On the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki comes this heart-pounding account of the war-room drama inside the cabinets of the United States and Japan that led to Armageddon on August 6, 1945.
Here are the secret strategy sessions, fierce debates, looming assassinations, and planned invasions that resulted in history's first use of nuclear weapons in combat, and the ensuing chaotic days as the Japanese government struggled to respond to the reality of nuclear war.
During the closing months of World War II, as America's strategic bombing campaign incinerated Japan's cities, two military giants locked in a death embrace of cultural differences and diplomatic intransigence. The leaders of the United States called for the "unconditional surrender" of the Japanese Empire while developing history's deadliest weapon and weighing an invasion, Downfall, that would have dwarfed D-Day. Their enemy responded with a last-ditch plan termed Ketsu-Go, which called for the suicidal resistance of every able-bodied man and woman in "The Decisive Battle" for the homeland. But had Emperor Hirohito's generals miscalculated how far the Americans had come in developing the atomic bomb? How close did President Harry Truman come to ordering the invasion of Japan?
Within the Japanese Supreme Council at the Direction of War, a.k.a. "The Big Six," Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō risked assassination in his crusade to convince his dysfunctional government, dominated by militarist fanatics, to save his country from annihilation.
Despite Allied warnings of Japan's "prompt and utter destruction" and that the Allies would "brook no delay," the Big Six remained defiant. They refused to surrender even after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
How did Japanese leaders come to this impasse? The answers lie in this nearly day-by-day account of the struggle to end the most destructive conflict in history.
David Dean Barrett is a military historian, specializing in World War II. He has published work in WWII Quarterly Magazine, U.S. Military History Review, and Global War Studies. He is the Consulting/Producer for Lou Reda Productions' two-hour documentary, tentatively titled "The Real Mighty Eighth," which will air as a primetime global event on National Geographic in late 2020. David has been a frequent guest speaker for more than a decade on the use of the atomic bomb in the final days of WWII and the end of the Pacific War.
Mr. Barrett began his career as a professional historian late in life, after spending nearly thirty years in Information Technology. David was awarded his Master's Degree in History from the University of Colorado, Denver, in the summer of 2006. Six years later, in 2012, he officially entered his new profession, opening the doors of One With History, Inc. Mr. Barrett lives in Littleton, Colorado.
140 Days to Hiroshima by David Dean Barrett This is presented in such an interesting fashion that I felt like I was there. I am old but not that old. 😂 I really got a sense of what went on behind the curtain when the heads of states were deciding their fates and the fates of others. It's crazy how each side had people with radical ideas that continued throughout the war.
This book taught me two pivotal things. First, it illustrated the terrifying mentality of the Japanese during WWII. Second, the resolve and leadership of President Truman after FDR’s death was pretty inspiring.
The militarism of the Japanese was fierce and the fact that they kept the public in the dark about their situation in the final months of the war was insane. The outcome of the war once the Germans were defeated and the Potsdam Declaration made was in the hands of only a few powerful figures within the Japanese government. More specifically, the Big Six were strongly divided on whether to surrender or to continue fighting to the bitter end. Enter the atomic bomb. Even after the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the hardliners refused to surrender despite the wishes of Emperor Hirohito.
Sure, there’s the requisite debate on whether dropping nuclear weapons was the end-all-be-all solution to getting Japan to capitulate. But when Truman consulted with former president Hoover on allied losses if an invasion of Japan were necessary, the estimates were staggering: 1 million dead and triple that wounded. That’s not to mention the number of Japanese soldiers and civilians. “Casualties occurring on Pacific battlefields were mounting dramatically and they would be on a much greater scale during an invasion of the Japanese homeland.”
The stubbornness of Japanese leadership was incredibly frustrating, as was their attempt to shape perception of themselves as victims after their surrender. “That [the foreign minister]… chose to invoke the Hague Convention agreements when his country had consistently violated its provisions all through the war… smacks of hypocrisy and a double standard the Japanese lived by during the entirely of the war.” The attitude of the Japanese is unfathomable, but Barrett does a great job outlining the key players and their staunch views.
I received a complimentary copy of this book via the Amazon Vine program.
This is my 66th book read on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and/or Nagasaki and it was one of the best. The author gives one of the better accounts of why these bombings were necessary and effectively disputes the claims of revisionist "historians". Revisionists often assert that high American casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan were a postwar fabrication to justify the use of the atomic bomb, and grossly overstated the expectations of the American military planners (see: Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath by Paul Ham). Fact after fact presented in the Barrett book's epilogue utterly destroy this argument. Truman was indeed provided with estimates that vastly exceeded the modest numbers offered up by revisionists. And what of enemy casualties, civilian and military, resulting from an invasion of Japan - something revisionists callously dodge in their narratives? US planners forecasted between 5,000,000 and 10,000 million Japanese would be killed. Barrett also effectively refutes the supposition that it was the Soviet entry into the war that compelled the Japanese to surrender. The claims that the Japanese would have surrendered perhaps as early as the spring of 1945, most likely before the scheduled invasion, and certainly no later than the end of 1945, the author finds the most outrageous of all. Barrett effectively destroys these claims and others in the conclusion of his book. The fact is that these atomic bombings, as horrible as they were, were necessary and brought a quicker ending to the war with Japan and in doing so saved lives on both sides. I highly recommend reading this account.
August 6, 1945, is enshrined in history as the date when the first atomic bomb (Little Boy) was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. This book deals with the 140 days leading up to that explosion, and the period afterwards up until the formal surrender of the Japanese aboard the USS Missouri.
In the 80 years that have followed that memorable day there has been much controversy over whether it was really necessary to drop two atomic bombs to end the war or would the Japanese have been forced to surrender by conventional weapons. This book tries to answer those questions and others about the fraught period when the Allies contemplated an invasion of of Japan in November, 1945, rather than use the expensive and terrible weapon that they had created.
Reading the narrative about the countdown to August 6, I think the thing that struck me most was the self-delusionment by most of the Japanese goverment about how the war was progressing. Even though many of their cities had been devastated by bombing, much of their shipping was at the bottom of ocean, their once-massive navy and air force had been defeated time and time again, and their once-proud army now faced a new enemy (the Russians), men like War Minister Anami still demanded that their island nation fight to the last man, woman and child! Fortunately, one man, Foreign Minister Togo, insisted that way was folly, and the Emperor agreed with him, especially after the two bombs were dropped.
This is a very interesting book, showing the differences in the ideologies of the participants. It's hard to imagine the Japanese of today being so blind to what was going on, but it was a different time, a different mindset. According to the author, the use of the bomb gave the Japanese the excuse to believe that they had been defeated by science, allowing them to ignore their terrible guilt and atrocities.
140 Days to Hiroshima: The Story of Japan's Last Chance to Avert Armageddon by David Dean Barrett was timed to be released for the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki captures the war-room drama inside the cabinets of the United States and Japan in the days that led up to the Armageddon on August 6, 1945. The author details the results of his research findings sharing the secret strategy sessions, fierce debates, looming assassinations, and planned invasions that resulted in history’s first use of nuclear weapons in combat, and the ensuing chaotic days as the Japanese government struggled to respond to the reality of nuclear war. He puts us readers in the rooms where reactions and strategy were discussed by those with the power to influence history. As much as I have read about the Pacific War and the use of the atomic bombs to help bring it to an end, I still learned things from reading this book that is written as a countdown to the days the bombs were dropped as well as the aftermath.
Fascinating inside look at the struggles of the Japanese government in determining how to handle the waning years of the war. The ignorance of some of the big government members in regard to how the war was really going was interesting to learn about. Some still believed they could fight on even after the destruction of not one, but two atomic attacks. Finally Emperor Hirohito stepped in to try and settle the deadlock and realized it was rightfully time to give it up. Some even tried to attempt a coup at the end before finally being convinced the game was up and fighting to the extinction of Japan wasn't the right call.
I'm no historian, I am not particularly a student of history but the fervor surrounding the Oppenheimer movie, led me to this book. It was extremely interesting to hear the accounts that came from Japan and their sense of duty. It's equally interesting to know how stupid men and their pride can be. All in all, I was captivated by the format of the book, as it doesn't just end with the events on Hiroshima but follows for weeks after. It's extremely sad to know how many lives were lost.
It’s the spring and summer of 1945. American troops are mopping up the last pockets of Japanese resistance in the Philippines and are locked in fierce fights to take Okinawa and Iwo Jima. The Imperial Japanese Navy has effectively ceased to exist as a fighting force, and Japanese aircraft are being used in suicide attacks in an attempt to inflict mass casualties on the Allied fleets. The war enters a new, even deadlier phase, as American B-29s conduct raids on Tokyo and other major Japanese cities, igniting mass conflagrations that kill thousands every night. The question on both sides becomes: What happens next? This is the story of “140 Days to Hiroshima”, a chronicle of the final decisions being made by leaders on both sides of the war in the Pacific.
It’s clear to both sides that the war is coming to an end, and that there’s a good chance that more of the fighting will come to the shores of Japan itself soon. On the American side, there’s a debate as to whether Japan might be persuaded to surrender with continued bombing raids, carrier strikes, and blockades of vital supplies, or if the only way to end the war is to launch a massive invasion of the Japanese home islands - an operation that will dwarf the invasion of Europe in scope and in the number of predicted casualties. The Japanese government, dominated by the military, gets new ministers who are at least open to the idea of negotiating a peace deal, but still has many people in positions of power that believe that if they stall the peace faction by making demands to reach out to the Soviet Union and in the meantime make the fighting bloody enough, America will lose its resolve and broker a peace that will leave Japan’s political and military structure intact. The most devoted members of the military- including many mid-level officers who are the ones who really keep the war and the country going - cling to the belief that nothing short of Japanese victory or Japanese annihilation is acceptable, and are willing to incite a military coup if that’s what it takes to avoid disgrace through unconditional surrender.
David Barrett’s book covers the major decisions made by the Japanese and American governments in the period from the first American incendiary raid on Tokyo to Emperor Hirohito’s announcement to the Japanese people of their country’s surrender to the Allies, and how events in that period - like the costly American victories at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, the death of President Roosevelt and his replacement by President Truman, the surrender of Nazi Germany, the Allied conference at Potsdam, the successful test of the first atomic bomb at Trinity, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - influenced the decisions that both governments made.
David’s thoroughly researched book seeks to clarify the various perspectives and principles that key figures brought to their governments’ discussions about the war, and seeks to dispel revisionist and alternative historical interpretations that argue about Japan’s willingness to surrender and about the necessity of using nuclear weapons. It’s a fascinating look at how decisions were made at a time when the war ending in an Allied victory was never really in doubt, but where both governments were working towards a resolution of the war that would be acceptable to their populaces as well as to the other side.
People may think that they know the story of the end of of World War II, but David’s book makes it clear that there was more going on in the national capitals than most people realize. Recommended!
Heavy political rhetoric behind the scenes of WWII's eastern climax, as Japan does everything in its power to save face, Russia jockeys for post-war spoils, the United States undergoes a change in leadership while readying the bomb, and the rest of the civilized world anxiously watches and waits.
The book's first half takes a broad view, skimming weeks at a time while setting the table and establishing the major players, before growing more calendar-driven and granular as the day of Hiroshima's devastation draws closer. I was hoping for a bit more focus on the technical aspect of this event, a tighter look at the rapid feats in science and engineering that culminated in the twin mushroom clouds above Japan, but the closed-door political debates are equally important and, to my surprise, gripping.
There's a decidedly pro-American bias to the telling, very little criticism for the Truman administration, although the presented evidence does make a pretty damn convincing argument. Hard to imagine a scenario where Japan isn't the villain of this story anyway, given their arrogant determination to continue warring against impossible odds. This was a nation betrayed by its idealistic military leaders and deeply-ingrained propaganda machine. Even as the second bomb hit Nagasaki, news which reached the war council in the middle of a tense argument over their fighting chances, opinions remained evenly split between accepting the Allies' terms or chasing the dream of some mythical, climactic change in fortune that might allow the nation to retain a certain twisted measure of honor in defeat. The whole situation is frustrating and sad from a simple human perspective.
I have a special connection to Japan because I turned 19 in Kyoto in 1967 on the way to Bangkok, Thailand to study at Chulalongkorn University. I was part of the only undergraduate study group in Southeast Asia at the time. I was a student at St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota which has / had an amazing international study program. Remember that this was during the height of the Vietnam war - the Tet Offensive was in the spring of 1968 so it was an amazing time to be in Southeast Asia. Two factors from that trip have influenced my view of Japan ever since. I was not that impressed with Tokyo - If you stood in the Ginza district, you could have been in New York City except for the people and the signage. We visited some lovely shrines that survived the bombing of the city in WWII. While walking in Tokyo one evening a couple of friends and I were invited by some Japanese college students to go out for drinks so they could practice their English. The subject of the Vietnam war came up and I was totally amazed when one of the young men suggested that the American forces use the atomic bomb on North Vietnam. I could not believe that a student from the only country to ever experience a nuclear bomb would believe that using the weapon was a good idea. I fell in love with Kyoto and Nara with its beautiful temples and gardens. In the last year I found out that Kyoto was at the top of the list of cities for use of the bomb. Secretary of War Stimson saved the city because he had traveled to Kyoto and thought it was too valuable as a cultural center. Finally as an avid reader of WWII history I have had a struggle reconciling the Japanese idea of "honor" and the atrocities committed by the military. 27% of POW's in Japanese camps died while only 4% died in Nazi prison camps. Now remember I am talking about American and British soldiers. By one estimate, 5,754,000 Russians surrendered to German forces during World War II, of whom 3.7 million died in captivity. Another source estimates that 3.1 million Soviet POWs died in German captivity...... The Nazis sold their honor in swearing allegiance to Adolf Hitler. Japanese honor meant never surrendering, suicide charges, kamikaze attacks (sadly some of these young men were shamed or coerced into these flights ) and even forcing civilians on Pacific islands to commit suicide out of fear. Hara Kiri, or ritual suicide out of shame at defeat, was not unusual. I find it difficult reconcile this "honor" with the Bataan Death March, the Thai Burma (death railroad), the Manila massacre, and the failure of the Japanese to compensate the thousands of Korean "comfort women" until 2015 when only a few dozen were still alive. The worst atrocity was the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign. In 1942 the American Air Force was planning to construct clandestine airstrips on Chinese territory. They were to serve as a landing runways for US bombers after the Doolittle Raid Because the Japanese Army was already in the process of locating and destroying the Chinese airbases, most of the aircraft ran out of fuel and crash-landed in the provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangxi. Surviving airmen parachuted and hid among the Chinese civilians who provided them shelter. Out of 64 that managed to bail out, eight were captured and executed almost immediately by the Japanese. In the search for the remaining US airmen, the result was a devastating trail of 250,000 dead Chinese civilians. Honor?? ********Review: The title of this book is misleading about the most important issue addressed, namely why and how the decision for unconditional surrender was made after the atomic bombs; or was the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima necessary? The first half of the book marks the major events in the Pacific war and American and Japnese political and military strategies. Curtis LeMay took over the B-29 napalm bombing of Japan. By war's end he would obliterate 40% of Japan's 66 largest cities. 100,000 people were killed in Tokyo on March 10 with no effect upon Japans will to fight. An alternative to the bomb was blockade and continued bombing. Tojo was replaced as Prime Minister on jULY 22, 1944. He was succeeded by Kuniaki Koiso - removed April 7, 1945 - and Kantarō Suzuki until August 17, 1945. The emperor blamed Koiso for defeats at Leyte and Iwo Jima. April 12, 1945 President Roosevelt dies. Truman takes over totally unaware of the atomic bomb project. The Battle of Okinawa, one of the bloodiest for American forces takes place from April 1 to June 22 Plans were underway for the invasion of Japan - southern Kyushu on November 1 ( the Japanese had deduced the site and timing) and the Tokyo plain on March 1, 1946. Estimates of invasion casualties for Americans ranged from 300,000 American deaths to 1,000,000. (Remember that total American military deaths in WWII were 291,557). The U.S. was already drafting 140,000 men a month. Japan was attempting to renew non-aggression pacts with the Soviet Union. Yet even with supposed agreements, the Japanese regarded the Russians as untrustworthy. (In April they were moving troops and equipment toward Manchuoko.) Japan planned to use over 5,000 kamikazi planes against the invasion attacking while the Americans were still on transports and against carriers, battleships, and other ships. 45 new military divisions had been formed - 450,000 to 600,00 Japanese combatants. The People's Volunteer Corps demanded service from all men age 15 to 60 and all women 17 to 40. They could / would fight alongside military troops. This involved **28,000,000** Japanese citizens. Postwar calculations showed that the troops at Kyushu numbered 900,00. American invasion plans were based upon an estimate of 350,000. (On Iwo Jima 21,000 troops caused 26,000 American casualties.)Americans were debating whether to hold a open demonstration an atomic bomb. Given the few bombs available and doubt about effectiveness this idea was vetoed. Plans were even being considered to use atomic bombs as tactical weapons during the invasion. Some scientists believed American forces could enter the bombed area safely one hour after detonation. ( Can we spell stupid??) At the Potsdam Conference ( Clement Atlee has replaced Churchill) in July Japan was given one last chance to surrender unconditionally and the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan after the European victory. Terms included the removal of all military and civilian leaders who had led Japan to war, limitation of Japanese sovereignty to the major and minor islands, occupation until a new civil government was established, freedom of speech and religion, and trail of war criminals by Allied forces. Japan continued to believe it could bargain for a conditional surrender. The position of the Emperor was not explicitly stated. ***August 6, Hiroshima.*** Within hours Hirohito wished to begin negotiations for peace. This was rejected. Anami, Umezo and Toyoda ( the power trio inside the governing "Big Six") had no interest in ending the war. Shigenori Togo, Minister of Foreign Affairs struggled almost alone to try to end the war. August 7. The Japanese army downplayed the impact of the bomb and rejected Togo's efforts. August 8, Silence from the leaders of Japan. Togo meets with the Emperor who agrees the war must be ended immediately. The Big Six do not even meet due to more important priorities. (What could be more important?? They simply did not want to surrender. ) August 9 The Soviet Union declares war.. Togo demanded that the Supreme War Council meet and end the war. Prime Minister Suzuki agreed. Generals Umezu and Anamibelieved Japan should give no thought to surrender. A fighting withdrawal from Manchuria was acceptable. **Nagasaki Bomb.** Toyoda, Umezu and Anami scoffed at the idea of more atomic bombs. General Anami believed it would be wondrous for the entire country to be destroyed like a beautiful flower. The 3 aggressors demanded 4 conditions: Japanese control of war crime trials and the disarming of the military, continuation of the Imperial rule, and minimal or no occupation. Anami could have declared the counsel deadlocked and ended Suzuki's government. Surprisingly he does not do so. August 10. Suzuki and Togo persuade Hirohito to convene the Imperial Conference. Secondary military leaders attempt a coup to capture the Emperor and continue the war. In tears the Emperor urges the government to accept the Potsdam declaration. August 14. Americans drop leaflets about possible surrender. A Cabinet session is convened. The attempted coup is continuing. The Imperial decision to surrender is handed down. Cabinet still trying to negotiate. Try to hold US to Hague conventions which Japan never signed. August 15. Emperor broadcasts intention to surrender to save Japan. Anami commits hara kiri. Conspirators enter Imperial Guard office but are defeated. Truman accepts surrender. August 17 Imperial order issued to troops. Hirohito writes crown prince and states atomic bomb was the reason for surrender 3 times. ********** My conclusions: Some historians argue that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9th caused the surrender. The Japanese had not trusted Stalin for a long time. The lost of Manchuria was largely insignificant and a foregone assumption. Also remember the Soviet military was a strictly land-based army. They had never staged an amphibious landing. Their threat to the Japanese islands was negligible. Others argue that blockade and bombing would have eventually ended the war and the atomic bombs were unnecessary. Perhaps that would have been true, but at what loss of life to Japanese civilians?? There is a third argument that the Americans could have invaded without have to use the bomb. Again at what loss of life to the Allies and the Japanese? The Americans were facing 900,000 troops in Kyushu and 28,000,000 civilians had been ordered into an attacking army. Plus 5,000 kamakazi attack planes. I believe 1,000,000 Allied dead would not have been an overestimation. Finally for some reason, perhaps simply the fact that 1 plane could destroy a city, the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki convinced Emperor Hirohito that the Japanese should surrender. Eventually the government bowed to his wishes. The last big question is whether the second bomb was necessary? Emperor Hirohito wanted the military / government to surrender before the Nagasaki bomb. Would he have prevailed without the second bomb?? We will never know. It was a struggle to the end with some members of the government. Since the Japanese did not know how many atomic bombs the U. S. had, perhaps it helped persuade some government members to agree to Hirohito's wishes. ************** All in all this is a terrific book about the final days of the war with Japan. I highly recommend it. Kristi & Abby Tabby
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Interesting Analysis That Covers Both Sides of the Issue …
This book was reviewed as part of Amazon's Vine program which included a free copy of the book.
The United States’ use of the atomic bomb in World War II is yet another issue that solidifies World War II as one of the most important events in human history. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is still a sensitive and controversial subject matter to this day. 140 DAYS TO HIROSHIMA does an excellent job of illustrating the lead-up to the bombs being dropped from both the Japanese and American perspective.
David Dean Barrett wastes no time setting the scenario for readers. Starting with the massive American firebombing raids that destroyed Tokyo, we are given an idea as to how both American political and military leadership came to the decision to ultimately use an atomic weapon to avert the horrendous casualty estimates associated with the plan to invade Japan (Operation Olympic). While the American perspective is interesting (and covered thoroughly by other books), it’s the countering view of how the Japanese leadership reacts/responds to events that makes this book such a worthy read. This view of events leading up to (and after) the bombs being dropped not only makes it quite clear how the difficult decision to use the weapons was made, but how the rift within the Japanese hierarchy almost resulted in more cities being vaporized.
I like how Barrett chronologically organizes the book with each chapter title including a countdown of days until the first atomic bomb is dropped. Even though we know the historical sequence of events, it still creates a “clock-ticking to doomsday” feel that generates a sense of pressure while reading. It’s hard not to read about the Japanese leadership’s actions without getting a “if you only had a hint of what was coming” sense of doom.
The book clearly details that the ultimate decision to use the bomb was not impulsive. Barrett illustrates the complexities associated with the decision of using the secret new weapon from America’s political and military point of view. The uncertainty of the weapons’ ultimate effectiveness and the fact that the closer the war approached Japan’s homelands, the more fanatical the Japanese fought, and this certainly presented a potentially catastrophic casualty rate if Japan was to be invaded. Compounding the issue was that Harry Truman was just inaugurated as President following FDR’s death in office and was forced to face the monumental decision of using the bomb almost immediately. The whole American scenario plays-out with a sense of controlled-chaos as all those involved in the decision-making process never universally agreed on any single source/study accounting for the bomb’s likely effectiveness or the human cost involved with invading Japan … it was essentially a high-stakes guessing-game. There was even the thought of using the bombs tactically with the invasion plan where bombs would be dropped on cities with American troops going in shortly afterward. This further illustrates that the science behind this type of weaponry was still in its infancy stages. It’s hard to fathom such a grave decision being made today and I found it amazing to see the thoughtful, thorough, mature and deliberate manner in which leaders made such a serious and deadly determination based on so many hypothetical scenarios … especially considering up to a million American lives were estimated to be at stake.
The parallel Japanese perspective is as diverse as it is interesting. Readers will get a clear view of how Japanese leadership generally put saving the image of Japanese culture ahead of its citizens at all costs. We see the rift between those who wished to prolong the war to the bitter end versus those who wanted to end it. So much turmoil during those 140 days: coup attempts, suicides, assassination plots, futile desires to keep the Soviet Union out of the war and the desire to turn millions of Japanese citizens into suicidal warriors. While the Americans letter-bombed Japan with warnings of the use of a destructive new weapon, Japan’s leaders are made to appear more concerned about their righteous image to the people than their well-being. If anything, readers may see Hirohito as being more complicit in Japan’s war crimes than western media alluded him to be … as he is the only head of an Axis power to not only survive the war but retain his leadership position.
I found 140 DAYS TO HIROSHIMA to be a concise and well-sourced presentation of a complex and controversial subject matter. Providing perspectives from both sides of the issue makes this book an excellent resource to understand the gravity of the situation at that time by generating a fly-on-the-wall view of how issues were presented, how decisions were made and reactions to the results of those decisions. While the countdown starts 140 days before the Hiroshima bomb being dropped, chapters also account for the days afterward all the way to Japan’s surrender. Barrett also reserves a chapter at the end that details the post-war lives of all significant individuals.
I would certainly recommend 140 DAYS TO HIROSHIMA to anyone seeking a well-rounded view of this chapter in history. The author presents his well-sourced research in a readable manner that flows without getting bogged-down in minutia and the book never gets boring.
Barrett traces the decisions and reprecussions that lead the Americans to use the atomic bomb and the efforts and machinations that it still took for the Japanese to surrender.
Why I started this book: Deep diving in the atomic bomb and ending the war again.
Why I finished it: Fascinating to see historians debating in real time about why someone reacted to the events around them. Personal insights from Barrett's arguements: Japan had never surrendered and all military leaders were willing to keep going rather than be the first to surrender in Japanese history. They controlled the government and could shape the information flowing all the way to the top. Like gamblers, they felt with just one more roll, they could win and make up for all the losses suffered so far. One decisive battle would give them better options. And it took days and schemes to get around these militarists to accept the surrender. Barrett stressed that they wouldn't have surrendered without the atomic bomb (since they barely surrendered with it being dropped twice). The Japanese considered America the main enemy and did not discuss Russia's joining the fight. They wanted to die gloriously in battle. And a blockade and bombardment would have resulted in far more civilian deaths. The rice harvest was poor and about 30,000-40,000 were dying a month from starvation. He also goes through all the processes used to come up with the American casualities estimates. The papers, and who had their thumbs on the scale for personal or political reasons.
This is a fine work of history, explicitly opposing revisionist historiography around the use of atomic weapons in the Second World War. A summary follows; call it "spoilers" if you like.
Using primary source material including memoirs, diaries, official records and MAGIC intercepts, David Dean Barrett follows the interior debates in both Japan and the United States. It is quite clear that Japan was planning to cause mass American casualties in the event of an American invasion, and did not worry overmuch about Japanese casualties. The Japanese Minister of War conceived the whole project as a sort of national seppuku, and himself committed seppuku when the Emperor allied with the cabinet's peace party and ordered the military to stand down.
On the American side, there was a clear division between those who thought of atomic weapons as something qualitatively new, and those who thought of them as "more of the same." Truman himself used them to try to force a surrender before Olympic could take place in November; he agonized over the thought that continuing the war into 1946 would at least double American casualties for the war overall.
Official estimates on the American side ran from half-a-million total American casualties to a million American dead. Both sides estimated many millions of Japanese dead as a result of not obtaining an early surrender, whether or not the invasion went through. These estimates were based on American experience in the Pacific War, particularly casualty rates at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. And American estimates of Japanese casualties are lower than Japanese estimates: the Americans didn't know about 1945's disastrous rice harvest. One of the peace-party arguments was the fear that if the war continued, Japanese civilians would rise in revolt and overthrow the Emperor.
The book concludes by presenting revisionist arguments and demolishing them one by one.
As I said, a fine work of history. But the editing is far less than "fine." I suspect that AI or some other form of autocomplete was used in the editing process because misspellings that make hash of the intended meaning are common (for example, substituting "compromised" for "comprised"). It's jarring to come across, and it's far too frequent for something from a professional press.
140 Days to Hiroshima follows the path that the US and Japan took to get to the bombing of Hiroshima and its aftermath. The title is a little misleading as 100 plus pages are spent on what follows after Hiroshima. This book written to address the revisionist history that the dropping of the bombs was not necessary as Japan was about to surrender or the Soviet invasion is really what did it. This book aims to argue that the bombs were what caused the surrender and looks at the actions of the Big Six in the Japanese war council and the actions they took in the lead up and aftermath of Hiroshima. It is a fast paced and well written book focusing on the deliberations inside of Japan with looks at the US government. The chapters are broken up by days before or after Hiroshima which keeps the story moving. In the end it comes off as a nice summary of John Tolland’s classic of The Rising Sun without going into the exhaustive detail that Tolland does. The necessity of dropping the bomb will remain hotly debated but this is a nice entry into why it was necessary and makes a compelling case that it did save overall casualties as well as hasten the end of the war. Ultimately the Emperor of Japan does say in several speeches and meetings that it was science that defeated the Army which is what Barrett rests his claims upon. If you are into World War II you will find this a good entry on this topic.
An interesting, detailed account of the delusional and wishful thinking of Japanese leadership in the run up to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.
Having worked in Japan for nearly a year, I have a workable understanding of Japanese culture. I also have read other material in this subject. Even so, many things surprised me.
Barrett refutes the a-bomb revisionists (those who, being totally removed from the original context and with perfect 20/20 hindsight, condemn the 1945 decision to use the a-bomb).
Bearing in mind the need to avoid a repetition of WW1, and Japanese leadership was implacable, unconditional surrender was demanded. There were three possible actions:
1. Invade and conquer. Up to a million Allied deaths and millions of Japanese deaths 2. Blockade and starve the Japanese into submission. Unknown timeline, millions of Japanese deaths. 3. Use the a-bomb with the expectation that it would hasten (2) or provoke an immediate surrender, avoiding (1)
Barrett points out fallacies in the revisionist argument. For example, neglecting the Japanese deaths resulting from (1) or (2), making the decision to drop the bomb appear self-serving, merely to avoid Allied (mostly American) deaths, as opposed to the overall death toll.
Readers of this review may note I am not unbiased on this topic. My reply: spend a year in Japan and you will see things differently.
Well documented and organised, very good use of contemporary documents particularly on the Japanese side. Unsurprisingly, unquestioningly favourable to the US and rather slanted in tone. Seems to me to be overemphasis on some Japanese military hardliners and the coup plot, as we now know basically to be expected from colonel-level officers in Japan's armed forces, as justification for believing Japan would not surrender. No indication given in the text (I don't know whether intercepts show) that the US was aware of the internal conflicts. Hardening of rhetoric from some in Japan after the first bomb should have been expected, and in itself should not provide retrospective justification for the second bomb. Also, US naïveté regarding the persistent effects of radiation existed and is given prominent coverage by the author, but it too should not be used as justification for using the bombs.
I don't think a specific stance has to be taken, but it's easier to get speaking engagements within the US with the approach taken in this book. I think (assuming it is even possible to justify using nuclear weapons on fellow humans) it is easier to justify the first bomb than the second, so it is the Nagasaki drop that deserves closest scrutiny.
Well worth the read. I have read many accounts of the end of WWII and have always struggled with the question of was it “necessary” to drop not only one but two atomic bombs. After all, with hindsight, it was clear Japan was beaten and would logically come that conclusion and surrender. She had no path to victory and only suffering and death to offer her people. Surrender was not only logical but “inevitable”. The problem was – the Japanese leadership did not care about that. Their honor bound duty was to fight to the end, to force a climatic struggler on their home Islands – to force a “national” suicide that would come at such a cost in casualties that the Americans would offer more “favorable” terms. Was this a bluff on their part – No! Iwo Jima and Okinawa were clear indications of their will to fight to the last. Were the Americans going to back down – No. Invasion plans, and dates were well developed and being prepared
The author does an excellent job of documenting and laying out the chronology of the events leading to the decision to drop the bombs. Each step there was an off ramp for the Japanese – one not taken or even considered.
Barrett is excellent in his approach to this subject. At the heart of the discussion is how the United States came to use a nuclear device twice against cities with military import and a significant civilian population.
The approach is chronological and provides the reader with a wealth of primary documents from the 140 days before the bombs to about 10 days after. Eyewitness accounts, diplomatic cables, memoranda, and news reports are placed before the reader without any particular viewpoint. In the final chapter, Barrett provides his assessment of various theories of nuclear use including the traditional view and various revisionist views.
At 289 pages of content, there is little "fluff" and less obvious bias. He includes short biographies of the main players in the final chapter. The volume is well documented with footnotes, heavily indexed, and includes an extensive bibliography for additional study. This historian has no bone to pick and no reason to present anything other than truth. I highly commend this book for study.
A fascinating account told from both the American and the Japanese perspective in chronological, countdown style. A lot of the information on the Japanese side has apparently just recently become available. Knowing the American side of things pretty well, it was stunning to fill in just what was going on on the other side, as the powerful military leaders refused to give in to the views of the civilian leaders even after the first bomb was dropped and additionally resisted the supposedly divine and unquestionable decision of the Emperor. It became clear that what was going on with the Japanese leaders answers a lot of questions about why the Japanese did what they did, which from a Western perspective was confusing. And it becomes inescapable that the oft-repeated reason for dropping the bomb was to save lives, really did. The Japanese generals' plan, in the face of clear inablity to win the war, and even after the first bomb was dropped, is incomprehensible. I won't even try. You have to read it for yourself.
As with any 3 star rating, there is the good and the not so good. I learned a number of things that I wasn’t aware of regarding the lead up to dropping the atomic bomb. But there was quite a bit of what I considered to be general knowledge regarding using the bomb. So I found that half the book increased my understanding of the lead up to the decision to use the bomb. The rest of it bored me silly. I loved learning the actions and thought processes of the Japanese leadership during that time. I also got a feel for the mental processes and actions of the Japanese soldier. Their culture shone throughout the war. I got a lot out of that portion. But there was little to learn about the American thoughts and actions. It was just the same as you would expect from any textbook regarding that time period. There were a number of data dumps discussing expected casualties if this or that action was taken. All in all, about half of the book interested me.
I can't think of a tougher moral history subject than the atomic bombing of Japan. Why did President Truman authorize use of the deadliest weapon in human history to be dropped -- twice? Author Barrett searches for the answers in the archives of the Japanese military. While he reveals a stunning story of Japanese hard-liners' insistence to fight to the last man, woman and child in the face of an all-out invasion of the Japanese homeland, he touches upon the nature of extremism: Why would a handful of men be willing to sacrifice millions of lives? What was the guiding rationale behind this thinking? I'm not sure that I saw this exposition to my satisfaction, although it's painstaking documentation of the groupthink of the Japanese military is on full display. The archival research is breathtaking and well worth exploring if you want to venture into this heart of darkness.
A most interesting book. In answer to the frequent questions of 'Why did Harry Truman drop the Bomb?' And 'why did he do it twice?' The author takes us inside the detailed deliberations in Tokyo, in Washington, in the meeting rooms, and on the battlefields of the Pacific, day by day for each of the 140 day lead up to the dropping of the bomb. It is great history, and it utterly destroys the 'revisionist' theory that it wasn't necessary, that the Japanese would surrender, and that it was so much more horrible than the alternatives. The Japanese government, completely under the control of its Army leadership had no grip on reality and fully intended to make a last stand on the southern islands, even if it cost the lives of every man, woman, and child who were left. Don't believe it? Don't want to believe it? Read the book. BB
I picked this book up on sale as I was interested in Japan's final days of WWII. This book started slow with the days leading up to Hiroshima but provided great insight into what was all being done to end the war, including not just using the bomb. It then detailed why the bomb was ultimately decided to be used, and then the book got really interesting with the first bomb being used, the immediate aftermath and Japanese government view and stance, then leading into Nagasaki and why it was necessary, and again the details of Japan coming around to surrender. While I knew some of the high level details, this book really opened up my understanding of why it took Japan so long to surrender in the face of annihilation. I feel this book should be required reading when studying WWII. I highly recommend this book.
A large part of this is really fascinating. Five of the gang of six decision makers are military, so the prospects for any peaceful settlement are always in doubt. The shifting thoughts are well described and in the days following Hiroshima this book shines. An excellent job defining the rationale each side - US and Japan - was wrestling with.
Well-illuminated the significance of the Emperor to the Japanese people and how that played through to the eventual surrender. The description of the military faction trying to take over the Imperial grounds following Hirohito's acceptance of Allied terms reads like a Shakespearean story line.
The tradeoffs - being measures in terms of millions of lives within the Pacific theater - were monstrous. Truman was magnificent.
An informative account of the political and military events in the months leading up to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the tumultuous end to Japan's resistance to America's demand for unconditional surrender. Barrett focuses on a nearly day-by-day account of the deliberations in Washington's and Tokyo's Cabinet rooms and the justification for Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb in light of Japan's fanatical determination to continue the war. I must say that Barrett's writing is somewhat clumsy and, sometimes, hard to decipher. In his Acknowledgements, he refers to himself as "a rookie writer" and it shows. Readers interested in the Pacific War might do better with Max Hasting's book, Retribution.
One of the best I have read! The author presented the facts about the Presidents decision to use the bombs on Japan and I think,based on what we knew at the time,that it was the only choice available. The Japanese government was totally willing to sacrifice their countrymen in order to save face and were so arrogant as to think they could dictate the terms of surrender,I thought their approach to the Russians was just as ludicrous. Their position of not agreeing to war crimes trials was just as ludicrous. They have played the “victim “ since the war ended and have never taken responsibility for the lives they destroyed,what’s even more repugnant is their position that they never surrendered and we all know they did “unconditionally” the Japanese continue to be just as arrogant today about their history read this book,it’s excellent!.
So much of the history I've been reading lately has turned out to be thinly disguised advocacy pieces, using historical events to comment on current issues, not so here. This is an excellent book that stays focused on its subject, the countdown to Hiroshima and its immediate aftermath, a very welcome change. In addition, most of the opinions are left for the Epilogue/Conclusion and they are generally limited to the main point, Was the use of the atomic bomb necessary and was it for good or ill?
I read this book immediately after "Day of Deceit" by Robert Stinnett, to gain a perspective on the beginning of the war with Japan, and "140 Days to Hiroshima" to achieve the same for the ending of the war. I think that it was successful on both accounts, although "140 Days to Hiroshima" was somewhat easier to read. I paid close attention while reading the Epilogue, where the author described the positions of the revisionists and why they were incorrect.
Coincidentally, the bomb was dropped 10 days after I was born, and just before my father, who was in the Navy, disembarked in Hawaii.
Excellent book based on FACTS, not revisionist speculation about the run up to the end of the war with Japan.
Ketsu-go, theJapanese plan for a suicidal bloodbath , was planned, staffed and ready to go the minute the Allies hid the Japanese shores.
The cost in Allied lives would have been horrendous, but the cost in Japanese lives, civilians and military, based on what happened at Saipan and Okinawawould have run into the millions
I really liked the book. Although, the Amount of Japanese politics became too much for me at times. But it was interesting to hear that side of what was happening or not happening. I enjoyed Countdown 1945 much better, although it won’t quite give you the details of what was happening with the Japanese emporer and other leaders like this one does.