Case White by Robert Forczyk is the best of the single volume treatments of the Polish Campaign of 1939 that I have so far encountered. Forczyk, former US Army officer, and current defense analyst, gives a balanced view of the background to, conduct of, and aftermath of the fall of Poland. Although the main focus of this book is the viewpoint of the Poles themselves, Forczyk does not skim over the German side of the equation, nor does he ignore the participation of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania to the overall tale.
Forczyk begins his narrative analysis with a brief overview of Polish history, highlighting how Poland and her history can best be summed up as caught between the two giants of German and Russian civilization and interests. Although for a time Poland, as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was one of the premier powers of Europe (even seizing Moscow for a brief time), her own power rapidly waned in the face of the external predatory states of Sweden, Prussia, and Russia.
By the late 18th century, Poland was a shell of it's former glory, and was contemptuously carved up between the far more powerful States of Prussia, Russia, and the Austrian Empire. Despite this, however, Poland displayed a cultural tenacity that has only rarely been mirrored in history, and never did the Poles give up the dream of independence and sovereignty.
That independence came, finally, in 1918 with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian Empires.
Forczyk spends a great deal of the book detailing this brief period of Polish history, and gives a very good character portrait of Josef Pilsudski in the process. Under Pilsudski's leadership, Poland came quite close to expanding her borders deep into Ukraine, taking advantage of the Russian Civil War,even taking Kiev for a brief period and helping the Germans in buttressing an independent, Nationalist Ukrainian government.
However, Red Army victories against the uncoordinated and White Army forces allowed the Red Army to allocate a considerable portion of their manpower to driving the Poles out of Ukraine, and crushing the nascent Ukrainian independence movement. Then, in 1920, the Red Army launched a massive invasion of Poland itself, with designs upon marching well into Germany as an ultimate goal.
However, at the Battle of Warsaw, the Poles won a stunning victory which crushed the Red Army, inflicted well over 100,000 casualties on the Soviets, and drove them entirely out of Poland in disorganized route.
After the settling of the dust of the Polish-Soviet War, Poland was, very briefly, the most powerful state in Eastern Europe outside of the Soviet Union.
However, Poland's infrastructure and industry was far behind that of Germany's and the West, and well before the National Socialists took power in Germany, Germany had outstripped Poland in industrial output, as had the Soviet Union. Poland's own oft times aggressive stance towards her neighbors left her somewhat politically isolated, relying upon promises of support from London and Paris to guarantee her security and position.
And yet promises is all the Western powers managed to give to Poland.
Forczyk is scathing in his treatment of the British and the French in this book. Western pacificity, weakness, and timidity aided and abetted the predatory powers of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in equal measure. Even before the Nazis took charge in Berlin, Berlin and Moscow had discussed the possibility of working together to erase the "Polish Problem" as both states termed it.
Both Germany and the Soviet Union had strategic and long standing cultural reasons to wipe Poland off of the map. The Soviets because Poland was seen as a Western bridgehead aimed at the western Soviet frontier zones, and a major obstacle to their goal of exporting the Revolution to the nations of the West via the Red Army. Germany seethed with passionate hatred for a Poland who had been carved out of the corpse of the German Empire. Much of Silesia, Pomerania, and Prussia itself went over to the Poles, and violence between ethnic Germans and Poles was endemic in Poland in the years leading up to the war.
This isn't to say, however, that Forczyk white washes Polish history.
Polish policy towards their own ethnic minorities; Germans, Ukrainians, Slovakians, Hungarians, Romanians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, was not exactly gentle, and Poland contributed her own fair share to the tabulation of atrocities committed against innocents in the first half of the twentieth century.
Despite being a powder keg of ethnic violence waiting to explode, following the death of Pilsudski and the rise of Edward Smigly Rydz, Warsaw utterly failed in their attempt to totally modernize and prepare the country for the war that everyone in Poland knew was inevitable by the end of the 1920's. Forczyk details, in great detail, sometimes to the point of exhaustion, the industrial output and capacity of Polish industry, armaments production and research and development, as well as foreign procurement programs. The training, equipping, and leadership of the Armed Forces of Poland is heavily detailed, and Forczyk does an excellent job of looking into the various operational and tactical doctrines of all three of the major participants of the coming war: Poland, Germany, and the Soviet Union.
It's in this section that Forczyk performs a little bit of mythbusting within the narrative. It has long been a canard of military historians that the Spanish Civil War was a training ground for the tactics and operational doctrine that shaped the early years of World War Two. The problem with this analysis is that it focuses entirely on Germany, ignores the Soviet contribution to the Spanish Civil War, and vastly inflates German involvement in said conflict.
The Condor Legion, the Luftwaffe contingent sent to aid Franco's Nationalist forces, has long been seen as the test bed for the Luftwaffe's lethal close air support doctrine that helped see the Wehrmacht march to victory in Poland, Norway, France and the Low Countries, the Balkans, North Africa, and come within an ace of knocking out the Soviet Union. However, as Forczyk points out, the Condor Legion was far too small to be seen as a proper testbed for close air support doctrine, and the opposing aerial forces weren't enough of a challenge to truly gauge the effectiveness of Luftwaffe air combat tactics, either.
Also, the number of German ground troops who actively participated in fighting on the ground in Spain was tiny, merely a few hundred, and the Italian contribution to Franco's victory was far and away greater than was Germany's (it should be noted that it was the Spanish Nationalists, more than their allies, who ultimately won that war).
The Soviet Union sent a much greater contingent to Spain than did Germany, including a plethora of heavy equipment and aerial squadrons. However, the Purges of the Red Army which began in 1937 hamstrung any Soviet efforts to properly analyze and inculcate any lessons that could have been learned in Spain, and so the Red Army which invaded eastern Poland in mid September 1939, was still a very untried, untested, unsure force.
In the final days of peace before the outbreak of war, Forczyk details the secret clauses of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, showing convincingly that the two powers colluded to carve up Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, as well as mapping out the total erasure of Poland as an independent State much like what had happened in the late 18th century. And again, Forczyk is relentless in his berating of the French and British for their inexcusable cowardice in the face of coming hostilities.
In terms of narrating the course of the fighting itself, much like he did in his excellent "Case Red: The Fall of France 1940", Forczyk is a superb analyzer of combat, and is a skilled enough writer to deliver a coherent picture to the reader of the flow of military events, though some readers will find the level of detail and description too academic and militarily scientific for their taste.
Again, Forczyk busts quite a few myths about the performance of the Germans in the early days of the War.
First of all, he categorically shoots down the notion that the Luftwaffe destroyed the Polish Air Force in the first two days of the War. Far from it.
The Polish Air Force performed magnificently against numerically and technologically superior German aircraft, eroding the effectiveness of German strategic bombing of Polish strategic targets, albeit the Polish Air Force was simply too small to also provide much in the way of air cover for her hard pressed ground forces. Even so, many a German bomber, Stuka, and fighter went spiraling down in flames to the guns of the persistent, and genuinely heroic Polish fighter pilots.
In fact, the Polish Air Force only ceased to be a factor when the Wehrmacht overran Polish airfields and supply depots. And while the Luftwaffe did attrit the Poles quite severely in the air, the Poles, statistically, did better in the air against the Germans than anyone else before 1943.
On the ground, too, the Poles fought much better than they have been given credit for, and the Germans were far from the fearsomely Teutonically efficient force that they have been pegged as for years. For one, the Germans were green, and like all green forces, mistakes, miscues, blunders, and disorganization which lead to panic was not unheard of, and the Poles inflicted more than a few tactical defeats on the Germans in heavy fighting.
It was the nature of Polish geography, and the German occupation of Slovakia, which largely doomed Polish efforts despite the level of their resistance. Due to the variegies of Polish geography, and the fact that operating out of Slovakia, the Germans could easily outflank the exposed Polish southern flank, the Poles found themselves being strategically squeezed by the advancing German pincers from north and south. And with so much of the developed portion of Poland having been in the former German Empire, the Poles were forced to front load their forces along their western frontiers, a position that was easily outflanked by the Germans. Had the portion of Poland once belonging to Russia not been the poor, underdeveloped side, Poland may have opted to defend further inland, giving them some options to further delay the German advance. However, as Forczyk points out, such a strategic option was politically unthinkable regardless as the majority of the Polish population was in the Western half of the nation. And even so, defending the Eastern half would not help them in the case of a Soviet strike into their rear.
Which on 17 September, is precisely what happened.
Forczyk spends more time detailing the Red Army's operations in eastern Poland than any other book on the conflict. The Red Army waged a clumsy, largely inept campaign, although several younger officers did standout who would go on to become major players in the eventual Soviet victory in 1945 such as Ivan Konev. As Forczyk points out, the damage done to the Red Army by Stalin's Purges was all to apparent to all outside observers who paid attention to the Red Army's lackluster performance in Poland (one notable effect being the total haphazard way in which the operations were planned, and the absolute failure of the Red Army's logistical network; something that wouldn't had happened had the Red Army not been eviscerated at the top by the Purges as the Red Army pre-Purge was a well honed machine). The Germans especially noted the Soviet's poor performance, a performance that would bear truly bitter fruit in 1941 as it was largely what convinced the Germans that they could knock the Russians out in a single blow.
Despite heroic fighting, the twin invasions doomed Poland. And following the defeat of the Poles, Forczyk details the fate of the occupied country, those in the armed forces and government who managed to escape, and the contribution the Poles continued to make to the overall Allied war effort.
Forczyk spares no details on the harsh German and Soviet occupation of Poland. Both the Germans and the Soviets were ruthless in their rooting out, and murder, of Polish intellectuals and patriots.
Both the Germans and the Soviets were determined to break Poland culturally, as well as physically. The Katyn Massacre is not ignored, and Forczyk is fairly scathing of the Western Allies collusion in aiding the Soviet Union in covering up the crime as well as the scale of the slaughter. He also discusses the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, not failing to showcase who the Allies, Soviet and Western, colluded to allow the Germans to destroy the Polish Home Army.
And while it's obviously beyond the purview of the topic, Forczyk does at least take a few paragraphs to briefly discuss the nature of Soviet and Warsaw Pact occupation of Poland until the rise of the Solidarity Movement which aided in the fall of Communism in Poland.
This really is a standout book, one that should be required reading for anyone seeking to study Polish, German, or Russian history as well as the Military and Political history of the Second World War and of Eastern Europe.
Very highly recommended.