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The Rise and Decline of The Medici Bank
金融帝國的興衰：從暴發戶到跨國企業，梅迪奇銀行帶你見證資本主義的起源
◎台灣版獨家附贈梅迪奇家族系譜精美海報，從首位出現於歷史記載的梅迪奇族人到太陽王路易十四，完整收錄！
梅迪奇是中世紀歐洲豪門、文藝復興的金主，
資助教宗、王室，贊助達文西、米開朗基羅，
但他們的財富從何而來？
經濟史泰斗德魯福，進哈佛前的會計的經驗，
使他能以實務技術解讀中世紀財務報表和機密帳本，
解密梅迪奇家族如何從暴發戶成為金融帝國，
追溯今日的商業制度在500年前如何運作發明。
在德魯福之後，梅迪奇銀行的諸多研究都未能跳脫這本經典的核心！
◎哈佛「特魯普佩因傑出商業論著獎」桂冠作品。
◎清華大學經濟系榮譽教授賴建誠推薦導讀。
◇文藝復興金主的致富機密
梅迪奇家族出過三位教皇、兩位法國皇后，是十五世紀佛羅倫斯政治的執掌者。他們大力支持文藝復興時代的藝文事業，出資興建佛羅倫斯地標「百花大教堂」，贊助波提切利和拉斐爾等。然而，他們身為銀行家和商人的活動卻未引起同樣關注。但卻是經濟力量使得梅迪奇家族有機會抓住政治權力，也是經濟力量提供資金來源，使得他們有能力資助藝術家，弘揚人文主義。
◇現代商業模式與經營策略的祖師爺
十五世紀的梅迪奇銀行，是教會財富管理人、貸款給王公貴族，促進西歐貿易發展。大力支持藝文活動，推動文藝復興的發展。當時許多商業制度都有了最初的模型，梅迪奇家族不但能綜合靈活運用，更設計了類似控股公司的組織，找到遠端管理跨國公司的方法，他們與商業競爭對手一起操縱市場價格，建立人類史上最早的卡特爾壟斷市場。他們打下了資本主義的基礎，當然也很懂得今日商人各種避稅的撇步。閱讀梅迪奇銀行的歷史可以增加我們對現代商業根基的了解。雖然商業技術已然改變，但人的問題依舊，如何選用人才、經營管理，無論對梅迪奇家族還是今天的商業都是個大哉問。
◇以機密帳本完成的學術經典
本書作者在1948年完成梅迪奇銀行研究，隔年即發現梅迪奇家族的機密帳本。此後花費十年光陰，搭配各種票據、書信等史料完成本書。不僅分析梅迪奇的發展背景、商業模式和組織架構，書中而人物性格因素、商業交易與利益分配等也都納入這段百年興衰史，因而本書不僅是一本具里程碑意義的學術經典著作，也可以讀到人物風采、各方勢力交織的精彩故事，和西歐各國政治經濟情勢的變幻莫測。
好評推薦
談文藝復興銀行業的英文著作中，這本書是最重要的一本。——《經濟學人》
這本書是光輝的傑作，是關於梅迪奇銀行最權威的著作，對中世紀經濟史研究價值不可估量。——哈裡·A.米斯基明（Harry A. Miskimin），耶魯經濟史教授
在各種語言寫成的文藝復興經濟史著作中，這本書是最權威的一本。——龍多·卡梅隆（Rondo Cameron），國際經濟史學會前主席
這本書是最好的一本介紹中世紀銀行體系的書，沒有之一。——小約翰·T.努南（John T. Noonan, Jr.），聯邦巡迴上訴法院法官
歷史上所有的銀行中，梅迪奇銀行是最有名的。但它之所以地位顯赫，與其說是直接因為貨幣紅利，不如說是因為奢華的羅倫佐的詩句、馬基亞維利的散文，以及梅迪奇家族花錢買來的藝術品。在現代歷史編纂學中，梅迪奇文化權勢背後的經濟來源一直受到忽視。每一位元文藝復興研究者都會提到梅迪奇銀行的財富，但只有這本書講清楚了美第奇銀行的金融運營。——羅伯特·薩巴蒂諾 ·洛佩斯（Robert Sabatino Lopez），中世紀經濟史專家
這本書關注了梅迪奇銀行的歷史發展，及其合夥人與經理人的性格因素。此外，作者還介紹了制度和經濟背景，這對非專業研究經濟史的讀者來說特別有幫助。——尼古拉·魯賓斯坦（Nicolai Rubinstein），佛羅倫斯史專家
經濟史家德魯福將商業作為研究重點，奉獻了這本分析中世紀銀行與貿易的經典。這本書是傑出的學術研究與優美文筆的結合。作者基於中世紀史料，配有大量插圖和圖表（含宗譜圖），使得這本書今天對我們的價值絲毫不遜於1963年初版之時。——《企業重塑》（Turnarounds & Workouts）雜誌
梅迪奇是中世紀歐洲豪門、文藝復興的金主，
資助教宗、王室，贊助達文西、米開朗基羅，
但他們的財富從何而來？
經濟史泰斗德魯福，進哈佛前的會計的經驗，
使他能以實務技術解讀中世紀財務報表和機密帳本，
解密梅迪奇家族如何從暴發戶成為金融帝國，
追溯今日的商業制度在500年前如何運作發明。
在德魯福之後，梅迪奇銀行的諸多研究都未能跳脫這本經典的核心！
◎哈佛「特魯普佩因傑出商業論著獎」桂冠作品。
◎清華大學經濟系榮譽教授賴建誠推薦導讀。
◇文藝復興金主的致富機密
梅迪奇家族出過三位教皇、兩位法國皇后，是十五世紀佛羅倫斯政治的執掌者。他們大力支持文藝復興時代的藝文事業，出資興建佛羅倫斯地標「百花大教堂」，贊助波提切利和拉斐爾等。然而，他們身為銀行家和商人的活動卻未引起同樣關注。但卻是經濟力量使得梅迪奇家族有機會抓住政治權力，也是經濟力量提供資金來源，使得他們有能力資助藝術家，弘揚人文主義。
◇現代商業模式與經營策略的祖師爺
十五世紀的梅迪奇銀行，是教會財富管理人、貸款給王公貴族，促進西歐貿易發展。大力支持藝文活動，推動文藝復興的發展。當時許多商業制度都有了最初的模型，梅迪奇家族不但能綜合靈活運用，更設計了類似控股公司的組織，找到遠端管理跨國公司的方法，他們與商業競爭對手一起操縱市場價格，建立人類史上最早的卡特爾壟斷市場。他們打下了資本主義的基礎，當然也很懂得今日商人各種避稅的撇步。閱讀梅迪奇銀行的歷史可以增加我們對現代商業根基的了解。雖然商業技術已然改變，但人的問題依舊，如何選用人才、經營管理，無論對梅迪奇家族還是今天的商業都是個大哉問。
◇以機密帳本完成的學術經典
本書作者在1948年完成梅迪奇銀行研究，隔年即發現梅迪奇家族的機密帳本。此後花費十年光陰，搭配各種票據、書信等史料完成本書。不僅分析梅迪奇的發展背景、商業模式和組織架構，書中而人物性格因素、商業交易與利益分配等也都納入這段百年興衰史，因而本書不僅是一本具里程碑意義的學術經典著作，也可以讀到人物風采、各方勢力交織的精彩故事，和西歐各國政治經濟情勢的變幻莫測。
好評推薦
談文藝復興銀行業的英文著作中，這本書是最重要的一本。——《經濟學人》
這本書是光輝的傑作，是關於梅迪奇銀行最權威的著作，對中世紀經濟史研究價值不可估量。——哈裡·A.米斯基明（Harry A. Miskimin），耶魯經濟史教授
在各種語言寫成的文藝復興經濟史著作中，這本書是最權威的一本。——龍多·卡梅隆（Rondo Cameron），國際經濟史學會前主席
這本書是最好的一本介紹中世紀銀行體系的書，沒有之一。——小約翰·T.努南（John T. Noonan, Jr.），聯邦巡迴上訴法院法官
歷史上所有的銀行中，梅迪奇銀行是最有名的。但它之所以地位顯赫，與其說是直接因為貨幣紅利，不如說是因為奢華的羅倫佐的詩句、馬基亞維利的散文，以及梅迪奇家族花錢買來的藝術品。在現代歷史編纂學中，梅迪奇文化權勢背後的經濟來源一直受到忽視。每一位元文藝復興研究者都會提到梅迪奇銀行的財富，但只有這本書講清楚了美第奇銀行的金融運營。——羅伯特·薩巴蒂諾 ·洛佩斯（Robert Sabatino Lopez），中世紀經濟史專家
這本書關注了梅迪奇銀行的歷史發展，及其合夥人與經理人的性格因素。此外，作者還介紹了制度和經濟背景，這對非專業研究經濟史的讀者來說特別有幫助。——尼古拉·魯賓斯坦（Nicolai Rubinstein），佛羅倫斯史專家
經濟史家德魯福將商業作為研究重點，奉獻了這本分析中世紀銀行與貿易的經典。這本書是傑出的學術研究與優美文筆的結合。作者基於中世紀史料，配有大量插圖和圖表（含宗譜圖），使得這本書今天對我們的價值絲毫不遜於1963年初版之時。——《企業重塑》（Turnarounds & Workouts）雜誌
680 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1963
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December 3, 2025
Raymond de Roover Studies The Rise And Fall Of The Famed Medici Bank Of Florence, During The Period Ranging From 1397-1494.
The Medici Bank of Florence ranked among Europe's most powerful financial institutions during the Italian Late Middle Age and early Renaissance periods, earning its place next to the Fuggers of Augsburg, Genoa's Casa di San Giorgio, and the Ricciardi bank of Lucca. It flourished under Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici, dominated the economic landscape under Cosimo Pater Patriae and his sons, Piero de'Medici and Giovanni di Cosimo, and was subsequently brought to ruin under Lorenzo the Magnificent and his heir, Piero the Unfortunate. Florence and the Medici were not, however, always placed at the forefront of Italian political and financial affairs. During the Italian Duecento, or thirteenth century, the preeminent banking establishment on the peninsula was the Gran Tavola (great table, or bank) of Orlando Buonsignori, a wealthy Sienese financier whose firm failed in 1298, with Florence afterward assuming Siena's former position as Italy's foremost banking city.
"The Medici are well known in history because of the prominent rôle they played in the Italian Renaissance as political figures or as patrons of letters and fine arts. However, their activity as bankers and traders did not attract the same degree of attention. Yet, it was economic power that made it possible for the Medici to seize political power and that also provided the financial resources which enabled them to commission artists, to promote humanism, to collect a unique and magnificent library..and to spend huge amounts on monumental buildings..The Medici, from Giovanni di Bicci down, were not of the middle class, as some sociological historians have held, since the tax records show that they were by far the richest family in the entire city of Florence and occupied the upper rung of the social ladder." These passages from the introductory chapter of Raymond de Roover's The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 speak loudly in favor of the Medici clan's indominable economic aspirations, their genius for generating revenue, and their ability to transcend their own mercantile social status and stand amongst kings and queens.
The Medici certainly had their share of competition in Florence, however, coming in the form of powerful rival banking clans, most notably the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli - who, between them, effectively dominated Florentine financial affairs during the first half of the fourteenth century. The onset of the Black Death in 1347 led to these three families' banking "companies", as they were known, collapsing, due to a number of factors which, according to de Roover, were "..probably caused by overextension of credit and excessive loans to sovereigns, especially to Edward III (reigned 1327-1377), King of England, and to Robert (1309-1343), the Angevin King of Naples." Their downfall set the stage for the Medici's hegemonic rise to become the most prestigious European banking house of the Italian Quattrocento, allowing them to enter politics where they became Grand Dukes of Tuscany and produced two Catholic Popes, before marrying into the Royal House of France.
This digitally-printed trade paperback edition of Professor Raymond de Roover's The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 was first published in 1963, but released as part of the Norton Library in 1966 by W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., and its 375-page main text is accompanied by a host of supplementary materials which include twelve photos of Medici artwork and sculpture, numerous charts, figures, graphs and numerical statistics accompanying the text, appendices containing names of the Medici's general and branch managers, and a short list of relevant historical events occurring during 1397-1404. There are also 75 pages of additional notes, a 17-page bibliography and an index at the back of the volume.
In Chapter 2, The Medici Bank and its Institutional Background, de Roover discusses the different ways that medieval and Renaissance banking companies would be constrained by church protocol to circumvent the usury doctrine, which prohibited the collection of interest resulting from financial transactions. The Medici and other banking firms had to be very inventive in how they conducted their respective businesses to comply with these regulations and remain on the correct side of ecclesiastical policies, hopefully avoiding being labeled as usurers by the Catholic Church.
The primary method they utilized to achieve this was through a process known as a four-party exchange. Although there were variations to the number and role of the involved parties, the exchange was the Late Middle Age or Renaissance equivalent to the traditional 'loan', in the sense that modern society is familiar with it. It was a complex, circuitous transaction that could not be conducted in the normal manner, using the same monetary unit with interest tacked onto the principal amount. The interest rate had to be incorporated into an exchange fee that was charged when money changed hands between two currencies, and was written up onto a bill of exchange.
Once initiated, a standard bill of exchange took a predetermined amount of time to mature, after which the transaction could be concluded, and it had four parties. The process began in a particular city, and, using one form of currency, the deliverer, also called the remitter, would buy a bill of exchange from the taker, or drawer, at a fluctuating exchange rate, which completed the first portion of the deal. There was then an intervening period, usually one to three months, when the bill matured, after which the next part of the exchange could be undertaken. The second half of the process was conducted in the second city, using the second form of currency, and involved a payor, or drawee (usually an associate of the taker, or drawer) accepting and paying the bill upon maturity, and then, for the final part of the transaction, the payee, or beneficiary (who was generally associated with the deliverer, or remitter), would collect the bill in the deliverer's name. Afterward, an inverse process would occur using another four-party bill of exchange, with a new exchange rate and an additional one-to-three-month period, after which the second form of currency was converted back to the original, and with any luck the two exchange rates would work out to accrue the original deliverer a greater amount of capital than he had invested at the beginning.
While the reviewer is by no stretch of the imagination a financial expert, he nonetheless had a wonderful time working through Raymond de Roover's technical analyses concerning the ins and outs of Medici banking, reading with rapt attention as the economic historian's thoughtful prose explained these complicated concepts with relative ease, utilizing helpful diagrams and hypothetical examples that rendered them much, much easier to understand. The exchange procedure just described uses a transparent four-party model, meaning that the parties can be substituted, rearranged or combined to accommodate many different kinds of transactions, but de Roover does not dwell overmuch on this procedural aspect of the story he tells.
First instituted in 1423, the Florentine castato was a tax on real estate and investments that was normally levied once or twice a year, but during times of emergency it could be collected more frequently. It originally came into being during a period when the monte comune had grown so large as to be unmanageable, and Florence became increasingly involved in costly wars with other Italian city-states such as Lucca and Milan. The monte comune, or public fund, was a concept that had developed over a period of 2-3 years following the short reign of Walter of Brienne, who had "..found himself in such desperate straits that he cancelled all assignments in order to have the tax money flow into the public treasury instead of into the pockets of the state creditors." This government debt was rolled into a massive public debt, the monte comune, which was then bought into by wealthy private citizens, who provided the Florentine government with instant capital, and in return were paid interest, with their profits increasing according to how many shares they had purchased.
Professor de Roover has amazingly provided data from none other than Cosimo de'Medici's tax receipt for the 1457 castato, in which he and his nephew Pierfranceso report their total assets to be 122,669 florins for that year, including Cosimo's sizeable real estate holdings (59,741 florins) and his stock in the monte comune (8,569 florins). These are weighted against his 7,499 florins in total deductions, which include the administrative expense for his real estate, his 120 pairs of oxen and the cost of feeding his 14 family members. After deductions, the new sum for Cosimo's total taxable wealth, called the sovrabbondante, drops to 115,170 florins. Finally, the castato itself was calculated as one-half percent of the sovrabbondante, leaving Cosimo owing 576 florins.
Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici, from whom the family's senior Cafaggiolo and junior Popolani branches originated, started his banking career in 1385 as a junior partner, working at the Roman branch of a Florence-based banking and trade company owned by his distant cousin, Vieri de'Medici, called "Vieri di Cambio de'Medici & Co.". Vieri was a banker first and foremost, but throughout the course of his forty-year career he had slowly expanded his firm to encompass other aspects of business, and upon his retirement in 1393, he divided his enterprise into three portions, entrusting them to his son, his nephew, and Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici. Vieri di Cambrio de'Medici's banking firm and numerous other topics related to how Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici came to control what became the most powerful financial institution in Europe, are explored in greater depth in Chapter 3, The Antecedents and the Early Years of the Medici Bank Under the Management of Giovanni di Bicci, 1397-1429.
On two separate occasions, first at Ancona and then in Milan, the Medici opened bank branches specifically to accommodate the financial needs of the powerful condottiere-turned-lord, Francesco Sforza. The Ancona branch was ostensibly established to take advantage of the port city's increased Apulian and Levantine port traffic, but according to one historian, Frederick Gaupp, it was actually opened to fund Sforza's military campaigns in the Anconetana. The theory posited by Gaupp is very convincing, especially upon reading de Roover's data, "..since the total invested by all partners together was 20,000 ducats, a suspiciously large amount for a firm doing business in such a small trading center as Ancona." The author also observes that Francesco's name appeared on the trading contract, as "the Magnificent Count Sforza".
In Milan, Cosimo de'Medici made the decision to hedge his bets, so to speak, and preserve the Peace of Lodi's delicate balance of power by opening a Milanese branch, which would help Sforza consolidate his relatively new government (1450), by exclusively allowing him access to large amounts of funds and prevent the city from falling to the Venetians. The Ancona and Milan branches were opened respectively in 1436 and 1459, at different periods in Sforza's professional career, but they signified an enduring alliance between two powerful Italian families, both of whom contributed greatly to Italian stability during the latter half of the fifteenth century.
In Chapter 4, The Heyday of the Medici Bank: Cosimo at the Helm, 1429-1464, de Roover explains how, after the death of Giovanni di Bicci in 1429, the bank enjoyed its most prosperous period while under the partnership of his two sons, Cosimo, and Lorenzo de'Medici (Lorenzo the Elder), and expanded to form multiple branches not only within Italy but also abroad. Cosimo in particular possessed a very business-oriented mind and developed an astute sense of character judgment, leading to a succession of shrewd management decisions to appoint intelligent, capable men at his branches' leadership positions. "With Cosimo at the helm, the Medici Bank became the largest banking house of its time. Cosimo did not try to manage everything. On the contrary, instead of becoming submerged in detail, he understood how to delegate power while holding the reins of his team with a firm hand. Throughout his career, it was he who laid down the law, formulated policies, and saw to it that his instructions were obeyed to the letter."
The business-savvy Medici eventually expanded their profitable banking firm to include other businesses and trades, opening two woolshops, which from 1397-1420 generated approximately 8,472 florins, 5.5 percent of total Medici profits for that period, and a lucrative silkshop that, as of November 1, 1441, had a working capital, called a corpo, of 4,200 florins with a surplus, called a soppracorpo, of 3,120 florins, and succeeded in large part due to its skilled manager, Francesco Berlinghieri. The Medici also trafficked in alum, working with Pope Pius II to become the exclusive partner in a Papal mining contract that permitted them to extract the precious mineral from the alum mine in the Italian city of Tolfa, near Citavecchia, upon its discovery in 1470. This effectually made the Medici the most reliable alum procurer in Europe during that period.
Professor de Roover explores the bank's organizational structure, analyzes management and staffing at its numerous branches, and discusses more specialized topics such as its written correspondence and accounting procedures, in Chapter 5, The Legal Status and Economic Structure of the Medici Bank. The bank's full-time personnel comprised three kinds of workers - fattori, or factors, were employees who could be bound to a banking firm by a notarial contract, and if they were outstanding at their jobs, fattori could receive bonuses and additional income, but they were not eligible for profit sharing; and compagno, or partners, who were privileged employees affiliated with the bank through partnership agreements, through the terms of which they shared in the profits along with the maggiore, or senior partners, a reserved position for major shareholders. The Medici were considered members of the maggiore.
Chapter 7, The Medici as Merchants and as Dealers in Iron and Alum introduces several enterprises the Medici engaged in to generate additional revenue, such as venture trading, underwriting, and mining in alum and iron. When a firm decided to invest capital into selling a specialized, high-risk commodity, the practice was known as venture trading, or "adventuring". These were one-time consignments on rare items such as exotic foods and spices, Latin manuscripts, and woven tapestries, and they ran a high risk of failure, either due to the agent's dishonesty or his inability to sell through his complete stock. The bank's diverse portfolio even included the occasional underwriting of ships carrying expensive or high-volume cargoes, to help safeguard investors against the risks associated with losing the merchandise to a shipwreck in a long sea voyage. The Venice branch generally functioned as the insurance hub for the rest of the company, as it possessed the sufficient capital to negotiate policies for the other branches.
In Chapters 9-13, Professor de Roover limns what are perhaps the most compelling portions of his study - the engaging individual chronicles of the Medici Bank's numerous branches. Each location's story is an economic narrative possessing its own unique appeal - the Rome branch was administered without any initial working capital - the Catholic Church and its Pope performed gigantic deposits that provided all the money it would ever need, and "Up to 1435, it produced more than 50 percent of the bank's aggregate earnings." The Florentine branch was known as the Tavola, and its members were required to register in the city's money-changers gild, the Arte del Cambio. This branch mostly dealt in banking, imports and exports, and bills of exchange, and it survived with a low reserve of ready capital due to its close proximity to the Medici central office.
The Venice branch opened in 1402 under the leadership of Neri di Cipriano Tornaquinci, and it experienced an odious beginning, "..when it was discovered that Neri had been reporting fictitious profits and that there actually was a loss. He also reported profits for the next three years (1403-1405), but these were never credited to the partners' accounts. As Neri's doings aroused suspicion, an investigation was made, and all sorts of frauds were uncovered." Although the Medici did seek reparations against Neri in the Florence's mercantile court, the Sei della Mercanzia, Giovanni di Bicci later took pity on him, sending him 36 florins while he was living in a state of poverty in Cracow, Poland. There are also sections exploring the fascinating stories of the branches in Naples, Milan, Pisa, Geneva, Lyons, Avignon, Bruges and London. Chapter 14, The Decline: 1464-1494 chronicles the bank's waning years during Francesco Sassetti's disastrous tenure as manager, as well as the financial impact of the Florentine bank crash of 1464 and the Pazzi Conspiracy of 1478.
Raymond de Roover's The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 is an outstanding financial study on the most powerful banking family of the Italian Quattrocento, and an exceptional work of modern twentieth-century scholarship that has yet to be equaled. Taking into account the fact that the book was written over sixty years ago, and that in the reviewer's opinion, its subject matter likely falls into the upper tier of intermediate-to-advanced, the author's chosen prose style is remarkably easy to read, rendering its difficulty level not as intimidating as it may at first appear, and its enjoyment level higher than one might expect. I believe that any reader could undertake this book, learn a tremendous amount from it, and also enjoy it immensely in the bargain. Thank you so much for reading, I hope that you enjoyed the review!
The Medici Bank of Florence ranked among Europe's most powerful financial institutions during the Italian Late Middle Age and early Renaissance periods, earning its place next to the Fuggers of Augsburg, Genoa's Casa di San Giorgio, and the Ricciardi bank of Lucca. It flourished under Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici, dominated the economic landscape under Cosimo Pater Patriae and his sons, Piero de'Medici and Giovanni di Cosimo, and was subsequently brought to ruin under Lorenzo the Magnificent and his heir, Piero the Unfortunate. Florence and the Medici were not, however, always placed at the forefront of Italian political and financial affairs. During the Italian Duecento, or thirteenth century, the preeminent banking establishment on the peninsula was the Gran Tavola (great table, or bank) of Orlando Buonsignori, a wealthy Sienese financier whose firm failed in 1298, with Florence afterward assuming Siena's former position as Italy's foremost banking city.
"The Medici are well known in history because of the prominent rôle they played in the Italian Renaissance as political figures or as patrons of letters and fine arts. However, their activity as bankers and traders did not attract the same degree of attention. Yet, it was economic power that made it possible for the Medici to seize political power and that also provided the financial resources which enabled them to commission artists, to promote humanism, to collect a unique and magnificent library..and to spend huge amounts on monumental buildings..The Medici, from Giovanni di Bicci down, were not of the middle class, as some sociological historians have held, since the tax records show that they were by far the richest family in the entire city of Florence and occupied the upper rung of the social ladder." These passages from the introductory chapter of Raymond de Roover's The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 speak loudly in favor of the Medici clan's indominable economic aspirations, their genius for generating revenue, and their ability to transcend their own mercantile social status and stand amongst kings and queens.
The Medici certainly had their share of competition in Florence, however, coming in the form of powerful rival banking clans, most notably the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli - who, between them, effectively dominated Florentine financial affairs during the first half of the fourteenth century. The onset of the Black Death in 1347 led to these three families' banking "companies", as they were known, collapsing, due to a number of factors which, according to de Roover, were "..probably caused by overextension of credit and excessive loans to sovereigns, especially to Edward III (reigned 1327-1377), King of England, and to Robert (1309-1343), the Angevin King of Naples." Their downfall set the stage for the Medici's hegemonic rise to become the most prestigious European banking house of the Italian Quattrocento, allowing them to enter politics where they became Grand Dukes of Tuscany and produced two Catholic Popes, before marrying into the Royal House of France.
This digitally-printed trade paperback edition of Professor Raymond de Roover's The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 was first published in 1963, but released as part of the Norton Library in 1966 by W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., and its 375-page main text is accompanied by a host of supplementary materials which include twelve photos of Medici artwork and sculpture, numerous charts, figures, graphs and numerical statistics accompanying the text, appendices containing names of the Medici's general and branch managers, and a short list of relevant historical events occurring during 1397-1404. There are also 75 pages of additional notes, a 17-page bibliography and an index at the back of the volume.
In Chapter 2, The Medici Bank and its Institutional Background, de Roover discusses the different ways that medieval and Renaissance banking companies would be constrained by church protocol to circumvent the usury doctrine, which prohibited the collection of interest resulting from financial transactions. The Medici and other banking firms had to be very inventive in how they conducted their respective businesses to comply with these regulations and remain on the correct side of ecclesiastical policies, hopefully avoiding being labeled as usurers by the Catholic Church.
The primary method they utilized to achieve this was through a process known as a four-party exchange. Although there were variations to the number and role of the involved parties, the exchange was the Late Middle Age or Renaissance equivalent to the traditional 'loan', in the sense that modern society is familiar with it. It was a complex, circuitous transaction that could not be conducted in the normal manner, using the same monetary unit with interest tacked onto the principal amount. The interest rate had to be incorporated into an exchange fee that was charged when money changed hands between two currencies, and was written up onto a bill of exchange.
Once initiated, a standard bill of exchange took a predetermined amount of time to mature, after which the transaction could be concluded, and it had four parties. The process began in a particular city, and, using one form of currency, the deliverer, also called the remitter, would buy a bill of exchange from the taker, or drawer, at a fluctuating exchange rate, which completed the first portion of the deal. There was then an intervening period, usually one to three months, when the bill matured, after which the next part of the exchange could be undertaken. The second half of the process was conducted in the second city, using the second form of currency, and involved a payor, or drawee (usually an associate of the taker, or drawer) accepting and paying the bill upon maturity, and then, for the final part of the transaction, the payee, or beneficiary (who was generally associated with the deliverer, or remitter), would collect the bill in the deliverer's name. Afterward, an inverse process would occur using another four-party bill of exchange, with a new exchange rate and an additional one-to-three-month period, after which the second form of currency was converted back to the original, and with any luck the two exchange rates would work out to accrue the original deliverer a greater amount of capital than he had invested at the beginning.
While the reviewer is by no stretch of the imagination a financial expert, he nonetheless had a wonderful time working through Raymond de Roover's technical analyses concerning the ins and outs of Medici banking, reading with rapt attention as the economic historian's thoughtful prose explained these complicated concepts with relative ease, utilizing helpful diagrams and hypothetical examples that rendered them much, much easier to understand. The exchange procedure just described uses a transparent four-party model, meaning that the parties can be substituted, rearranged or combined to accommodate many different kinds of transactions, but de Roover does not dwell overmuch on this procedural aspect of the story he tells.
First instituted in 1423, the Florentine castato was a tax on real estate and investments that was normally levied once or twice a year, but during times of emergency it could be collected more frequently. It originally came into being during a period when the monte comune had grown so large as to be unmanageable, and Florence became increasingly involved in costly wars with other Italian city-states such as Lucca and Milan. The monte comune, or public fund, was a concept that had developed over a period of 2-3 years following the short reign of Walter of Brienne, who had "..found himself in such desperate straits that he cancelled all assignments in order to have the tax money flow into the public treasury instead of into the pockets of the state creditors." This government debt was rolled into a massive public debt, the monte comune, which was then bought into by wealthy private citizens, who provided the Florentine government with instant capital, and in return were paid interest, with their profits increasing according to how many shares they had purchased.
Professor de Roover has amazingly provided data from none other than Cosimo de'Medici's tax receipt for the 1457 castato, in which he and his nephew Pierfranceso report their total assets to be 122,669 florins for that year, including Cosimo's sizeable real estate holdings (59,741 florins) and his stock in the monte comune (8,569 florins). These are weighted against his 7,499 florins in total deductions, which include the administrative expense for his real estate, his 120 pairs of oxen and the cost of feeding his 14 family members. After deductions, the new sum for Cosimo's total taxable wealth, called the sovrabbondante, drops to 115,170 florins. Finally, the castato itself was calculated as one-half percent of the sovrabbondante, leaving Cosimo owing 576 florins.
Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici, from whom the family's senior Cafaggiolo and junior Popolani branches originated, started his banking career in 1385 as a junior partner, working at the Roman branch of a Florence-based banking and trade company owned by his distant cousin, Vieri de'Medici, called "Vieri di Cambio de'Medici & Co.". Vieri was a banker first and foremost, but throughout the course of his forty-year career he had slowly expanded his firm to encompass other aspects of business, and upon his retirement in 1393, he divided his enterprise into three portions, entrusting them to his son, his nephew, and Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici. Vieri di Cambrio de'Medici's banking firm and numerous other topics related to how Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici came to control what became the most powerful financial institution in Europe, are explored in greater depth in Chapter 3, The Antecedents and the Early Years of the Medici Bank Under the Management of Giovanni di Bicci, 1397-1429.
On two separate occasions, first at Ancona and then in Milan, the Medici opened bank branches specifically to accommodate the financial needs of the powerful condottiere-turned-lord, Francesco Sforza. The Ancona branch was ostensibly established to take advantage of the port city's increased Apulian and Levantine port traffic, but according to one historian, Frederick Gaupp, it was actually opened to fund Sforza's military campaigns in the Anconetana. The theory posited by Gaupp is very convincing, especially upon reading de Roover's data, "..since the total invested by all partners together was 20,000 ducats, a suspiciously large amount for a firm doing business in such a small trading center as Ancona." The author also observes that Francesco's name appeared on the trading contract, as "the Magnificent Count Sforza".
In Milan, Cosimo de'Medici made the decision to hedge his bets, so to speak, and preserve the Peace of Lodi's delicate balance of power by opening a Milanese branch, which would help Sforza consolidate his relatively new government (1450), by exclusively allowing him access to large amounts of funds and prevent the city from falling to the Venetians. The Ancona and Milan branches were opened respectively in 1436 and 1459, at different periods in Sforza's professional career, but they signified an enduring alliance between two powerful Italian families, both of whom contributed greatly to Italian stability during the latter half of the fifteenth century.
In Chapter 4, The Heyday of the Medici Bank: Cosimo at the Helm, 1429-1464, de Roover explains how, after the death of Giovanni di Bicci in 1429, the bank enjoyed its most prosperous period while under the partnership of his two sons, Cosimo, and Lorenzo de'Medici (Lorenzo the Elder), and expanded to form multiple branches not only within Italy but also abroad. Cosimo in particular possessed a very business-oriented mind and developed an astute sense of character judgment, leading to a succession of shrewd management decisions to appoint intelligent, capable men at his branches' leadership positions. "With Cosimo at the helm, the Medici Bank became the largest banking house of its time. Cosimo did not try to manage everything. On the contrary, instead of becoming submerged in detail, he understood how to delegate power while holding the reins of his team with a firm hand. Throughout his career, it was he who laid down the law, formulated policies, and saw to it that his instructions were obeyed to the letter."
The business-savvy Medici eventually expanded their profitable banking firm to include other businesses and trades, opening two woolshops, which from 1397-1420 generated approximately 8,472 florins, 5.5 percent of total Medici profits for that period, and a lucrative silkshop that, as of November 1, 1441, had a working capital, called a corpo, of 4,200 florins with a surplus, called a soppracorpo, of 3,120 florins, and succeeded in large part due to its skilled manager, Francesco Berlinghieri. The Medici also trafficked in alum, working with Pope Pius II to become the exclusive partner in a Papal mining contract that permitted them to extract the precious mineral from the alum mine in the Italian city of Tolfa, near Citavecchia, upon its discovery in 1470. This effectually made the Medici the most reliable alum procurer in Europe during that period.
Professor de Roover explores the bank's organizational structure, analyzes management and staffing at its numerous branches, and discusses more specialized topics such as its written correspondence and accounting procedures, in Chapter 5, The Legal Status and Economic Structure of the Medici Bank. The bank's full-time personnel comprised three kinds of workers - fattori, or factors, were employees who could be bound to a banking firm by a notarial contract, and if they were outstanding at their jobs, fattori could receive bonuses and additional income, but they were not eligible for profit sharing; and compagno, or partners, who were privileged employees affiliated with the bank through partnership agreements, through the terms of which they shared in the profits along with the maggiore, or senior partners, a reserved position for major shareholders. The Medici were considered members of the maggiore.
Chapter 7, The Medici as Merchants and as Dealers in Iron and Alum introduces several enterprises the Medici engaged in to generate additional revenue, such as venture trading, underwriting, and mining in alum and iron. When a firm decided to invest capital into selling a specialized, high-risk commodity, the practice was known as venture trading, or "adventuring". These were one-time consignments on rare items such as exotic foods and spices, Latin manuscripts, and woven tapestries, and they ran a high risk of failure, either due to the agent's dishonesty or his inability to sell through his complete stock. The bank's diverse portfolio even included the occasional underwriting of ships carrying expensive or high-volume cargoes, to help safeguard investors against the risks associated with losing the merchandise to a shipwreck in a long sea voyage. The Venice branch generally functioned as the insurance hub for the rest of the company, as it possessed the sufficient capital to negotiate policies for the other branches.
In Chapters 9-13, Professor de Roover limns what are perhaps the most compelling portions of his study - the engaging individual chronicles of the Medici Bank's numerous branches. Each location's story is an economic narrative possessing its own unique appeal - the Rome branch was administered without any initial working capital - the Catholic Church and its Pope performed gigantic deposits that provided all the money it would ever need, and "Up to 1435, it produced more than 50 percent of the bank's aggregate earnings." The Florentine branch was known as the Tavola, and its members were required to register in the city's money-changers gild, the Arte del Cambio. This branch mostly dealt in banking, imports and exports, and bills of exchange, and it survived with a low reserve of ready capital due to its close proximity to the Medici central office.
The Venice branch opened in 1402 under the leadership of Neri di Cipriano Tornaquinci, and it experienced an odious beginning, "..when it was discovered that Neri had been reporting fictitious profits and that there actually was a loss. He also reported profits for the next three years (1403-1405), but these were never credited to the partners' accounts. As Neri's doings aroused suspicion, an investigation was made, and all sorts of frauds were uncovered." Although the Medici did seek reparations against Neri in the Florence's mercantile court, the Sei della Mercanzia, Giovanni di Bicci later took pity on him, sending him 36 florins while he was living in a state of poverty in Cracow, Poland. There are also sections exploring the fascinating stories of the branches in Naples, Milan, Pisa, Geneva, Lyons, Avignon, Bruges and London. Chapter 14, The Decline: 1464-1494 chronicles the bank's waning years during Francesco Sassetti's disastrous tenure as manager, as well as the financial impact of the Florentine bank crash of 1464 and the Pazzi Conspiracy of 1478.
Raymond de Roover's The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 is an outstanding financial study on the most powerful banking family of the Italian Quattrocento, and an exceptional work of modern twentieth-century scholarship that has yet to be equaled. Taking into account the fact that the book was written over sixty years ago, and that in the reviewer's opinion, its subject matter likely falls into the upper tier of intermediate-to-advanced, the author's chosen prose style is remarkably easy to read, rendering its difficulty level not as intimidating as it may at first appear, and its enjoyment level higher than one might expect. I believe that any reader could undertake this book, learn a tremendous amount from it, and also enjoy it immensely in the bargain. Thank you so much for reading, I hope that you enjoyed the review!
March 8, 2023
又消滅一本閱讀器藏書啦
有會計專才的歷史學家似乎很少
大概是當會計師好賺多了吧
像作者這種有會計師資格的歷史學者
應該是挺少見的特例
但該怎麼評價本書呢....
只能說，有些書真的是不能當閒書隨便讀的Orzz
本書可以看得出體例嚴謹立論精密
但對只修過管院大一必修經原的我來說
實在太天書了
開篇介紹金融會計原理還有中世貨幣制度我就已經不行了
接著講中世紀金融運作，各分行運作史
各種術語報表和數字我都有看沒懂
(中世紀人為什麼都不用十進位?光金額換算我就昏頭了)
經濟會計學小白如我看完全書
只學到對貴族放款是很危險低
老爺們傾向是借錢不還賴皮到底
最後壞帳連環爆，銀行就倒店了
另外就是任用專業經理人是很重要的
"國父"科西莫除了自己的才能外
也謹慎選用有才能的經理
到了孫子豪奢的羅倫佐
自己沒有金融知識就算了，還用了一堆只想偷雞摸狗的庸才
再加上大環境不景氣，梅迪奇銀行就垮到底了
倒是覺得這本書很適合讓管理學院各系所來看
書中提到的金融原理，對管院學生來說應該都是小菜一碟吧~
我就...給個中庸的三星評價吧
有會計專才的歷史學家似乎很少
大概是當會計師好賺多了吧
像作者這種有會計師資格的歷史學者
應該是挺少見的特例
但該怎麼評價本書呢....
只能說，有些書真的是不能當閒書隨便讀的Orzz
本書可以看得出體例嚴謹立論精密
但對只修過管院大一必修經原的我來說
實在太天書了
開篇介紹金融會計原理還有中世貨幣制度我就已經不行了
接著講中世紀金融運作，各分行運作史
各種術語報表和數字我都有看沒懂
(中世紀人為什麼都不用十進位?光金額換算我就昏頭了)
經濟會計學小白如我看完全書
只學到對貴族放款是很危險低
老爺們傾向是借錢不還賴皮到底
最後壞帳連環爆，銀行就倒店了
另外就是任用專業經理人是很重要的
"國父"科西莫除了自己的才能外
也謹慎選用有才能的經理
到了孫子豪奢的羅倫佐
自己沒有金融知識就算了，還用了一堆只想偷雞摸狗的庸才
再加上大環境不景氣，梅迪奇銀行就垮到底了
倒是覺得這本書很適合讓管理學院各系所來看
書中提到的金融原理，對管院學生來說應該都是小菜一碟吧~
我就...給個中庸的三星評價吧
January 8, 2025
Väldigt spännande genomgång, och väldigt datarik.
December 24, 2018
A classic work on the Medici Bank. Not an easy read but well researched...
March 9, 2025
If you want to study business, take advice from Cosimo instead of Lorenzo.
October 6, 2025
I was given this book, because I owned a copy of Robert Sapolsky’s. Why Zebra’s don’t get Ulcers.
February 3, 2014
This is a great description of the origins of commerce and banking as we know them. The Medici Bank was headquartered in Florence, Italy, and had branches all over Europe. It has interesting implications for banking centralization and decentralization and I used it as required reading when I used to take student groups to Italy. It is well-referenced and fairly readable for those of us interested in the topic.
May 10, 2016
A comprehensive narrative and economic analysis of the Medici Bank. de Roover is second to none in his approach to economic history and presents a wealth of data to support his argument.
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