Strategic Instincts: The Adaptive Advantages of Cognitive Biases in International Politics

by Dominic D.P. Johnson

"A very timely book."―Anne-Marie Slaughter, CEO of New America
How cognitive biases can guide good decision making in politics and international relations

A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases―quirks of the brain we all share as human beings―are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In Strategic Instincts , Dominic Johnson challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, he considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information.

Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases―overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. He then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. He acknowledges the dark side of biases―when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance.

Strategic Instincts shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.

Genres: Psychology, History, Nonfiction

392 pages, Hardcover

Published September 8, 2020

Reviews

[Maher Razouk · Rating 5 out of 5]

لقد عاش الناس وماتوا ، أو ضحوا بالآخرين ، ليس فقط من أجل المكاسب المادية ولكن أيضا من أجل الأيديولوجية والدين والمبدأ والعدالة والكبرياء والشرف والانتقام والمجد. وكما أشار ديفيد ويلش بقوله: "عند قراءة النصوص الكلاسيكية لنظرية العلاقات الدولية، لن يشك المرء أبداً في أن البشر لديهم أدمغة يمينية وكذلك يسارية. فبالإضافة إلى كونهم أنانيين ، فإنهم يحبون أيضا ويكرهون ويأملون ؛ إنهم في بعض الأحيان لا يتصرفون بدافع المصلحة ، ولكن بدافع الشجاعة أو الأدب أو الغضب ".

حتى عندما ناضلوا من أجل مصالح مادية أكثر عقلانية، مثل الثروة أو السلطة، فقد تأثر الناس كذلك بالتصورات الخاطئة والتحيزات على طول الطريق. في كثير من الأحيان، أدى هذا إلى كارثة. تقدم مسيرة الحماقة لباربرا توكمان، على سبيل المثال، سلسلة من الأمثلة على الدول التي تمكنت من التصرف ضد مصلحتها الذاتية، مع الشخصيات والتأثيرات النفسية التي تساعد في إسقاط الحكومات، والتنازل عن الأراضي، وخسارة الحروب!!
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Dominic D. P. Johnson
Strategic Instincts
Translated By #Maher_Razouk

[Kevin Christiansen · Rating 3 out of 5]

An outside-the-box discussion of cognitive biases at the intersection of international relations and psychology. The argument of the book is that cognitive biases evolved in humans because they provided adaptive advantages (think shorthand/quick decision making) and that these advantages still exist today in the field of international relations. Johnson focuses on overconfidence, fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias (although other cognitive biases may also provide advantages), and uses examples of the American Revolution, Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler, and the war in the Pacific as examples to illustrate his point. The author notes that his argument runs counter to conventional views that cognitive biases often tend to lead to less optimal decision-making and outcomes (e.g., Daniel Kahneman/Amos Tversky in Thinking, Fast and Slow). While I think the author makes a forceful argument, I was left with a variety of questions including: would these biases still lead to positive outcomes in our 21st century world; what are the limits beyond which these biases produce less than optimal outcomes; and does this theory discount rational choice more than it should (a fourth question is why don't I get out more). I also think the book would benefit from more historical examples to support Johnson's argument. While not necessarily a relaxing read, it's definitely thought-provoking.