Peter Hitchens does something unexpected and daring with his “The Phoney Victory” book: he tries his hand in the history field, and the result is intriguing. Full of reminiscences of his childhood, fastidious source criticism coupled with uncritical remarks verging from quirky to uninformed, this must-read book make contemporary reader long for the days of slowpoke steamers and toy soldiers (“My little plastic replica was an object of devotion, even idolatry, though nobody at my cathedral choir school would ever have thought to point it out”). Navy is the subject that is closest to Mr Hitchens's heart and the one about which he is most emotional and nostalgic, to the point of sounding slightly surreal at times; he writes about HMS "Prince of Wales": "Every intricate part of her was made according to traditional measurements of England, feet, inches, pounds and hundredweight" (p.167) - a bit like a loony CDs collector who believes that Japanese record pressings offer superior sound to their German editions.
"These are now abandoned in favour of the metric system" - laments Mr Hitchens - "which was used by our enemies" (ibidem) - I'm not sure if he is aware that the first proposal of a global decimal measurement system came from Britain: James Watt proposed it in 1783 because he had difficulties in communicating with German scientists.
Peter Hitchens gets many things right (that are deliberately glossed over by many historians), for example, “the bullion dispatched through Canada made its way eventually to Fort Knox, the USA’s famous fortified vaults in Kentucky. One calculation of the value of the gold is (in modern terms) rather more than ₤26 billion.” (p.89), only not to get other things right about WW2 history even by accident (e.g. p.46: “Poland was expected to hold against Germany for a few months” – in fact, Poland was expected to hold against Germany for precisely two weeks - and Britain and France did not even wait two weeks to decide against honouring their military obligations resulting from their international agreements with Poland: this decision was made at their meeting at Abbeville on September 12, 1939, five days before Russia invaded Poland; but Mr Hitchens would rather make things up than admit he didn’t have time to research certain things).
Writing on Operation Fish, he rather conveniently chooses to gloss over the fact that earlier, Britain did something much more cynical to Poland than what the U.S. did to Britain (which could be justified by the fact that in 1934, Britain defaulted on its enormous debt to the U.S.), namely Britain confiscated all gold of the Polish state that the Polish army managed to rescue from occupied Poland in September 1939 (he merely mentions that “Britain was even borrowing from the Czech government in exile”, p. 88) - not in exchange for ships or food (like the U.S. did) but to charge Poland for... the planes used by Polish pilots in the Battle of Britain!
Things that Mr Hitchens gets right are mostly related to the Royal Navy, and his reader can benefit a great deal from his book when it comes to some historical details or insights. He is not afraid to debunk some lingering myths, for instance about Winston Churchill as a superb Commander, suggesting that it was due to Churchill’s lack of imagination that “Prince of Wales” and “Repulse” were sunk by Japanese on 10 December 1941: “Germany was on the offensive and we were on the defensive. In the Pacific, Britain could do more than wait to be attacked, and Japan, overwhelmingly superior to Britain in land, naval and air power, could choose its time and place. Britain’s main concern was to wonder when and how Japan would strike against our inferior forces. Sending more major ships into the region only gave Japanese more targets. This idea was naval nonsense”.
While “The Phoney Victory” does not lay claims to be an academic work, it does offer some valuable references; I found it illuminating that Mr Hitchens dug out the obscure fact that “As long as 1936, the Tory politician Duff Cooper, in his then post of Secretary of State for War, had argued for Britain to create a large army capable of facing those of the Continental powers. He had been overruled by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, mainly on the grounds of the cost, an enormous ₤40 million by the value of the time” (p.66). This should be, in my opinion, coupled with the fact that Sir Alexander Montagu George Cadogan (Britain’s Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Sir Harold Orme Garton Sargent (deputy Under-Secretary) and Baron William Strang (leading adviser to the British government) all insisted that no representative of the British Embassy should accompany Beck-Cooper meeting in August 1938 (on August 26, the British Embassy was officially asked not to attend that meeting (C7658/197/55 and Shepherd’s Memorandum, C8603/197/55); as W. Strang said, „Poland is one of the countries we want to cultivate"; during that meeting Józef Beck suggested that for Polish diplomacy, southern direction is less important than northern direction, and he proposed strengthening the Baltic states; Duff Cooper has immediately informed Lord Halifax about Beck’s words (Cooper to Halifax, Gdynia, May 8, 1938; FO 371/21807 and C8719/2168/55); in his opinion, Beck was seeking rapprochement with Great Britain and Cooper was enthusiastic when minister Beck agreed with his opinion that the international status quo should be maintained.
Equally novel is Mr Hitchens’s reminder that British refugees from bombed London met with active hostility and violence in other parts of Britain, notably in Essex (p.126). For a British author, it takes courage to write such things and in fairness, Mr Hitchens, rather courageously, is not afraid of any controversy; also, he is refreshingly unequivocal in calling the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact “the most cynical and devastating stroke of diplomacy in modern times” (p.83); he even admits that “Britain was actively obstructing the largest single escape route open to European Jews who wished to flee Nazi persecution” (p.35).
Still, it isn't like his book is particularly consistent; e.g. on page 120 he notices that Germans “Despite their might on land, they did not at that time posses a single landing craft”; yet on page 124 he notices that “Hitler had noted the severe effects that Britain’s economic blockade had had on Germany in the Great War. He was interested in doing the same to a Britain which was far from self-sufficient”. It is sufficient to say during German blockade of food supplies from Britain to the Channel Islands, tea in the shop cost ₤20 - ₤940 in today’s money.
Outside his (large) area of expertise, “The Phoney Victory” is akin to a tale of a man who walks 30 feet in front of his house with his smartphone and comes back home five minutes later to alert his wife to sensational news that Americans did not land on the moon. Take his “discovery” of Poland’s 1938 annexation of Czechoslovakia as an example: “Like so many such inconvenient facts, this is well known, in the West, to historians, but largely unknown anywhere else.” (p.65) – I’m not sure where that “anywhere else” is, and neither is Peter Hitchens.
Speaking of things largely unknown, Mr Hitchens’s ignorance about Zaolzie (an area disputed between interwar Poland and Czechoslovakia) is encyclopaedic: “The area was quickly subjected to Polish law and language, following the traditional pattern of such forced annexations” (p.65) – Zaolzie could not have been subjected to Polish language as Polish was the indigenous language of the vast majority of its native population: out of 218,000 of Zaolzie’s inhabitants, 200,000 spoke Polish; besides, Mr Hitchens is blissfully unaware that in 1938, Poland regained territories taken by force by Czechoslovakia in 1920 (this is very clearly stated by Prof. Prazmowska, quoted by Mr Hitchens when it suits his Polish “hyena” narrative but not when it does not) - when Poland was invaded by Soviet Russia - and against the wishes of Zaolzie’s native population (14,000 Poles were expelled from Zaolzie by force), although this fact has to be considered separately from taking a positive view Poland’s annexation of Zaolzie (I view it negatively).
Using Peter Hitchens’s inept metaphor, he might as well claim that Britain has, "like a hyena", “dismembered” Channel Islands by taking them from Nazi Germany.
Mr Hitchens is also unaware that in some cases, Czechoslovakian authorities actually insisted that the Polish Army enters Zaolzie (e.g. the date of annexing Bogumin was changed because Czechoslovakia was afraid that it will be taken by Germans), or that Poland was only annexing territories with ethnic Polish majority (that’s why after its annexation of Morawka village, Poland returned it to Czechoslovakia, having ensured that it would not be occupied by Nazi Germany).
When it comes to Polish history, it is not that Mr Hitchens occasionally screws up and fails to make the facts and his revisionist claims agree: he always screws it up. He has an anti-ear for Polish history research, and in his deafness to arguments, he is a Proust or a Flaubert à rebours – he is incapable of rendering even the smallest details of Polish WW2 history without major distortions or omissions.
Occasionally his remarks about Poland oscillate between comical and racialist, e.g. “Indeed, the civilised Eden must have recoiled inwardly” (p.64) meeting General Władysław Sikorski (then prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile); this is because Poland "was deeply anti-Semitic in practice." - Mr Hitchens asserts without qualification and without referenced quotations as if it was just unbridled truth, which is indicative of how these issues have morphed in his mind into a narrative that is almost unfalsifiable and resulted in paranoia; according to Mr Hitchens, “we went to war in defence of a territorially aggressive, anti-Semitic despotism” (he fails to mention that 100,000 Polish Jews - mainly voluntarily - joined the Polish Army in defence of "a territorially aggressive, anti-Semitic despotism"); he stubbornly labours his empty point from the previous page with a slightly psychopathic wearisomeness, as if repeating it over and over again without any supporting evidence could make it true or was, on its own, a sufficient argument in a history book (strangely, in that “anti-Semitic despotism”, Jews had 130 Jewish language newspapers, 15 Jewish language theatres and constituted 40% of students).
It's worth noting that Gen. Sikorski wanted Polish Jews captured in the USSR to join the Polish army which would have saved their lives (a request rejected by Russians on racial grounds); Eden would rather have them killed in NKVD camps than let them emigrate to British Palestine. In his dispatch to minister Raczyński (IPMS, PRM44/1, nr 263, December 26, 1941, p.50.) Sikorski writes about his talks with the Jewish organisations in the U.S. regarding releasing the Polish Jews from the Soviet captivity and allowing them to form the future state of Israel. Sikorski "pestered" Eden about the Jews not in order to block their entry to future Poland but to help them create the state of Israel; Eden informed him (Jan 1942) that Britain would not allow any such release of the Polish Jews (prior to that, the USSR negatively answered the Polish government-in-exile diplomatic note in which Polish government-in-exile protested against the USSR stripping all Polish Jews of the Polish citizenship).
Predictably, Hitchens spends the rest of his “Plucky Little Poland” chapter piling one insane image on top of the other. On page 184 he writes “deliberate bombings of cities in World War II was not a retaliation against Hunnish barbarism, but definitely begun by RAF, on 11 May 1940, long before the Blitz”. He then awkwardly tries to justify his revisionism by triumphally announcing that “This is was not, as some claim, a righteous response to Germany’s notorious bombings of Rotterdam. It cannot have been, because Rotterdam was not bombed until 14 May, three days later.” – and he is right: it was not a righteous response to Germany’s notorious bombing of Rotterdam, it was a righteous response to Germany bombing Warsaw (with casualties comparable to those after bombing of Dresden) and the rest of Poland, with Luftwaffe targeting, among other objects, Red Cross hospitals, enormous evangelical church during church service, and civilian refugees from Warsaw (and even though at the end of WW2, Warsaw was destroyed more than Nagasaki, Germany never paid a red penny for that destruction).
He writes: “In 1939, it was not the martyred hero nation, champion of freedom, justice and democracy, of propaganda myth.”
I’m not aware of any historian – Polish, British or any other – who claims that in 1939, Poland was such “champion of freedom, justice and democracy”; furthermore, it would appear that the more conservative Polish historians are, the more critical they are about Poland in the 1930s (e.g. during his public speech commemorating the centenary of the restoration of Polish independence, historian Leszek Żebrowski excoriated Józef Piƚsudski’s regime: “Unfortunately, this period of independence - independence of the state and freedom of citizens - lasted only a short time. In 1926, a very bloody coup took place, claiming lives of approximately 400 citizens, with over 800 injured. We didn't lose sovereignty, no foreign powers entered as a result of the civil war - but citizens lost their freedom”).
However, this has to be put into perspective – Poland’s “Sanacja” regime was arguably less authoritarian than Roosevelt’s New Deal regime, with its Lame Duck Amendment, National Recovery Administration - unconstitutional cartel-creating agency, and with unconstitutional Agricultural Adjustment Act program aimed at boosting up food prices by reducing food supplies by force (incidentally, Roosevelt political role model was Mussolini; he said that he was “deeply impressed by what he has accomplished.”).
In turn, when on March 27, 1943, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Mr Hitchens’s “civilised” hero, met in Washington with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, he “expressed his fear that Hitler might actually accept an offer from the Allies to move Jews out of areas under German control” (Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt regarding a meeting with Anthony Eden March 27, 1943); he was also very hostile to Polish government-in-exile idea to bomb tracks leading to Auschwitz (he didn’t want any war refugees, especially Jewish, to end up in Britain).
Would I recommend buying Peter Hitchens’s “The Phoney Victory”? All in all, I would, because after all, it is a great read – even though many arguments used by Peter Hitchens in that book are even more phoney than Britain’s victory.