The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today

The Princeton Economic History of the Western World #80

by David Stasavage

"One of the most important books on political regimes written in a generation." —Steven Levitsky, New York Times –bestselling author of How Democracies Die

A new understanding of how and why early democracy took hold, how modern democracy evolved, and what this history teaches us about the future

Historical accounts of democracy’s rise tend to focus on ancient Greece and pre-Renaissance Europe. The Decline and Rise of Democracy draws from global evidence to show that the story is much richer—democratic practices were present in many places, at many other times, from the Americas before European conquest, to ancient Mesopotamia, to precolonial Africa. Delving into the prevalence of early democracy throughout the world, David Stasavage makes the case that understanding how and where these democracies flourished—and when and why they declined—can provide crucial information not just about the history of governance, but also about the ways modern democracies work and where they could manifest in the future.

Drawing from examples spanning several millennia, Stasavage first considers why states developed either democratic or autocratic styles of governance and argues that early democracy tended to develop in small places with a weak state and, counterintuitively, simple technologies. When central state institutions (such as a tax bureaucracy) were absent—as in medieval Europe—rulers needed consent from their populace to govern. When central institutions were strong—as in China or the Middle East—consent was less necessary and autocracy more likely. He then explores the transition from early to modern democracy, which first took shape in England and then the United States, illustrating that modern democracy arose as an effort to combine popular control with a strong state over a large territory. Democracy has been an experiment that has unfolded over time and across the world—and its transformation is ongoing.

Amidst rising democratic anxieties, The Decline and Rise of Democracy widens the historical lens on the growth of political institutions and offers surprising lessons for all who care about governance.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, Political Science, Economics, World History, Academic

424 pages, Hardcover

Published June 2, 2020

About the author

David Stasavage is the Julius Silver Professor in NYU’s Department of Politics and an Affiliated Professor in NYU’s School of Law, as well as its Department of History. He uses both current and historical data to investigate long run trends in inequality and in the development of state institutions. Recently, together with Ken Scheve at Stanford, he published Taxing The Rich, a book that charts the evolution of progressive taxation in twenty countries over the last two centuries. Before that he published States of Credit and Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State, two books in which he explored the joint development of representative government and public borrowing in Europe during the medieval and early modern periods. David has also published a number of articles on these and related topics. He is currently working on a book under contract for Princeton University Press that will explore the history of government by consent in a global setting, charting the long rise of democracy in Europe in comparison with China, the Middle East, and other world regions.

Reviews

[Jacopo Quercia · Rating 5 out of 5]

Any book on politics written before January 6, 2021, is now an artifact of history, a dated document that should be held to a simple standard: do its arguments still stand against what we now know about the United States? Did its author anticipate the Republican Party's embrace of authoritarianism or Donald Trump's failed coup attempt? Does the text depict white supremacy as a domestic terror capable of temporarily seizing the U.S. Capitol? Do the book's arguments accurately depict American democracy as a fragile thing, a potential crisis if unattended, or perhaps an idea so unrealistic that it has only ever existed in idea? Such was my approach when writing this review these last two weeks.

"To understand where we are today—and where we might be headed," Prof. David Stasavage (NYU) opens, "we need to broaden our view to look at the deep history of democracy." His exhaustive study of the subject is remarkably succinct, covering thousands of years of world history in just under 300 pages. The result is edifying and should upend many misunderstandings about the nature of democracy, which Stasavage writes was "widespread in human societies... just about as common as autocracy" from its early history. He adds "that humans were governed in these two very different ways across multiple millennia and many world regions should lead us to a clear conclusion: there was no single common path of political development." Simply put, democracy "come naturally to humans even if it far from inevitable." This statement alone, which closes the book's second of twelves chapters, should warrant purchasing this book.

'The Decline and Rise of Democracy' is a welcome read for any researcher and refreshingly approachable, making it a desirable text for use in college classrooms. Its global scope is also as welcome as it is warranted—I particularly enjoyed the book's attention to ancient China and the Americas. For me personally, I must commend Prof. Stasavage for presenting valuable insight and compelling arguments on American democracy at a crucial hour in our nation's history. I read this book in full before the events of January 6, 2021, and after reexamining it for this review, it is my pleasure to recommend this book as one of the few that got it right about democracy in America when it was under siege. 5 stars.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

An impressive and wide-ranging book about why modern and early democracy formed and did not form in different parts of the world. Stasavage's argument hinges on the difference between early and modern demo. Early demo, he argues, was far more widespread than we tend to think; while Athens had the most robust and formalized demo of the early world, many if not most societies had forms of local rule, council government, assemblies, independent city gov't, etc, all of which meant that at least some people at the local and regional levels were consenting to the rule of a King or other central power while retaining the power to resist its edicts. This could take the form of African towns, European cities and shires, confederacies like the Huron, etc. I think the use of the word democracy in those situations is tenuous, but it does show that most of the monarchies we think of in history really weren't that powerful, usually because they lacked a bureaucratic state, and that even empires like Rome relied heavily on negotiation and consent with outlying territories. Modern demo, on the other hand, emerged in just a few places (GB, USA, etc). it involved more formal representation of a wider range of people, formal constitutional limits on gov't power, enumerated rights, the end of the mandate form of representation, and federalism.

So why then did some areas/civilizations become democratic (Europe, North America, India, sub-Saharan Africa) while others did not (MIddle East, China)? Stasavage's answer is all about the balance of power between the people and the state, which can hinge on all kinds of geographical, sociological, agricultural, environmental, etc reasons. China and Egypt, for instance, originated in highly fertile river valleys that allowed significant concentration of the population (thus easier to control) as well as systematic, intensive agricultural cooperation. The high-yield loess fields, concentrated in river valleys, enabled governments to make the territory "legible," ie they could figure out how much a given area would produce in an average year and thus how much they could tax. Ordinary people had fewer "exit options<" meaning that if they disliked the ruler's actions it was hard to leave (like in Egypt, where are you going to go?). In China in particular, to manage and protect farmland, a bureaucratic state formed under the Shang dynasty in which the government ruled directly at the local level without relying much on local entities; the system of competitive civil service exams obviated the need to negotiate with local potentates (unlike a feudal system, for instance, or the early US colonies). Thus the Chinese bureaucratic state was installed early, was remarkably persistent across millennia, and was highly involved in ordinary life.

Stasavage argues that if a country formed a bureaucratic state (especially one with a centralized, professional military-think Prussia) before it developed systems of local rule, assembly gov't, mediated powers, etc, it is handicapped in the long run in terms of becoming democratic. In other cases, invaders inherit a bureaucratic state, which only has the same effect. He doesn't really spell out the mechanisms here, but the idea is that to have democracy you want a pattern/tradition in which the people have a great deal of leverage vis the gov't: they can leave if they dislike things, they control local affairs more or less, if they are called for military service/higher taxes they can demand stuff in return (think of co-evolution of universal conscription and suffrage in the 19th and early 20th centuries), and so on. Britain had these traditions of both local rule, the expectation that the gov't would respect local prerogatives and rights, and a legacy of counsel government, which were key preconditions. Britain had these things long before it started to build a bureaucratic state in the 18th century under the era of Parliamentary supremacy, which meant that its formation of a large and powerful state didn't destroy democracy, although it certainly eroded local rule to some extent. The balance of power between the government and the people was even more lopsided in the colonies (massive exit options, few people who wanted to settle there in the first place, high demand for labor, easy availability of land, difficulty of communication/travel) that even more stubborn practices of independence and local/state government formed, leading to the formation of the world's first modern democracy shortly after the Revolution.

One of the interesting insights of this book is that advances in technology, as well as economic growth, don't necessarily encourage freedom and democracy. Something like writing, or agricultural techniques, may make the people/land more legible to the state and make it easier for the state to exert power across space. China was case #1 for this; it was more technologically advanced than Europe for most of the 500-1500 era, especially in agriculture, but the pre-existence of a strong state meant that these advances only enhanced state power. China and Europe both had a commercial revolution in the Middle Ages, but the state was able to control this in China whereas European states failed to do so. Thus, the advance of civilization may only make it easier for centralized states to rule autocratically, hence the importance of sequencing and contingency in Stasavage's argument: if you develop a state and then democracy, you are in trouble, if you develop early democracy then a state, you have a much better chance of building and sustaining modern democracy.

Stasavage is brilliant at moving this complex story forward, although I did get a little tired of descriptions of agricultural techniques and methods of governance in ancient societies. I know this is essential to his argument; I just add this to say that not all of the book is thrilling; you have to bear with him as he sets up a lot of stuff about early civilizations (in short, this is a fascinating read, but not an easy one). This book is a great challenge for historians, as it seemingly downgrades the importance of ideas, politics, and individual decisions/actions. In a sense, this is true, but I think the bigger picture is less damning in this sense. Individual and collective actions always matter; people are always trying to get a little more, to demand their dignity be recognize, to assert themselves. Why do some succeed in some areas while others don't? These deep grooves of historical development help explain the terrain on which people and governments engage in this struggle, and they help us understand why in a place like Egypt, for instance, the strong state always seems to reassert itself an get the best of a weak civil society) Sequencing, of course, is a form of historical causative thinking; this happened, which set up the next thing, and so on. I will definitely use this book a lot in teaching, and it will be a great framework for thinking about the evolution of politics over time.

[Michael Kotsarinis]

A very interesting book on the conditions that led societies to democracy (or autocracy) and how democracy evolved through history.

Ένα βιβλίο που ενόψει των εκλογών το λες και επίκαιρο. Αναλύει την εμφάνιση της δημοκρατικής μορφής διακυβέρνησης από τις απαρχές της ιστορίας μέχρι τις μέρες μας και προσπαθεί να εντοπίσει τις κοινωνικές και άλλες συνθήκες που οδήγησαν στην υιοθέτηση της μορφής αυτής διακυβέρνησης ή άλλων πιο απολυταρχικών μορφών.

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[Allan Aksiim · Rating 5 out of 5]

A pretty decent read. Comprehensible and tightly written enough for the points to get across and short enough that it will be a quick read if one desires so. The main idea is that early democracy and early autocracy were pretty common across the world and people had no problem establishing democratic institutions even though they had never read Aristotle's works on political theory.

For the author "early democracy" is a broad term that means anything with assemblies where the ruler had to consult his or her subjects (be they all the people or an oligarchic or aristocratic minority). Early and even modern democracy (in the case of African states in the 90s) arose most where the state was weak - meaning it lacked a bureaucracy to make "the land legible" for taxation purposes. If a bureaucracy was lacking and people had exit options and the ruler needed income then said ruler had to consult the people he or she ruled to get that income and that was no easy task.

States that started out with a strong bureaucracy have had a more harder time to get to a democratic system because there is no incentive for the ruler to discuss with the people the state budget when the bureaucrats have the tax records. This happened most clearly with the rise of the Arabs when they conquered state apparatuses of Persia and Egypt - with the price of losing their own tribal consulting mechanisms.

This book made me a bit more pessimistic about democracy arising in China (but there is still Taiwan!) because the current incarnation of the Chinese state is not the first to simultaneously encourage a commercial Revolution and repress ideas that are dangerous for the ruling elite.

For those who have a greater interest in topics covered I would reccomend Francis Fukuyama's The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution which discusses similar topics in a much longer form. Also SSC review of Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed can be quite enlightening, link to SSC review here - it quite beautifully encapsulates the more nefarious aspects of a bureaucratic mindset.

[Jukka Aakula · Rating 5 out of 5]

On esitetty teoria, että kun maa kehittyy ja keskiluokka kasvaa, paine demokratisoida lisääntyy. Toisaalta innovaatio edellyttää ajattelun vapautta. Professori David Stasavage on tutkinut demokratian syntyä ja osoittaa, että demokratia on syntynyt todellisuudessa aika toisenlaista polkua. Viime aikojen demokratian voitot ovat tapahtuneet varsin köyhissä maissa (kuten Afrikassa ja Etelä-Amerikassa) - Kiinan demokratisoimtumista on saatu sen sijaan turhaan odottaa. Intia on yksi hyvä esimerkki maasta, jossa demokratia on toiminut, vaikka koulutustaso on suht alhainen ja kansa köyhää.

Demokratia ja autoritäärinen hallintotapa ovat eläneet rinnan vuosituhansia vaihtoehtoina, joiden välillä ei kovin nopeasti siirrytä, koska tehokas demokratia ja tehokas autoritaarinen valtio ovat varsin erilaisia instituutioiltaan. Heikko valtio siirtyy todennäköisesti helpommin demokratiaan, kuin viimeisen päälle optimoitu tehokas autoritäärinen valtio.

Stasavage aloittaa kirjan vertailemalla nykyisen Yhdysvaltojen alueen intiaanikulttuureita. Autoritääriset valtiot syntyivät kaakkoisille alueille, joissa väestö oli keskittynyt jokilaaksoihin ja exit option (mahdollisuus siirtyä muualle) oli alentunut. Sen sijaan hieman pohjoisempana alueilla, missä asukkaat elivät hajanaisemmin erillisissä kylissä, ja jossa asukkaat lisäksi vaihtoivat asuinpaikkaa viljelyalueiden köyhtyessä, syntyi kyläneuvostoja, jotka sitten valitsivat heimoneuvostoja ja jonkinlaisia parlamentin alkumuotoja. Valtiot olivat heikkoja ja hajautuneita, mutta huomattavasti demokraattisempia. (Stasavage käyttää sanaa demokratia tarkoittamaan kaikkia osallistuvampia päätöksentekotapoja riippumatta siitä kuinka yleistä äänioikeus oli.)

Egyptin väestö keskittyi Niilin rannoille. Exit option oli hyvin alhainen, koska Niilin ulkopuolella alkoi aavikko. Seurauksena oli tiukka keskitetty autoritaarinen valtio. Kiinan väestö keskittyi aluksi Keltaisen joen lössialueille. Exit option oli hieman korkeampi kuin Egyptissä, mutta vain etelään päin. Egyptin ja Kiinan autoritääriset hallinnot loivat byrokratian, joka hyödynsi kirjoitustaitoa ja muita innovaatioita kuten geometriaa tehokkaan hallinnon luomiseen. Kiinalainen byrokratia kykeni jo tuhansia vuosia ennen eurooppalaisia kategorisoimaan maan pellot niiden tuotantokyvyn mukaan ja luomaan keskitetyn verotusjärjestelmän, joka otti tuotantokyvyn huomioon. Lähes kaikki uusinnovaatio vahvisti autoritääristä keskusvaltiota sen sijaan, että olisi lisännyt painetta demokratisoida. Kun Kiinaan työntyi uudet valloittajat pohjoisesta, valloittajat säilyttivät byrokratian vaikka vaihtoivat maan ylimmän johdon. Virkamieskunnan konfutselaiseen koulutukseen - ja valintaan - satsattiin Kiinassa voimakkaasti.

Euroopassa valtioiden heikkous ja byrokratian kehittymättömyys edisti demokratiaa. Rooman romahtaessa keskistetty byrokratia oli jo romahtanut. Germaanivalloittajat hyödynsivät jossain määrin roomalaisilta jäänyttä paikallisbyrokratiaa ja sen verotuskykyä, mutta paikallisbyrokratiakin mureni suht nopeasti. Siinä missä kiinalainen keskitetty valtio perustui tehokkaaseen byrokratiaan, eurooppalainen valtio epäonnistui. Valtiot pysyivät pitkään heikkoina ja hajanaisina. Kiinan valtio onnistui verottamaan 10% BKT:sta, eurooppalaiset valtiot tuskin prosenttia. Eurooppa kehittyi toiseen suntaan, vaikka ajoittain eurooppalaisilla hallitsijoilla oli merkittävää yritystä keskittää valtaa ja luoda byrokratiaa. Merkittävimmät insititutionaaliset inovaatiot olivat kuitenkin muaalla: Charlemagne (Kaarle Suuri) onnistui laajentamaan germaanien heimoneuvostoja ensi kertaa suuren valtion neuvostoksi, jolle osa vallasta päätyi.

Asutus Euroopassa ei ollut keskittynyttä kuten Kiinassa - valtioita oli lukuisia. Eurooppaa leimasi voimakas kilpailu valtioiden välillä ja valtioiden väliset sodat. Sotateknologia kehittyi nopeasti. Koska sotaan tarvittiin rahaa, hallitsijat joutuivat heikkouttaan turvautumaan muihin toimijoihin sotilaiden ja rahan saamiseksi. Aluksi hallitsijat delegoivat sotilaiden hankkimisen feodaaliherroille, myöhemmin valtion hieman vahvistuttua eliitti kutsuttiin kokoon päättämään verotuksesta, jolla sodat rahoitettiin. Eliitin parlamentteja jouduttiin myöhemmin laajentamaan ottamalla mukaan kauppakaupunkien porvariston edustajia. Puoli-itsenäiset kauppakaupungit - aluksi Italiassa ja Flanderssa - loivat taloudellista toimeliaisuutta valtioiden alueella. Aikana jolloin valtiot eivät vielä saaneet lainaa suoraan pankeilta sodan käyntiin - koska velkojen takaisinmaksuun ei luotettu - kauppakaupungit saivat rahoitusta hankkeisiinsa. Valtiot hyötyivät kauppakaupunkien kyvystä hankkia lainaa markkinoilta. Kauppakaupunkien edustjat kannatti ottaa mukaan parlamentteihin.

Sotateknologinen innovaatio oli Euroopassa tietysti keskeistä. Merkittävä sotateknologinen innovaatio oli mm. varsijousi. Aikaisemmin sotiminen oli ollut ammattilaisten puuhaa, mutta sotateknologian edistyminen loi aseita, joiden tehokkaan käytön pystyi oppimaan nopeasti. Syntyi suuria kansanarmeijoita ja uudenlaisia sotia. Samalla kun tavalliset ihmiset mobilisisoitiin armeijaan, valtion riippuvuus kansan lojaliteetista kasvoi, mikä aiheutti painetta laajentaa äänioikeutta edelleen. Lopulta 1909 oltiin tilanteessa missä Ruotsin sosiaalidemokraatit esittivät vaatimuksen: Yksi mies, yksi kivääri, yksi ääni. Samalla kun Ruotsi sotilaallisen konfliktin riskin noustessa siirtyi yleiseen asevelvollisuuteen, se siirtyi myös sotilasdemokratiaan (military democracy) eli yleiseen ja yhtäläiseen miesten äänioikeuteen.

Englanti ja USA olivat modernin demokratian edelläkävijöitä. Brittien parlamentin merkitys alkoi kasvaa varhain mutta yleinen ääiniokeus laajeni varsin hitaasti. Parlamentti syrjäytti kuninkaan tärkeimpänä valtioelimenä 1600-luvulla paljon ennen muita eurooppalaisia parlamentteja.
Euroopassa oli kuitenkin myös yksi valtio - Preussi - joka onnistui toteuttamaan autoritäärisen polun erittäin tehokkasti. Virkamiesten koulutukseen satsattiin Kiinan tapaan voimakkaasti. Valtio militarisoitiin aluksi laajan palkka-armeijan kautta, mutta Napoleonin sodassa Preussi ei enää menestynytkään, ja armeijaa alettiin laajentaa kansanarmeijan suuntaan. Kansaa ei saatu lojaaliksi demokratian vaan pikemmin sosiaalipolitiikan kautta. Preussilainen yhteiskuntakokeilu päättyi lopulta toisen maailmansodan katastrofiin - vuonna 1947 Preussin valtio lakkautettiin.

Lisäys: HS julkaisi samana päivänä jutun kirjasta: https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-200000...

[Adam Carter · Rating 4 out of 5]

Two really interesting ideas are explored in this book and make it well worth reading. The first is sequencing: a state is less likely to develop into a democracy if it is preceded by a strong state. The second idea is mandates: not requiring representatives to be bound by mandates came with significant legislative power characteristic of modern democracy. The last 12 pages on contemporary democracy is less interesting, but this is, after all a history.

[Zéro Janvier · Rating 4 out of 5]

Je ne sais plus exactement à quelle occasion j'ai découvert ce livre, je sais simplement qu'il devait être cité comme référence dans un livre que j'ai lu au début de l'année, car c'est à cette époque que je l'ai acheté et que j'ai prévu de le lire. Je ne le regrette pas, car c'est une lecture passionnante et enrichissante.

David Stasavage, professeur américain de science politique, propose dans cet ouvrage une histoire de la démocratie, de l'Antiquité à nos jours.

Il s'intéresse tout d'abord aux démocraties anciennes, à Athènes mais pas seulement, en démontrant que la démocratie n'est pas une "invention" grecque mais une organisation que plusieurs civilisations ont expérimenté dans des lieux et des époques différentes.

La deuxième partie relate ensuite la divergence au Moyen-Âge entre deux modèles différents : la naissance de la démocratie représentative en Europe, et l'alternative bureaucratique centralisée en Chine et au Moyen-Orient.

Dans la troisième et dernière partie, l'auteur décrit l'avènement de la démocratie moderne, en Angleterre et aux États-Unis d'Amérique, puis son essor sur une partie du globe.

L'ouvrage se lit facilement, le propos est clair, accessible, et convaincant. Je suis ravi d'avoir eu l'occasion de le lire !

[Noah Lederman Greis · Rating 4 out of 5]

A systematic and very convincing if slightly dry argument for how (material) history in the long term has shaped democratic development into the modern day. The endless examples of democratic history as a history of ideas makes this a breath of fresh air, at least for me, because it is expressly not that, to the extent that it can avoid those discussions. Learned a LOT. About how widespread early democracy was, how different the reasons for it could be, and also gave me some serious perspective as far as analyzing and criticizing the systems that I have lived within my whole life and take for granted. Seeing as it covers literally all of human history it moves a little quickly maybe but whaddayagonnado

The fact that this was written in 2020 but its perspective on issues in America's democratic future sound like they were written last week is enough to acknowledge that he's definitely cooking here

[Miriam · Rating 5 out of 5]

Looooooove

[Marks54 · Rating 5 out of 5]

This outstanding book reports on a study of the evolution of democracy over time. While this is an historical account, the study is more an elaboration of a framework for understanding democracy and the application of that framework to various examples of democracy from antiquity to the present. The author is a senior professor of politics at NYU with links to the law school. The timing of the book suggests that current nastiness of democratic politics globally and especially in the US with the upcoming election provides more than a little of the motivation for the book. The policy questions could not be clearer. Is US democracy at risk with the current administration? Can it be saved? Are the current traumas of US politics related to the trends towards authoritarian populism in Eastern Europe and Russia? Is this what the founding fathers had in mind?

OK, OK, so there are lots of books out there covering this set of issues! Why is this book different? Why is it worth reading? I would not think of summarizing the book. It is complex, densely written in parts, and filled with odd facts and references. But I can suggest some “takeaways” from the book.

1). The author distinguishes two types of democracy - early democracy and modern democracy. But doing this, Professor Stasavage defines his terms and clearly distinguishes a variety of simplified forms that seem democratic from the democracy that developed in Britain, the US, and Western Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

2) The author then elaborates on a framework for analyzing the likelihood that democracy of either type would emerge and persist in a given situation.

3) Early democracy could spring up in lots of places but modern democracy is a phenomenon tied much larger societies and more sophisticated economies. Early democracy could very easily shift to autocracy as a society got larger and lacked the preconditions for modern democracy, for example in anxiety Greece.

4) What factors permitted large numbers of citizens to gain the franchise? Democracy persisted and grew into modern democracy when the rulers needed cooperation from citizens and could count on representatives that contributed to governance without the constraints of a localized mandate. They came to govern with full authority rather than a specific mandate. This happened in the US earlier than it did in Britain.

5) The role of bureaucracy as sometimes a supplement and sometimes a complement for democracy is also key to the framework. While discussions of Congress and the President are fun to follow, the role of the bureaucracy in enabling much of what government does is critical for understanding modern bureaucracy rather than the time of the Federalist Papers.

6) Another part of the framework concerns whether the legislature can effectively act over time without devolving into chaos. To this end Stasavage provides a nice discussion of the reduced reliance of constituent mandates and how that enabled modern democracy.

7). Why would the government give up its monopoly of power and share more with citizens. How does the core of citizens who are not part of the elites get enfranchised, stay enfranchised, and prosper? The line the author takes is consistent with political/economic approaches that suggest that when labor is costly and key citizens are not bound to the state, then the state will be more likely to share power.

8) The current messy political scene has more historical continuity than one might expect and the book retains a bit of optimism for the future, even granting the current worries over chaos. The founding fathers were wise and the government has faced dire threats in the past. The author seems to expect that the system is resilient.

There is much much more in the book. I thought the author was very credible and the framework seems to make sense. It is well written for an academic/wonky sort of book and will

I found out the author has other works on early state finances, which I am sure will also tie in well to the arguments in this book.

[notformebabesbooks · Rating 3 out of 5]

I’ll start with what I liked.

Stasavage provides an interesting argument around autocracy and democracy, and what causes such systems of state to develop. He cites a lack of writing, many exit options, smaller populations, and variable agricultural production as making a population more likely to be an early democracy. A system of writing, few exit options, bigger populations, and predictable agricultural productions are more likely to lead to an autocracy. However, the mixture of these two systems, i.e. a representative system of politics with a bureaucracy to oversee a larger population that has options to leave and incentives to stay, creates what he describes as modern democracy. The goal and outline of this book is very clear from the beginning, and he frequently restates his own argument to support his studies.

Stasavage asks a fundamental question that is present at the very end of the book: If democracy survives, will we be satisfied with what we get? It’s a question that is prevalent throughout the book and that stimulates a new way of looking at human history in terms of politics, geography, and economics.

Now to what I didn’t like.

Stasavage’s main fault is that he simply lacks a good amount of evidence needed to fully prove certain points. Some arguments are solid, while some are largely conjecture, boiling down to: well, if someone in this society wrote about, regardless of what knowledge we do have, then it must be important.

He also covers a very large period and expanse of history in one book, leading to a large generalization and omission of crucial events and areas. While one can’t be expected to cover everything, it perhaps would’ve served Stasavage’s advantage to write one book on each region. I can’t fault him for not deciding to delve into the undoubtedly monstrous amount of work that would’ve been, though.

Overall, I do highly suggest this book, as it comes from a plausible and unique point of view, but I caution other readers to be mindful of his vagueness and lack of evidence.

[Sam Seitz · Rating 3 out of 5]

The popular conception of antiquity seems to assume that most denizens of the period were governed by quite powerful, autocratic regimes. Of course, those familiar with the anthropological literature on hunter gatherer societies as well as the work of people such as James Scott know this to be too simplistic a view. There was in fact a wide degree of diversity in government styles throughout the ancient and early modern world. After all, as the book notes, it was not just ancient Athens that employed a democratic style of governance. Ancient Arabia, the Huron Confederation, Anglo-Saxon England, Renaissance Italian city states, and the Mari Kingdom in Mesopotamia all incorporated at least some democratic features in their systems of government. Yet, at the same time, autocracy was far from rare: Sparta, Qin China, and the Islamic Caliphates were all highly centralized, autocratic bodies. Stasavage seeks to explain this observed variation by identifying when and why democracy emerged.

The crux of the argument revolves around bargaining pressures and information asymmetries. Stasavage assumes that leaders seek autocratic power, but they are often constrained by the environment in which they’re located. These constraints come in two forms. The first is the ability of subjects to relocate and thus withhold their labor and income. The second is the difficulty of understanding and predicting agricultural output ex ante, at least in certain climes. When conditions were such that subjects could easily leave and agricultural yields were difficult to estimate, leaders were forced to cede some degree of power in the form of councils or devolved political authority. After all, were rulers in this position to act in an overbearing manner, their people would flee, taking their labor and local knowledge on crop yields (so crucial for tax purposes) with them. Conversely, when polities emerged in areas surrounded by inhospitable conditions and where climactic patterns and crop varieties result in intensive, legible agriculture, leaders were able to wield power without constraint because their subalterns possessed very little leverage.

Another theme of the book, again drawing on people such as Scott and Foucault, is the degree to which leaders sought to make their domains legible. The result was the expansion of bureaucracies, which served to categorize and organize the state and thus make it easier to control. But Stasavage makes an interesting sequencing argument here, contending that only when democratic institutions preceded bureaucratization was democracy sustainable. If bureaucracy came first, democracy was doomed. He illustrates these claims through a wide-ranging set of historical data and narrative, showing how absorption of already bureaucratized states, the Chinese and Sassanid, respectively, moved the Mongols and Arabs toward more autocratic forms of governance. Stasavage also substantiates his claims through the use of caloric data, revealing that in areas with greater caloric variability, councils (his proxy for democracy) were more likely to be present.

The book then concludes by investigating the rise of modern democracy, which he argues differs from its early counterpart by virtue of its lack of citizen mandates. Whereas in antiquity constituents had to approve of every vote their representative made (and in some cases could ignore decisions not supported by their representative), modern legislators obviously possess the power to make decisions regardless of their constituents’ wishes (though this may lead to a tough re-election). Stasavage traces this evolution in democratic norms to the English state, which sought to empower Parliament by, in part, weakening constituents’ control over their legislators. While this is somewhat less democratic, it also was an important innovation that allowed democracy to function at far larger scales.

Whatever you think of the argument, and I find it to be generally well substantiated, the book is an excellent read very much in the tradition of books like Against the Grain, The WEIRDest People in the World, and Escape from Rome. It’s full of fascinating data, big ideas, and interesting historical anecdotes that are interesting beyond simply their ability to support the theoretical claims of the book. The Decline and Rise of Democracy does have its shortcomings, of course. For one, I found its discussion of early democracy to be a bit underdeveloped insofar as there is little attempt to distinguish different forms of democratic checks on power. The Huron were quite different from the Romans, for example, and the Venetian oligarchy varied greatly from early Anglo-Saxon councils in Britain. Explaining this variation in democratic type might be difficult given the nature of the variables employed, but that might just suggest the need for more nuanced (or at least numerous) variables and scope conditions. The concluding bit of the book that seeks to address contemporary concerns about democratic backsliding is also, I think, a bit too underdeveloped. And while Stasavage no doubt felt compelled to include it to make the book relevant for today, I couldn’t help feeling the section was just too much of a stretch for the mostly historically grounded work. But despite these minor issues, I highly recommend this book, which is interesting, transparently presented, and one of my favorite reads of the year.

[Thom DeLair]

I would endorse and vote for this book as a good read. Writing this as the 2020 election in the United States approaches, it's a good time to take a look what democracy has been so we can better understand what it can be.

As I was taught at a young age, democracy was invented by the ancient Greeks. As The Parthenon Enigma by Joan Breton mentions, that Isaac Newton had Greek statues with muddied millennium old paints removed, to present pristine white sculptures that were shaped the way we view the ancient past and the cultural origins of democracy. Stasavage provides the closest thing to a scientific perspective of showing that the ancient Greek democratic anomaly is simply not the case. Council or assemblies that rulers would have to consult were found throughout the ancient world. It was exciting to read about this global perspective, covering places like Tlaxcala Mexico, the Luba people of Africa, and Buddha's home town.



To discuss democracy, Stasavage also provides the opposite, aristocracy, to fully understand what democracy is an is not. An important argument of the book is that as societies develop into larger and larger sizes, there comes a critical moment during that sequence of development when democracy forms or when it does not. Geography plays an important role in whether an ancient society was to turn out democratic or autocratic. Large flat areas that produce an abundance of food are much more easily corralled by an autocrat that can impose a monopoly of violence and therefore force those in the area to submit to tribute or taxes. On the other hand, democratic societies form in "compact locations" with greater "caloric variability" where people have a choice in leaving that area and therefore requiring agreements to be brokered. The critical components of the democratic formation, choice and agreement making, remind me of Getting to Yes by Ury and Fischer. The exit option of societies sounds like a BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) and where those involved in forming a dominate coalition need to focus on finding common interests rather than taking positions.



A key argument, is that autocratic or political traditions have shaped power structures that are very difficult to change. Regions like the Middle East or China have not adopted democracy because of these ingrained habits. The whole topic is vast and beyond the extent of one book. Some attempts explain these structures, like Russia, are extremely short. Other places like Israel are not mentioned in how their democracy transpired. Hong Kong and Taiwan (both with a Han population and democratic systems) don't get much mention, but one might guess that those were the Han that took an exit option a while back from the rest of China. The book is a good start to what could be a much larger discourse.

The early democracies differ from the modern democracy, which Stasavage points to the Anglo-American system as what made the switch. A key difference is when the English system removed any mandates on elected representatives, which were dropped in the fourteenth century. With representatives not having mandates allows legislation to get passed. It also seems to be why so many complain that all politicians are liars. Trade offs.

In discussing the United State's early success in modern democracy, Stasavage highlights James Madison's funding of the press to educated the young democracy and Hoarse Mann's later initiative in promoting public schools of bring public participation for the government, that is critical for a give the public a stake and therefor allow the democratic system to work. In the United States today, there is certainly a lot we could say that is going wrong, but I appreciate this book providing a global view and the United States' role in shaping democracy today.

[Clay Wescott · Rating 5 out of 5]

Combines political science, economic and anthropological perspectives innovatively to understand why some places are democratic and others are not. He defines two types: early and modern democracy. The former ocurrs in weakly governed states that tend to have small scale settlements, dispursed population, and exit options for unhappy citizens. These jurisdictions are "weak" because regime has a low rate of tax collection, often because its difficult to determine how much tax to collect. Leaders make deals with citizens to consult with them, and in return get help in raising taxes.

Autocracy, on the other hand, thrives when citizens don't have exit option: think Egypt with citizens living along the Nile surrounded by desert. It also is more likely to occur in large, dense jurisdictions where agricultural productivity is easy to determine, and thus the appropriate tax rate. Leaders appoint and build up a bureaucracy to support the work of government. The poster child of autocracy from the get go is China, where a large, dense population growing crops easy to store at predictable levels of productivity were ideal conditions for autocrats and bureaucracy. Most middle eastern countries started as early democracies. Then the rapid conquests following the birth of Islam favored autocracy because of the increasing size of the empire, and technical advances in writing, math, and accounting allowing autocrats to collect taxes without the need for democratgic consultation.

Modern democracy first appeared in the USA, building on hundreds of years of innovation in Britain including: the end of mandates, the notion of representation, and expanding those entitled to vote. A key challenge for modern democracy is that participation is widespread but shallow, leading in may settings to citizen distrust of government. Countries that started out with early democracy are more likely to adopt democracy.

This is a hugely ambitious story that inevitably leaves things out for future analysis. For example, China's autocratic history is a key feature of the argument: because of it, and because the conditions favoring it are still there today, China remains autocratic. But why is Taiwan democratic? And why do so many in Hong Kong want to be democratic?

Most rich countries are democratic: does tnat mean democracy is best for economic development? No, it's an accident of history that wealth grew fastest in Europe and its offshoots, which tended to be democratic. Autocracies can also get rich, though we haven't seen many cases where autocracies have broken through the middle income trap: only Singapore and Hong Kong so far, a point not discussed by Stasavage.

Then there's the question: Should aid agencies support good governance in poor countries, and if so, how should they do it? Stasavage rightly points out that governance improvements depend mainly on the work of local citizens. Hw also correctrly points out that having low incomes isn't necessarily a barrior to democracy: framce adopted modern democarcy in the 19th century when its income was the same as Senegal's income when it became democratic. Yet aid programs often work to strengthen bureaucracies and tax collection in client countries, including autocracies. Is this preventing the emergence of democracy, even in places that are fertile ground because they were a site for early democracy? Governance advisors should read this work carefully.

[Vahid Askarpour · Rating 4 out of 5]

برای بازکردن و خواندن کتاب‌های «تاریخِ جهان» باید هوشیاری زیادی به خرج داد. خیلی از کتاب‌های ذیلِ تاریخِ جهانیِ فلان و بهمان را که باز می‌کنیم، با انواع و اقسام کلی‌گویی‌ها، کلی‌بافی‌ها و احکام و آکسیوم‌هایی مواجه می‌شویم که به اندازة کلی-بودن‌شان، می‌توانند فاقد مصداق‌های مشخص و در نتیجه در بهترین حالت ناقص و در بدترین حالت، گمراه‌کننده باشند. وقتی با مفهومی مثل دموکراسی مواجه می‌شویم، این موضوع بسیار حادتر هم می‌شود. دموکراسی به عنوان یک شیوة خاص از حکومت، امروز در مقیاس جهانی به شدت بحث برانگیز است و تعجبی ندارد که در زمانة ترامپ و راست‌ها�� جدید، در بحبوحة شیوع پوپولیسم‌های اقتدارگرا و متمایل به حاکمیت تک‌حزبی، در دوران شکوفایی اقتصادی (دست‌کم در ظاهر) اوتوکراسی‌ها (یا در بهترین حالت، نظام‌های تک‌حزبی) نظیر چین، یا حکومت‌هایی مافیایی نظیر روسیه، نگارش کتاب‌هایی با موضوع تاریخ و فلسفة دموکراسی از هر زمان برجسته‌تر در نظر بیاید. 
این کتاب هم می‌توانست کتاب بدی باشد! نه فقط به خاطر موضوع چالش‌برانگیز و عدم‌توانایی جامع نویسنده برای به اصطلاح جمع‌کردن آن، که به خاطر ضعف‌های بنیادینی که در کل بیشتر کتاب‌های تاریخ جهان از آن رنج می‌برند. اما اتکای خاص نویسنده روی اعداد و ارقام، وسواس خاص او در به آزمون گذاشتن فرض‌های بدیل و تمرکز قابل‌ملاحظة او روی یک خط فکری و یک مفروضِ مشخص موجب شده تا به کتابی خواندنی، تأمل‌برانگیز و آموزنده تبدیل شود. 
یکی از مهمترین ویژگی‌های تمایزبخش این کتاب آن است که الف. دموکراسی را یک استثناء انسانی که در نقطة زمانی-مکانی خاص سربرآورده و به غایت شکننده باشد در نظر نمی‌گیرد؛ ب. پیشرفت دموکراسی را با افزایش سرانة ثروت جامعه همبسته نمی‌داند؛ پ. دموکراسی را راه‌حل نهایی نظام‌های حکومتی در جوامع انسانی پیش‌فرض نمی‌گیرد. در واقع، نویسندة این کتاب با به چالش کشیدن این فهم‌های رایج نسبت به دموکراسی، فضایی تازه را برای ترسیم تاریخ آن می‌گشاید و تاحدودی در پر کردن آن فضا هم توفیق می‌یابد. هرچند نویسندة کتاب به وضوح این نکته را بیان نمی‌کند، اما چارچوب نظری واقع در بطن نگاه او، ویژگی‌های ساختاری گونة انسان را مبنا قرار می‌دهد. به بیان ساده، جمعیت انسانی برای ابداع اصول سیاسی دو راه‌حل را به شکل طبیعی در چنته دارد: اوتوکراسی بروکرات (فردسالاری دیوانی) و دموکراسی (تصمیم‌گیری شورایی). او بحث را با این نکته آغاز می‌کند که اجتماعات انسانی لزوماً نیازی به ایجاد اصول سیاسی ندارند مگر همراه با کشاورزی متمرکز، سکونت در دره‌رودهای با بیشترین حاصلخیزی و در وضعیت تراکم بالای جمعیتی که افراد آن جمعیت نیز چندان امکان مهاجرت از آن را نداشته باشند. یک شرط دیگر هم البته هست: بخش قابل‌توجهی از جمعیت‌های انسانی گذشته و حتی حال، روی مصرف گیاهان ریشه‌ای (مثل انواع سیب‌زمینی‌ها) تأکید دارند. این محصولات مازاد تولید می‌کنند، اما نه مازاد قابل ذخیره‌سازی. شیوه‌های حکومتی متمرکز عموماً نه به خاطر مازادِ محصول، که در وجود مازاد ذخیره‌پذیر، مثل غلات نمایان شدند. آن دو راه‌حل پیش‌گفته دقیقاً به محض ابداع اصول سیاسی متأثر از همین مازادهای ذخیره‌پذیر وارد صحنه شدند و به محض ورود، انگار به نحوی جهانشمول «زنان» را از صحنه خارج کردند! نه در فردسالاری‌های دیوانی و نه در دموکراسی‌های اولیه، در هیچ‌یک گویی از همان ابتدا جایی برای زنان نبود. تنها تفاوت اقتصادی-معیشتی شیوه‌های دموکراتیک‌تر آن است که گویا به گواهی داده‌های آماریِ تاریخ، عموماً تنوع رژیمی جوامعِ آنها بالاتر بوده است و محدودیت‌های کمتری نیز در آنها، بر سر راه مهاجرت و جابجایی افراد انسانی وجود داشته است. این وضعیت‌ها معمولاً حاکمان را در موقعیت‌هایی ضعیف‌تر قرار می‌داد و آنها را وادار می‌کرد به مردمان خویش وابسته و متکی باشند. مورگانِ انسان‌شناس، پیوندی واضح را میان همة نرهای بالغ شرکت‌کننده در جنگ و همة نرهای بالغ دارای حق حضور و بیان در شوراها کشف کرده‌است؛ معنای این گزاره آن است که «دموکراسی نظامی»، یکی از نخستین مراحل اولیة پیشرفت سیاسی در آن دسته از جوامع انسانی بوده است که در محیط‌های با تراکم‌های جمعیتی والاتر و به مراتب پر-تنش‌تر قرار داشته‌اند. 
 باید این تصور را هم باطل کنیم که دموکراسی در یک مکان و در زمانی پیش از انتشار آن به جاهای دیگر ابداع شده است. دموکراسی‌های اولیه یکی از دو روی سکة پیدایش اصول سیاسی در جوامع انسانی هستند که بوروکراسیِ اوتوکرات، روی دیگر آن به شمار می‌آید و این دو به یک معنا نه تنها بدیل، که بارها مکمل یکدیگر بوده و هستند. دیوید استاساوِژ رابطه‌ای جالب را میان نظام‌های شورایی و بوروکراتیک کشف کرده و نشان می‌دهد. اگر ابتدا بوروکراسی نمایان شود، حاکمان نیاز کمتری به دموکراسی خواهند داشت، اما اگر دموکراسی ابتدا نمایان شود، نتیجه‌ای دیگر محتمل است. نشان داده می‌شود که به طور تاریخی، جوامع دموکراتیک معمولاً در محیط‌هایی رشد و باروری بیشتری یافته‌اند که امکان تأسیس و برقراری قواعد بوروکراتیک سفت و سخت در آنها دشوار و حتی در برخی موارد کاملاً غیرممکن بوده است. 
دو دیدگاه ناقص دربارة دموکراسی به طور مداوم تبلیغ و ترویج می‌شود که این دو نیز در این کتاب مورد تشکیک و پرسش قرار می‌گیرند؛ اول اینکه افزایش ثروت در یک جامعه به ناگزیر آن را در مسیر دموکرات‌تر-شدن سوق می‌دهد و دوم اینکه، فناوری و ارتباطات دریچه‌ای را برای تقویت بیشتر دموکراسی فراهم می‌سازد. در مورد نخست، بارها نشان داده می‌شود که بسیاری از جوامع اروپای غربی در زمان دموکراتیزاسیون کاملاً فقیر بودند. در مورد دوم نیز لزوماً رابطه‌ای مثبت میان دموکراسی و فناوری برقرار نبوده است. در جمهوریِ هلند سدة هفدهم، کسانی که کنترل شوراهای نمایندگی را در دستان خود داشتند عملاً مانع از ورود مبتکران و مبدعان جدید به میدان شدند تا نبض اقتصادی را به نحوی پایدار در دستان خود نگه‌دارند. در طول تاریخ نیز در بسیاری از نمونه‌ها، پیشرفت در تولید و ارتباطات، به شکلی وارونه موجب تضعیف دموکراسی اولیه شده است. وقتی به تاریخ خط و کتابت نظر افکنیم، در می‌یابیم که نگارشِ نخستین در آن نواحی ارتقاء یافته است که وجود کشاورزی تشدیدشده مبتنی بر غلات و گیاهان ذخیره‌پذیر، نظام‌های حکومتی تمرکزگرا را امکان‌پذیر ساخته است و این پیشرفت فناورانه به خودی خود در تقویت سیستم‌های بوروکراتیک و تحکیم همان حکومت‌های تمرکز‌گرا کمک قابل‌توجهی کرده است. جالب آنکه در مناطق بسیار مستعد برای کاشت و برداشت گیاهان ریشه‌ای، نه تنها حکومت‌های اقتدارگرا و متمرکز کمتری امکان ظهور یافته‌اند، که در اکثر قریب به اتفاق آنها در طول تاریخ خبری از ابداع یا اقتباس خط و کتابت نیز نبوده است.‌ از سویی دیگر، حضور نگارش هرگونه مزیت اطلاعاتی مردم نسبت به حاکمان را از میان برد و موجب شد تا به خصوص اطلاعات مالی آنها با سهولت به مراتب بیشتری توسط حاکمان و گماشتگان آنها جمع‌آوری و ذخیره شود. تنها نوع از خط و نگارش که مردم را نیز تقریباً به اندازة حاکمان توانمند ساخت، از اتفاق تنها در یک نقطة زمانی-مکانی خاص نشأت گرفت و سپس به نواحی پیرامون خود انتشار یافت؛ یعنی نگارش الفبایی کنعانی قدیم و خلف آن، نگارش فنیقی! 
علاوه‌بر نیروهای محیطی-درونی مؤثر بر دموکرات‌بودن یا نبودن یک اجتماع انسانی، نباید از نیروهای خارجی (و عموماً قدرتمندتر) چشم پوشید. برای مثال به نبرد دو قدرت منطقه‌ای بزرگ روم و شاهنشاهی ساسانی در سده‌های منتهی به ظهور اسلام اشاره می‌شود. نشان داده می‌شود که این دو قدرت بزرگ، به عنوان بخشی از این نبرد، منابع خود را برای ایجاد موکلان منطقه‌ای در سرزمین‌های عربی صرف کردند. به لطف این حمایت، برخی “سید”ها (یا شیخ‌ها) که تا پیش از این ریش‌سفیدان شوراهای محلی (و عموماً دموکرات در معنای اولیة آن) بودند، موفق شدند موقعیت خود را به عنوان «ملک» یا شاه مستبد و خودرأی استحکام ببخشند. در افریقای سدة بیستم نیز این پشتیبانی خارجی (از جانب امریکا، روسیه و برخی دول اروپایی دیگر) بود که به دوام اوتوکراسی‌های مستبد کمک کرد، نه وجود حاکمان قدرتمند داخلی!‌‌‌ 
در نهایت، انسان‌ها از زمان تأسیس تمدن‌های یکجانشین و پیش از آن به شیوه‌ای جمعی بر خویش حکم می‌راندند. دموکراسی چیزی نیست که تنها در لحظاتی بسیار ویژه، نظیر یونان کلاسیک، ایتالیای رنسانس و ایالات متحده تحقق یابد. چیزی که باید نگرانمان کند، از میان رفتن، از ریخت افتادن یا محو شدن دموکراسی‌ها نیست. دموکراسی بخشی جدایی‌ناپذیر از صفت جمعی انسانیت است. چیزی که امروز باید نگرانمان کند، اگر واقعاً می‌خواهیم سهمی در تحولات پیرامون خودمان داشته باشیم، یاری‌رساندن به جمع بیشتری از مردمان است تا بتوانند سهم بیشتری از قدرت جمعی را به دست آورند (امری که لزوماً نه با افزایش ثروت جامعه حاصل می‌شود و نه با پیشرفت فناوری‌های ارتباطات و جز آن). یادمان باشد با وجود ریشه‌داری اصول سیاسی دموکراتیک (و البته بدیل آن یعنی فردسالاری دیوانی) در تمدن‌های انسانی، در هیچ‌یک از مصادیق آنها تا همین اواخر نشان چندانی از قدرت مؤثر زنان وجود نداشته است. اما تنها در اشکال اجتماعی دموکراتیک‌تر امروزی است که می‌توان جنبش‌های زنان، جنبش‌های کارگری، جنبش‌های دگرباش‌ها و نظایر آن را شاهد بود. اصول سیاسی جوامع انسانی، در تحلیل نهایی، همواره چیزهایی در حال ساخت بوده و همچنان خواهند بود!

[Leonard Singer · Rating 3 out of 5]

Overlooks: the brutal physical and economic power, exercised regularly, by the modern state against its citizens; the regular use of tribal politics to enhance the power of the state against some or all of its citizens; the willingness of the police and military to support the intensification of state power; the inability of the non-rich to achieve elected office; and more.

[Billie Pritchett · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a highly instructive book on the nature of early and modern democracies and the future of modern democracy. But it has its shortcomings. Here are some.

According to David Stasavage, we need not glorify the Greeks for their democracy. While they may have given European languages the vocabulary and theory of democracy, they certainly didn't invent it, since, Stasavage demonstrates, among the earliest known civilizations, several of them were democratic.

All well and good, but whereas Stasavage would have it that roughly forty percent of the earliest known civilizations were democratically structured, we mustn't overlook what Stasavage counts as a democracy. Here's one iteration, where early democracy is conceived of as "a system in which a ruler governed jointly with a council or assembly composed of members of society who were themselves independent from the ruler and not subject to his or her whim." This understanding of democracy is too inclusive. It would include aristocracies as well and calls into question several of his cases including the putative Mesoamerican republic of Tlaxcala (an example he cites), which was ruled by "lords," those in society who held wealth and honors, i.e. aristocrats.

Another problem with the book can be seen in many popular nonfiction books in which the author is so eager to draw counterintuitive conclusions that he resorts to the strangest kinds of evidence. For example, in tracing the rise of modern democracy to 13th-century Europe, he says England's Magna Carta was "no big deal." Part of his evidence for the claim is that the so-called heavy exactions of King John "were not so heavy" when compared to, say, China around the same time when ruled by the Song dynasty or Iraq under the Abbasid caliphate. Now, really, do you think that the English merchants who foisted the Magna Carta onto the king would have cared at all, even if they knew, about what was going on with the Abbasid caliphate in Iraq? Has anyone in any country at any time who has opposed, say, a tripling in taxation within their country resorted to the argument that at least the taxation is not thirty times this amount as it might be in other countries? These sorts of comparisons just boggle the mind.

Still, it's a good book. You'll learn a lot.

[Anders Sundell · Rating 3 out of 5]

Varför är vissa länder demokratiska och andra inte? Stasavage visar först att "tidig demokrati" - direkt folkstyre genom råd och församlingar var utbrett och uppfanns på många olika ställen i världen och genom historien. Han beskriver det till och med som något naturligt mänskligt.

Stasavage ser den stora motsättningen stå mellan byråkrati och demokrati. Byråkrati representerar styre uppifrån, medan demokrati är styre nedifrån. Demokrati har bäst chans att få övertaget när folket ställning gentemot härskaren är stark. Folket är starkt när:
1. Det är svårt att mäta hur mycket som produceras, och därmed hur mycket som ska beskattas
2. När det är ont om arbetskraft i förhållande till jord
3. När folket har goda flyktmöjligheter
4. När härskaren behöver dem som soldater (tex vid de storskaliga arméernas intåg)
Härskaren har i sin tur övertaget när teknologin för övervakning och kontroll är välutvecklad.

Men sekvenser spelar också roll. En härskare som ärver en byråkrati kan använda den för att underbygga sitt styre.

Den moderna demokratin är skiljd från den tidiga demokratin. Modern demokrati bygger på representation, på obundna representanter, på centralstyre. Den moderna demokratin utvecklades i USA - och här gjordes ett medvetet försök att skilja den från den tidiga demokratin - och spreds sedan därifrån.

Men modern demokrati kunde bygga vidare på traditioner av tidig demokrati. Den bästa förklaringen till varför vissa länder är demokratiska och inte idag har att göra med hur historien såg ut. Där det fanns färdiga auktoritära byråkratier kunde inte demokratin slå rot - till exempel i Kina.

Boken är ambitiös och faktaspäckade, men som alla böcker med liknande anspråk blir det väl svepande ibland. Trots att den går in i detaljer får man ändå känslan av att det är lite väl tillrättalagt ibland, och att teorierna anpassas för att passa in med alla olika fall. Men överlag är grundidéen om demokrati vs byråkrati bra och informativ.

[Ernst · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had always been taught that Democracy was a fragile thing, with old forms happening in ancient Athens and the Roman republic, then invented again by the medieval Italian city states and in its most modern form, in the US, inspired by the ancient forms.
This book places democracy on a continuum, and argues that the democratic side of that continuum has always been well represented. At the origin, there are soils that support the growth of tubers, which cannot be stored, and cereals, which can be. Societies that originated in the cereal-friendly soils tended to invent some form of writing, those from the tuber-friendly soils usually didn't. Once a society has writing, it becomes unpredictable whether it will be more democratic or less so, but all areas of the continuum are represented.
If the society does not have writing, then we can look at the soil. If the soil of that society is all pretty much the same, the king can say, "This is the tax rate, everyone pay it" and usually the society will not be very democratic. If the soil of the society has different types, then the areas of that society will have different needs and different capabilities, and usually a much wider participatory form of government will arise.
After the prehistorics, there are chapters on many more modern episodes of history discussed, always arguing that tyranny was never stable, and that many societies found many ways to try to involve more of their citizens in running their governments. Democracy, the author argues, is a natural human impulse, has been invented in many different ways and places, and is unlikely to go away from anywhere for long.

[Justin Evans · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well-written and very suggestive. The basic idea (strong states do not produce modern democracies, even in places that featured 'early democracies', whereas weak states allow for the development of modern democracy) makes sense. You can have a strong state and modern democracy, but you have to have the modern democracy first. Fair.

Then, you start thinking about colonization, the particular time period in which the book was written. What, for instance, explains the collapse of modern democracies? Clearly, a weak state is insufficient, even if we think it's necessary. Or, different examples. Did Germany really not have a strong state before it developed modern democracy? Did Russia have a strong state before it developed whatever *this shit* is? Of course it did, but it was a while ago--it definitely had a weak state after the fall of the USSR, which is exactly how you ended up with whatever this shit is. What about colonies? Pretty sure Australia has modern democracy; also quite sure Australia had a strong 'state' (i.e., the UK) before it had modern democracy.

So, is the argument that a weak state is necessary for the development of modern democracy? Or, is it that modern democracy historically developed first in a place without a strong state, but can now develop elsewhere? And did it, anyway, because I would have thought the Tudors headed a pretty strong state?

Like Weber's 'Capitalist Work Ethic,' this is a great book to read, and to think with, and to pick holes in. Very impressive.

[Wing · Rating 4 out of 5]

All states need revenue to run. There are two major mechanisms for efficient tax collection - consensual (and collective) governance or a strong bureaucracy. If a state happens to acquire the latter before any significant development of a tradition of practicing the former, then autocracy may ensue and linger on. Otherwise, consensual rule almost always results because this is the default human tendency. Which of these two sociopolitical trajectories takes place depends on contingent factors such as ecology, scarcity of labour, and availability of exit options. For instance, if the ruler needs the ruled more than the other way round and the ruled can leave the polity at will, then democracy is very likely to happen. Professor Stasavage presents insightful data and analyses, covering various regions and epochs, to support his thesis. He also succinctly summarises the challenges that modern democracy faces. Four stars.

[Marc Sabatier · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of those grand theory/history books (in the style of Guns, Germs and Steel), that always seem a bit risky, because so much ground is being covered in so few pages, and so much is trying to be explained by the same theory.

Luckily, Stasavage succeeds with that, and offers a deeply counterintuitive take on how democracy has evolved. The main point is that direct democracy was not a idiosyncratic feature of ancient Athens, but rather a wide-spread natural form of organization that was wide-spread throughout the ancient world. It was the invention and proliferation of the strong centralized state that rendered this form of organization extinct, until it later would be succeeded by the modern form of democracy (representative governance).

The book is an excellent synthesis of leading theories in economics, political science and history for why the world is organized as it is today. Alas, one could wish that the cover was as beautiful as its title (yes, a sin in judgement).

[Eric · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was rather interested in the author's claim of the impact of soil/geography having such a direct impact on the manifestation of democracy in some societies; however, I never felt that he really nailed that one down before moving on to more typical methods and measures for society's political development. In the end his book revealed much about those places where democracy sprang up, relating those instances to their place in history and within the totality of human experience. I will let others judge whether he was always correct in his assessments (I suspect he is not), but he certainly serves up many things to consider. For example, how important is a free press to democracy's growth, or is it democracy's responsibility to supply free newspapers to its citizens to open up the society for its citizens? Will the desert sands for Saudi Arabia ever yield to democracy?

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

The title should ideally be "Democracy: the Impact of Governance and Economics" as war is clearly excluded from the history. The author suggests that people (their work and their diversity) and not war are more impactful to the form of government adopted. I personally think war, emulating neighbors, environment, and control of information also play a role but this is an extremely well-crafted and researched book.

But the book itself is an amazingly detailed composite of governing bodies and bureaucracies have been co-developed with the economies and people in nuanced ways. Some of these relationships have led to democratic entities (kicking and screaming in many cases). Not exciting to read but clearly thought provoking.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thoroughly researched and well written. Packed with data but digestible if you’re interested in the topic. The most appealing aspect of the book to me is that it relies on data and examples beyond Western Europe and North America, telling a fuller picture of how we have governed ourselves across time and distance. This is a great book for everyone curious about history and government but may particularly stand out to those who live (or have lived) in a modern democracy by serving as a reminder that there is not a single, correct way to conduct government by consent of the people. You will be challenged to think differently about how your particular government works.

[emily · Rating 4 out of 5]

a very comprehensive analysis of the history of democracy. picked this for a uni assignment, was largely happy w it! thought the perspective of democracy being naturally emerging and not founded it ancient athens to be very interesting. agreed with most general themes, however was unsure why the classification of early democracy seemed to be ‘anything besides an autocracy’. leads to communities of oligarchies for example to be a early democracy by stasavage’s perspective. besides that, thought it was a refreshing and optimistic view of modern democracy as an ongoing experiment! + got my essay in on time so yay for that

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lots of interesting information but unfortunately the main interpretive points that hold the book together are pretty weak. He wants to claim that democracy is not something that was invented at one time in one place--that it is natural and common across times and places. But the problem is that he defined democracy in such a loose fashion that basically any decentralized governance structure counts as democratic. Demonstrating that decentralized governance has developed all over the place is of course trivial. What starts as an interesting and provocative thesis ends up trivial due to a lack of care with definitions.

[Nitin Prasad · Rating 4 out of 5]

An intriguing history covering governing systems throughout the eras, and showing that democratic governance is not just an aberration of Athens or Rome but actually a rather common system that crops up organically in different times and geographical areas. I particularly enjoyed the focus on non-Western states - the books looks at institutions in the pre-1492 Americas, the Middle East, Africa, and China to provide support.

[Serge · Rating 5 out of 5]

Simply the most authoritative and well argued history book that I have read all year. I intend to share this book with my sophomore World History class as an example of a truly cosmopolitan outlook. Stasavage leverages quantitative historical evidence that not only substantiate but advance his bold claims about the trajectory of democracy around the world

[E. Kahn · Rating 3 out of 5]

Really old hat stuff if you've been paying attention to historians and (especially) anthropologists over the past few decades. There is very little original about this book and what is original is, uh, pretty obviously self-congratulatory anglocentric masturbation.

Give this guy a pass and go read some Graeber or something.