Drawing from the prevailing literature, Evans summarizes what might be regarded as a prevailing view of emotions (the book’s subtitle is, “The Science of Sentiment”). Rather than casting emotions as solely negative (to be controlled), or positive (the glue that holds the social world together), Evans sees a blend of head (reason) and heart (emotion) that works together as “emotional intelligence,” an optimal emotion state that “involves having just the right amount” along the lines of Aristotle’s golden mean. Evans then seams together nature (universal and biological emotions: joy, distress, anger, fear, surprise and disgust) with nurture (the culturally-specific emotions that “have elaborated on this repertoire, exalting different emotions, downgrading others, and embellishing the common feelings with cultural nuances…”). Evans adds one more category that he calls “higher cognitive emotions,” that “are universal, like basic emotions, but exhibit more cultural variation [and] also take longer to build up.” These he lists as love, guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride, envy and jealousy. Evans also distinguishes emotions that are immediate and short-lived from moods that last longer.
Evans does not tie emotions to motivation that provides the “reason” for behavior. As an alternative perspective, emotions might be seen more broadly as the full suite of evolutionarily-derived motivation structures that support survival and that run across a continuum, from instinctive to disposition, to Evans’ more cognitively-directed emotions, and from immediate expressions to the more general moods that reflect one’s state with the world. These emotion structures function in an integrated way. They contain the ‘reason’ for behavior, which is what we need or don’t need, the specific objects (with memory recognition) that are pertinent to need and threats, and behavior (active seeking, or reactive defending) that links (instinctively, dispositionally, or consciously) relevant objects with the need or threat.*
Even with Evans’ attempt to blend emotion and reason,** he keeps them in separate categories when they should be kept together, functioning as part of the same emotion structure. Ultimately, as far as personal behavior, we act or react to the world based on a needs and threats and ‘reason’ coordinates ends and means to help us solve our needs and to defend against threats. Cognition/consciousness does not replace emotions but overlay them. Evans himself suggests this point in his reference to Joseph LeDoux’s (1996) example of someone startled upon seeing a shadow on the pathway. Basic emotion kicks in first, but this is then followed by a conscious appraisal that brings in other clues that show that the shadow is a stick and not a snake, thereby relaxing the startle reaction. LeDoux suggests the possibility that at least some other emotions operate similarly. In an anger scenario, reason doesn’t replace anger but, rather, informs the body that its emotional well-being depends, for example, on not fighting back or quitting (a job) in a particular instance. Here mind contrasts the immediate with a broader context (or a longer-term and more overriding need) and performs its regulatory, adaptive function that way.
The culture-specific emotions that Evans mentions are variations on an underlying theme. Evolution designs us to be part of a group because this was necessary for survival. The underlying need is to be part of a group, and this comes with a full repertoire of social emotions to make that happen. But the specific content (rules, dress, mores, etc.) varies by group and culture, just as Evans suggests.
As a final note, pleasure (various forms) might be better seen as an emotional state, rather than just another emotion, where energy is quiet because need has been satisfied. Pain, in Schopenhauer’s sense, is also a need state (need to satisfy, need to defend) that is experienced as urge, frustration, fear or anger. But unlike pleasure, this pain state functions also to activate energy that, if of sufficient intensity, results in (motivates) behavior to satisfy or alleviate pain.***
*These emotions also can be experienced inwardly only, without behavior, when (1) they lack sufficient intensity; (2) they are masked so they are felt but not expressed; (3) they are suppressed because of the pain that is felt; or, (4) when they are overridden by broader, more important and longer-term interests or concerns.
** For example, Evans paraphrases Robert Frank: “Not only are there passions within reason, but there are reasons within passion.”
*** This is akin to the utilitarian pleasure and pain notions as overarching emotions, except the utilitarian focus is on the external objects that stimulate pleasure or pain whereas Schopenhauer moves these inside, which is the basis for why the self cares in the first place (why pleasure or pain is experienced vis-à-vis specific stimuli). Seen this way, the self functions as an integrated entity that (1) wants/doesn’t want specific things; (2) “suffers” pain because of what it needs or doesn’t need, which supplies the motive force for overt action/reaction, and (3) experiences pleasure when there’s success. Evans’ account of moods also reflects this broader view of emotion. When one is in a good state, there’s joy, happiness or contentment (needs are being met). When one suffers from a long-standing feeling that needs are not being met, then depression results.