The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth

Modern War Studies

by Earl J. Hess

The Civil War's single-shot, muzzle-loading musket revolutionized warfare-or so we've been told for years. Noted historian Earl J. Hess forcefully challenges that claim, offering a new, clear-eyed, and convincing assessment of the rifle musket's actual performance on the battlefield and its impact on the course of the Civil War.

Many contemporaries were impressed with the new weapon's increased range of 500 yards, compared to the smoothbore musket's range of 100 yards, and assumed that the rifle was a major factor in prolonging the Civil War. Historians have also assumed that the weapon dramatically increased casualty rates, made decisive victories rare, and relegated cavalry and artillery to far lesser roles than they played in smoothbore battles.

Hess presents a completely new assessment of the rifle musket, contending that its impact was much more limited than previously supposed and was confined primarily to marginal operations such as skirmishing and sniping. He argues further that its potential to alter battle line operations was virtually nullified by inadequate training, soldiers' preference for short-range firing, and the difficulty of seeing the enemy at a distance. He notes that bullets fired from the new musket followed a parabolic trajectory unlike those fired from smoothbores; at mid-range, those rifle balls flew well above the enemy, creating two killing zones between which troops could operate untouched. He also presents the most complete discussion to date of the development of skirmishing and sniping in the Civil War.

Drawing upon the observations and reflections of the soldiers themselves, Hess offers the most compelling argument yet made regarding the actual use of the rifle musket and its influence on Civil War combat. Engagingly written and meticulously researched, his book will be of special interest to Civil War scholars, buffs, re-enactors, and gun enthusiasts alike.

Genres: History, Civil War, American Civil War, American History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Military History

296 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 2008

About the author

Earl J. Hess is Stewart W. McClelland Chair in History at Lincoln Memorial University and the author of numerous books on the Civil War.

Reviews

[Joseph · Rating 5 out of 5]

The author debunks several long-standing myths about the rifle musket in Civil War battles. One of the most interesting parts of this book, for me, was the discussion of Whitworth rifles run in through the Federal naval blockade. I didn't realize the Confederates had organized special units of snipers as well as the Federals. Not sure why this thought never presented itself to me in the hundreds of Civil War books I've read, but there it is, anyway. Bottom line; this book is far too nuanced for the general reader, but makes for good reading for the dedicated Civil War aficionado.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Earl J. Hess can probably be called the dean of academic historians working in the history of the War Between the States. The man is a veritable machine when it comes to writing, with output that is simply astounding. While he has written battle, and campaign narratives, unit histories, and has delved deep into the evolution of trench warfare during the war, my personal favorites of his are his two, largely mythbusting works on the firepower used during the war.
If you have read his recent work on field artillery, then you will have an insider's baseball look into his investigative discourse on the impact of the rifle musket during Civil War combat. As is typical for a Hess work, he begins with as earliest a start point as possible when laying the foundations of his study. In this case, he outlines not just the entire evolutionary history of firearms, from the middle Middle Ages, up till the middle of the 19th century, but also their use in warfare both in Europe, and in the America's.
This will be an important foundational element for later in the book when he begins to hammer home his thesis. He also spends a considerable amount of time discussing the gun culture of America, North, and South, our shared frontier heritage, and how all of that impacted the building, and operations, of large, semi-professional armies.
Having taken the reader through the discussion on the foundations of his chief arguments, he then dives into the meat of his book. At heart, this work is a myth-busting polemic. The accepted narrative of the impact of the rifle musket was that the incredibly increased range of the weapon (true, it was magnitude times longer ranged, and more accurate, than smoothbore muskets) made the battles of the War unusually bloody, and directly led to the evolution from Napoleonic warfare, to trench warfare by 1864. The rifle musket made cavalry obsolete, and negated the effectiveness of artillery by forcing it further back from the battle lines. All of which conspired to make the war as largely indecisive as it was.
Hess is quite sure you have heard all of those arguments before. And you have, of course. The problem with all of those arguments, however, is that they don't, any of them, hold up to closer scrutiny.
First of all, Hess points out that the dreadful casualties of the American Civil War, both in terms of sheer numbers, and in statistical averages, is actually not at all unusual for black powder era warfare. In fact, as his statistical study of battles from the Seven Years War in Europe, the War of the Spanish Succession, and the Napoleonic Wars shows, the losses during the War for Southern Independence were slightly lower, on average, than the casualties absorbed in battles in Europe.
For one example, the bloody stalemate of the Battle of Murfreesboro in Tennessee, with roughly 24,000 casualties (about 13,000 Federal, and 11,000 Confederate), came out an average of about 1 of 4 men involved in the battle. That is, of course, horrific, and most modern armies would lose all cohesion taking such losses, with units at the front end needing to be rotated off the front line for extensive rest, refit, and rebuilding. However, he contrasts Murfreesboro, America's bloodiest battle on statistical averages, with the utter massacre of humanity that was the Battle of Borodino in Russia in September, 1812.
There two massive armies, dwarfing those at Murfreesboro (roughly 40-45,000 Federals at Murfreesboro against roughly 35,000 Confederates) clashed for a single day, and lost just over a full third of their number with total losses being roughly as many men who fought at Murfreesboro in both armies. And Borodino was fought with weapons significantly less lethal than those used by American forces in central Tennessee fifty years later.
And for Battle after battle, Waterloo, Malplequet, Zörndorf, Austerlitz, Eylau, and Salamanca among others, Hess shows that the rate for casualties between wars in Europe, and in America, was roughly, statistically about the same.
As for the evolution of trench warfare by the middle or 1864, that was far less the alleged impact of the rifle musket, than it was the sheer happenstance of continuous contact in the two main theaters: Virginia, and Georgia. Trenches were the only way for men to rest, and refit from the continuous close combat initiated when Grant, as commander of all Federal armies, determined upon a strategy of attrition to wear down the Southern armies, rather than seek decisive victories, which often didn't go the Northerners way.
As for the rifle musket making cavalry obsolete, Hess argues that this myth comes about from a misunderstanding of cavalry's role in 19th century warfare. He points out, by giving examples from European warfare, that cavalry was not as effective against infantry as often claimed. Murat's extraordinary charges at Eylau, which broke the Russian lines not once, but twice, are counterbalanced by Waterloo, where French cuirassiers failed to even dent British, Dutch, and German squares. And the times when infantry stolidly fought off cavalry far outweighed the instances when they were ridden down. Cavalry was primarily an arm for forward reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. Napoleon, and other Europeans, oft misuse of this arm as an arm of shock often distorts the perception of their true role.
Artillery, as well, was never as decisive as is often assumed in Napoleonic warfare. The few cases were the French used their guns offensively, Friedland against the Russians being the prime example, came with an unacceptably high cost in the lives of highly trained, well educated, men and officers who staffed the batteries. While Colonel Senarmont's guns blew bloody swathes through the Russian infantry, it came at an incredible cost in men who were genuinely hard to replace. Most often, artillery was placed well back from the main line as it was, so American artillery in the War Between the States being most often quite a ways behind the front lines was not at all unusual. And for similar reasons. Artillery crews, both gunners, and officers, were typically better educated, and took longer to train to high levels of competence, so as an asset, they were less disposable than either infantry, or cavalry.
As for the relative indecisiveness of American battles, Hess makes the decisive case that throughout history, the vast majority of battles were not decisive. Austerlitz is arguably the most decisive battle in modern history, and was decisive not because the French were overly qualitatively superior to either the Austrians, or Russians, but because Napoleon had shaped the battlefield psychologically by goading the Coalition into a hasty attack, on ground of Napoleon's choosing. For most other battles of the era, the armies of all the sides were remarkably similar in capabilities, even appearance, to the point to where they were symmetrical copies of the other. Same holds true for the armies of North and South. The strengths, and weaknesses of the Union and Confederate armies balanced each other out, and the quality of leadership, obviously Lee, like Napoleon, Wellington, or Grant, were all anomalies, so there was little to differentiate the two sides even there.
Where the rifle musket did have a transformative impact was in one art which Americans perfected, but was then made obsolete, and in another which Americans largely invented, and which has since been perfected.
The first was skirmishing. Popularized by the French Republicans, though not invented, Americans in their cousins war between the two regions perfected it. And as Hess points out, the skill of the skirmisher was largely symmetrical between the two armies, only changing in 1864, specifically in Georgia, when logistical constraints forced the Confederates to reduce ammunition supply to their forward skirmisher screen. However, as Hess makes clear, skirmishers had a minor impact on the war, with the main battlelines being the key factor to determine victory. Skirmishing evaporated by the time of the Franco-Prussian War in importance.
The second was sniping. Here, Hess argues that the Confederates did have a slight edge over their Yankee foes in this, due to very modern, long range English rifles sent through the blockade. The skill sets of the sniper: individualistic, self capability, lone wolves, with high functionality outside the norms of group societal norms made these men extremely dangerous individuals, and modern snipers are much the same.
One final area where the rifle musket aided innovation was in Robert E. Lee's hand in helping to formulate modern special forces with his creation of Scout Battalions in 1863. These men were given tasks of deep reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and targeted strikes similar to modern special forces. However, local commanders often used these highly valuable assets in wasteful ways, shoving them into battlelines when they felt the need arose. However, when these men were allowed to do what they were trained for, they were extraordinary. This capability to utilize such units for the Army of Northern Virginia allowed to conduct trench raids for supply, and reconnaissance, during the Petersburg Campaign with a level of ability that the Army of the Potomac simply lacked.
Even with all of that, however, the rifle musket was only tangentially involved in their increased capabilities, and their small numbers meant that Rebel special ops were only minorly impactful to the war's outcome.
One area Hess didn't touch on was the in the extreme use of ammunition during the American War as opposed to the Napoleonic Wars.
I remember reading somewhere that the Civil War saw a four to five time increase in ammunition usage as compared to the Napoleonic Wars. This was due to the American propensity to stop an advance and engage in prolonged firefights with enemy formations. Only a handful of Napoleonic battles saw prolonged firefights, Marshal Davout's remarkable stand against the main Prussian Army at Auerstädt being the prime example. Hess does point out, however, that in battle, Americans used their rifle muskets at ranges similar to those of smoothbore muskets, with most firefights being under 100 yards, negating their range advantage.
Even modern firefights are at short range as well.
Possibly a soldier's natural instinct to prefer to see what they're shooting at plays a role?
He argues, as well, that the notion of European armies firing in compact blocks only on command is also a myth. Soldiers invariably get caught in the heat of the moment, and fire by file, sounds similar enough to fire at will, that officers rapidly lost control of their units when triggers begin to be pulled.
Americans, North and South, showcased how individualistic cultures can actually make that a virtue on the battlefield.
The one argument that he makes concerning the parabolic trajectory of rifle muskets, while true, isn't quite as convincing as I doubt Mr. Hess has actually fired a weapon before. Would be fun, however, to do my own experiments.
Overall, this was a joy of a book to read, and one that should be on every military historian's shelves. Highly recommended.

[Charles Inglin · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author challenges the conventional view that the introduction of the rifle musket significantly changed warfare in the age of the black powder muzzle loading weapon. The rifle musket, unlike its predecessor the smoothbore musket, was capable of accurate fire at much longer ranges. Where a smoothbore musket was seldom accurate beyond 75-100 yards the rifle musket was capable of accurate fire to as much as 1,500 yards. This extended range, in many opinions, meant that in the Civil War infantry attacks were bloodier, cavalry charges became impracticable, artillery was forced to position further from the main battle line, and entrenchments became more common. The author disputes this.

Drawing on the works and studies of other historians he points out that the typical Civil War battlefield seldom had open terrain where the full range of the rifle musket could come into play. Even if it was the high arc of the rifle musket bullet meant that accurate fire against a target advancing from a distance required the individual soldier to have a high degree of skill in range estimation and setting his sights, a skill which most soldiers didn't possess. In fact, the standard of marksmanship overall was relatively low and surprisingly neither army, with some units being exceptions, had much of a program to improve it. Instead reliance remained as it had been on massed volleys aimed generally in the direction of the enemy battle line. Studies of the ranges that battles were fought at indicate that the distance between battle lines increased only marginally.

Where the rifle musket did causes some changes was in the increased use of skirmishers, screens of soldiers sent out in front of the battle line to harass and disrupt the enemy line, taking advantage of terrain and aimed fire, where the capability of the rifle musket could be used to greater effect. Additionally the practice of sniping became much more common as the war progressed, with select expert shots being trained in performing the duty, often equipped with specialized target rifle capable of surprising accuracy for the day.

An interesting fact the author mentions: the American Civil War was the only major war in which both sides used the rifle musket. The rifle musket was developed around the late 1840's and started going into general issue in the mid-1850's, with the Pattern 1853 and 1856 Enfield in England and the Models 1855 and 1861 Springfield rifle Muskets in the US, and their equivalents in Europe. In the Crimean War the British and French were partially equipped with rifle muskets while the Russians were primarily armed with smoothbores. But in the next major war after the Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, both sides were equipped primarily with breech loading rifles. Such was the speed of firearms development.

Highly recommended for students of the American Civil War.

[Clarke Wood · Rating 4 out of 5]

Until about ten years ago, the standard interpretation of civil war combat was that the rifled musket and field fortifications revolutionized war and the US civil war was a precursor to the First World War. The high casualty rates in the war are attributed to the rifle, along with outdated tactics and the myopia of many military leaders. A number of scholars have challenged this interpretation, and Mr. Hess wrote a whole book about this. To summarize, while the rifled musket influenced skirmishing and made long range sniping possible, it did not render existing tactical practices useless or outmoded. It also did not make Civil War battles more bloody than previous land battles.

I think Hess proves his thesis pretty well. The rifle's low velocity and the utter lack of training in its use made its capabilities more theoretical for the mass of the soldiers in the conflict. The historical records discuss numerous firefights being conducted at ranges like this and lasting for long periods of time, which makes it hard to square with the idea of an empty and long range battlefield. The accounts from battles like Franklin or Fredericksburg talk about the bulk of bodies lying around 100 yards or less from the defender's positions. As a side note, studies from recent conflicts indicate that even most modern firefights occur at ranges of well under 300 meters, so rifles have not resulted in a lot of long range combat shooting.

[Josh Liller · Rating 4 out of 5]

Building on previous works like Battle Tactics of the Civil War and The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War, Earl Hess looks at the use of the rifled musket in the American Civil War.

Hess argues a variety of factors meant rifle muskets were not much of an advantage for line infantry over their smoothbore predecessors. They were more effectively used by skirmishers and similiar troops, but not decisively. This book presents both statistical data and a lot of anecdotes. It is extensively endnoted.

The ideas put forth here are not really revolutionary, though they also aren't universally accepted among American Civil War historians and buffs. This book is a bit more modern, focused, and certainly lighter than many other books that have looked at the subject (Nosworthy's is especially hefty). It also serves as an an effective synopsis of the theory from a well-known author and with the peer-review expected of a university press.

[Henry Davis IV · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book which challenges conventional wisdom about the effectiveness of rifles on Civil War battlefields, "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat" is a must read for anyone interested in Civil War (or 19th Century) tactics, sniping / military marksmanship, or the evolution of infantry equipment and tactics. In this book, Hess convincingly argues that even though the widespread use of rifles by both Union and Confederate forces helped make the enabling functions of skirmishing and sharpshooting (sniping entered the American lexicon in the early 20th Century) possible, neither of these functions had a decisive effect on Civil War battlefields alone. I think Hess could have expanded upon some of his evidence drawn from pre and post Civil War tactical trends without straying too far from the topic at hand, but his point is well made nonetheless. The concepts discussed and arguments put forth in this book could easily lead to a great deal of productive research to help inform modern ideas about infantry equipment and tactical employment.

[Matt Heil · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent overview of the actual use of the rifle musket -and not just its capabilities - during the American Civil War. Not only disproves unfounded assumptions, such as the rifle musket making Civil War combat bloodier, but also delves into the Soldier's relationships with their guns - cleaning and maintenance, gun culture before and during the war, preferences, tactics, and a great deal more. It's a fascinating and easily accessible read that every Civil War scholar, whether popular or academic, should have.

[Sean Chick · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the seminal books on Civil War tactics. I have my reservations on a few points, such as his discussion of decisive battles, but all around the thesis holds up. I like that he does mention the rifled musket being dangerous with skirmishers and snipers, which made it hard for artillery to offer close support and generals to survey the battlefield. Napoleon and Frederick II often did close inspections which got men such as McCulloh and Sedgwick killed.

[Chris Miller · Rating 5 out of 5]

Earl Hess is a master of scholarly research, evidence-based conclusions, subject thoroughness, and conversational writing. In The Riifle Musket in Civil War Combat, he gives us a history lesson on the weapon's development, use, effectiveness, and implementation. Along the way, he constructs a historiography dealing with the perceptions of some historians. It is interesting and informative on many levels.

[James Dickerson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good review on the reality of the role of the Rifle Musket

[Chuck · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fairly comprehensive book on the rifle-musket and the civil war.

The author wrote well and I enjoyed the book. It was well researched and highly informative.

But the book seemed fairly technical and dispassionate. I did not get the feeling that he was out there with muzzle-loading/black powder groups shooting every weekend. Clearly to write a book on this subject requires a lot of love for the subject. But the author's voice in the writing did not convey that to me as a reader.

I highly recommend this book if you are a student of the Civil War and/or interested in firearms of this transitional period. The author makes a very credible argument that the rifled musket had less affect on the battles and battle casualties of the Civil War than was commonly been argued. Particularly in the first two years.

(Addendum)
I reopened this book to research a discussion on battles between the Texas Rangers and Comanches. I was surprised at how much better the book seemed in my second reading. I have not yet had a chance to think about how my perception changed. Nonetheless, I have upped the star count to 4 and must note that it provides a tremendous amount of information difficult to find elsewhere. (Beyond, perhaps Nosworthy's "The Bloody Crucible of Courage")

[Nick · Rating 3 out of 5]

The author set himself the very difficult task of proving a negative. His premise was that most other authors on the subject of Civil War weaponry were wrong, and that the technology of rifling did NOT have a major influence on combat.
Several facts he presented were very enlightening, such as the fact that a rifled musket actually has a lower velocity for the bullet as it leaves the barrel than a smoothbore. On the other hand, he didn't seem to mention the more rapid drop-off of velocity, and his explanation of bullet trajectories was a bit confusing.
In addition, he presents plenty of reasons why the rifled musket would have a psychological effect on the battlefield, but doesn't seem to think this matters.
He made an excellent case for the idea that neither side trained their troops very well, and he made a good case for rifled musketry not mattering much on the line of battle, but his own evidence showed that the effect on skirmishing and sniping was enormous. You may not be able to win an actual battle just with skirmishing and sniping, but he repeatedly showed that you could greatly damage the enemy's morale by superior use of those aspects.
So, the book is well worth reading, but didn't quite convince me of his initial premise.

[Danielle · Rating 5 out of 5]

I absolutely loved this book! Chapter 1 was a little rough because I didn't understand all the parts of the gun, but once I found a diagram of a Cvil War musket I was good to go. I really enjoyed this book and highly recommend it.