Stability

by U.S. Department of the Army

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, Stability, is the Army's doctrine for stability operations tasks. ADP 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations in operations. It establishes the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrinal publications. See the introductory figure on page iv for an illustrated overview of ADP 3-07. ADP 3-07 provides the doctrine for the conduct of stability operations, just as ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, provides doctrine for the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. The doctrine in ADP 3-07 provides a foundation for the Army's operational concept of unified land operations. This publication also forms the foundation for training and Army education curricula on stability operations tasks in operations.

78 pages, Paperback

Published September 27, 2019

About the author

The Department of the Army (DA) is one of the three military departments within the Department of Defense of the United States of America. The Department of the Army is the Federal Government agency within which the United States Army is organized, and it is led by the Secretary of the Army who has statutory authority 10 U.S.C. § 3013 to conduct its affairs and to prescribe regulations for its government, subject to the limits of the law, and the directions of the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The Secretary of the Army is a civilian official appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The highest-ranking military officer in the department is the Chief of Staff of the Army, who is also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other senior officials of the Department are the Under Secretary of the Army (principal deputy to the Secretary) and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (principal deputy to the Chief of Staff.)

The Department of War was originally formed in 1789 as an Executive Department of the United States, and was renamed by the National Security Act of 1947 to the Department of the Army on September 18, 1947. By amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 in 1949, the Department of the Army was transformed to its present-day status.

Reviews

[J.R. · Rating 2 out of 5]

Reading this helps make sense in my mind why the United States military utterly failed at obtaining its strategic objectives in Afghanistan.

One of the major objectives for a military force to accomplish if it wants sustained peace, is supporting a host nation government that is seen to have autonomy and legitimacy amongst the native population. This is difficult to do when there is an invading army occupying the nation and providing material support to said government.

This becomes even more difficult given the doctrine written here, that states that only democratic republican forms of government can provide rule of law and legitimacy. Not only is that historically inaccurate (most nations that have existed were not republican in form, nor democratic) it very well could be seen as Americans imposing their cultural beliefs upon the inhabitants of the host nation. Afghanistan had no history of republican government, no history of democratic institutions amongst the masses. Therefore, the population never saw the government as legitimate or a reflection of the Afghan people.

Sure, you could argue that stability was ensured while a relatively small contingent of US forces were present in the country, however, if you cannot consolidate gains and ensure sustained peace, did your strategy really work? Plenty of people have pointed fingers across the two decades as to why Stability operations failed in Afghanistan, I'd say critically examining Stability Operations doctrine (published in 2019) would be a good place to start.