Strangling the Axis: The Fight for Control of the Mediterranean during the Second World War

Cambridge Military Histories

by Richard Hammond

This is a major reassessment of the causes of Allied victory in the Second World War in the Mediterranean region. Drawing on a unique range of multinational source material, Richard Hammond demonstrates how the Allies' ability to gain control of the key routes across the sea and sink large quantities of enemy shipping denied the Axis forces in North Africa crucial supplies and proved vital to securing ultimate victory there. Furthermore, the sheer scale of attrition to Axis shipping outstripped their industrial capacity to compensate, leading to the collapse of the Axis position across key territories maintained by seaborne supply, such as Sardinia, Corsica and the Aegean islands. As such, Hammond demonstrates how the anti-shipping campaign in the Mediterranean was the fulcrum about which strategy in the theatre pivoted, and the vital enabling factor ultimately leading to Allied victory in the region.

Genres: World War II

300 pages, Hardcover

First published August 31, 2020

Reviews

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

The title and subtitle of this monograph represent truth in advertising, as Hammond (influenced by Phillips O'Brien's "How the War was Won"), sets out to demonstrate that the British effort to throttle Axis resupply efforts were ultimately successful, and were a major influence on why Rommel's efforts to break through to Egypt were ultimately unsuccessful. Hammond certainly has the numbers to back these conclusions up.

Somewhat less good is that once I finished this work, I realized that Hammond was less than clear about the tactical evolution of how the British moved from operating under the classic "cruiser" rules that they had worked to see incorporated in the international agreements pertaining to naval warfare in the Interwar Era, to pursuing unrestricted anti-commerce warfare by all means available. One is left with the impression that most individuals in a position of authority recognized the need (driven by Winston Churchill's demands for action on this front), and so all relevant parties groped towards solutions as resources allowed. In particular, the command arrangements that would allow RN and RAF assets to work in concert took some time to be thrashed out.

Given the option, I'd prefer to give this book a rating of 3.5.

[Mathieu Gaudreault · Rating 4 out of 5]

This good book shows the links between shipping lost and Axis misforutunes and lack of combat ability(lack of oil, lack of ammonutions, lack of heavy equipements etc) mostly during the North African campaign(June 1940-May 1943).


There also the shifting prioirites of the Luftwaffe that has to move back and forth Sicily to Russia large airfleet just to neutralized Malta . Also the Luftwaffe lost valuables air transports in the Tunisian campaign . More Axis troops and supporting personal were captured in Tunisia in May 1943 than at Stalingrad(300 000 versus 91 000).

The European Axis had the supply to at least hold North Africa in the watershed moment of September 1942 but lacked the servicable numbers of ships to deliver it. Lack of onloading port cability, an efficient British air -sea campagin against the Italian merchant navy and logistc infrastrucres , bad italian organization, Rommel mad dash tactics(always on the offensive so depleting faster the few ressources).

A good overall book on this often neglect subject.