The First Person in Cognition and Morality

by Béatrice Longuenesse

What do we express when we use the first-person pronoun 'I' in phrases such as 'I think' or 'I ought to'? Do we refer to ourselves as biologically unique, socially determined individuals? Or do we express a consciousness of ourselves as the bearers of thoughts we share, or can share, with all other human beings whatever their particular biological, social, or cultural background?

Every year the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam invites a prominent philosopher to occupy the Spinoza Chair and give two public lectures on a topic in philosophy. Beatrice Longuenesse, in these lectures, explores the contrast and complementarity between these two aspects of the use of 'I'. Her first lecture considers the first-person pronoun in relation to the exercise of our mental capacities in abstract reasoning, and in relation to our knowledge of objective facts about the world. Her second lecture explores the use of 'I' in relation to what we take to be our moral obligations. In bringing together these two fascinating lectures, this book presents contrasting aspects of the self as radically individual on the one hand, and as the bearer of universally shared capacities on the other.

Genres: Philosophy

98 pages, Paperback

Published January 20, 2020

About the author

Béatrice Longuenesse is Silver Professor of Philosophy. She studied at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris, France), the University of Paris-Sorbonne (where she received her Doctorat the troisième cycle (PhD) in 1981 and her Doctorat d’Etat in 1992), and Princeton University. She taught at Paris-Sorbonne, the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris), the University of Besançon and the University of Clermont-Ferrand before joining the philosophy department at Princeton University in 1993. She left Princeton for NYU in 2004. In 2006-07 she was a fellow at the Institute for Adavanced Study in Berlin. In 2012-13 she was a fellow at the American Academy in Berlin, holding the Berlin Prize on a Siemens grant in the fall 2012 and the Berlin prize on a John P. Birkelund grant in the spring 2013. Her books include Kant and the Capacity to Judge (1998), a revised and expanded version of Kant et le Pouvoir de Juger (1993), Kant on the Human Standpoint (2005) and Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics (2007), a revised and expanded version of Hegel et la Critique de la Métaphysique (1981). She is the co-editor, with Daniel Garber, of Kant and the Early Moderns (2008) and the editor of Le Moi/the Self/le Soi (a special issue of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 2010-4). She is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 2011.

Reviews

[Socrates · Rating 3 out of 5]

虽然都讨论第一人称和普遍性，但第一讲着重分类I的两种指代，上升到普遍性则轻描淡写。

2.5 正式探讨第一人称视角如何上升到普遍道德，弗洛伊德铺陈的不够，没有条分缕析的重要问题有：(1)弗洛伊德的自我意识结构和感知有什么关系；（2）超我由童年的亲子关系形成，那社会环境如何参与到个体的童年经历中而成为超我的一部分？不说明这一点，无法说明康德的FUL是通过弗洛伊德自我意识结构在体现启蒙运动时期的价值观。（至于结论，从第一人称到达普遍道德存在三重弗洛伊德心理疗法层面上的阻碍，轻轻揭过，收势亦粗草。）

总体观点和她的其它发表交相辉映。期待她修订后的版本The Organization of Mind出版。

[Mynt Marsellus · Rating 5 out of 5]

I do love a short clear philosophical text - open enough for most beginners but with wisdom for those who already spend too much time thinking about Kant and Freud.