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Mons: The Retreat to Victory
Book by Terraine, John
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1960
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
April 19, 2017
If Blenheim and Leipzig have taught us one thing, it's that one-day battles can fill hundreds of pages. The piecemeal withdrawal from the slagheaps on 23 August 1914 however, is so Osprey-sized (Mons 1914: The BEF's tactical triumph) that the entire retreat to victory follows, until the German cavalry under Von Richthofen narrowly misses the opportunity to deny the French 5th Army passage across the Aisne.
John Terraine was decades ahead of his contemporaries in his abstinence of Donkeyism cfr.
Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. He always knew where to assign blame and when to praise, an characteristic which always makes for a clear and even prose that remains fresh.
Parts of it might feel dèjà-vu now, because his tableaux about the 'mad minute' rifle fire have become a BEF stock image. At the same time I have seldom seen this phrase combined with a reference to the Boer War, which had taught the Regulars the art of concealment until the last minute. A French volley at least announced itself by the white gloves of an officer.
The cavalry gets high praise in the phase of open warfare, notwithstanding its mental association with the overambitious attacks during the later siege of the Western Front. Once again, a cliché is embroided upon: the French rode their horses saddlesore in the Napoleonic tradition and the Uhlans' lances were of little use against British sabres. But not every German horseman was a Uhlan (these regiments were distinguished by their helmets) and unless caught red-handed by Lee Enfields bearing down the crest, they compensated their medieval weaponry with horse artillery and mounted machine-guns, courtesy of the supporting Jäger units.
It is also noteworthy that the 'under the eye of the gun' feeling was felt on both sides; superior number of batteries were distant comfort to a Landser who felt every 18 pounds of shrapnel trained on his spine as he hugged the canal bank.
One unsalvagable victim of his balanced judgement is John French, who greatly underestimated the effectiveness of his two corps after Le Cateau and made the already defective cooperation with his continental ally worse. Given the fit he threw when Kitchener showed up in person on September 1, one can only imagine his unrestrained response to the infamous "perhaps the Germans came to the Meuse to fish" comment. Joffre, by contrast, is not clueless underneath his imperturbaility: alltough slow to realize the real danger of the (oddly meandering) Right Wing, he is always firmly in control.
John Terraine was decades ahead of his contemporaries in his abstinence of Donkeyism cfr.
Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. He always knew where to assign blame and when to praise, an characteristic which always makes for a clear and even prose that remains fresh.
Parts of it might feel dèjà-vu now, because his tableaux about the 'mad minute' rifle fire have become a BEF stock image. At the same time I have seldom seen this phrase combined with a reference to the Boer War, which had taught the Regulars the art of concealment until the last minute. A French volley at least announced itself by the white gloves of an officer.
The cavalry gets high praise in the phase of open warfare, notwithstanding its mental association with the overambitious attacks during the later siege of the Western Front. Once again, a cliché is embroided upon: the French rode their horses saddlesore in the Napoleonic tradition and the Uhlans' lances were of little use against British sabres. But not every German horseman was a Uhlan (these regiments were distinguished by their helmets) and unless caught red-handed by Lee Enfields bearing down the crest, they compensated their medieval weaponry with horse artillery and mounted machine-guns, courtesy of the supporting Jäger units.
It is also noteworthy that the 'under the eye of the gun' feeling was felt on both sides; superior number of batteries were distant comfort to a Landser who felt every 18 pounds of shrapnel trained on his spine as he hugged the canal bank.
One unsalvagable victim of his balanced judgement is John French, who greatly underestimated the effectiveness of his two corps after Le Cateau and made the already defective cooperation with his continental ally worse. Given the fit he threw when Kitchener showed up in person on September 1, one can only imagine his unrestrained response to the infamous "perhaps the Germans came to the Meuse to fish" comment. Joffre, by contrast, is not clueless underneath his imperturbaility: alltough slow to realize the real danger of the (oddly meandering) Right Wing, he is always firmly in control.
July 30, 2016
A good standard account of the start of the war. The book doesn't solely concentrate on Mons as per the title but the wider campaign up to the end of the battle of the Marne.
The author was a greatly respected military author, who defended Haig in his books and writings, and was a founder member of the excellent Western Front Association and a key contributor to the BBC's ground breaking First World War series.
This book is now over 50 years old and has to this reviewer's mind been surpassed by other accounts, but it remains an important account and I would suggest people read it if interested in the early open campaign prior to the trench warfare that has become synonymous of WWI.
He does the BEF a good service and positions the British high command's position in and with France as the campaign moves from early engagements to wholesale retreat.
He is in the main generous to both French and British commands as they grapple with commanding large scale armies in modern war that is yet to come to grips with all arms engagements and communications.
He is also, to my mind, too fair on British commanders (although I must emphasise I do not subscribe to Chateau generals nor Lions led by Donkey viewpoints). Also to Sir John French, I feel he is less critical than he could have been, although the author does criticise him and point to errors and indeed how the field marshal outlined his views and tweaked events and accounts post-war. My suspicion here is that some of those men in divisional, corps and army command, or at least their direct descendants, were still alive and 1960s writing was less critical of those in authority.
The old contemptible army served her country well and this account will set you on the path to understanding them, the conditions they operated in and the battles they fought; and the later difficulties in 1915 because to a large part of the loss of so many BEF officers and NCOs in 1914.
For those asking why this might be it is worth noting that casualties in the early stage were very high, with some regiments, squadrons and batteries suffering loss rates more readily recognised by the general public at the Somme in 1916.
I would have liked to have seen a chapter with Mr Terraine detailing the wider take-up of static warfare and the evolution of command, but perhaps this is because I heard him speak and know his future standing, as neither he nor his publisher did in 1960.
The author was a greatly respected military author, who defended Haig in his books and writings, and was a founder member of the excellent Western Front Association and a key contributor to the BBC's ground breaking First World War series.
This book is now over 50 years old and has to this reviewer's mind been surpassed by other accounts, but it remains an important account and I would suggest people read it if interested in the early open campaign prior to the trench warfare that has become synonymous of WWI.
He does the BEF a good service and positions the British high command's position in and with France as the campaign moves from early engagements to wholesale retreat.
He is in the main generous to both French and British commands as they grapple with commanding large scale armies in modern war that is yet to come to grips with all arms engagements and communications.
He is also, to my mind, too fair on British commanders (although I must emphasise I do not subscribe to Chateau generals nor Lions led by Donkey viewpoints). Also to Sir John French, I feel he is less critical than he could have been, although the author does criticise him and point to errors and indeed how the field marshal outlined his views and tweaked events and accounts post-war. My suspicion here is that some of those men in divisional, corps and army command, or at least their direct descendants, were still alive and 1960s writing was less critical of those in authority.
The old contemptible army served her country well and this account will set you on the path to understanding them, the conditions they operated in and the battles they fought; and the later difficulties in 1915 because to a large part of the loss of so many BEF officers and NCOs in 1914.
For those asking why this might be it is worth noting that casualties in the early stage were very high, with some regiments, squadrons and batteries suffering loss rates more readily recognised by the general public at the Somme in 1916.
I would have liked to have seen a chapter with Mr Terraine detailing the wider take-up of static warfare and the evolution of command, but perhaps this is because I heard him speak and know his future standing, as neither he nor his publisher did in 1960.
October 22, 2014
Good description of the British Armys opening campaign in France in 1914 & the retreat from Mons to the Marne. I particularly enjoyed the descriptions of the "old contemptibles" and of G.H.Q.'s inaction during the opening battles and of its fraught relations with the French high command during those opening weeks. However this would have been a far better book with 1 more chapter properly detailing the battle of the Marne which took place at the end of the retreat as opposed to the cursory description which it does receive. Also I feel that the book gives too much credit to Joffre for recovering from a dire situation which was in a large measure of his own creation.
October 1, 2018
Published in 1960, John Terraine’s account of the first campaign of the Great War is dated for sure. It also, surprisingly, makes little use of the average soldier’s viewpoint especially considering that there were quite a few then alive to do so. Instead this book prefers a top down approach with the occasional notice of particular valor on the British side excluding both the French and German viewpoints.
The book’s merits are that like the British soldier with an Enfield- it’s rapid fire and to the mark. But, it leaves a lot to be desired all the same. I’d recommend Peter Hart’s more recent Fire and Movement that covers the same events with far better detail and analysis and in addition contains a more equitable variety of primary sources.
The book’s merits are that like the British soldier with an Enfield- it’s rapid fire and to the mark. But, it leaves a lot to be desired all the same. I’d recommend Peter Hart’s more recent Fire and Movement that covers the same events with far better detail and analysis and in addition contains a more equitable variety of primary sources.
November 7, 2022
An excellent factual analysis and timeliness of the BEF's initial I volvement in WWI. The book accurately describes the action that took place along with the decisions taken by the leaders of all armies (British, French and German). It also Chronicles some of the experiences of the common soldier and the efforts they were put through
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews