Does the real world, defined as a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities, really exist? Jan Westerhoff argues that we have good reason to believe it does not. His discussion considers four main facets of the idea of the real world, ranging from the existence of a separate external and internal world (comprising various mental states congregated around a self), to the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world, and the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. As Westerhoff discusses the reasons for rejecting the postulation of an external world behind our representations, he asserts that the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and that there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence. Drawing on conclusions from the ancient Indian philosophical system of Madhyamaka Buddhism, Westerhoff defends his stance in a purely Western philosophical framework, and affirms that ontology, and philosophy more generally, need not be conceived as providing an ultimately true theory of the world.
Jan Christoph Westerhoff is a philosopher and orientalist with specific interests in metaphysics and the philosophy of language. He was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge and SOAS. At present he is a University Lecturer in Religious Ethics at the University of Oxford, a Fellow of Lady Margaret Hall and a Research Associate at SOAS. He was previously a Research Fellow in Philosophy at the City University of New York, a Seminar Associate at Columbia University, a Junior Research Fellow at Linacre College and a Junior Lecturer in the Philosophy of Mathematics at the University of Oxford.
He is a specialist in metaphysics and Indo-Tibetan philosophy. His research interests also include the history of ideas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Jan Westerhoff is a world authority on the philosophy of Nagarjuna, 1st to 3rd century (precise dates unknown) Indian Buddhist philosopher. Nagarjuna's philosophy constellates around four mutually opposing statements:
All things exist. All things do not exist. All things both exist and do not exist. All things neither exist nor do not exist.
Taken together, these four statements define a state of Sunya (emptiness).
The four statements have two corollaries:
All is possible when emptiness is possible. Nothing is possible when emptiness is impossible.
The above is food for a lifetime of meditation.
Westerhoff made the curious decision to write this book without any reference to Nagarjuna. This resulted in confusion for me. Is the book, as it appears to be, an exposition of Westerhoff's interpretation of Nagarjuna? If so, how closely does he cleave to the that master's thought? If not, what is the point of introducing an unspoken distance between the two?
To shed some light and learn more about Nagarjuna, I plan to read Westerhoff's Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction.
Westerhoff attempts to dispel four intuitively plausible assumptions about the world:
1. That our epistemic processes connects us with objects in the external world that they more or less faithfully;
2. That we have direct and incorrigible access to our inner world of mental states;
3. That even if the status of external and internal objects as a firm foundation was undermined, there would still be some fundamental level of reality;
4. That even if this foundationalism should fail, the truth of the statement that it fails would constitute part of the ultimate theory of what the world is like at the most fundamental level.
Westerhoff’s enterprise is a magnificent piece of work, that thoroughly assesses each possible position and counter-position. I highly recommend reading this difficult dense book to anyone curious to explore the Flammarion liminal spheres.
To the lucky few who manage to wrestle through and get a sense of it, I welcome you.