The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age

by Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press

Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so competitive? Indeed, why are today's major geopolitical rivalries intensifying?

In The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press tackle the central puzzle of the nuclear age: the persistence of intense geopolitical competition in the shadow of nuclear weapons. They explain why the Cold War superpowers raced so feverishly against each other; why the creation of mutual assured destruction does not ensure peace; and why the rapid technological changes of the 21st century will weaken deterrence in critical hotspots around the world.

By explaining how the nuclear revolution falls short, Lieber and Press discover answers to the most pressing questions about deterrence in the coming decades: how much capability is required for a reliable nuclear deterrent, how conventional conflicts may become nuclear wars, and how great care is required now to prevent new technology from ushering in an age of nuclear instability.

--General Bob Kehler, USAF (ret)--former commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Genres: Nonfiction, International Relations

180 pages, Hardcover

First published April 7, 2020

Reviews

[Alex · Rating 3 out of 5]

Really smart, short but thoughtful book about why states that have nuclear weapons still compete through things such as arms races despite nuclear stalemate.

My only real issues with the book are:

* the principal claim has never in my experience been that nuclear weapons would stop competition in international politics (but it would stop nuclear conflict or conventional war through deterrence)

* the book doesn’t (and frankly can’t) address whether countries today would learn lessons from the Cold War examples so that it might rely on assured retaliation or minimum deterrence (not to mention compete in other areas like cyber, economics etc below the threshold of war)

* there were times where I felt an IS version of the whole book would have been sufficient (the counterforce chapter—3—was turned into an IS article) but that’s probably more because I am personally more familiar with some of these issues and history and in fairness, it wouldn’t have been able to go into as much historical depth.

So my only real criticisms are in the design of the book and limitations of predicting from history rather than it’s execution, which is spectacular for the quality of writing and clarity of organization.

Well worth reading for those interested in nuclear strategy

In particular, the typology of nuclear posture (strategy/doctrine) in chapter 2 (How Much Is Enough?) is particularly strong, distinguishing existential deterrence, minimum deterrence, assured retaliation and assured destruction.

[Andrea Sacchi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Libro estrememamente interessante.
Se è vero che l'avvento del deterrente nucleare ha portato a 70 anni di pace fra superpotenze, generando un senso di sicurezza protetto dal terrore di un bel fungo atomico, sorgono almeno un paio di domande: perché si continua a fare geopolitica come prima? Perché si continua a cercare alleati, contendersi territori strategici, preoccuparsi per la crescita economica di potenziali avversari e migliorare le proprie tecnologie militari?
Gli autori rispondono a queste domande analizzando gli aspetti salienti della corsa alle armi durante la guerra fredda e le sfide tecnologiche del presente, consentendoci così di dare una sbirciata a possibili scenari futuri e tentare di rispondere alla domanda forse più cruciale: si può fare a meno delle bombe atomiche?

[Andrew Carr · Rating 4 out of 5]

Are nuclear weapons a revolutionary weapon that fundamentally change conflict, or are they just noticeably larger explosives of a kind states have other ways of achieving? This is the fascinating question at the heart of this important and compelling study.

The 'puzzle' of this academic text (and for once it is a puzzle and a meaningful one) is that we all assume nuclear weapons are fundamentally distinct in providing security and deterrence, yet the behaviour of large states with nuclear weapons is relatively similar to that of large states prior to 1945. They compete, they arms race, they focus on important territory and value allies - all behaviours that assurance of nuclear deterrence ought to remove.

In clear and engaging prose Lieber and Press show that while our theories expect states to be more secure once they have nuclear weapons, it's never enough to simply 'have' a weapon. Nukes are difficult to obtain, difficult to maintain and have never been very secure from disarming strikes, even for the US, Russia and China. The value of this book is that they go beyond the theories and conceptual debates to show how nuclear weapons are managed and protected in practice, getting into the historical and technical details enough to show - as is always and ever the case - that real life is always more complex.

Worse, Lieber and Press argue that 21st century changes in technology (genuinely precise strike and vastly improved detection and surveillance both on land and below the seas) are making it even harder to preserve a secure second-strike capacity. Meaning geopolitical paranoia and competition and the resulting size and investment in nuclear forces are likely to increase. While nuclear weapons do provide significant and meaningful deterrent capacity that has reduced great power war, this book shows they are not revolutionary in changing the nature of politics or security.

Though the authors don't talk about the plight of middle or small countries, this book provides a powerful caution to the idea that such states could simply acquire a few nuclear weapons to buy themselves a reliable deterrent in the more difficult years to come. The costs and difficulties of obtaining such a capacity are substantial, and need intensive management and expensive research development to maintain rather than being a set-and-forget shield. Much of their value as a deterrent will also be tied into the conventional balance - which mid-sized states who take the nuclear path will necessarily then have far fewer resources to support.

This is a very good book, though I'd caution against getting the audio book version as I did. (It was during the lockdown and I had far far less time for reading work books like this). Though the narrator tries hard and the writing is very clear, this is still a complex book that really needs the chance to re-read and think through the logic as you go. I enjoyed listening along, but there's parts of the argument that I missed because of the ease of distraction while listening to audio books. I've not factored that into my rating above, but it's worth noting.

The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution is an important, clearly written, academic study. It takes a bit of work to get through, and I've ordered a paper copy to go through again in more detail, but it is recommended for all pondering just how important nuclear weapons are.

[John Deacon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Having read this book immediately after Jervis's "The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution," it is easy to see the flaws in the nuclear revolution argument. Though some aspects of the argument are correct, the history of nuclear policy calls into question whether a fundamental change has taken place.

I found this book a bit frustrating at first as it takes the framework of offensive realism and runs with it (perhaps why Mearsheimer is such a fan!) without wrestling much with theory, but overall it is a solid analysis of the reality of the history of nuclear arms racing.

The book tackles the question: Why has great power competition continued during the nuclear age?
Lieber and Press argue that, while nuclear weapons are the most effective instruments of deterrence ever created, they have not eliminated the incentives for intense international security competition.

The book provides some great historical insight into past Cold War strategies as well as some of the more recent (and ongoing) cases of strategic geopolitical competition.

[Ayushman · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is probably the most important book since Vipin Narang’s.

[Martin Gallardo · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you want to understand the politics behind nuclear weapons and nuclear coercion, this one is a must!