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The Arab Winter: A Tragedy
A New York Times Book Review Editors’ Choice
Why the conventional wisdom about the Arab Spring is wrong
The Arab Spring promised to end dictatorship and bring self-government to people across the Middle East. Yet everywhere except Tunisia it led to either renewed dictatorship, civil war, extremist terror, or all three. In The Arab Winter , Noah Feldman argues that the Arab Spring was nevertheless not an unmitigated failure, much less an inevitable one. Rather, it was a noble, tragic series of events in which, for the first time in recent Middle Eastern history, Arabic-speaking peoples took free, collective political action as they sought to achieve self-determination.
Focusing on the Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution, the Syrian civil war, the rise and fall of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and the Tunisian struggle toward Islamic constitutionalism, Feldman provides an original account of the political consequences of the Arab Spring, including the reaffirmation of pan-Arab identity, the devastation of Arab nationalisms, and the death of political Islam with the collapse of ISIS. He also challenges commentators who say that the Arab Spring was never truly transformative, that Arab popular self-determination was a mirage, and even that Arabs or Muslims are less capable of democracy than other peoples.
Above all, The Arab Winter shows that we must not let the tragic outcome of the Arab Spring disguise its inherent human worth. People whose political lives had been determined from the outside tried, and for a time succeeded, in making politics for themselves. That this did not result in constitutional democracy or a better life for most of those affected doesn't mean the effort didn't matter. To the contrary, it matters for history―and it matters for the future.
Why the conventional wisdom about the Arab Spring is wrong
The Arab Spring promised to end dictatorship and bring self-government to people across the Middle East. Yet everywhere except Tunisia it led to either renewed dictatorship, civil war, extremist terror, or all three. In The Arab Winter , Noah Feldman argues that the Arab Spring was nevertheless not an unmitigated failure, much less an inevitable one. Rather, it was a noble, tragic series of events in which, for the first time in recent Middle Eastern history, Arabic-speaking peoples took free, collective political action as they sought to achieve self-determination.
Focusing on the Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution, the Syrian civil war, the rise and fall of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and the Tunisian struggle toward Islamic constitutionalism, Feldman provides an original account of the political consequences of the Arab Spring, including the reaffirmation of pan-Arab identity, the devastation of Arab nationalisms, and the death of political Islam with the collapse of ISIS. He also challenges commentators who say that the Arab Spring was never truly transformative, that Arab popular self-determination was a mirage, and even that Arabs or Muslims are less capable of democracy than other peoples.
Above all, The Arab Winter shows that we must not let the tragic outcome of the Arab Spring disguise its inherent human worth. People whose political lives had been determined from the outside tried, and for a time succeeded, in making politics for themselves. That this did not result in constitutional democracy or a better life for most of those affected doesn't mean the effort didn't matter. To the contrary, it matters for history―and it matters for the future.
216 pages, Hardcover
Published May 12, 2020
82 people are currently reading
837 people want to read
About the author
Noah Feldman
31 books206 followersNoah Feldman is an American author and professor of law at Harvard Law School.
Feldman grew up in Boston, Massachusetts, where he attended the Maimonides School. He graduated from Harvard College in 1992, ranked first in the College, and earned a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, where he earned a D.Phil in Islamic Thought in 1994. Upon his return from Oxford, he received his J.D., in 1997, from Yale Law School, where he was the book review editor of the Yale Law Journal. He later served as a law clerk for Associate Justice David Souter on the U.S. Supreme Court.
In 2001, he joined the faculty of New York University Law School (NYU), leaving for Harvard in 2007. In 2008, he was appointed the Bemis Professor of International Law. He worked as an advisor in the early days of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq following the 2003 invasion of the country. He regularly contributes features and opinion pieces to The New York Times Magazine and is a senior adjunct fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Feldman grew up in Boston, Massachusetts, where he attended the Maimonides School. He graduated from Harvard College in 1992, ranked first in the College, and earned a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, where he earned a D.Phil in Islamic Thought in 1994. Upon his return from Oxford, he received his J.D., in 1997, from Yale Law School, where he was the book review editor of the Yale Law Journal. He later served as a law clerk for Associate Justice David Souter on the U.S. Supreme Court.
In 2001, he joined the faculty of New York University Law School (NYU), leaving for Harvard in 2007. In 2008, he was appointed the Bemis Professor of International Law. He worked as an advisor in the early days of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq following the 2003 invasion of the country. He regularly contributes features and opinion pieces to The New York Times Magazine and is a senior adjunct fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 40 reviews
June 20, 2020
There are certainly places of insight here, but I just don't see how Noah Feldman (the guy who wrote the Iraqi Constitution) can make the case that the tragedy of the Arab spring had nothing to do with outside influence and was fully a home-grown issue. How can anything in the Middle East be homegrown anymore? I agree with him on several counts--that there was no good decision Obama could have made on Syria that would not have had a backlash (though he too-readily dismisses the fact that if Obama had intervened, many lives could have been saved, which. is no small matter). He is also right (and this is the best part of the book): that democracy can yield illiberal leaders and that outside countries have to respect that. In other words, that choosing the Muslim Brotherhood was a valid choice made by the populace and one that should be respect. This seems so obvious to me, but I am glad that it is obvious to a notable Middle East expert like Noah Feldman.
August 20, 2021
The Arab Middle East has had its political fate determined by outside imperial forces from the fall of the medieval Abbasid Caliphate at the hands of the Mongols up til the end of formal European colonialism in the 20th century. After the Europeans departed the United States entered as a new quasi-imperial sovereign and has ruled that way up til the present. That order is waning however. The Arab Spring, Feldman argues, despite its tragic failures, was effectively the first time in a long time that Arabs exercised their own political agency without outsiders ultimately deciding their fate. Feldman aims to rescue the term "Arab Spring" from being a bitter punchline. The uprisings weren't all a foreign plot or conspiracy, and everything from the successful liberal Islamist revolution in Tunisia to the utopian fanaticism of the Islamic State was in a sense genuinely Arab, for both good and bad. The Arab Spring was an exercise in collective meaning making, even if for the time being it failed to change the political order of the region in a positive way.
The book is very carefully written, much in the style of the constitutional law professor that Feldman is. Like a legal document it is also quite dry and conservative with the claims it makes. Much of it is a bit tedious to be honest, offering a blow-by-blow of things already documented with light commentary here and there. For anyone who followed these historic, painful events however there is at least small thing of value to take from Feldman's argument: it wasn't all a waste.
The book is very carefully written, much in the style of the constitutional law professor that Feldman is. Like a legal document it is also quite dry and conservative with the claims it makes. Much of it is a bit tedious to be honest, offering a blow-by-blow of things already documented with light commentary here and there. For anyone who followed these historic, painful events however there is at least small thing of value to take from Feldman's argument: it wasn't all a waste.
June 7, 2020
Full disclosure: I haven't yet finished reading the book. But the Syria chapter is beyond atrocious. The author somehow neglects to mention Israel as a regional actor in Syria and absolves Obama of any blame all while whitewashing his flipflopping on Syria as a "middle-ground policy." The author does say in the introduction that this book shouldn't be regarded as an in-depth history book about the Middle East, yet it somehow even fails on the most basic of levels.
Also nowhere to be found anywhere in the capter is any mention of Iranian militias, opting otherwise to depict Iran as just one of several "supporters" of the Assad regime. This is very misleading especially coming from someone who claims to be following Syria closely. Iran was involved and invested in the survival of the Assad regime from the get go, thus debunking your claim that it's all a purely Syrian affair from start to finish.
Also, it seems that the final take on Syria ends up being about the perils of calling for self-determination in the country since it's just not in the cards for Syrians, but make no mistake, it's all their fault, as the author is more than happy to have you all believe.
Also nowhere to be found anywhere in the capter is any mention of Iranian militias, opting otherwise to depict Iran as just one of several "supporters" of the Assad regime. This is very misleading especially coming from someone who claims to be following Syria closely. Iran was involved and invested in the survival of the Assad regime from the get go, thus debunking your claim that it's all a purely Syrian affair from start to finish.
Also, it seems that the final take on Syria ends up being about the perils of calling for self-determination in the country since it's just not in the cards for Syrians, but make no mistake, it's all their fault, as the author is more than happy to have you all believe.
June 21, 2025
This was recommended by another author, and maybe I misread the recommendation, but I expected it to be a good overall account of the Arab Spring. That is precisely what it is not. Feldman is first and last a political theorist and this is all interpretation with scant detail (he covers three revolutions in one slim book). I found it frankly infuriating, but maybe because I am a historian by inclination. The lack of, well you could say detail I might say evidence, is substituted by theory, with heavy reference to Arendt. Feldman's aim is laudatory - the rescue the Arab Spring from the discard heap of inevitability. To do this, he tries to demonstrate that the culture in Tunisia provided for a level of compromise and cooperation that did not occur in Egypt or Syria. In the process, I felt that he made unfair and unestablished claims about Syria. This includes a predicable-in-sentiment if not in blatency statement that Syria is not the US' fault but rather the Syrians (I do wish Westerners woukd stop ignoring the 'foreign' aspect of ISIS in Syria, the Syrians certainly haven't) and his assessment of Assad's unassailability had not held up. And got into a rather silly argument about whether the people have the right to overturn a democratic election in regards to Egypt. There is a point at which Feldman says he could not be a historian because he cares too much about how this plays out. It sat uneasily to me, because wanting to understand something, to shape it with your analysis, does not grant you the insight to categorise it. We all care, even if the role assumed is to document rather than argue.
February 23, 2022
It's pretty rare that I rate a book higher than the average, but this book definitely deserves it. It's essentially a philosophical, political theory, and sociological - all mashed up into one - look at the Arab Spring and its aftermath in a few countries. And the guy providing it isn't exactly a nobody either.
I found the book both insightful and well-reasoned, and it does exactly what it sets out to do. Feldman starts by outlining his methodology and structure, thoroughly delineating between concepts and clarifies what he means with specific terms - crucially, if you miss what he means with the terms "political agency" and "historical agency" relating to the subject matter here, you're likely to make the same mistake that many others clearly have made (based on the reviews here).
Which leads me to these crucial points: Feldman does not argue that other factors (such as colonial history and influence, external pressures and influence, foreign involvement, etc.) did not play a role in the events he describes. Nor does he claim that the people and the countries covered are the only ones at fault and/or responsible for what happened both during and after the Arab Spring. What he does argue is that the people of these countries, their uprisings and calls for change were the main driver (historical agent) behind the tumultuous events that he covers - good and bad.
That being said, there are a few caveats. Chiefly, 1) this is most definitely a work of opinion - which, to his credit, the author makes abundantly clear, 2) while he tries to avoid it, the author's U.S.-centric bias is clearly evident, and 3) the book is a heavily academic one, so it would be easy to get lost in the rationale of Feldman's arguments (my guess is that's a likely culprit behind some of the arguments in the negative reviews).
While "The Arab Winter" might seem like a negative book - I mean, "A Tragedy" ... - I think it's a pretty hopeful book. It covers, of course, the various failures of the Arab Spring, but it also covers the successes and shows that a transition to democracy is absolutely possible for these states. Though it requires some good will and a legitimate concern for all governed people, rather than for just a small group therein. Therefore, as Feldman states with regard to Tunisia, "there are worse values for a polity to have when trying to produce a new constitution, than an incompletely theorized and non-rational commitment to getting along."
However, with the possibility and reality of true democratic choice, the results of democratic action are not always promoting of democracy and/or liberalism. Sometimes, democratic actions lead to autocracy. I think that's what makes this book and other similar arguments rub people the wrong way. It's just more satisfying to blame failures on everyone else.
I found the book both insightful and well-reasoned, and it does exactly what it sets out to do. Feldman starts by outlining his methodology and structure, thoroughly delineating between concepts and clarifies what he means with specific terms - crucially, if you miss what he means with the terms "political agency" and "historical agency" relating to the subject matter here, you're likely to make the same mistake that many others clearly have made (based on the reviews here).
Which leads me to these crucial points: Feldman does not argue that other factors (such as colonial history and influence, external pressures and influence, foreign involvement, etc.) did not play a role in the events he describes. Nor does he claim that the people and the countries covered are the only ones at fault and/or responsible for what happened both during and after the Arab Spring. What he does argue is that the people of these countries, their uprisings and calls for change were the main driver (historical agent) behind the tumultuous events that he covers - good and bad.
That being said, there are a few caveats. Chiefly, 1) this is most definitely a work of opinion - which, to his credit, the author makes abundantly clear, 2) while he tries to avoid it, the author's U.S.-centric bias is clearly evident, and 3) the book is a heavily academic one, so it would be easy to get lost in the rationale of Feldman's arguments (my guess is that's a likely culprit behind some of the arguments in the negative reviews).
While "The Arab Winter" might seem like a negative book - I mean, "A Tragedy" ... - I think it's a pretty hopeful book. It covers, of course, the various failures of the Arab Spring, but it also covers the successes and shows that a transition to democracy is absolutely possible for these states. Though it requires some good will and a legitimate concern for all governed people, rather than for just a small group therein. Therefore, as Feldman states with regard to Tunisia, "there are worse values for a polity to have when trying to produce a new constitution, than an incompletely theorized and non-rational commitment to getting along."
However, with the possibility and reality of true democratic choice, the results of democratic action are not always promoting of democracy and/or liberalism. Sometimes, democratic actions lead to autocracy. I think that's what makes this book and other similar arguments rub people the wrong way. It's just more satisfying to blame failures on everyone else.
September 5, 2020
Claims to be a work of political theory or philosophy meditating on human agency and the “meaning” of the Arab Spring, but is more of a legal brief (complete with jargon like “intervening causes”) on the culpability of the US with respect to events in Egypt and Syria (not at fault) and Iraq (kinda at fault).
The historical narrative is tendentious. The victims carry most of the blame in Syria, and the narrative on Egypt can reasonably be called falsification. I would recommend the review of the book in the Baffler for the details.
Basically worthless except as a window into the mind of the liberal US foreign policy establishment. Feldman does narrate the audiobook beautifully however.
The historical narrative is tendentious. The victims carry most of the blame in Syria, and the narrative on Egypt can reasonably be called falsification. I would recommend the review of the book in the Baffler for the details.
Basically worthless except as a window into the mind of the liberal US foreign policy establishment. Feldman does narrate the audiobook beautifully however.
Read
May 24, 2023The book requires that you read about the topics in advance and learn the history so you can better follow up with Feldman's analysis. Otherwise it can get pretty confusing since the author rarely explains details that are necessary for understanding the general concept and the more detailed analysis that he provides
September 21, 2024
This is a book where I wrote several paragraphs for this review while reading it, and then threw it all away. The reason is simple - although Feldman states at the very start what his aims are, it's only once I had arrived at the final chapter regarding Tunisia that it clicked into place. It shouldn't have, because really, what he's saying is pretty simple, but on the way there, he serves things up in such a way that you can get quite the wrong idea (as it seems many have). But the essential point is:
Political, or any action, is not enough on its own; what is needed is a sense of responsibility and (for achieving democracy) the understanding of its inherently compromise-oriented nature. Under democracy, nobody should be getting all they want, sometimes not even what they want the most, which is why democracy can really suck, but, as the quote goes, it's still better than the others because at least you're alive to want another day.
At least when it goes well. There's a reason the author left Tunisia for the last, to underline that the tragedy we saw happen in most Arab countries did not have to happen, as Tunisia shows; but even in Tunisia, there were dangerous crisis points and awful actions taken by people who don't understand how democracy works. The difference is, Feldman argues, that Tunisians took responsibility for what they were trying to achieve (and were also lucky to have leaders who were oriented towards compromise, and a strong local third party representation that could help guide politicians towards democracy).
Something Feldman doesn't state outright, but is obvious is that the book also works as an anti-islamophobia and an anti-anti-Arab treatise. I remember full well many people arguing during the fall of the Arab Spring that this was inevitable and that you can't export democracy and all such crap that xenophobes and islamophobes are wont to argue, but Feldman counters not just with the example of Tunisia, but a detailed enough explanation as to why exactly the different countries took these different paths, touching on both local factors and wider fears. What's more, he concentrates on the human element and how what is common in us all can drive us towards negative outcomes, be it for ourselves or others, whether we want them or not, and what a difficult balancing act it truly is to keep something as fragile as democracy alive, especially in a world where so many people would rather just kick you in the face than give even an inch in.
It's a good read, once you get past the inherent degree of discomfort of reading a nerdy white guy discuss Arab politics. The audiobook version is also fine, well narrated by the author himself, even though the subject matter can be challenging enough for a layperson (such as me) that rewinds and picking more alert moments for listing are in order. But talking of the author, I do wonder (somewhat jokingly) which came first - the decision to write the book, or that strikingly convenient final sentence.
I lack a comparatively great way of finishing my thoughts here, so I'll just express my appreciation for such an intellectually stimulating and morally vital book that offers an optimistic counterargument to the usually pessimistic view of a wide movement that often led to tragedy that is still reverberating with lamentable consequences around the world. I'm not sure how much this book will help, but it is a timely reminder of the importance of personal responsibility in the upholding of democracy. It's easy to want people we don't like to not get to govern, but that sword cuts both ways. Democracy is a constant struggle, and Feldman is clear about its weak points, even occasionally threatening to lean towards defending autocratic systems that deliver on promises that democracy doesn't offer any guarantee for either, but it's clear no form of government is an answer just by itself. The difference is though that in some you can say so, and in others, well. You know.
Political, or any action, is not enough on its own; what is needed is a sense of responsibility and (for achieving democracy) the understanding of its inherently compromise-oriented nature. Under democracy, nobody should be getting all they want, sometimes not even what they want the most, which is why democracy can really suck, but, as the quote goes, it's still better than the others because at least you're alive to want another day.
At least when it goes well. There's a reason the author left Tunisia for the last, to underline that the tragedy we saw happen in most Arab countries did not have to happen, as Tunisia shows; but even in Tunisia, there were dangerous crisis points and awful actions taken by people who don't understand how democracy works. The difference is, Feldman argues, that Tunisians took responsibility for what they were trying to achieve (and were also lucky to have leaders who were oriented towards compromise, and a strong local third party representation that could help guide politicians towards democracy).
Something Feldman doesn't state outright, but is obvious is that the book also works as an anti-islamophobia and an anti-anti-Arab treatise. I remember full well many people arguing during the fall of the Arab Spring that this was inevitable and that you can't export democracy and all such crap that xenophobes and islamophobes are wont to argue, but Feldman counters not just with the example of Tunisia, but a detailed enough explanation as to why exactly the different countries took these different paths, touching on both local factors and wider fears. What's more, he concentrates on the human element and how what is common in us all can drive us towards negative outcomes, be it for ourselves or others, whether we want them or not, and what a difficult balancing act it truly is to keep something as fragile as democracy alive, especially in a world where so many people would rather just kick you in the face than give even an inch in.
It's a good read, once you get past the inherent degree of discomfort of reading a nerdy white guy discuss Arab politics. The audiobook version is also fine, well narrated by the author himself, even though the subject matter can be challenging enough for a layperson (such as me) that rewinds and picking more alert moments for listing are in order. But talking of the author, I do wonder (somewhat jokingly) which came first - the decision to write the book, or that strikingly convenient final sentence.
I lack a comparatively great way of finishing my thoughts here, so I'll just express my appreciation for such an intellectually stimulating and morally vital book that offers an optimistic counterargument to the usually pessimistic view of a wide movement that often led to tragedy that is still reverberating with lamentable consequences around the world. I'm not sure how much this book will help, but it is a timely reminder of the importance of personal responsibility in the upholding of democracy. It's easy to want people we don't like to not get to govern, but that sword cuts both ways. Democracy is a constant struggle, and Feldman is clear about its weak points, even occasionally threatening to lean towards defending autocratic systems that deliver on promises that democracy doesn't offer any guarantee for either, but it's clear no form of government is an answer just by itself. The difference is though that in some you can say so, and in others, well. You know.
August 20, 2020
Two stars for the font and smooth pages. Very appealing to the senses. Otherwise, a philosophical dive by a white man into a brown man’s history.
June 10, 2020
The book lacks in so many aspects and it's too limited in its scope to qualify as an assessment of the Arab Spring and what ensued afterwards. Even as a brief reading of the crisis, the author seems to generalize a lot throughout the book as he makes assumption based on false conclusions. For instance, in the chapter about Syria, he insists that the US had very little influence in the affairs which is of course a false claim.
He completely skips the U.S-backed coups that characterized the an entire decade of Syria's history between 1950s and 1960s. Also he never mentions the assassination of Lebanese PM Rafic Hariri which had Assad's fingerprints all-over it.
Additionally. the author also does not talk about how The CIA used Syria as an illicit base of operations to torture so-called "ghost detainees", as part of a program known as extraordinary rendition.
He fails to mention how secretary of State Madeline Albright personally visited Syria to offer her condolences to Bashar Al-Assad and found nothing wrong with him succeeding his father, on the contrary, she was impressed with him and gave her blessings to his undemocratic takeover.
Not to mention that he totally leaves Israel out of the equation which was utterly odd.
Last but not least, shamelessly, the author concludes that perhaps Syrians are better off living under a brutal dictatorship since the odds are stacked against them.
He might have as well told the Syrian people that they weren't deserving of freedom, dignity and a better life.. because "it's not in the stars" so why bother! He is practically telling Syrians to give up already and that their sacrifices were all in vain which I found astonishingly patronizing and extremely condescending.
I don't recommend this book at all if you're looking for accurate narrative on Syria.
He completely skips the U.S-backed coups that characterized the an entire decade of Syria's history between 1950s and 1960s. Also he never mentions the assassination of Lebanese PM Rafic Hariri which had Assad's fingerprints all-over it.
Additionally. the author also does not talk about how The CIA used Syria as an illicit base of operations to torture so-called "ghost detainees", as part of a program known as extraordinary rendition.
He fails to mention how secretary of State Madeline Albright personally visited Syria to offer her condolences to Bashar Al-Assad and found nothing wrong with him succeeding his father, on the contrary, she was impressed with him and gave her blessings to his undemocratic takeover.
Not to mention that he totally leaves Israel out of the equation which was utterly odd.
Last but not least, shamelessly, the author concludes that perhaps Syrians are better off living under a brutal dictatorship since the odds are stacked against them.
He might have as well told the Syrian people that they weren't deserving of freedom, dignity and a better life.. because "it's not in the stars" so why bother! He is practically telling Syrians to give up already and that their sacrifices were all in vain which I found astonishingly patronizing and extremely condescending.
I don't recommend this book at all if you're looking for accurate narrative on Syria.
July 7, 2024
a fascinating read and definitely something that i probably wouldn’t have read myself, and though i agreed with some of the conclusions, especially concerning tunisia and egypt, i was completely at odds with feldman’s reasoning about syria. how can he put the onus on america during the iraq war less than ten years prior and yet completely leave syrians to deal with the consequences of their “actions?” by putting the syrian chapter first and then following it with the one about the islamic state, feldman not only confuses readers but also gets his conclusions muddled. though i obviously don’t have as much experience on the subject that feldman has, i completely disagreed with his takes on syria, and that negatively affects my opinion of him greatly. its impossible to discuss arab political history without discussing the imperial past of the region, especially without including the us’s presence. saying that obama was morally not at fault is unreasonable after blaming bush for the iraq war. definitely a fascinating subject that i’d love to learn more about, but i think that needs to come from reading middle eastern scholars versus white ones who marginally participated in the constitutional process
August 22, 2021
History has erased the Tunisian happy ending of this book. However, I enjoyed his dissecting of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the philosophical and political implications of the later popular uprising against democracy. Also found his analysis of the blundering handling of Syrian policy by the Obama Administration insightful.
June 19, 2020
Average book and no interesting facts!! It was so difficult to turn the pages.
October 3, 2021
ما که در جایی به نام خاورمیانه به دنیا آمده و زندگی کردهایم، اگر نه همیشه، در بیشتر مواقع از این نام، تصور جغرافیایی را در ذهن خود پروراندهایم که مثل موم در دست قدرتهای خارجی و عاملهای بیرونی به هر شکلی که آنها خواستهاند و اراده کردهاند در آمده است. خاورمیانه برای ما بخشی از جهان بوده است که همیشه توسط امپریالیسم شکل گرفته است. خود این عبارت هم حتی محصولی امپریالیستی تلقی شده و میشود. خلاف جاهای مختلف جهان، انگار خاورمیانه هیچ بازیگر و عامل درونی هیچ وقت نداشته است و همیشه باید به این و آن نفرین بفرستد بابت سرنوشت خودش. نقطة متضاد این تلقی به «بهار عربی» معروف است. آنجا که «مردم سقوط نظامشان» را خواستند. این بهار همة نقاط معروف به خاورمیانه را، از تونس و لیبی و مصر تا سوریه و بحرین و یمن فراگرفت. کتاب «زمستان عربی» از زاویهدید ارزشمندی به این مجموعه وقایع نگاه کرده است. او نیز میتوانست مثل همة ذهنیتهای حاکم بر خاورمیانه، تمامقد همة عاملیتهای همة وقایع این نقطة جغرافیایی را به گردن «بیگانگان» بیاندازد و خیال همه را راحت کند که اصلاً هر چه هست تقصیر دیگران است و بس! اما نکتة مثبت این کتاب که رگمایههایی از تأمل فلسفی نیز در آن هست، دقیقاً اینجاست که در پی شرح و تفسیر عاملهای اثرگذار درونی برمیآید. ما ساکنان خاورمیانه زیاد با این زاویه دید آشنا نیستیم که شاید بخش عمدهای از مصائب ما تقصیر خودمان هم باشد. ما گیرکردة گذشتههای اساطیری و زرین، اساساً ناتوان از درک درست تاریخ، به خصوص تاریخ دویست-سیصدسال اخیر نشان دادهایم.
در این کتاب خیزش مردم کشورهای عربی معروف به بهار عربی مورد کنکاش قرار میگیرد (در همین برهه در ایران و ترکیه نیز تحولات و خیزشهایی روی میدهد که به عمد در این کتاب جای نگرفته است). نویسنده مبدأ تأملات خود را فروپاشی امپراتوری عثمانی و تحولات پس از جنگ جهانی اول در شمال افریقا و خاورمیانه میگذارد و از آنجا به سمت مرزکشیهای پسا-استعماری میان انگلیس و فرانسه پیش میرود و بنیان بهار عربی در نظر او، شکلگیری انقلابهای «ناسیونالیستی-چپگرا»ی عربی است که عمدتاً (شاید اکثر قریب به اتفاق آنها) توسط ژنرالها روی میدهد. در اینجا است که در بیشتر کشورهای عربی یک گسست بنیادین میان «عموم مردم» و سلایق و عقایدشان با حکومتهای نظامی-ملیگرا-مایل به چپ ایجاد میشود که هنوز همة جوامع این منطقه را تحت تأثیر خود دارد. از بطن این عموم مردم، رفته رفته نهضتهای اسلامی ذیل نام «بیداری اسلامی» رشد میکند و اسلامگرایی به نظاممندترین جریان غالب مردمی در منطقه تبدیل میشود. هر کشور عربی حتماً ذیل نام «نهضت» یا «اخوان» و یا هر دو، یکی از اینها را در خود پرورش داده است. هرجا هم که حق اختیاری برای مردم در نظر گرفته شده، پیروزی این جریان از پیش مشخص بوده است؛ تنها به یک دلیل ساده: نظاممندی و انسجام مدنی بیرقیب آن نسبت به همة جریانهای دیگر.
عمدة جریانهای اسلامگرای منطقه اما نگاه منفی به دموکراسی و مدرنیزاسیون نداشتهاند. آنها اصول قانونگذاری دموکراتیک و جامعة مدنی را از همان ابتدا پذیرفتهاند و اتفاقاً مبنای تحرکات خود را نیز همان اصول قرار دادهاند: اینکه جامعة اسلامی باید برمبنای قانون اداره شود و محتوای آن قانون باید از نص مقدس بیرون بیاید. رابطة اسلامگرایی و حقوق مدنی هنوز محل مناقشات قابل توجهی در این منطقه است؛ اما نکتة مهم اینکه عمدة روشنفکران دینی نیز از زمین همین جریانهای اسلامگرا روییده و بدنة غالب روشنفکری کشورهای این منطقه را شکل داده است (مثل مردمسالاری دینی جریان خاتمی در ایران خود ما).
نکتة جالب اینکه بهار عربی توسط این نهضتها و اخوانها شکل نگرفت! وقتی آنها سرگرم بحث و فحصهای خودشان بودند، دستفروشی در تونس خود را آتش زد؛ مردمی در لیبی خواستار رفتن قذافی شدند؛ میدان تحریر پر شد از جریانهای عمدتاً سکولار مخالف ژنرال مبارک که روی دوش اسلامگرایی افراطی بر اریکة قدرت سوار شده بود؛ در سوریه نیز اکثریت سنی علیه اقلیت علوی حاضر در قدرت قیام کردند (عکس این موضوع در بحرین و یمن روی داد، آنجا که اکثریت شیعه علیه اقیت سنی به پا خاست). نهضتها و اخوانها از ابتدای همة این جریانها غایب بودند، اما نظاممندی و انسجام ساختاری آنها کمکشان کرد، آنجا که پای انتخابی در میان آمد (مثل مصر و حتی خود تونس)، به برندگان اصلی بهار عربی تبدیل شوند.
در این میان سلفی-جهادیها هم هستند. آنها مدرنترین جریان اسلامگرای منطقه را شکل میدهند؛ جریانی اتوپیایی، انقلابی، در پی ایجاد یک تمدن ناب و البته پیشرفته در منطقه! آنها نیز در میدانهای تحریر بهارهای عربی حضور نداشتند، اما به خصوص در مرز کمرنگشده و از نفسافتادة عراق و سوریه خود را به جهان معرفی کردند و در پی تحقق خلافت آرمانی امت مسلمان برآمدند.
حال از میان همة این جریانها، آن مردمانی که شعار میدادند «مردم خواستار سقوط نظام» هستند دقیقاً کجا قرار دارند؟ پاسخ کاملاً روشن است: همهجا و هیچجا! آنها مردمی عادی و متعلق به کوچهپسکوچهها بودند که بیش از همه در اعتراض به انواع ناکارآمدیها، به شکلی تودهوار خیابانها و میدانها را به اشغال خود درآوردند، اما دقیقاً همین بیوضعیتی بنیادینشان (که گاهوبیگاه به شکلی تقلیلگرایانه بیرهبری هم خوانده میشود)، آنها را همیشه از برخورداری از حاصل دسترنج خود محروم ساخته است (حتی در تونس که گرچه به ساختاری دموکراتیکتر در پسابهار عربی انجامید، اما نانی در دهان دستفروشانش نگذاشت!) این مردم همیشه سقوط چیزی را خواستهاند، اما هرگز نتوانستهاند بدانند که دقیقاً چه میخواهند!
واقعیت این است که خاورمیانه در شرق و غربش اکنون دچار یک ترومای سیاسی بغرنج است. ساختارهای دموکراتیک نتوانستهاند انسان دموکراتیک، اقتصاد دموکراتیک و سیاست دموکراتیک پرورش دهند. همهچیز در یک وضعیت نمایشی به سر میبرد. این کتاب که در چارچوب نظریة عاملیت سیاسی به نگارش درآمده است، درسهای جالبی برای همة ساکنان همة کشورهای خاورمیانة کنونی دارد. خواندنش زوایای کمتر دیدهشدهای را به روی ما میگشاید که شاید مفید افتد.
در این کتاب خیزش مردم کشورهای عربی معروف به بهار عربی مورد کنکاش قرار میگیرد (در همین برهه در ایران و ترکیه نیز تحولات و خیزشهایی روی میدهد که به عمد در این کتاب جای نگرفته است). نویسنده مبدأ تأملات خود را فروپاشی امپراتوری عثمانی و تحولات پس از جنگ جهانی اول در شمال افریقا و خاورمیانه میگذارد و از آنجا به سمت مرزکشیهای پسا-استعماری میان انگلیس و فرانسه پیش میرود و بنیان بهار عربی در نظر او، شکلگیری انقلابهای «ناسیونالیستی-چپگرا»ی عربی است که عمدتاً (شاید اکثر قریب به اتفاق آنها) توسط ژنرالها روی میدهد. در اینجا است که در بیشتر کشورهای عربی یک گسست بنیادین میان «عموم مردم» و سلایق و عقایدشان با حکومتهای نظامی-ملیگرا-مایل به چپ ایجاد میشود که هنوز همة جوامع این منطقه را تحت تأثیر خود دارد. از بطن این عموم مردم، رفته رفته نهضتهای اسلامی ذیل نام «بیداری اسلامی» رشد میکند و اسلامگرایی به نظاممندترین جریان غالب مردمی در منطقه تبدیل میشود. هر کشور عربی حتماً ذیل نام «نهضت» یا «اخوان» و یا هر دو، یکی از اینها را در خود پرورش داده است. هرجا هم که حق اختیاری برای مردم در نظر گرفته شده، پیروزی این جریان از پیش مشخص بوده است؛ تنها به یک دلیل ساده: نظاممندی و انسجام مدنی بیرقیب آن نسبت به همة جریانهای دیگر.
عمدة جریانهای اسلامگرای منطقه اما نگاه منفی به دموکراسی و مدرنیزاسیون نداشتهاند. آنها اصول قانونگذاری دموکراتیک و جامعة مدنی را از همان ابتدا پذیرفتهاند و اتفاقاً مبنای تحرکات خود را نیز همان اصول قرار دادهاند: اینکه جامعة اسلامی باید برمبنای قانون اداره شود و محتوای آن قانون باید از نص مقدس بیرون بیاید. رابطة اسلامگرایی و حقوق مدنی هنوز محل مناقشات قابل توجهی در این منطقه است؛ اما نکتة مهم اینکه عمدة روشنفکران دینی نیز از زمین همین جریانهای اسلامگرا روییده و بدنة غالب روشنفکری کشورهای این منطقه را شکل داده است (مثل مردمسالاری دینی جریان خاتمی در ایران خود ما).
نکتة جالب اینکه بهار عربی توسط این نهضتها و اخوانها شکل نگرفت! وقتی آنها سرگرم بحث و فحصهای خودشان بودند، دستفروشی در تونس خود را آتش زد؛ مردمی در لیبی خواستار رفتن قذافی شدند؛ میدان تحریر پر شد از جریانهای عمدتاً سکولار مخالف ژنرال مبارک که روی دوش اسلامگرایی افراطی بر اریکة قدرت سوار شده بود؛ در سوریه نیز اکثریت سنی علیه اقلیت علوی حاضر در قدرت قیام کردند (عکس این موضوع در بحرین و یمن روی داد، آنجا که اکثریت شیعه علیه اقیت سنی به پا خاست). نهضتها و اخوانها از ابتدای همة این جریانها غایب بودند، اما نظاممندی و انسجام ساختاری آنها کمکشان کرد، آنجا که پای انتخابی در میان آمد (مثل مصر و حتی خود تونس)، به برندگان اصلی بهار عربی تبدیل شوند.
در این میان سلفی-جهادیها هم هستند. آنها مدرنترین جریان اسلامگرای منطقه را شکل میدهند؛ جریانی اتوپیایی، انقلابی، در پی ایجاد یک تمدن ناب و البته پیشرفته در منطقه! آنها نیز در میدانهای تحریر بهارهای عربی حضور نداشتند، اما به خصوص در مرز کمرنگشده و از نفسافتادة عراق و سوریه خود را به جهان معرفی کردند و در پی تحقق خلافت آرمانی امت مسلمان برآمدند.
حال از میان همة این جریانها، آن مردمانی که شعار میدادند «مردم خواستار سقوط نظام» هستند دقیقاً کجا قرار دارند؟ پاسخ کاملاً روشن است: همهجا و هیچجا! آنها مردمی عادی و متعلق به کوچهپسکوچهها بودند که بیش از همه در اعتراض به انواع ناکارآمدیها، به شکلی تودهوار خیابانها و میدانها را به اشغال خود درآوردند، اما دقیقاً همین بیوضعیتی بنیادینشان (که گاهوبیگاه به شکلی تقلیلگرایانه بیرهبری هم خوانده میشود)، آنها را همیشه از برخورداری از حاصل دسترنج خود محروم ساخته است (حتی در تونس که گرچه به ساختاری دموکراتیکتر در پسابهار عربی انجامید، اما نانی در دهان دستفروشانش نگذاشت!) این مردم همیشه سقوط چیزی را خواستهاند، اما هرگز نتوانستهاند بدانند که دقیقاً چه میخواهند!
واقعیت این است که خاورمیانه در شرق و غربش اکنون دچار یک ترومای سیاسی بغرنج است. ساختارهای دموکراتیک نتوانستهاند انسان دموکراتیک، اقتصاد دموکراتیک و سیاست دموکراتیک پرورش دهند. همهچیز در یک وضعیت نمایشی به سر میبرد. این کتاب که در چارچوب نظریة عاملیت سیاسی به نگارش درآمده است، درسهای جالبی برای همة ساکنان همة کشورهای خاورمیانة کنونی دارد. خواندنش زوایای کمتر دیدهشدهای را به روی ما میگشاید که شاید مفید افتد.
February 2, 2023
garbage. refuse. other synonyms for trash.
December 17, 2023
This book was...ok. I generally like Feldman's analysis, but this one felt rushed and is sometimes a little thin. NF argues that the historical significance of the ARab Spring (and now, the Arab Winter which reflects the failure of the Arab Spring rebellions in all nations but Tunisia) is that Arabs exercised political agency and themselves determined the course of events. In other words, outside imperial powers were secondary actors to a history driven by Arabs. This is a good insight, but NF belabors this relatively straightforward point, going to philosophical lengths in his discussion of the meaning of agency. Most historians now view "agency" as an overrated concept, as all human beings have it and can use it in any circumstance. I would have rather learned more about the political and constitutional processes in these nations rather than a treatise on historical agency or who counts as "the people." HIs chapter on Syria is just weird almost to the point of blaming Syrians for hoping to get bailed out by the West, and his chapter on the Islamic State adds nothing new to existing expert analyses of that phenomenon.
One of the more interesting parts of the book is his comparison of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. The former failed after a brief democratic experiment, and EG is once again under military rule. The latter succeeded and has led to a burgeoning democracy. NF argues that the EG people exercised agency but not responsibility in calling for the military to remove the democratically elected Morsi. Morsi was a terrible leader who acted like he had a huge mandate and pushed the country in illiberal directions. But liberal Egyptians and many others erred seriously in backing the military against him; they effectively destroyed democratic and constitutional rule in Egypt in order to remove one leader when they should have waited for the next election to defeat him, thereby preserving the structure and process of democratic govt.
NF argues that this was nonetheless a legitimate exercise of democratic political agency given that the people have the right to abolish democracy itself. I disagree on Burkean terms. The people at any given moment of history owe it to their ancestors who struggled for democracy and to their descendants who deserve a chance to live in democracy to stick with this form of government, or at least to not choose its abolition.
In Tunisia, however, a spirit of compromise and moderation reigned, enabling the country to emerge through growing pains without having a military takeover or dramatic religious radicalization. A crucial step was the moderating of Ennahda, the main Islamic political party, and its astute leader Rashid Ghannouchi, who adopted a more tolerant position and defended the democratic process and constitutional law. The Muslim Brotherhood in EG, in contrast, erred and overstepped, creating an opportunity for hte military to end the experiment. Tunisia remains the shining beacon of the Arab Spring and an illustration that Arab nations can become democratic. But I would have liked to hear more of a sustained analysis from Feldman as to why the Arab spring faltered in so many places.
There are some good insights in this book, but it is hardly a seminal text on the subject. In short, if you want to learn about the Arab Spring try something else, like "Into the Hands of the SOldiers" by Kirkpatrick or "Stranger in Your Own City" by Ahad.
One of the more interesting parts of the book is his comparison of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. The former failed after a brief democratic experiment, and EG is once again under military rule. The latter succeeded and has led to a burgeoning democracy. NF argues that the EG people exercised agency but not responsibility in calling for the military to remove the democratically elected Morsi. Morsi was a terrible leader who acted like he had a huge mandate and pushed the country in illiberal directions. But liberal Egyptians and many others erred seriously in backing the military against him; they effectively destroyed democratic and constitutional rule in Egypt in order to remove one leader when they should have waited for the next election to defeat him, thereby preserving the structure and process of democratic govt.
NF argues that this was nonetheless a legitimate exercise of democratic political agency given that the people have the right to abolish democracy itself. I disagree on Burkean terms. The people at any given moment of history owe it to their ancestors who struggled for democracy and to their descendants who deserve a chance to live in democracy to stick with this form of government, or at least to not choose its abolition.
In Tunisia, however, a spirit of compromise and moderation reigned, enabling the country to emerge through growing pains without having a military takeover or dramatic religious radicalization. A crucial step was the moderating of Ennahda, the main Islamic political party, and its astute leader Rashid Ghannouchi, who adopted a more tolerant position and defended the democratic process and constitutional law. The Muslim Brotherhood in EG, in contrast, erred and overstepped, creating an opportunity for hte military to end the experiment. Tunisia remains the shining beacon of the Arab Spring and an illustration that Arab nations can become democratic. But I would have liked to hear more of a sustained analysis from Feldman as to why the Arab spring faltered in so many places.
There are some good insights in this book, but it is hardly a seminal text on the subject. In short, if you want to learn about the Arab Spring try something else, like "Into the Hands of the SOldiers" by Kirkpatrick or "Stranger in Your Own City" by Ahad.
December 2, 2021
This is a strange book. Mr. Feldman carefully explains that he is not describing what happened but rather why it happened yet the sequence of events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria is crucial to following the narrative. This long essay seems quite informative and raises points lost in the media-heavy coverage of the Arab Spring and its aftermath (the Arab Winter of the title) but it's also quite vague about or simply omits aspects Mr. Feldman apparently does not think are worthy of analysis. Mr. Feldman has several notable biases, as anyone does, and he admits to them, but he doesn't seem aware that they color his narrative in major ways. (His biases include the conviction that nothing about Iraq post 2003 can be good and nothing done by the US under Obama can be bad. He calls the 2014 election in Tunisia the "first democratic election in the Arab world" ignoring the Iraqi elections in 2005 and 2010.) He strives to reach reasonable conclusions but struggles to keep them untainted by his biases. His conclusions boil down to protests about things can change the government but don't guarantee the new government fixes those things. The Arab Spring failed to produce democracy in Syria and Egypt because simply removing a tyrant (or trying to) doesn't fix an economy or eliminate ethnic and sectarian hatred. Mr. Feldman admits that the protestors didn't really know what they wanted besides change which in and of itself is not progress. The best part of this essay is a thoughtful exploration of what democracy means in the context of the Arab states, and how difficult it is to achieve a liberal democracy through the expression of political will by popular demonstrations. I think most people already understand that. In spite of being quite trendy, protests never have and never will create anything. Mr. Feldman concludes that democracy was achieved in Tunisia through compromise by secular and Islamist political leaders. Ultimately, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Ennahda succeeded because it successfully resisted the demands of its supporters rather than being driven by them. This is the dilemma (and common failing) of revolutionaries the world over.
August 18, 2020
I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in Middle Eastern Studies because of the fact that it presents a strong case for rethinking the Arab Spring than just a series of failed revolutions. Feldman's analyses on Tunisia and Egypt are probably the best chapters in the book, whereas the chapter on Syria is probably the weakest. He makes a strong case that if we accept Egyptians expressing political agency in the 2011 protests, then we must accept them exercising agency again in the 2013 protests. While the results of the Arab Spring at first glance are incredibly disheartening, the example of Tunisia and (at the time of writing) possibly Sudan presents cause for hope in the future. Unfortunately, Feldman's chapter on Syria exhibits some flaws. In his attempt to present the Arab Spring as entirely the native populations expressing political agency, Feldman extremely downplays the role US interference (and lack thereof) had in the creation of the Syrian civil war. While he is correct that Obama cannot bare all of the guilt for what transpired, it feels that he writes his influence off too much. Another smaller problem Feldman has in this book is his mention in Chapter I about how the Arab Winter has signalled the end of Pan-Arabism in the Middle-East and North Africa, yet does not really provide any evidence for this fact nor addresses it again within the book. All of these faults aside, it is still a worthwhile read simply for the thesis that he has laid out on how Arab Peoples expressed political agency and that the Arab Spring was not totally in vain.
January 21, 2021
This was a deeply tragic exploration of Arab politics with a focus on the Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution, the Syrian civil war, the rise and fall of Isis in Syria and Iraq and the Tunisian struggle toward Islamic constitutionalism.
As a book it is quite scholarly in nature, heavy on historical content and reflection and the nuances of international politics.
As a work of opinion, it is well informed. The author is knowledgeable, intentional and lays out arguments for his various opinions that are not aggressive and end in a ray of hope.
The highlight of the book is of course reading about the historical occurrence of the first democratic transition of political parties in modern Arab history (Tunisia).
The end of this work culminates in a beautiful reflection on democracy, “In a liberal democracy, the protests need not translate into demands for a new regime. Tunisians now understand that democracy offers no inherent answer to economic troubles. But that means they also understand that a return to autocracy would not solve those troubles either. Thus protests that challenge the government need not challenge the structure of constitutional democracy itself.
This is an important feature of political responsibility in successful democracy. In an autocracy, people may imagine they can improve their lot by overthrowing both the government and the type of regime, as happened in the Arab spring. In a democracy however, people exercising political responsibility know that they cannot improve matters by overthrowing themselves.”
As a book it is quite scholarly in nature, heavy on historical content and reflection and the nuances of international politics.
As a work of opinion, it is well informed. The author is knowledgeable, intentional and lays out arguments for his various opinions that are not aggressive and end in a ray of hope.
The highlight of the book is of course reading about the historical occurrence of the first democratic transition of political parties in modern Arab history (Tunisia).
The end of this work culminates in a beautiful reflection on democracy, “In a liberal democracy, the protests need not translate into demands for a new regime. Tunisians now understand that democracy offers no inherent answer to economic troubles. But that means they also understand that a return to autocracy would not solve those troubles either. Thus protests that challenge the government need not challenge the structure of constitutional democracy itself.
This is an important feature of political responsibility in successful democracy. In an autocracy, people may imagine they can improve their lot by overthrowing both the government and the type of regime, as happened in the Arab spring. In a democracy however, people exercising political responsibility know that they cannot improve matters by overthrowing themselves.”
March 10, 2024
A major disappointment.
First of all, I've expected a properly presented historical background. And an objective, unprocessed chronicle of the main events, followed by rigorous multi-dimensional analysis. What I've got instead is:
- long intro filled with conclusions (!) & strong opinions (and chaos ...)
- assumptions that the readers are intimately familiar with the topic
- few chapters (better than the initial part) dedicated to Egypt, Tunisia, Syria & IS that are filled with oversimplification - they feel like prepared to be broadcasted to US voters via CNN ;/ - I may not be super-familiar with what happened in Egypt, but at least the Tunisian chapter is far from the objective reality ;/
2.4 stars - as some comments were really interesting & thought-provoking, e.g., about what makes democracy work and why it's important that it doesn't become a theory of elected majority. This has several implications people should understand, as it seems we've started forgetting them even in the Western Europe ;/
First of all, I've expected a properly presented historical background. And an objective, unprocessed chronicle of the main events, followed by rigorous multi-dimensional analysis. What I've got instead is:
- long intro filled with conclusions (!) & strong opinions (and chaos ...)
- assumptions that the readers are intimately familiar with the topic
- few chapters (better than the initial part) dedicated to Egypt, Tunisia, Syria & IS that are filled with oversimplification - they feel like prepared to be broadcasted to US voters via CNN ;/ - I may not be super-familiar with what happened in Egypt, but at least the Tunisian chapter is far from the objective reality ;/
2.4 stars - as some comments were really interesting & thought-provoking, e.g., about what makes democracy work and why it's important that it doesn't become a theory of elected majority. This has several implications people should understand, as it seems we've started forgetting them even in the Western Europe ;/
April 1, 2023
This book made me feel torn between the sadness it brought up in me for the fate of Arab Spring countries' dreams and aspirations and admiration for the depth and rigor of the author's analysis of this tragic fate. He dissects every case he gives with a precision that can be rarely found in the writing of an outsider about the Arab world. I agree with his general analysis but find his final note of hope hard to embrace. As time went on, the dream of building functioning democracies in the region receded more and more. Radicalism is on the rise. Societies are more strained than ever. Right now, it is credible that freedom--if given under these circumstances--can lead to the dissolution of the social fabric of most Arab nations. But maybe the author's hopeful wishes would come true; after winter spring can come again!
June 14, 2023
Notwithstanding the inevitable biases and side agendas, whether consciously pursued or not, this is a very decent effort and at times insightful reading of the events.
I am particularly impressed by the level of knowledge and understanding of the Arab intellectuel panorama past and present displayed by the author. Extremely rare and unexpected from a non-Arab intellectual.
There are even hints at some intricate elements of historically relevant Arab/Islamic thought… stuff that is deeply buried in the tradition of Fiqh and or Fikr Al Islami (الفقه او الفكر الاسلامي)
At a time where TV panels are full of so-called “experts of the Arab world” who know just as much as the next expert on whatever the next subject going on Air.. ie not much! This man actually knows what he is talking about.
Makes for an interesting reading.
I am particularly impressed by the level of knowledge and understanding of the Arab intellectuel panorama past and present displayed by the author. Extremely rare and unexpected from a non-Arab intellectual.
There are even hints at some intricate elements of historically relevant Arab/Islamic thought… stuff that is deeply buried in the tradition of Fiqh and or Fikr Al Islami (الفقه او الفكر الاسلامي)
At a time where TV panels are full of so-called “experts of the Arab world” who know just as much as the next expert on whatever the next subject going on Air.. ie not much! This man actually knows what he is talking about.
Makes for an interesting reading.
September 11, 2020
Author overlooks scriptures like below that literally call for destruction of pagan artifacts and murder of kafirs in a possible attempt to whitewash isis.a simple google search suffices...but he says he cant finsd any indication that scripture call for destruction [lol]
34:7: The Unbelievers (Kafaru) say (in ridicule): “Shall we point out to you a man that will tell you, when ye are all scattered to pieces in disintegration, that ye shall (then be raised) in a New Creation?
4:56: Those who reject (Kafaru) our Signs, We shall soon cast into the Fire
5:86: But those who reject Faith (Kafaru) and belie our Signs, – they shall be companions of Hell-fire.
For most other parts he praises the arab spring while the underlying motive was not establishing a democracy but sharia.
34:7: The Unbelievers (Kafaru) say (in ridicule): “Shall we point out to you a man that will tell you, when ye are all scattered to pieces in disintegration, that ye shall (then be raised) in a New Creation?
4:56: Those who reject (Kafaru) our Signs, We shall soon cast into the Fire
5:86: But those who reject Faith (Kafaru) and belie our Signs, – they shall be companions of Hell-fire.
For most other parts he praises the arab spring while the underlying motive was not establishing a democracy but sharia.
Read
December 14, 2020I was drawn by the title of this one. As the title promises, it's about the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The part I didn't like was the part where Noah Feldman makes the point *in each chapter*, at length, that Arabs exercised their own agency in the outcome of the Arab Spring. Not because I disagree with the point (obviously with qualifications where Syria is concerned, but Feldman acknowledges that much), but because, OK, you've made that point, and I'm not sure I want to read it at quite this much length. However, once I got past that part, the book did supply a lot of detail on why we saw the outcomes we did in each country - the return of autocracy in Egypt, successful transition to democracy in Tunisia, civil war in Syria.
February 13, 2021
الشتاء العربي ، تراجيديا
المؤلف : نوح فيلدمان، استاذ قانون بجامعة هارفارد
يتحدث هذا الكتاب عن الربيع العربي
اسبابه التاريخية التي لها جذور استعمارية اوجدت انظمة قمعية و طائفية، بالاضافة لاخفاق الولايات المتحدة من تحقيق غايتها من ازالة صدام ( تأسيس ديمقراطية) هو ممن ساهموا بكتابة دستور العراق بعد ازالة صدام
يحلل التجربة المصرية، كيف بدات بثورة تطالب بتنحي مبارك و انتهت بدعوة الحكم العسكري مجددا ، هل كانت الإطاحة بمرسي عملية ديمقراطية او انقلاب ؟
التجربة التونسية ناجحة ام لا
ظهور القاعدة و داعش الاسباب ؟ الدوافع ؟ ما الذي ادى لانضمام ٣٠ الف مجاهد من دول متقدمة لصفوفها ؟ ما الذي ادى لانضمام النساء ايضا للدولة الاسلامية ؟
كتاب جيد
المؤلف : نوح فيلدمان، استاذ قانون بجامعة هارفارد
يتحدث هذا الكتاب عن الربيع العربي
اسبابه التاريخية التي لها جذور استعمارية اوجدت انظمة قمعية و طائفية، بالاضافة لاخفاق الولايات المتحدة من تحقيق غايتها من ازالة صدام ( تأسيس ديمقراطية) هو ممن ساهموا بكتابة دستور العراق بعد ازالة صدام
يحلل التجربة المصرية، كيف بدات بثورة تطالب بتنحي مبارك و انتهت بدعوة الحكم العسكري مجددا ، هل كانت الإطاحة بمرسي عملية ديمقراطية او انقلاب ؟
التجربة التونسية ناجحة ام لا
ظهور القاعدة و داعش الاسباب ؟ الدوافع ؟ ما الذي ادى لانضمام ٣٠ الف مجاهد من دول متقدمة لصفوفها ؟ ما الذي ادى لانضمام النساء ايضا للدولة الاسلامية ؟
كتاب جيد
May 18, 2023
I thought this was an enlightening look at the results of the Arab Spring. My main take away is that people wanted change and wanted a revolution, but that's more about describing the problem and there was very little effort spent on what the solution would be or who had the power to carry it out. It also made the point that the exact form of government doesn't matter if citizens feel they are supported, which often seems to be that they have enough wealth. The book was weighed down by a lot of academic formalism that made it less accessible and diluted the argument.
February 14, 2023
Arab spring of 2011, largely dubbed as unsuccessful. But it shook a lot of things, it has its success, like establishment of democratic govt in Tunisia, to failures, like mass slaughter in syria by repressive dictator Asad, and failed establishment of democracy in egypt, to succumb again to dictatorship of Al Sisi. But story goes to the heart of the unrest, and gives a glimer of hope and if learned carefully, some lesions into democracy. Good read.
September 7, 2020
I’m glad I read this book, it helped me put in context the last 10 years of the news arising from “The Arab Spring.” The author does a good job of explaining in broad terms how he understands what is going on in that part of the world. His focus on Egypt and Syria and Tunisia was particularly helpful.
May 19, 2020
Very Detailed
This is a very detailed account of the Arab Spring and failure - except in the case of Tunisia. The chapters on Egypt and the Islamic State were particularly interesting to me.
This is a very detailed account of the Arab Spring and failure - except in the case of Tunisia. The chapters on Egypt and the Islamic State were particularly interesting to me.
February 18, 2024
I have only read sections of this book, and whilst there is some incredibly flawed logic in the book and a failure to discuss Bahrain. It is still a thought provoking and interesting perspective on the 2011 uprisings.
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