detriment when it keeps philosophers from saying something novel, because they feel the need to provide enormous historical context that is either (a) unnecessary or (b) redundant. In many cases, it reduces the feeling of plagiarism, and that is certainly the case for Rockwell, who acknowledges up-front that he feels that Dewey thought of many of his ideas decades before he, himself, did.

But I think that Rockwell sells himself short on this point, and at some cost to the book. It seems to me that Rockwell's commentary in the last chapter regarding pragmatic fields and 'basins' is very much his own, despite those other contemporaries who originate the terms. His commentary on Freeman and other psychologists and neuroscientists are really something new; I've been in the field a while now and haven't run up against ideas much at all like those developed by Rockwell. The book suffers because the time spent developing the historical context that informs the ideas Rockwell is considering could have been spent presenting and developing the ideas proper. While a historical treatment of the ideas is important, especially for a philosopher, it leaves the exegesis of the ideas feeling incomplete, even unsatisfactory. Perhaps it is a nice point of development for a future book.

[Aaron Brown · Rating 5 out of 5]

'We' all know Cartesianism is dead in its classical form - there is no soul distinct from the body. Yet modern science and philosophy of mind inherit much of the baggage that fell out of the Frenchman's dualism. While current thought successfully reduces Descartes' dualist framework to a singular material substrate, it persists in viewing the mind as absolutely and singularly coterminous with the brain. This anachronistic conceptual move plagues the way we frame important questions about the constitution of mind, consciousness and the Self.

Neither Brain nor Ghost is a well written and rigorous meditation on the implications of embodied cognition - the view that the mind is a dynamically constituted, self-organizing behavioral field comprising the brain, the body and aspects of the environment immediately relevant to a biological agent's intentional actions and goal-directed activities. In short, the aware 'I' involves more than gray matter and a (secondary) bodily support system.

Highlights include interesting readings concerning causality in the pragmatic philosophy of James and Dewey, a short and lucid primer on dynamic systems theory, as well as interesting incorporations of Heiddegerian principles regarding Being (Dasein) as intimately constituted in and through embodiment in a meaning laden environment. Overall, Rockwell's claims regarding the delineation of the 'mind' or 'self' will likely be considered extreme, and he champions this quality of his work over an against theorists such as Andy Clark and Daniel Dennet who, while subscribing to embodied cognition, fail to push the idea beyond the body.

No longer, "i think therefore i am"; all the hip kids know it is more like "i act in the world, therefore i am, and it so happens i can think about some aspect of what i'm doing." Strongly suggested for those interested in new formulations in philosophy of mind.

[Steen Ledet · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting and important book on mind and embodiment which articulates significant criticisms against neurobiology's emphasis on the brain.