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حرب صليبية في اوروبا
Five-star General Dwight D. Eisenhower was arguably the single most important military figure of World War II. For many historians, his memoirs of this eventful period of U.S. history have become the single most important record of the war. "Crusade in Europe" tells the complete story of the war as Eisenhower planned and lived it. Through his eyes, the enormous scope and drama of the war--strategy, battles, moments of fateful decision--become fully illuminated in all their fateful glory.
Yet this is also a warm and richly human account. Ike recalls the long months of waiting, planning, and working toward victory in Europe. His personal record of the tense first hours after he had issued the order to attack--and there was no turning back--leaves no doubt of Eisenhower's travail and reveals this great man in ways that no biographer has ever surpassed.
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First published January 1, 1948
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About the author
Dwight David Eisenhower
253 books128 followersDwight David Eisenhower, born David Dwight Eisenhower, nicknamed "Ike", was a General of the Army (five star general) in the United States Army and U.S. politician, who served as the thirty-fourth President of the United States (1953 – 1961). During the Second World War, he served as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, with responsibility for planning and supervising the successful invasion of France and Germany in 1944-45. In 1951, he became the first supreme commander of NATO.
As President, he oversaw the cease-fire of the Korean War, kept up the pressure on the Soviet Union during the Cold War, made nuclear weapons a higher defense priority, launched the Space Race, enlarged the Social Security program, and began the Interstate Highway System.
As President, he oversaw the cease-fire of the Korean War, kept up the pressure on the Soviet Union during the Cold War, made nuclear weapons a higher defense priority, launched the Space Race, enlarged the Social Security program, and began the Interstate Highway System.
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June 1, 2020
لو عرفت اليابان ما سيحدث لما فكّرت أبدًا بالهجوم على بيرل هاربر، وربما كان الدرس الأهم الذي تلقّته اليابان في هذه الحرب: لا تستفز عدوًا لا يمكنك مجاراته.
دخول الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في الحرب العالمية الثانية كان نقطة التحوّل الكبرى التي نتجت في النهاية عن هزيمة دول المحور. فالولايات المتحدة، التي بدأت الحرب بإمكانيات ضعيفة وبجيش غير مستعد وسلاح طيران غير موجود وبحرية مُرهقة، خرجت من الحرب كقوة عظمى، بل القوة العظمى الأهم.
يحكي آيزنهاور، الذي كان قائدًا لقوات الحلفاء في أوروبا، والرئيس المستقبلي ( في ذلك الوقت ) للولايات المتحدة، قصة الحرب العالمية الثانية من منظور الولايات المتحدة، منظور لم نراه من قبل لأنه:
أولًا: منظور رجل عسكري رأى منذ البداية أن تجاهل الولايات المتحدة للحرب الدائرة في أوروبا هو خطأ شنيع، وهو ما ثبت صحّته.
وثانيًا: لأنه منظور الولايات المتحدة المُهمَل (في رأيي الشخصي). ففي حين ركّزت الوثائقيات والكتب وتسجيل الوقائع على ما يدور في أوروبا؛ هزيمة فرنسا المروعة واحتلالها من قِبل ألمانيا، اللوفتوافا وقنابله التي لا تتوقف عن السقوط فوق رؤوس الإنجليز، تشرشل وخطاباته البارعة وأخيرًا الحروب الدائرة في شمال إفريقيا بين قوات رومل ومونتغمري، ضاع المنظور الأمريكي للحرب وسط كل هذا.
"حرب صليبية في أوروبا" هو كتاب حربي وعسكري بالدرجة الأولى، لغته جافة وخشنة لأن آيزنهاور لديه ما يقوله، وهو يقوله بأكثر الطرق مباشرةً. إذا لم تكن مهتمًا بما حدث وشغوفًا، شغفًا حقيقيًا، بمعرفة وقائع الحرب، فهذا الكتاب ليس من أجلك.
November 13, 2023
Good solid auto-biography of Eisenhower's war years. While it has been pointed out that he glosses over the conflicts that occurred between the allies and their respective commanding officers it's understandable. The book was published in 1948. Many of those personages were not only still around, but still in positions of great authority which included Eisenhower. The man wasn't a fool. The Soviets were becoming an issue and Eisenhower knew that we (the United States) needed our allies - even France. Eisenhower had to take into consideration that he was still working with many of those individuals. It wasn't the time to be settling personal grudges and sticking knives into backs.
Another thing that becomes very obvious to the reader is that Eisenhower believed in the concept of allies. He doesn't gloss over the fact that there was tension and disagreements, but Eisenhower made it very clear to his subordinates that he expected everyone to work together and make an effort to get things done. Why would he then turn around and show himself to be a hypocrite so shortly after the end of the war? This book isn't about slinging mud.
Eisenhower was a professional soldier through and through. He practiced what he preached and if later research shows that he occasionally lapsed then that shows that he was only Human and the better because of it. For when he did stumble, he would always get back on his feet and focus on the task at hand.
The book is well written and unpretentious. I particularly like that Eisenhower explains his decisions. Decisions that, even during World War II, were questioned by many. Though you might not agree with everything he did at least he stands his ground and backs up his explanations logically. I found myself thinking more than once "Sure. If it had been me in the same situation, I might have done the same thing." Decisions had to be made and he went with what he believed was the best course of action at the time. That was his job, not worrying about what future historians would write.
Another aspect that I found interesting is that Eisenhower talks about criticism that was directed at him and the allied command in the press. He acknowledges it and addresses it. For me it makes Eisenhower more real - instead of a distant historical "great" figure.
It gives a sense of perspective to World War II. There are many who would have us believe that it's only been since the 1960's that Americans have become fractured and contentious (The Civil War anyone?). In particular they like to point to World War II as a magical "Golden Age" when all Americans came together, rolled up their sleeves, and pitched in. One big happy family. Of course just a couple hours of research will quickly dispel that illusion, but I found it refreshing to read about it in Eisenhower's book. Eisenhower had a lot to deal with and he didn't always have everyone's support. It makes the fact that the United States and it's allies were able to defeat the Axis Powers all that more impressive.
So, in closing I recommend Crusade in Europe. As I stated at the beginning of this review it's a good, solid biography of Ike's war years. There will be no shocking revelations, but you might get a little better idea of the man and what he did.
Another thing that becomes very obvious to the reader is that Eisenhower believed in the concept of allies. He doesn't gloss over the fact that there was tension and disagreements, but Eisenhower made it very clear to his subordinates that he expected everyone to work together and make an effort to get things done. Why would he then turn around and show himself to be a hypocrite so shortly after the end of the war? This book isn't about slinging mud.
Eisenhower was a professional soldier through and through. He practiced what he preached and if later research shows that he occasionally lapsed then that shows that he was only Human and the better because of it. For when he did stumble, he would always get back on his feet and focus on the task at hand.
The book is well written and unpretentious. I particularly like that Eisenhower explains his decisions. Decisions that, even during World War II, were questioned by many. Though you might not agree with everything he did at least he stands his ground and backs up his explanations logically. I found myself thinking more than once "Sure. If it had been me in the same situation, I might have done the same thing." Decisions had to be made and he went with what he believed was the best course of action at the time. That was his job, not worrying about what future historians would write.
Another aspect that I found interesting is that Eisenhower talks about criticism that was directed at him and the allied command in the press. He acknowledges it and addresses it. For me it makes Eisenhower more real - instead of a distant historical "great" figure.
It gives a sense of perspective to World War II. There are many who would have us believe that it's only been since the 1960's that Americans have become fractured and contentious (The Civil War anyone?). In particular they like to point to World War II as a magical "Golden Age" when all Americans came together, rolled up their sleeves, and pitched in. One big happy family. Of course just a couple hours of research will quickly dispel that illusion, but I found it refreshing to read about it in Eisenhower's book. Eisenhower had a lot to deal with and he didn't always have everyone's support. It makes the fact that the United States and it's allies were able to defeat the Axis Powers all that more impressive.
So, in closing I recommend Crusade in Europe. As I stated at the beginning of this review it's a good, solid biography of Ike's war years. There will be no shocking revelations, but you might get a little better idea of the man and what he did.
January 18, 2023
I would definitely say that I hold Dwight Eisenhower in a high regard as a World War Two commander; he didn’t command armies personally per say, but he had the task of coordinating the forces of the Western Allies, drawing up their strategy, and making sure they were operating smoothly and efficiently, while also having to manage the larger than life personalities of commanders like Patton and Bradley. For him to do all of that, it makes me think highly of him.
Memoirs often times can be filled with bias, and can skew the publics perception on historical topics, such as what German generals did post war, but I feel that Eisenhowers memoirs are not there to elevate him in any way, but to explain his experiences during the Second World War, and try to explain to the public the actions he took and provide a glimpse into the planning and mindset that a military commander has in terms of warfare. One thing that really got to me was when Eisenhower said he would was one solely to blame for what happened during the Battle of Bulge if historians sought to judge who was at fault; when I read this, I felt my respect deepen for him, because most people would try to shift the blame from themselves onto someone else, which is typical human nature, but he did not. I felt like I came away with a broader understanding of certain decisions pursued in the war, for example: Eisenhower explains why the allies couldn’t have feasibly have conducted operation overlord in 1942, and he lists many reasons that illuminated this to me. There is a lot that one can gather from this book, and I’d say for World War Two enthusiasts like me, this is perfect for you. It has definitely gotten me much more interested in the Western front, and specifically the American army’s role in the European theatre much more.
Memoirs often times can be filled with bias, and can skew the publics perception on historical topics, such as what German generals did post war, but I feel that Eisenhowers memoirs are not there to elevate him in any way, but to explain his experiences during the Second World War, and try to explain to the public the actions he took and provide a glimpse into the planning and mindset that a military commander has in terms of warfare. One thing that really got to me was when Eisenhower said he would was one solely to blame for what happened during the Battle of Bulge if historians sought to judge who was at fault; when I read this, I felt my respect deepen for him, because most people would try to shift the blame from themselves onto someone else, which is typical human nature, but he did not. I felt like I came away with a broader understanding of certain decisions pursued in the war, for example: Eisenhower explains why the allies couldn’t have feasibly have conducted operation overlord in 1942, and he lists many reasons that illuminated this to me. There is a lot that one can gather from this book, and I’d say for World War Two enthusiasts like me, this is perfect for you. It has definitely gotten me much more interested in the Western front, and specifically the American army’s role in the European theatre much more.
December 15, 2023
No matter how many secondary books you read on WWII, there is something irreplaceable about the memoirs of its senior commanders.
Be it that overquoted bit you get to read in the original, such as the dangerous kneepat "Monty, you can't talk to me that way. I'm your boss." Or contemporary concerns that we gloss over too readily with the benefit of hindsight, such as the room to deploy 35 or 70 divisions at the front, depending on how broadly you approach the Rhine.
On the other hand, sometimes there is too much of that winning Kansas smile and not enough of the chainsmoker whose nerves see victorydance like a coin on edge. The Ardennes in particular get a shrug. "Weakest part of the line, probable place of counterattack, but it's fine, they won't get far, it rests upon strong shoulders."
Be it that overquoted bit you get to read in the original, such as the dangerous kneepat "Monty, you can't talk to me that way. I'm your boss." Or contemporary concerns that we gloss over too readily with the benefit of hindsight, such as the room to deploy 35 or 70 divisions at the front, depending on how broadly you approach the Rhine.
On the other hand, sometimes there is too much of that winning Kansas smile and not enough of the chainsmoker whose nerves see victorydance like a coin on edge. The Ardennes in particular get a shrug. "Weakest part of the line, probable place of counterattack, but it's fine, they won't get far, it rests upon strong shoulders."
April 6, 2018
Outstanding book! A must for all especially those interested in WWII history.
April 28, 2018
This is a straight-forward and honest account of the American build-up and attack on Nazi-occupied Africa and Europe by one of the main military organizers and planners. It is certainly not as exhilarating and inspiring as Winston Churchill’s memoirs, but it does rank among one of the major works on World War II by one who was directly involved during those tumultuous years.
Eisenhower does come across as one who disdained pomp and ceremony – witness his signing of the surrender by Jodl or his refusal to honour or even partake of coffee with captured enemy officers.
At times he does seem to gloss over military blunders, like at Kasserine, but perhaps that is why he was so popular with his colleagues by refusing to dwell and lay blame or assign mistakes. However he does focus more on the prestige of American forces than on the British – and even less on the Canadians.
His conversations with Marshall Zhukov at wars end are illuminating in the distinction of human values between these two alleged allies. Zhukov had absolutely no quibbles of sending his own infantry troops to walk through mine fields with no concern as to the human loss. As a contrast, General Patton was humbled for slapping a soldier which Eisenhower discusses.
Eisenhower’s descriptions of the supply problems after Normandy were indeed interesting. All and all this is a very good read.
Eisenhower does come across as one who disdained pomp and ceremony – witness his signing of the surrender by Jodl or his refusal to honour or even partake of coffee with captured enemy officers.
At times he does seem to gloss over military blunders, like at Kasserine, but perhaps that is why he was so popular with his colleagues by refusing to dwell and lay blame or assign mistakes. However he does focus more on the prestige of American forces than on the British – and even less on the Canadians.
His conversations with Marshall Zhukov at wars end are illuminating in the distinction of human values between these two alleged allies. Zhukov had absolutely no quibbles of sending his own infantry troops to walk through mine fields with no concern as to the human loss. As a contrast, General Patton was humbled for slapping a soldier which Eisenhower discusses.
Eisenhower’s descriptions of the supply problems after Normandy were indeed interesting. All and all this is a very good read.
November 21, 2013
I am currently reading this vast memoir of Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower. It is vast in it's scope, covering his experiences from the days after Pearl Harbor was bombed, to the immediate aftermath of the surrender of Germany. In it, he speaks of the master strategies that he planned to bring victory first to North Africa, then to Sicily, and then to Overlord. While modest about his contributions, it is clear that he is aware of the enormous part he played in Hitler's defeat.
And what becomes clear as the volume goes on is his willingness to take the blame for mishaps or disasters, even as he demands answers from his subordinates. He was fully prepared to take responsibility for any disaster that might befall the Allied armies on D Day. He was not a prima donna, and you see his character shine through as he deals with a brash General Patton, a vain Field Marshal Montgomery, and the 20 hour days to which he became accustomed.
He also hints at his anti racial views when he spends a few paragraphs talking about the uproar it caused in the US Army when black soldiers freely mingled- and dated- white English girls. Eisenhower didn't think it was a bad thing, and allowed it. If one wanted to see how he felt about race before 1957, you see it here.
I don't know what it is about American history, but it seems that at the right moment, at a time of maximum danger, the right man or woman seems to rise to the top to lead us through the danger to safety. Eisenhower was the absolute right man for the job he had, and while far from perfect, he possessed the qualities needed to hold an unwieldy coalition of allies together until final victory. Many lessons of leadership can be learned from this man.
And what becomes clear as the volume goes on is his willingness to take the blame for mishaps or disasters, even as he demands answers from his subordinates. He was fully prepared to take responsibility for any disaster that might befall the Allied armies on D Day. He was not a prima donna, and you see his character shine through as he deals with a brash General Patton, a vain Field Marshal Montgomery, and the 20 hour days to which he became accustomed.
He also hints at his anti racial views when he spends a few paragraphs talking about the uproar it caused in the US Army when black soldiers freely mingled- and dated- white English girls. Eisenhower didn't think it was a bad thing, and allowed it. If one wanted to see how he felt about race before 1957, you see it here.
I don't know what it is about American history, but it seems that at the right moment, at a time of maximum danger, the right man or woman seems to rise to the top to lead us through the danger to safety. Eisenhower was the absolute right man for the job he had, and while far from perfect, he possessed the qualities needed to hold an unwieldy coalition of allies together until final victory. Many lessons of leadership can be learned from this man.
August 5, 2014
Interesante hagiografía (casi) de precampaña presidencial.-
Género. Biografía (porque aunque tenga mucha Historia detrás, no deja de ser una autobiografía).
Lo que nos cuenta. Relato, de la mano del propio protagonista, de las vivencias y experiencias de Eisenhower (castrenses nada más) desde que empieza la Segunda Guerra Mundial hasta verano del 45, que nos muestra su intervención en un buen número de acciones de guerra muy conocidas y de gran importancia en las que tuvo que usar mucha mano izquierda para manejar a personalidades muy difíciles y con poder de forma que se cumpliesen los objetivos de guerra.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
Género. Biografía (porque aunque tenga mucha Historia detrás, no deja de ser una autobiografía).
Lo que nos cuenta. Relato, de la mano del propio protagonista, de las vivencias y experiencias de Eisenhower (castrenses nada más) desde que empieza la Segunda Guerra Mundial hasta verano del 45, que nos muestra su intervención en un buen número de acciones de guerra muy conocidas y de gran importancia en las que tuvo que usar mucha mano izquierda para manejar a personalidades muy difíciles y con poder de forma que se cumpliesen los objetivos de guerra.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
December 22, 2017
I've been fascinated with Dwight Eisenhower for many years now. I wondered what to expect from this book. Call me pleasantly surprised! This book was even better than I expected. What a rare man he was, and truly a gift to our country at a time when we needed a great leader most.
May 23, 2024
Very interesting. Eisenhower early on gets the media on side. He also focuses on lesser generals (Come on does anyone ACTUALLY know Devers and Hodges were. I didn't. Now the fault. The prose is very dry. In the hands of a better writer Ike's story WOULD have been exciting stuff but not here. Out there is a excellent biography on Eisenhower. This isn't it.
August 29, 2018
Brilliant writer, lessons in logistics and management applicable to many fields. His commitment to America and the wellbeing of every soldier in his command is inspiring.
June 25, 2018
Fantastically clear telling of one of Humanity's worst nightmares.
October 19, 2017
Not quite what I had expected. I was hoping for an in depth analysis from his perspective of all the planning that was involved in D-day. This was a brief summary of his involvement in all aspects of the war he was involved in including Africa. D-day planning had no more depth than either the battles in Africa or the continuation of the march through Europe.
I did like Ike's summaries of what the war ultimately cost (Ch. 23 "Operation Study") and his perspective on continuing relations with Russia in the post-war era. It is interesting to note his perspective on this in the final chapter of this book weighed against his thoughts in "Three Days in January" by Bret Baier.
Some of Ike's wisdom and experience related to war and leadership:
p. 59
Admittedly there are certain things to be learned from battle experience that can be observed in no other way. On the other hand, any commander who permits a unit to enter battle lacking any advantage, any needed instruction, or any useful understanding that could be imparted to that unit beforehand, is guilty of a grave crime against the soldiers he leads.
p. 75
The planning process sometimes, as in the case of a vast triphibious undertaking, takes weeks and months. As a consequence these plans must be founded in fact and intelligent conclusion, and once made they must be fixed and clear. Deviation from fundamental concepts is permissible only when significant changes in the situation compel it. The high commander must therefore be calm, clear, and determined--and in all commands, especially allied organizations, his success will be measured more by his ability to lead and persuade than by his adherence to fixed notions of arbitrary command practices. This truth applies with a particular force during the time necessary to build up confidence--a confidence that reaches back into the governments at home as well as throughout the length and breadth of the command.
p. 119 [on a staff officer refusing a piece of equipment on the grounds that it would use up half its useful life]
The young staff officer was not to blame for this extraordinary attitude. He had been trained assiduously, through years of peace, in the eternal need for economy, for avoiding waste. Peacetime training was possible, as he well knew, only when the cost would be inconsequential. He had not yet accepted the essential harshness of war; he did not realize that the word is synonymous with waste, or did he understand that every positive action requires expenditure. The problem is to determine how, in space and time, to expend assets so as to achieve the maximum in results. When this has been determined, then assets must be spent with a lavish hand, particularly when the cost can be measured in the saving of lives.
p. 124
In such circumstances [adverse weather] it is always necessary for the commander to avoid an attitude of defeatism; discouragement on the part of the high commander always inevitably spreads rapidly throughout the command and always with unfortunate results. On that occasion it was exceedingly difficult to display any particular optimism.
p. 176
Speed of movement often enables troops to minimize any advantage the enemy may temporarily gain but, more important, speed makes possible the full exploitation of every favorable opportunity and prevents the enemy from readjusting his forces to meet successive attacks. Thus through speed and determination each successive advantage is more easily and economically gained than the previous one. Continuation of the process finally results in the demoralization of the enemy. Thereupon speed must be redoubled-relentless and speedy pursuit is the most profitable action in war.
p. 188
The relief of a combat leader is something that is not to be lightly done in war. Its first effect is to indicate to troops dissatisfaction with their performance; otherwise the commander would be commended, not relieved. This probably effect must always be weighed against the hoped-for advantage of assigning the post to another, and possibly untried, commander. On the other hand, really inept leadership must be quickly detected and instantly removed. Lives of thousands are involved--the question is not one of academic justice for the leader, it is that of concern for the many and the objective of victory.
p. 210
...Morale is the greatest single factor in successful war. Endurable comparisons with the enemy in other essential factors--leadership, discipline, technique, numbers, equipment, mobility, supply, and maintenance--are prerequisite to the existence of morale. It breeds most readily upon success; but under good leaders it will be maintained among troops even during extended periods of adversity. The methods employed by successful leaders in developing morale differ so widely as to defy any attempt to establish rules. One observation, however, always applies: in any long and bitter campaign morale will suffer unless all ranks thoroughly believe that their commanders are concerned first and always with the welfare of the troops who do the fighting. A human understanding and a natural ability to mingle with all men on a basis of equality are more important than any degree of technical skill.
p. 325
Morale of the combat troops had always to be carefully watched. The capacity of soldiers for absorbing punishment and enduring privations is almost inexhaustible so long as they believe they are getting a square deal, that their commanders are looking out for them, and that their own accomplishments are understood and appreciated. Any intimation that they are the victims of unfair treatment understandably arouses their anger and resentment, and the feeling can sweep through a command like wildfire.
p. 337
There was certainly no other nation in the world that could have supplied, repaired, and supported the great fleet of motor transportation that the American armed forces used in World War II.
p. 354
No responsible individual in war is ever free of mental strain; in battles such as the one initiated by the German attack in the Ardennes, this reaches a peak. But in a well-trained combat force, everyone has been schooled to accept it. Hysteria, born of excessive fear, is encountered only in exceptional cases. In battles of this kind it is more than ever necessary that responsible commanders exhibit the firmness, the calmness, the optimism that can pierce through the web of conflicting reports, doubts, and uncertainty and by taking advantage of every enemy weakness win through to victory. The American commanders reacted in just this fashion.
p. 409
With many of Mr. Roosevelt's political acts I could never possibly agree. But I knew him solely in his capacity as leader of a nation at war--and in that capacity he seemed to me to fulfill all that could possibly be expected of him.
p. 413
The French position in the war was, of course, not an easy one. Once known as the foremost military power of Europe, their army as well as their pride had been shattered in the great debacle of 1940. Consequently when the Torch invasion of 1942 again gave patriotic Frenchmen an opportunity to join in the fight against the Nazis they were sensitive to all questions on national pride and honor. Added to this was their bitter hatred of the Nazi, a hatred which seemed to be intensified against some of their own former political and military leaders. On top of all this was the uncertain basis on which rested DeGaulle's authority and that of the governmental organization he had installed in France. A further factor was the complete dependence of the French Army, and indeed of considerable portions of the population, upon American supplies. This was an additional irritant to their pride and, although the constantly insisted upon the need for greater amount of every kind of equipment and materiel, they were naturally galled by the realization that without those supplies they were completely helpless. All this tended to make the peculiarly sensitive and therefore difficult to deal with when they could find in any question, no matter how trivial, anything that they thought involved their national honor. Nevertheless, America's investment in the French forces paid magnificent dividends.
p. 414
Among the French were numbers of important individuals who never caused the slightest trouble; men whose breadth of vision and understanding of the issues at stake made them splendid allies. I personally like General DeGaulle, as I recognized in him many fine qualities. We felt, however, that these fine qualities were marred by hypersensitiveness and an extraordinary stubbornness in matters which appeared inconsequential to us. My own wartime contacts with him never developed the heat that seemed to be generated frequently in his meetings with many others.
p. 472 [On Stalin]
The marshal seemed to be a firm believer in the Communist concept. He said that, as he saw it, the Soviet system of government was based upon idealism, and ours upon materialism. In expanding his idea of this difference he remarked--and introduced an apology because of his criticism--that he felt our system appealed to all that was selfish in people. He said that we induced a man to do things by telling him he might keep what he earned, might say what he pleased, and in every direction allowed him to be largely an undisciplined, unoriented entity within a great national complex.
I did like Ike's summaries of what the war ultimately cost (Ch. 23 "Operation Study") and his perspective on continuing relations with Russia in the post-war era. It is interesting to note his perspective on this in the final chapter of this book weighed against his thoughts in "Three Days in January" by Bret Baier.
Some of Ike's wisdom and experience related to war and leadership:
p. 59
Admittedly there are certain things to be learned from battle experience that can be observed in no other way. On the other hand, any commander who permits a unit to enter battle lacking any advantage, any needed instruction, or any useful understanding that could be imparted to that unit beforehand, is guilty of a grave crime against the soldiers he leads.
p. 75
The planning process sometimes, as in the case of a vast triphibious undertaking, takes weeks and months. As a consequence these plans must be founded in fact and intelligent conclusion, and once made they must be fixed and clear. Deviation from fundamental concepts is permissible only when significant changes in the situation compel it. The high commander must therefore be calm, clear, and determined--and in all commands, especially allied organizations, his success will be measured more by his ability to lead and persuade than by his adherence to fixed notions of arbitrary command practices. This truth applies with a particular force during the time necessary to build up confidence--a confidence that reaches back into the governments at home as well as throughout the length and breadth of the command.
p. 119 [on a staff officer refusing a piece of equipment on the grounds that it would use up half its useful life]
The young staff officer was not to blame for this extraordinary attitude. He had been trained assiduously, through years of peace, in the eternal need for economy, for avoiding waste. Peacetime training was possible, as he well knew, only when the cost would be inconsequential. He had not yet accepted the essential harshness of war; he did not realize that the word is synonymous with waste, or did he understand that every positive action requires expenditure. The problem is to determine how, in space and time, to expend assets so as to achieve the maximum in results. When this has been determined, then assets must be spent with a lavish hand, particularly when the cost can be measured in the saving of lives.
p. 124
In such circumstances [adverse weather] it is always necessary for the commander to avoid an attitude of defeatism; discouragement on the part of the high commander always inevitably spreads rapidly throughout the command and always with unfortunate results. On that occasion it was exceedingly difficult to display any particular optimism.
p. 176
Speed of movement often enables troops to minimize any advantage the enemy may temporarily gain but, more important, speed makes possible the full exploitation of every favorable opportunity and prevents the enemy from readjusting his forces to meet successive attacks. Thus through speed and determination each successive advantage is more easily and economically gained than the previous one. Continuation of the process finally results in the demoralization of the enemy. Thereupon speed must be redoubled-relentless and speedy pursuit is the most profitable action in war.
p. 188
The relief of a combat leader is something that is not to be lightly done in war. Its first effect is to indicate to troops dissatisfaction with their performance; otherwise the commander would be commended, not relieved. This probably effect must always be weighed against the hoped-for advantage of assigning the post to another, and possibly untried, commander. On the other hand, really inept leadership must be quickly detected and instantly removed. Lives of thousands are involved--the question is not one of academic justice for the leader, it is that of concern for the many and the objective of victory.
p. 210
...Morale is the greatest single factor in successful war. Endurable comparisons with the enemy in other essential factors--leadership, discipline, technique, numbers, equipment, mobility, supply, and maintenance--are prerequisite to the existence of morale. It breeds most readily upon success; but under good leaders it will be maintained among troops even during extended periods of adversity. The methods employed by successful leaders in developing morale differ so widely as to defy any attempt to establish rules. One observation, however, always applies: in any long and bitter campaign morale will suffer unless all ranks thoroughly believe that their commanders are concerned first and always with the welfare of the troops who do the fighting. A human understanding and a natural ability to mingle with all men on a basis of equality are more important than any degree of technical skill.
p. 325
Morale of the combat troops had always to be carefully watched. The capacity of soldiers for absorbing punishment and enduring privations is almost inexhaustible so long as they believe they are getting a square deal, that their commanders are looking out for them, and that their own accomplishments are understood and appreciated. Any intimation that they are the victims of unfair treatment understandably arouses their anger and resentment, and the feeling can sweep through a command like wildfire.
p. 337
There was certainly no other nation in the world that could have supplied, repaired, and supported the great fleet of motor transportation that the American armed forces used in World War II.
p. 354
No responsible individual in war is ever free of mental strain; in battles such as the one initiated by the German attack in the Ardennes, this reaches a peak. But in a well-trained combat force, everyone has been schooled to accept it. Hysteria, born of excessive fear, is encountered only in exceptional cases. In battles of this kind it is more than ever necessary that responsible commanders exhibit the firmness, the calmness, the optimism that can pierce through the web of conflicting reports, doubts, and uncertainty and by taking advantage of every enemy weakness win through to victory. The American commanders reacted in just this fashion.
p. 409
With many of Mr. Roosevelt's political acts I could never possibly agree. But I knew him solely in his capacity as leader of a nation at war--and in that capacity he seemed to me to fulfill all that could possibly be expected of him.
p. 413
The French position in the war was, of course, not an easy one. Once known as the foremost military power of Europe, their army as well as their pride had been shattered in the great debacle of 1940. Consequently when the Torch invasion of 1942 again gave patriotic Frenchmen an opportunity to join in the fight against the Nazis they were sensitive to all questions on national pride and honor. Added to this was their bitter hatred of the Nazi, a hatred which seemed to be intensified against some of their own former political and military leaders. On top of all this was the uncertain basis on which rested DeGaulle's authority and that of the governmental organization he had installed in France. A further factor was the complete dependence of the French Army, and indeed of considerable portions of the population, upon American supplies. This was an additional irritant to their pride and, although the constantly insisted upon the need for greater amount of every kind of equipment and materiel, they were naturally galled by the realization that without those supplies they were completely helpless. All this tended to make the peculiarly sensitive and therefore difficult to deal with when they could find in any question, no matter how trivial, anything that they thought involved their national honor. Nevertheless, America's investment in the French forces paid magnificent dividends.
p. 414
Among the French were numbers of important individuals who never caused the slightest trouble; men whose breadth of vision and understanding of the issues at stake made them splendid allies. I personally like General DeGaulle, as I recognized in him many fine qualities. We felt, however, that these fine qualities were marred by hypersensitiveness and an extraordinary stubbornness in matters which appeared inconsequential to us. My own wartime contacts with him never developed the heat that seemed to be generated frequently in his meetings with many others.
p. 472 [On Stalin]
The marshal seemed to be a firm believer in the Communist concept. He said that, as he saw it, the Soviet system of government was based upon idealism, and ours upon materialism. In expanding his idea of this difference he remarked--and introduced an apology because of his criticism--that he felt our system appealed to all that was selfish in people. He said that we induced a man to do things by telling him he might keep what he earned, might say what he pleased, and in every direction allowed him to be largely an undisciplined, unoriented entity within a great national complex.
February 6, 2017
Excellent Autobiography; technical yet concise, specific but clear. Ike takes us on a journey from the launch of Torch to the surrender of the Reich. He does not attempt to dazzle the reader and provides a remarkably human perspective on the giant personalities of WWII to include Churchill, Montgomery, and Patton. Historians have argued that Ike's memoirs rank a close second to the famously majestic prose of Ulysses Grant in the annals of wartime leaders, and while his personal style may be more to the point than Grant, it struck me as a much easier read and just as packed with information. For those looking to gain a true understanding of the North African campaign, Invasion of Italy, Operation Overlord, and subsequent exploitation of a crumbling Nazi regime, look no further than this entertaining and enthusiastically written account.
February 11, 2013
I'm kind of with a lot of others on this where while I think this is an important book for anyone interested in WWII history Eisenhower takes too measured an approach in describing events and individuals involved. If you are looking for detailed insight from someone that was there forget it. It's a very dry administrative telling of the war along the lines of Sir Kenneth Strong's Intelligence at the Top.
June 13, 2013
Granted it was written in 1948 but it read like a clinical. Very little was written about what the author (in this case one of the major figures of the war) was thinking or what went behind many of the decisions or actions that occured.
January 15, 2013
Great read! Last few pages are a great reminder of who we are as a nation and a call to action that is needed now more than ever in our national history.
July 26, 2013
TO COIN A PHRASE, "A MAN AND A MOMENT MEET" IS TRULY APPROPRIATE IN THIS ERA.
THE LOGISTICAL PLANNING NEEDED FOR A WORLD WAR IS MIND BOGGLING AN INFORMATIVE
AND INSIGHTFUL READ.
THE LOGISTICAL PLANNING NEEDED FOR A WORLD WAR IS MIND BOGGLING AN INFORMATIVE
AND INSIGHTFUL READ.
April 18, 2012
I was hesitant to read this for the simple reason that I was afraid that it would be rather dull. What light would Eisenhower be able to shed on the war from having directed it at the highest level? It may be sparse on tactics, but as a (former) Army officer myself, it shed great light on leadership. Eisenhower is famous for managing the first truly multinational force in modern times, possibly ever. But his perspective on directing and managing a war in all of its complexities, from logistics to maneuver operations to morale to combined/joint operations, to intelligence, etc, etc, etc is priceless. But other than the practical lessons this memoir has to offer the student of military history, what impressed me most was Eisenhower's exemplification of leadership and of being an officer and a gentleman. What I never realized was the grasp on good leadership that Eisenhower had. I have in fact compiled a list of my favorite quotes, most of them regarding leadership (see below; page references from original edition). As far as being a gentleman, I quickly noticed how Eisenhower spoke of everyone else in the book with complete respect. If he spoke of a disagreement between him and another, he was quick to give him due credit for either the other's position or other good qualities the other possessed. There was no smack of politics in the words, either. To me, his praises of others were sincere expressions by a man who lived the values he espoused. How rare it is to find men like Eisenhower in today's society.
Nuggets from Crusade in Europe
p.34 – “Pressure from any source, in favor of any individual in the Army, was more likely than not to boomerang if the Chief of Staff became aware of its existence. I was in his office one day when someone called him on the telephone, apparently to urge the promotion of some friend in the Army. His answer was, “If the man is a friend of yours, the best service you can do him is to avoid mentioning his name to me.”
p.35 – “[Marshall] insisted that his principal assistants should think and act on their own conclusions in their own spheres of responsibility, a doctrine emphasized in our Army schools but too little practiced in peacetime.”
p.35 – “By the same token he had nothing but scorn for any man who attempted ‘to do everything himself’ – he believed that the man who worked himself to tatters on minor details had no ability to handle the more vital issues of war. Another type General Marshall disliked was the truculent personality – the man who confused firmness and strength with bad manners and deliberate discourtesy. He also avoided those with too great a love of the limelight. Moreover, he was irritated by those who were often in trouble with others or who were too stupid to see that leadership in conference, even with subordinates, is as important as on the battlefield.”
p.59 – “There has always existed the curious notion that instant perfection in these matters comes about with the first whistle of a hostile bullet. Admittedly there are certain things to be learned from battle experience that can be absorbed in no other way. On the other hand, any commander who permits a unit to enter battle lacking any advantage, any needed instruction, or any useful understanding that could be imparted to that unit beforehand, is guilty of a grave crime against the soldiers he leads.”
p.60 – “…the American soldier, in spite of wisecracking, sometimes cynical speech, is an intelligent human being who demands and deserves basic understanding of the reasons why his country took up arms and of the conflicting consequences of victory or defeat. Von Steuben commented vividly on this point during the American Revolution. He explained in a letter to a friend that in Europe you tell a soldier to do thus, and he does it; and that in America it is necessary also to tell him why he does it.
Once the recruit of 1941 was inducted into the service the military leader had to shoulder almost exclusive responsibility for imparting such an understanding, but there was implied a glaring deficiency in our country’s educational processes. It seemed to me that constant stressing of the individual rights and privileges of American citizenship had overshadowed the equally important truth that such individualism can be sustained only so long as the citizen accepts his full responsibility for the welfare of the nation that protects him in the exercise of these rights.”
p. 74-75 – “The military methods and machinery for making and waging war have become so extraordinarily complex and intricate that high commanders must have gargantuan staffs for control and direction. Because of this it is sometimes assumed that the influence of the individual in war has become submerged, that the mistakes of one responsible officer are corrected or concealed in the mass action of a great number of associates. This is not true.
“The individual now works differently; indeed, one of the most important characteristics of the successful officer today is his ability to continue changing his methods, almost even his mental processes, in order to keep abreast of the constant change that modern science, working under the compelling urge to national self-preservation, brings to the battlefield. But personal characteristics are more important than ever before in warfare. The reasons for this are simple. It was not a matter of great moment is if a Wellington happened to be a crusty, unapproachable individual who found one of his chief delights in penning sarcastic quips to the War Office. He was the single head, who saw the whole battlefield and directed operations through a small administrative staff and a few aides and orderlies. As long as he had the stamina and the courage to make decisions to stand by them, and as long as his tactical skill met the requirements of his particular time and conditions, he was a great commander. But the teams and staff through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally the whole should be practically a single mind; consequently misfits defeat the purpose of the command organizations essential to the supply and control of vast land, air, sea, and logistical forces that must be brought to bear as a unit against the enemy. The personalities of senior commanders and staff officers are of special importance. Professional military ability and strength of character, always required in high military position, are often marred by unfortunate characteristics, the two most frequently encountered and hurtful ones being a too obvious avidity for public acclaim and the delusion that strength of purpose demands arrogant and even insufferable deportment.”
p.126 – “A qualified commander should normally be assigned only a general mission, whether it be of attack or defense, and then given the means to carry it out. In this way he is completely unfettered in achieving the general purpose of his superior.”
p.132 – “…a full measure of health is basic to successful command.”
p.134 – “Every commander is always careful to select only the best officers he can find for key staff positions in his headquarters. Yet these men, who in the average case would do anything to obtain a field command and who could serve brilliantly in such positions, devote their talents to the drudgery of the staff with few of the rewards that go to their comrades of the line.”
p.171 – “This incident involved the construction of the airfield on the little island of Gozo, just off Malta. It was so ill favored in the matter of terrain that British field engineers…had given up any hope of producing a field there in time for use in the Sicilian campaign. Happily, just at the critical moment Air Marshall Park, in command of the air forces of the island, had as a visitor an American engineer. Park told the engineer of this particular problem and after showing him the projected site asked for an estimate on the time it would take to construct an operational strip. The answer was a nonchalant ‘Ten days…as soon as my equipment can get here, which should take several days.’ The upshot was that messages began to fly through the air, and thirteen days from the time the first American construction unit stepped on the island the first fighter plane was taking off from the strip. This story was told to me over and over again by British officers on the island who admiration for the American engineers was scarcely short in awe.”
p.176 – “Patton was a shrewd student of warfare who always clearly appreciated the value of speed in the conduct of operations. Speed of movement often enables troops to minimize any advantage the enemy may temporarily gain, but more important, speed makes possible the full exploitation of every favorable opportunity and prevents the enemy from readjusting his forces to meet successive attacks. Thus through speed and determination each successive advantage is more easily and economically gained than the previous one. Continuations of the process finally results in the demoralizations of the enemy. Thereupon speed must be redoubled – relentlessly, and thus not only minimized casualties but shook the whole Italian Government so forcibly that Mussolini toppled from his position of power in late July.”
p.202 – “A basic principle for the conduct of a supporting or auxiliary operation is that it be carried out as cheaply as possible. Since its purpose is to induce dispersion of hostile power, the operation, to be successful, must force a heavier relative drain upon enemy resources than upon our own. Obviously, however, there must be something valuable to the enemy under threat by the auxiliary operation, and our forces must be strong enough to sustain the threat. If these two conditions are not present the enemy can afford to ignore the whole effort.”
p.210 – “Morale is the greatest single factor in successful war. Endurable comparisons with the enemy in other essential factors – leadership, discipline, technique, numbers, equipment, mobility, supply, and maintenance – are prerequisite to the existence of good morale. It breeds most readily upon success; but under good leaders it will be maintained among troops even during extended periods of adversity. The methods employed by successful leaders in developing morale differ so widely as to defy any attempt to establish rules. One observation, however, always applies: in any long and bitter campaign morale will suffer unless all ranks thoroughly believe that their commanders are concerned first and always with the welfare of the troops who are doing the fighting. A human understanding and a natural ability to mingle with all men on a basis of equality are more important than any degree of technical skill.”
p.314 – “In the first place I felt that through constant talking to enlisted men I gained accurate impressions of their state of mind. I talked to them about anything and everything: a favorite question of mine was to inquire whether the particular squad or platoon had figured out any new trick or gadget for use in infantry fighting. I would talk about anything so long as I could get the soldier to talk to me in return.
“…There is among the mass of individuals who carry rifles in war, a great amount of ingenuity and initiative. If men can naturally and without restraint talk to their officers, the products of their resourcefulness become available to all. Moreover, out of the habit grows mutual confidence, a feeling of partnership that is the essence of esprit de corps. An army fearful of its officers is never as good as one that trusts and confides in its leaders.”
p.315 – “Morale of combat troops had always to be carefully watched. The capacity of soldiers for absorbing punishment and enduring privations is almost inexhaustible so long as they believe they are getting a square deal, that their commanders are looking out for them, and that their own accomplishments are understood and appreciated. Any intimation that they are the victims of unfair treatment understandably arouses their anger and resentment, and the feeling can sweep through a command like wildfire. Once, in Africa, front-line troops complained to me that they could get no chocolate bars or anything to smoke, when they knew that these plentifully issued to the Services of Supply. I queried the local commander, who said he had requisitioned these things time and again, only to be told that no transport was available to bring them to the front.
“I merely telephoned to the rear and directed that until every forward airfield and front-line unit was getting its share of these items there would not be another piece of candy or a cigarette or cigar issued to anyone in the supply services. In a surprisingly short time I received a happy report from the front that their requisitions were being promptly filled.”
p. 455 – “In war, time is vital. There is much to be done. Visible evidences of efficiency, noted in perfection of techniques and deportment, are so easy to observe that officers of all grades cannot or do not give sufficient attention to the individual. Yet attention to the individual is the key to success, particularly because American manpower is not only our most precious commodity – it will, in any global war, always be in short supply.”
Nuggets from Crusade in Europe
p.34 – “Pressure from any source, in favor of any individual in the Army, was more likely than not to boomerang if the Chief of Staff became aware of its existence. I was in his office one day when someone called him on the telephone, apparently to urge the promotion of some friend in the Army. His answer was, “If the man is a friend of yours, the best service you can do him is to avoid mentioning his name to me.”
p.35 – “[Marshall] insisted that his principal assistants should think and act on their own conclusions in their own spheres of responsibility, a doctrine emphasized in our Army schools but too little practiced in peacetime.”
p.35 – “By the same token he had nothing but scorn for any man who attempted ‘to do everything himself’ – he believed that the man who worked himself to tatters on minor details had no ability to handle the more vital issues of war. Another type General Marshall disliked was the truculent personality – the man who confused firmness and strength with bad manners and deliberate discourtesy. He also avoided those with too great a love of the limelight. Moreover, he was irritated by those who were often in trouble with others or who were too stupid to see that leadership in conference, even with subordinates, is as important as on the battlefield.”
p.59 – “There has always existed the curious notion that instant perfection in these matters comes about with the first whistle of a hostile bullet. Admittedly there are certain things to be learned from battle experience that can be absorbed in no other way. On the other hand, any commander who permits a unit to enter battle lacking any advantage, any needed instruction, or any useful understanding that could be imparted to that unit beforehand, is guilty of a grave crime against the soldiers he leads.”
p.60 – “…the American soldier, in spite of wisecracking, sometimes cynical speech, is an intelligent human being who demands and deserves basic understanding of the reasons why his country took up arms and of the conflicting consequences of victory or defeat. Von Steuben commented vividly on this point during the American Revolution. He explained in a letter to a friend that in Europe you tell a soldier to do thus, and he does it; and that in America it is necessary also to tell him why he does it.
Once the recruit of 1941 was inducted into the service the military leader had to shoulder almost exclusive responsibility for imparting such an understanding, but there was implied a glaring deficiency in our country’s educational processes. It seemed to me that constant stressing of the individual rights and privileges of American citizenship had overshadowed the equally important truth that such individualism can be sustained only so long as the citizen accepts his full responsibility for the welfare of the nation that protects him in the exercise of these rights.”
p. 74-75 – “The military methods and machinery for making and waging war have become so extraordinarily complex and intricate that high commanders must have gargantuan staffs for control and direction. Because of this it is sometimes assumed that the influence of the individual in war has become submerged, that the mistakes of one responsible officer are corrected or concealed in the mass action of a great number of associates. This is not true.
“The individual now works differently; indeed, one of the most important characteristics of the successful officer today is his ability to continue changing his methods, almost even his mental processes, in order to keep abreast of the constant change that modern science, working under the compelling urge to national self-preservation, brings to the battlefield. But personal characteristics are more important than ever before in warfare. The reasons for this are simple. It was not a matter of great moment is if a Wellington happened to be a crusty, unapproachable individual who found one of his chief delights in penning sarcastic quips to the War Office. He was the single head, who saw the whole battlefield and directed operations through a small administrative staff and a few aides and orderlies. As long as he had the stamina and the courage to make decisions to stand by them, and as long as his tactical skill met the requirements of his particular time and conditions, he was a great commander. But the teams and staff through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally the whole should be practically a single mind; consequently misfits defeat the purpose of the command organizations essential to the supply and control of vast land, air, sea, and logistical forces that must be brought to bear as a unit against the enemy. The personalities of senior commanders and staff officers are of special importance. Professional military ability and strength of character, always required in high military position, are often marred by unfortunate characteristics, the two most frequently encountered and hurtful ones being a too obvious avidity for public acclaim and the delusion that strength of purpose demands arrogant and even insufferable deportment.”
p.126 – “A qualified commander should normally be assigned only a general mission, whether it be of attack or defense, and then given the means to carry it out. In this way he is completely unfettered in achieving the general purpose of his superior.”
p.132 – “…a full measure of health is basic to successful command.”
p.134 – “Every commander is always careful to select only the best officers he can find for key staff positions in his headquarters. Yet these men, who in the average case would do anything to obtain a field command and who could serve brilliantly in such positions, devote their talents to the drudgery of the staff with few of the rewards that go to their comrades of the line.”
p.171 – “This incident involved the construction of the airfield on the little island of Gozo, just off Malta. It was so ill favored in the matter of terrain that British field engineers…had given up any hope of producing a field there in time for use in the Sicilian campaign. Happily, just at the critical moment Air Marshall Park, in command of the air forces of the island, had as a visitor an American engineer. Park told the engineer of this particular problem and after showing him the projected site asked for an estimate on the time it would take to construct an operational strip. The answer was a nonchalant ‘Ten days…as soon as my equipment can get here, which should take several days.’ The upshot was that messages began to fly through the air, and thirteen days from the time the first American construction unit stepped on the island the first fighter plane was taking off from the strip. This story was told to me over and over again by British officers on the island who admiration for the American engineers was scarcely short in awe.”
p.176 – “Patton was a shrewd student of warfare who always clearly appreciated the value of speed in the conduct of operations. Speed of movement often enables troops to minimize any advantage the enemy may temporarily gain, but more important, speed makes possible the full exploitation of every favorable opportunity and prevents the enemy from readjusting his forces to meet successive attacks. Thus through speed and determination each successive advantage is more easily and economically gained than the previous one. Continuations of the process finally results in the demoralizations of the enemy. Thereupon speed must be redoubled – relentlessly, and thus not only minimized casualties but shook the whole Italian Government so forcibly that Mussolini toppled from his position of power in late July.”
p.202 – “A basic principle for the conduct of a supporting or auxiliary operation is that it be carried out as cheaply as possible. Since its purpose is to induce dispersion of hostile power, the operation, to be successful, must force a heavier relative drain upon enemy resources than upon our own. Obviously, however, there must be something valuable to the enemy under threat by the auxiliary operation, and our forces must be strong enough to sustain the threat. If these two conditions are not present the enemy can afford to ignore the whole effort.”
p.210 – “Morale is the greatest single factor in successful war. Endurable comparisons with the enemy in other essential factors – leadership, discipline, technique, numbers, equipment, mobility, supply, and maintenance – are prerequisite to the existence of good morale. It breeds most readily upon success; but under good leaders it will be maintained among troops even during extended periods of adversity. The methods employed by successful leaders in developing morale differ so widely as to defy any attempt to establish rules. One observation, however, always applies: in any long and bitter campaign morale will suffer unless all ranks thoroughly believe that their commanders are concerned first and always with the welfare of the troops who are doing the fighting. A human understanding and a natural ability to mingle with all men on a basis of equality are more important than any degree of technical skill.”
p.314 – “In the first place I felt that through constant talking to enlisted men I gained accurate impressions of their state of mind. I talked to them about anything and everything: a favorite question of mine was to inquire whether the particular squad or platoon had figured out any new trick or gadget for use in infantry fighting. I would talk about anything so long as I could get the soldier to talk to me in return.
“…There is among the mass of individuals who carry rifles in war, a great amount of ingenuity and initiative. If men can naturally and without restraint talk to their officers, the products of their resourcefulness become available to all. Moreover, out of the habit grows mutual confidence, a feeling of partnership that is the essence of esprit de corps. An army fearful of its officers is never as good as one that trusts and confides in its leaders.”
p.315 – “Morale of combat troops had always to be carefully watched. The capacity of soldiers for absorbing punishment and enduring privations is almost inexhaustible so long as they believe they are getting a square deal, that their commanders are looking out for them, and that their own accomplishments are understood and appreciated. Any intimation that they are the victims of unfair treatment understandably arouses their anger and resentment, and the feeling can sweep through a command like wildfire. Once, in Africa, front-line troops complained to me that they could get no chocolate bars or anything to smoke, when they knew that these plentifully issued to the Services of Supply. I queried the local commander, who said he had requisitioned these things time and again, only to be told that no transport was available to bring them to the front.
“I merely telephoned to the rear and directed that until every forward airfield and front-line unit was getting its share of these items there would not be another piece of candy or a cigarette or cigar issued to anyone in the supply services. In a surprisingly short time I received a happy report from the front that their requisitions were being promptly filled.”
p. 455 – “In war, time is vital. There is much to be done. Visible evidences of efficiency, noted in perfection of techniques and deportment, are so easy to observe that officers of all grades cannot or do not give sufficient attention to the individual. Yet attention to the individual is the key to success, particularly because American manpower is not only our most precious commodity – it will, in any global war, always be in short supply.”
November 24, 2021
1948…
… Autorul are cu un deceniu mai mult decât secolul. Pentru oricine, la 58 de ani, vârsta debuturilor a rămas undeva în urmă. Nu şi pentru el: la 58 de ani îşi publică primul volum. Un începător întârziat deci, ba încă unul cu handicapuri numeroase şi evidente. Meseria nu-l predispune la scris. Căci proaspătul autor este un vechi militar, care practică meseria armelor de exact 33 de ani.
La aceşti ani se referă volumul. Nu la toţi însă. Primii douăzeci şi şapte sunt plaţi şi cenuşii. O carieră ca oricare alta a unui ofiţer de infanterie oarecare. Cu realizări mediocre şi cu idealuri înduioşător de modeste. Idealul imediat: să conducă o unitate, adică să aibă de-a face nemijlocit cu soldaţii. Dar destinul se încăpăţânează să-i joace renghiuri, neîngăduindu-i să tragă pe nări mirosul prafului de puşcă de pe poligonul de tragere şi surghiunindu-l periodic în cancelariile îmbâcsite de fum de tutun ale statelor-majore. Idealul de perspectivă: să iasă la pensie cu gradul de colonel. Destinul nu-i va face nici aici pe plac. Dar nu reţinându-l în josul scării ierarhice, ci catapultându-l pe treptele ei cele mai înalte. Şi nu ale unei singure scări, ci ale ambelor posibile: cea militară mai întâi, cea civilă ulterior.
Sursa acestei neverosimile forţe de proiectare trebuie căutată într-o perioadă scurtă, care reprezintă ceva mai puţin de a zecea parte din durata carierei sale: trei ani din cei treizeci şi trei. Către capătul lungii drepte orizontale, un minuscul segment ţâşneşte vertiginos în sus. De el, de segmentul celor trei ani, se ocupă în prima sa carte.
Sunt ultimii trei ani ai celui de-al doilea război mondial. Despre ei vorbeşte autorul debutant. Abia au trecut alţi trei ani de când sângerosul coşmar a luat sfârşit. Nimeni nu a uitat nimic din cele întâmplate ― nici învingătorii, nici învinşii, nici văduvele, nici infirmii, nici orfanii, nici cei rămaşi fără nimic de-al lor pe lume, nici cei rămaşi fără nimeni din ai lor pe lume. Nimeni nu a uitat, toţi îşi amintesc.
Ce le poate aduce, prin urmare, această carte? Chiar dacă se intitulează, sfidător, Cruciadă în Europa. Şi chiar dacă o semnează ex-generalul Dwight David Eisenhower, purtător al epoletului cu cinci stele ― cel mai înalt grad în armata de uscat a Statelor Unite ―, fost şef al Marelui Stat-Major al acesteia şi fost comandant suprem al Forţelor expediţionare aliate în Africa de Nord, Italia şi Europa occidentală.
” Pe cine poate interesa a n-a carte despre războiul atât de recent şi atât de proaspăt în toate memoriile? ― se întreabă, încă înainte de a o avea în mână, cronicarul unui mare cotidian american. ― Eisenhower se grăbeşte să se alăture numărului deja respectabil de căpetenii militare ale căror opuri posace, scrise parcă de fete bătrâne şi lipsite de vlagă, se prăfuiesc, nerăsfoite de nimeni, în bibliotecile şcolilor de ofiţeri. Cine să le citească? Cine să-l citească pe Eisenhower? Poate doar un camarad de promoţie ros de invidie, sau un fost subaltern ranchiunos, care vor zâmbi ironic la anumite pasaje, mâzgălind pe margine comentarii nimicitor de sarcastice… Ne pare rău că Eisenhower, invincibil pe fronturile bubuitoare ale războiului, se expune unei înfrângeri inevitabile pe frontul foşnitor al paginii tipărite”.
Primele recenzii propriu-zise nu sunt nici ele mai încurajatoare.” Stilul generalului este la fel de pedestru ca şi trupele în fruntea cărora şi-a câştigat galoanele”, remarcă acru un critic.” Amatorii de revelaţii senzaţionale sau de polemici-pumnal vor fi profund dezamăgiţi”, avertizează un altul. Dincoace de ocean, în Anglia, tonul este şi mai caustic:” Ajungând la capătul cruciadei, avem impresia că am citit mai degrabă Patimile mântuitorilor (americani) ai Europei, după Sf. Eisenhower”.
Dar iată că, refuzând să ia în seamă obiecţiile subtile şi rafinate aduse cărţii, publicul o caută cu insistenţă. Primul tiraj (30 000 de exemplare) se epuizează în două zile. Îi urmează altele şi altele. Cruciadă în Europa se instalează în rândul bestseller-elor şi urcă metodic în clasament, ajungând curând pe locul I, pe care îl păstrează îndelung. În nici nouă luni, ediţia originală ― îngrijit cartonată ― atinge 1 320 000 de exemplare. După aceea vine rândul ediţiei de masă, broşată şi sensibil mai ieftină, din care se difuzează peste două milioane de exemplare. În Marea Britanie se vând alte 600 000, cam tot atât cât versiunile franceză şi italiană. Pe frontul foşnitor al hârtiei, inevitabila înfrângere, atât de categoric pronosticată, refuză să se materializeze…
… Autorul are cu un deceniu mai mult decât secolul. Pentru oricine, la 58 de ani, vârsta debuturilor a rămas undeva în urmă. Nu şi pentru el: la 58 de ani îşi publică primul volum. Un începător întârziat deci, ba încă unul cu handicapuri numeroase şi evidente. Meseria nu-l predispune la scris. Căci proaspătul autor este un vechi militar, care practică meseria armelor de exact 33 de ani.
La aceşti ani se referă volumul. Nu la toţi însă. Primii douăzeci şi şapte sunt plaţi şi cenuşii. O carieră ca oricare alta a unui ofiţer de infanterie oarecare. Cu realizări mediocre şi cu idealuri înduioşător de modeste. Idealul imediat: să conducă o unitate, adică să aibă de-a face nemijlocit cu soldaţii. Dar destinul se încăpăţânează să-i joace renghiuri, neîngăduindu-i să tragă pe nări mirosul prafului de puşcă de pe poligonul de tragere şi surghiunindu-l periodic în cancelariile îmbâcsite de fum de tutun ale statelor-majore. Idealul de perspectivă: să iasă la pensie cu gradul de colonel. Destinul nu-i va face nici aici pe plac. Dar nu reţinându-l în josul scării ierarhice, ci catapultându-l pe treptele ei cele mai înalte. Şi nu ale unei singure scări, ci ale ambelor posibile: cea militară mai întâi, cea civilă ulterior.
Sursa acestei neverosimile forţe de proiectare trebuie căutată într-o perioadă scurtă, care reprezintă ceva mai puţin de a zecea parte din durata carierei sale: trei ani din cei treizeci şi trei. Către capătul lungii drepte orizontale, un minuscul segment ţâşneşte vertiginos în sus. De el, de segmentul celor trei ani, se ocupă în prima sa carte.
Sunt ultimii trei ani ai celui de-al doilea război mondial. Despre ei vorbeşte autorul debutant. Abia au trecut alţi trei ani de când sângerosul coşmar a luat sfârşit. Nimeni nu a uitat nimic din cele întâmplate ― nici învingătorii, nici învinşii, nici văduvele, nici infirmii, nici orfanii, nici cei rămaşi fără nimic de-al lor pe lume, nici cei rămaşi fără nimeni din ai lor pe lume. Nimeni nu a uitat, toţi îşi amintesc.
Ce le poate aduce, prin urmare, această carte? Chiar dacă se intitulează, sfidător, Cruciadă în Europa. Şi chiar dacă o semnează ex-generalul Dwight David Eisenhower, purtător al epoletului cu cinci stele ― cel mai înalt grad în armata de uscat a Statelor Unite ―, fost şef al Marelui Stat-Major al acesteia şi fost comandant suprem al Forţelor expediţionare aliate în Africa de Nord, Italia şi Europa occidentală.
” Pe cine poate interesa a n-a carte despre războiul atât de recent şi atât de proaspăt în toate memoriile? ― se întreabă, încă înainte de a o avea în mână, cronicarul unui mare cotidian american. ― Eisenhower se grăbeşte să se alăture numărului deja respectabil de căpetenii militare ale căror opuri posace, scrise parcă de fete bătrâne şi lipsite de vlagă, se prăfuiesc, nerăsfoite de nimeni, în bibliotecile şcolilor de ofiţeri. Cine să le citească? Cine să-l citească pe Eisenhower? Poate doar un camarad de promoţie ros de invidie, sau un fost subaltern ranchiunos, care vor zâmbi ironic la anumite pasaje, mâzgălind pe margine comentarii nimicitor de sarcastice… Ne pare rău că Eisenhower, invincibil pe fronturile bubuitoare ale războiului, se expune unei înfrângeri inevitabile pe frontul foşnitor al paginii tipărite”.
Primele recenzii propriu-zise nu sunt nici ele mai încurajatoare.” Stilul generalului este la fel de pedestru ca şi trupele în fruntea cărora şi-a câştigat galoanele”, remarcă acru un critic.” Amatorii de revelaţii senzaţionale sau de polemici-pumnal vor fi profund dezamăgiţi”, avertizează un altul. Dincoace de ocean, în Anglia, tonul este şi mai caustic:” Ajungând la capătul cruciadei, avem impresia că am citit mai degrabă Patimile mântuitorilor (americani) ai Europei, după Sf. Eisenhower”.
Dar iată că, refuzând să ia în seamă obiecţiile subtile şi rafinate aduse cărţii, publicul o caută cu insistenţă. Primul tiraj (30 000 de exemplare) se epuizează în două zile. Îi urmează altele şi altele. Cruciadă în Europa se instalează în rândul bestseller-elor şi urcă metodic în clasament, ajungând curând pe locul I, pe care îl păstrează îndelung. În nici nouă luni, ediţia originală ― îngrijit cartonată ― atinge 1 320 000 de exemplare. După aceea vine rândul ediţiei de masă, broşată şi sensibil mai ieftină, din care se difuzează peste două milioane de exemplare. În Marea Britanie se vând alte 600 000, cam tot atât cât versiunile franceză şi italiană. Pe frontul foşnitor al hârtiei, inevitabila înfrângere, atât de categoric pronosticată, refuză să se materializeze…
December 3, 2020
Crusade in Europe is General Dwight Eisenhower’s memoir of his experiences during World War II. This is not a retelling of individual battles, nor does it offer detail about life on the front lines. Eisenhower, as the supreme commander of the Allied forces in Europe, was responsible for the strategy, planning and leadership of all Allied operations in the European Theatre. The bulk of the book focuses then, on how Eisenhower and his staff (the Supreme HQ, Allied Expeditionary Force or SHAEF) led the Allied effort against Nazi Germany.
This is an excellent book, and very much worth your time. Some have found Eisenhower’s writing style dry, but I found it straightforward and practical, even as it is also more businesslike than personable. At some points he does assume the reader has an understanding of things that, given the passage of over 70 years, you may not be familiar with. So if you’re like me you’ll find yourself googling to find out more about people, war equipment, or locations that he discusses. I recommend you do this if you read the book - I found that giving myself this added context really helped me understand more of what Ike had to say.
Eisenhower’s purpose in writing the book seems to be to leave the reader with a better understanding of what it took him to be successful, and what future leaders called to similar tasks may want to learn from his experience. He goes into some detail to explain why certain decisions were made, what support he had (both military and political) that helped him keep the Allied forces focused on the overall strategy, how methodical the planning was, how things changed on the ground but yet the overall goals were never lost sight of (despite disagreement at times among his staff and from his civilian Allied bosses). You’ll also get a full accounting of the progress of the war in North Africa and Europe complete with over 40 maps showing key battles and Allied advances, and you'll get some flavor for the personalities around Eisenhower in Allied leadership.
Most of all, you'll get a really good sense of Eisenhower and who he was as a leader from reading this book. I was impressed with his focus on his soldiers - his desire to understand the experience of the soldiers on the front line, his need to gather their input, and the importance he placed on morale and transparent communication (to the extent possible in war) up and down the hierarchy. There are many passages where Eisenhower speaks on leadership that are really good, but these passages are so much a part of his overall narrative of events that I found myself having to pause and reflect every once and awhile to let them sink in.
This book was published in 1948, three years after the end of World War II. The edition I read was put out in 1952. It has Appendices that list the different Army Groups and Divisions of the final offensive. It also has the maps I mentioned above sprinkled throughout the text. But, at the very end of the book is note admitting that it’s missing the footnotes of the original Doubleday edition! So I don’t know how much context I missed by not having those footnotes, but this strikes me as the kind of book where they would have been beneficial. Regardless I found this a very worthwhile read. If you have an interest in World War II, and in Ike’s take on leadership by all means read it.
This is an excellent book, and very much worth your time. Some have found Eisenhower’s writing style dry, but I found it straightforward and practical, even as it is also more businesslike than personable. At some points he does assume the reader has an understanding of things that, given the passage of over 70 years, you may not be familiar with. So if you’re like me you’ll find yourself googling to find out more about people, war equipment, or locations that he discusses. I recommend you do this if you read the book - I found that giving myself this added context really helped me understand more of what Ike had to say.
Eisenhower’s purpose in writing the book seems to be to leave the reader with a better understanding of what it took him to be successful, and what future leaders called to similar tasks may want to learn from his experience. He goes into some detail to explain why certain decisions were made, what support he had (both military and political) that helped him keep the Allied forces focused on the overall strategy, how methodical the planning was, how things changed on the ground but yet the overall goals were never lost sight of (despite disagreement at times among his staff and from his civilian Allied bosses). You’ll also get a full accounting of the progress of the war in North Africa and Europe complete with over 40 maps showing key battles and Allied advances, and you'll get some flavor for the personalities around Eisenhower in Allied leadership.
Most of all, you'll get a really good sense of Eisenhower and who he was as a leader from reading this book. I was impressed with his focus on his soldiers - his desire to understand the experience of the soldiers on the front line, his need to gather their input, and the importance he placed on morale and transparent communication (to the extent possible in war) up and down the hierarchy. There are many passages where Eisenhower speaks on leadership that are really good, but these passages are so much a part of his overall narrative of events that I found myself having to pause and reflect every once and awhile to let them sink in.
This book was published in 1948, three years after the end of World War II. The edition I read was put out in 1952. It has Appendices that list the different Army Groups and Divisions of the final offensive. It also has the maps I mentioned above sprinkled throughout the text. But, at the very end of the book is note admitting that it’s missing the footnotes of the original Doubleday edition! So I don’t know how much context I missed by not having those footnotes, but this strikes me as the kind of book where they would have been beneficial. Regardless I found this a very worthwhile read. If you have an interest in World War II, and in Ike’s take on leadership by all means read it.
March 26, 2021
**** Why so many voters declared "I Like Ike!" ****
Dwight Eisenhower’s purpose in writing this book was not to provide a day-by-day, battle-by-battle account of the European conflict. Rather, in chronicling the invasions of North Africa, Sicily and Italy, Operation Overlord, the Battle of the Bulge and the final onslaught into Germany, it was to provide insight into his personality, responsibilities, relationships and thought processes as Supreme Commander. He does not engage in self-aggrandizement, making excuses for mistakes, or self-justification; instead, he gives readers a behind-the-scenes look at what a tremendous undertaking it was to plan the strategy, tactics, immensely complicated logistics, and long-range goals of the war. At the same time he shows how those at the highest levels of command also had to deal with issues of personnel, politics, diplomacy, and often-conflicting systems of values and governmental philosophy and operation between the nations of the Western Alliance, and how the Soviet Union was so different from the Alliance that it required an entire set of attitudes and procedures all unto itself. And all these factors had to be dealt with simultaneously!
Eisenhower was slow to anger and even-tempered and possessed a remarkable sense of fairness and equanimity, which enabled him to work successfully (more or less!) with such contrasting personalities as Winston Churchill, George Patton and Marshal Zhukov; but he also exhibited a strong sense of righteous indignation and moral outrage, as when he visited Nazi concentration camps and saw the horrors that had been perpetrated upon the hapless inmates. This strengthened his determination to demand nothing less than unconditional surrender from the Nazi high command. His sense of satisfaction and fulfillment at seeing General Jodl sign the surrender document at Reims on May 7, 1945, officially ending the war, is perhaps the book’s high point.
He does perhaps gloss over the magnitude of the Allied defeats at Kasserine Pass and in Operation Market Garden, as well as the degree to which the Allies had their backs to the wall during the opening days of the Battle of the Bulge; but he takes responsibility as Supreme Commander for all strategic and tactical mistakes, such as the reliance on green, inexperienced troops at the former (not that there was much choice in February 1943!), and faulty intelligence and overconfidence in the underestimating of German strength and willingness to fight in the battles of late 1944. (And, although it is not mentioned in this book, he even prepared a press release to be issued in case the Normandy invasion failed, taking responsibility for that as well and announcing the withdrawal of the troops.) And if the optimism he exhibits in the book’s final section about the ability of the United States to work in partnership with the Soviet Union toward the goal of world peace and the abolition of war strikes present-day readers as somewhat naïve, it must be kept in mind that the book was written in 1948, most likely before the Berlin Airlift and before the Russians exploded their first A-Bomb.
The qualities of spirit, intellect and personality which made Eisenhower so well liked and helped propel him to the Presidency in 1952 and 1956 are amply on display in this book.
Highly recommended!
**** review by Chuck Graham ****
Dwight Eisenhower’s purpose in writing this book was not to provide a day-by-day, battle-by-battle account of the European conflict. Rather, in chronicling the invasions of North Africa, Sicily and Italy, Operation Overlord, the Battle of the Bulge and the final onslaught into Germany, it was to provide insight into his personality, responsibilities, relationships and thought processes as Supreme Commander. He does not engage in self-aggrandizement, making excuses for mistakes, or self-justification; instead, he gives readers a behind-the-scenes look at what a tremendous undertaking it was to plan the strategy, tactics, immensely complicated logistics, and long-range goals of the war. At the same time he shows how those at the highest levels of command also had to deal with issues of personnel, politics, diplomacy, and often-conflicting systems of values and governmental philosophy and operation between the nations of the Western Alliance, and how the Soviet Union was so different from the Alliance that it required an entire set of attitudes and procedures all unto itself. And all these factors had to be dealt with simultaneously!
Eisenhower was slow to anger and even-tempered and possessed a remarkable sense of fairness and equanimity, which enabled him to work successfully (more or less!) with such contrasting personalities as Winston Churchill, George Patton and Marshal Zhukov; but he also exhibited a strong sense of righteous indignation and moral outrage, as when he visited Nazi concentration camps and saw the horrors that had been perpetrated upon the hapless inmates. This strengthened his determination to demand nothing less than unconditional surrender from the Nazi high command. His sense of satisfaction and fulfillment at seeing General Jodl sign the surrender document at Reims on May 7, 1945, officially ending the war, is perhaps the book’s high point.
He does perhaps gloss over the magnitude of the Allied defeats at Kasserine Pass and in Operation Market Garden, as well as the degree to which the Allies had their backs to the wall during the opening days of the Battle of the Bulge; but he takes responsibility as Supreme Commander for all strategic and tactical mistakes, such as the reliance on green, inexperienced troops at the former (not that there was much choice in February 1943!), and faulty intelligence and overconfidence in the underestimating of German strength and willingness to fight in the battles of late 1944. (And, although it is not mentioned in this book, he even prepared a press release to be issued in case the Normandy invasion failed, taking responsibility for that as well and announcing the withdrawal of the troops.) And if the optimism he exhibits in the book’s final section about the ability of the United States to work in partnership with the Soviet Union toward the goal of world peace and the abolition of war strikes present-day readers as somewhat naïve, it must be kept in mind that the book was written in 1948, most likely before the Berlin Airlift and before the Russians exploded their first A-Bomb.
The qualities of spirit, intellect and personality which made Eisenhower so well liked and helped propel him to the Presidency in 1952 and 1956 are amply on display in this book.
Highly recommended!
**** review by Chuck Graham ****
July 24, 2017
Should be required reading in high schools and universities
The description of battles is not the primary focus. The book is about the political and military personalities, the political and economic considerations, the benefits and problems of press coverage, risk management, planning and preparation, limitations of material and transportation, the justification of risking lives, military vs. social issues, the impossibility of knowing everything and always being right, individual efforts (from generals to troops), the consequences of weather, seasonal considerations, the importance of unified command, team building, and morale. Morale is critical, requiring many factors and constant effort.
It is the fleshed out, rounded picture of war and people that makes it interesting. Of course, he is an politically astute, or he would not have been able to do the job; so, he doesn't really give the dirt on people even while indicating problems.
He fully understands the critical issues of logistics and the productive capacity of a nation at war. (For an even deeper understanding of this, and how it fails under dictatorships from ancient Sparta and Rome to modern Germany and Japan, see the chapter, "The Energy Circuit in Wartime," in Paterson's "The God of the Machine.")
Given the various failures and miscalculations of large operations, the reader can easily imagine that given the attitudes of modern press coverage of Iraq by shallow minded news anchors and politicians, neither Eisenhower, nor Bradly, nor Montgomery, nor Patton would have been able to keep their jobs.
One lesson: It takes months, even years to properly plan and prepare for major military operations, depending on the strength of the enemy. In this case, from the need to design and build new types of landing craft to the need for feeding the civilians of Europe.
The description of battles is not the primary focus. The book is about the political and military personalities, the political and economic considerations, the benefits and problems of press coverage, risk management, planning and preparation, limitations of material and transportation, the justification of risking lives, military vs. social issues, the impossibility of knowing everything and always being right, individual efforts (from generals to troops), the consequences of weather, seasonal considerations, the importance of unified command, team building, and morale. Morale is critical, requiring many factors and constant effort.
It is the fleshed out, rounded picture of war and people that makes it interesting. Of course, he is an politically astute, or he would not have been able to do the job; so, he doesn't really give the dirt on people even while indicating problems.
He fully understands the critical issues of logistics and the productive capacity of a nation at war. (For an even deeper understanding of this, and how it fails under dictatorships from ancient Sparta and Rome to modern Germany and Japan, see the chapter, "The Energy Circuit in Wartime," in Paterson's "The God of the Machine.")
Given the various failures and miscalculations of large operations, the reader can easily imagine that given the attitudes of modern press coverage of Iraq by shallow minded news anchors and politicians, neither Eisenhower, nor Bradly, nor Montgomery, nor Patton would have been able to keep their jobs.
One lesson: It takes months, even years to properly plan and prepare for major military operations, depending on the strength of the enemy. In this case, from the need to design and build new types of landing craft to the need for feeding the civilians of Europe.
July 20, 2020
З цієї книги я прочитав розділи 5-8, які присвячені кампанії в Марокко, Алжирі та Тунісі.
Набагато інформативніше, ніж мемуари Паттона Война, какой я ее знал. Ейзенгауер вже не відчуває тиску цензури, а тому подає багато цікавих деталей.
Втім, з цих мемуарів стає ясно, що Айк був більше політичною фігурою, ніж бойовим генералом: він більше пише про політику, але доволі мало про бойові дії. Але і це цікаво.
По-перше, Айк пояснює, чому саме американець мав очолювати операцію "Торч": через бажання перетягти на свій бік вішистів. А останні дуже не любили англійців, адже після Дюнкерка Великобританія почала війну проти Франції (напади на фр. флот в Європі та Африці, окупація Сирії тощо).
По-друге, Айк показує, як США використовували вішистів, а фактично - легалізовували їх. Навіть якщо ті були одіозними расистами та антисемітами. І головне, що не просто робили їх союзниками в плані контролю території, але й використовували їх війська. Отже, погані вішисти перемогли ще гірших нацистів.
І по-третє, Айк чесно показує всі помилки в кампанії 1942 р., про що більш детально пише Рольф в Кровавая дорога в Тунис. Попри це, в Айка краще описано налагодження стосунків з вішистами.
Набагато інформативніше, ніж мемуари Паттона Война, какой я ее знал. Ейзенгауер вже не відчуває тиску цензури, а тому подає багато цікавих деталей.
Втім, з цих мемуарів стає ясно, що Айк був більше політичною фігурою, ніж бойовим генералом: він більше пише про політику, але доволі мало про бойові дії. Але і це цікаво.
По-перше, Айк пояснює, чому саме американець мав очолювати операцію "Торч": через бажання перетягти на свій бік вішистів. А останні дуже не любили англійців, адже після Дюнкерка Великобританія почала війну проти Франції (напади на фр. флот в Європі та Африці, окупація Сирії тощо).
По-друге, Айк показує, як США використовували вішистів, а фактично - легалізовували їх. Навіть якщо ті були одіозними расистами та антисемітами. І головне, що не просто робили їх союзниками в плані контролю території, але й використовували їх війська. Отже, погані вішисти перемогли ще гірших нацистів.
І по-третє, Айк чесно показує всі помилки в кампанії 1942 р., про що більш детально пише Рольф в Кровавая дорога в Тунис. Попри це, в Айка краще описано налагодження стосунків з вішистами.
March 28, 2023
Who knew? Growing up I envisioned war in general and WWII specifically as a response to aggressive and destructive actions of an egomaniacal, cruel-hearted, evil dictator with an insatiable appetite for power and territory over which to rule.
Typically, the response took the form of gathering a horde of its citizens and send them to a training center where they were given a short haircut, uniform, rifle, gas mask, and other such small miscellaneous articles to enhance their effectiveness and safety. Here they were taught how to use and maintain said equipment, given instruction in hand-to-hand combat, and indoctrinated to a system of strict discipline. This experience of mutual hardships upon these recruits instills a true esprit de corps.
Upon completion of training they are shipped to the battlefield where despite the incompetency of the politicians and commanders they miraculously overcome the enemy because not only are their leaders evil, they are even more incompetent. After all ‘Right makes Might’.
Well DDE’s ‘Crusade in Europe’ dispels this notion and very clearly sets forth the incredible amount of strategic and logistic planning, the political challenges, and production/manufacturing needs, and innovation that are crucial to achieve victory. I found the writing clear and crisp and it’s presentation interesting enough to keep the pages turning. George Marshall made an excellent decision when he set his hopes on Ike’s broad soldiers. This is essential reading for anybody interested in WWII. 5 stars.
Typically, the response took the form of gathering a horde of its citizens and send them to a training center where they were given a short haircut, uniform, rifle, gas mask, and other such small miscellaneous articles to enhance their effectiveness and safety. Here they were taught how to use and maintain said equipment, given instruction in hand-to-hand combat, and indoctrinated to a system of strict discipline. This experience of mutual hardships upon these recruits instills a true esprit de corps.
Upon completion of training they are shipped to the battlefield where despite the incompetency of the politicians and commanders they miraculously overcome the enemy because not only are their leaders evil, they are even more incompetent. After all ‘Right makes Might’.
Well DDE’s ‘Crusade in Europe’ dispels this notion and very clearly sets forth the incredible amount of strategic and logistic planning, the political challenges, and production/manufacturing needs, and innovation that are crucial to achieve victory. I found the writing clear and crisp and it’s presentation interesting enough to keep the pages turning. George Marshall made an excellent decision when he set his hopes on Ike’s broad soldiers. This is essential reading for anybody interested in WWII. 5 stars.
February 28, 2025
Made it through this detailed descriptive memoir. This is a WWII buff's ideal read. Battles are detailed (named, placed, described). Leaders military and political, places and maps abound. I appreciate the index as much as the maps.
I think it's possible through this book to get an idea of the world situation in 1940's planet earth. Indeed all the major continents were pulled into this conflict by men, materials, land, or resources.
Also, it depicts one the last really 'great' military heroes of conventional warfare. They don't 'make' generals like they used to! This is apparent going forward in history owing to different technologies and well, new ways of waging conflict. I don't think there'll ever be heroes like 'Ike', George Patton, Omar Bradley, Marshall. The 'enemy' was a clear and formidable challenge in WWII. There was unprecedented cooperation (well for the most part!) among the Allied forces. This 20th century hero, Ike, exhibited what it takes to lead, to own responsibility, to plan and yet be flexible, and to be focused more on overall outcome vs personal greatness.
Finally, the final chapters address some the splits in the unity of the 'world at peace at last'. Eisenhower presents an honest assessment of the direction Russia appeared to be heading as the world moved into the 1950's. Interesting how much things have changed and simultaneously how concerns back then are worrisome now.
I think it's possible through this book to get an idea of the world situation in 1940's planet earth. Indeed all the major continents were pulled into this conflict by men, materials, land, or resources.
Also, it depicts one the last really 'great' military heroes of conventional warfare. They don't 'make' generals like they used to! This is apparent going forward in history owing to different technologies and well, new ways of waging conflict. I don't think there'll ever be heroes like 'Ike', George Patton, Omar Bradley, Marshall. The 'enemy' was a clear and formidable challenge in WWII. There was unprecedented cooperation (well for the most part!) among the Allied forces. This 20th century hero, Ike, exhibited what it takes to lead, to own responsibility, to plan and yet be flexible, and to be focused more on overall outcome vs personal greatness.
Finally, the final chapters address some the splits in the unity of the 'world at peace at last'. Eisenhower presents an honest assessment of the direction Russia appeared to be heading as the world moved into the 1950's. Interesting how much things have changed and simultaneously how concerns back then are worrisome now.
April 3, 2018
This memoir by Dwight Eisenhower tells his story of his experience during WW II. He begins with an assessment of the condition of American military forces on the eve of war. He details the reasons for weak and ill prepared condition of our armed forces. Ike shows how forces, both political and military, tried to get us ready to fight a war. It wasn't until after Pearl Harbor that the US had to catch up to the Axis Powers and do it quickly. Ike takes us through the steps of mobilization of not only our manpower but also converting the economy to a war footing.
We then follow the career of Eisenhower from being part of the general staff in Washington to commander of the forces that invaded Africa in 1942. From there we follow Ike to Sicily and the landings in Italy. With the results of these campaigns, Ike is named supreme commander for the cross channel invasion of Europe. Ike not only describes the military decisions, but also the delicate political decisions that had to be made. Strategic decisions had to be planned as well as supply problems of keeping the fighting forces supplied with the necessities to fight. Ike tells the reader of the invention of and development of the equipment needed to win. The efforts of the medical personnel is also described.
Ike gives the reader a inside look of what it took to win the war.
We then follow the career of Eisenhower from being part of the general staff in Washington to commander of the forces that invaded Africa in 1942. From there we follow Ike to Sicily and the landings in Italy. With the results of these campaigns, Ike is named supreme commander for the cross channel invasion of Europe. Ike not only describes the military decisions, but also the delicate political decisions that had to be made. Strategic decisions had to be planned as well as supply problems of keeping the fighting forces supplied with the necessities to fight. Ike tells the reader of the invention of and development of the equipment needed to win. The efforts of the medical personnel is also described.
Ike gives the reader a inside look of what it took to win the war.
February 15, 2021
كتاب يشرح تكتيكات حربية أكثر منه يوميات، كتبه القائد الأعلى لقوات الحلفاء في أوروبا أثناء الحرب العالمية الثانية والرئيس السابق للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية دوايت ايزنهاور.
كثيف التفاصيل، هذا ما يمكن أن يتصف به الكتاب، بداية من هجوم اليابان على بيرل هاربر ودخول الولايات الحرب، مرورًا بالحملة الإفريقية وهزيمة الألمان في تونس، وأخيرًا تفاصيل هامة عن تخطيط إنزال النورماندي الضخم الذي كان بداية النهاية لألمانيا النازية التي وضعت للحرب العالمية الثانية أوزارها.
تفاصيل توضح كيف يفكر القادة العسكريون في وقت تقع على عاتقهم مسؤولية أرواح بشر يقاتلون من أجل وجودهم، فمهما كان رأي أي أحد، لا يُنكر أن ألمانيا النازية الهتلرية من أسوأ أنظمة الحكم الفاشي في التاريخ، وعلى الرغم من كفاءة آلة الحرب النازية، إلا أن روح واحدة أُزهقت أثناء الحرب لا يساوي بجانبها أيّ أهداف إستعمارية يحلم بها أكثر قادة التاريخ جنونًا وعنصرية.
تعتقد بكسب المجد على حساب دم الشبان فإني أقول لك أنه لا يوجد مجد يضاهي بقيمته ما يسفك من دماء لأجله.
ليست الحرب إلا إمتدادًا لوجهة سياسية واسطتها القوة لا الكلام.
يجب أن نتذكر أن هناك بون شاسع بين الحذر والجبن، كما أن هناك بون بين الشجاعة والتهور.
وليس بعيدًا أن الخوف، الخوف من الفناء والزوال سينجح في وضع حدٍّ للحروب أكثر مما تنجح محاولات أرباب السياسة والدبلوماسية حتى والدين نفسه.
November 16, 2020
لقد قاد مؤلف هذا الكتاب قوات التحالف للنصر في الحرب العالمية الثانية ولم تتوقف إنجازاته هناك بل ترشح لاحقًا لرئاسة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وفاز بها، لذا أرى أنه من المهم لكل شخص مُهتم بالحرب العالمية الثانية قراءة هذا الكتاب،
وذلك لأن الحرب العالمية الثانية غيرت وجه العالم كُليًا ولقد قرر المنتصرون كيفما سيكون النظام العالمي الجديد، والمثير في هذا الكتاب هو أنه يُرينا نظرة مختلفة للشخص الذي قاد النصر.
فمما أعجبني فالكتاب هو أنه أعطانا نظرة داخلية لمجرى العمليات اللي حصلت ويشرح لنا ايزنهاور أسبابه لإتخاذ بعض القرارت مبينًا لنا وجهة نظره ووجهة نظر من خالفوه وقتها،
وجعلني الكتاب أدرك بعض الأمور التي كنت أجهلها كعدم جاهزية الولايات المتحدة للدخول فالحرب وعدم رغبة الكثير من الأمريكان في دخول الحرب من الأساس كونها بنظرهم حرب أوروبية لا علاقة لهم بها،
والكتاب يستحق القراءة لمجرد كونه مذكرات قائد أكبر حملة عسكرية فالتاريخ، لكن إن لم تكن مهتم بالحرب العالمية الثانية او الموضوع جديد عليك وتريد البدء فالقراءة عنها فهذا الكتاب ليس لك كونه يحتوي على الكثير من التفاصيل ولا يتحدث عن الحرب إلا من وجهة نظر واحدة.
أما للأشخاص الشغوفين بالحرب فهو كتاب يستحق القراءة، ملاحظة أخيرة نسختي من الكتاب أظنها النسخة العربية الوحيدة وهي من دار الرافدين للأسف احتوت على الكثير جدا من الأخطاء الإملائية لكن أتمنى علاجها في النسخ الجديدة.
وذلك لأن الحرب العالمية الثانية غيرت وجه العالم كُليًا ولقد قرر المنتصرون كيفما سيكون النظام العالمي الجديد، والمثير في هذا الكتاب هو أنه يُرينا نظرة مختلفة للشخص الذي قاد النصر.
فمما أعجبني فالكتاب هو أنه أعطانا نظرة داخلية لمجرى العمليات اللي حصلت ويشرح لنا ايزنهاور أسبابه لإتخاذ بعض القرارت مبينًا لنا وجهة نظره ووجهة نظر من خالفوه وقتها،
وجعلني الكتاب أدرك بعض الأمور التي كنت أجهلها كعدم جاهزية الولايات المتحدة للدخول فالحرب وعدم رغبة الكثير من الأمريكان في دخول الحرب من الأساس كونها بنظرهم حرب أوروبية لا علاقة لهم بها،
والكتاب يستحق القراءة لمجرد كونه مذكرات قائد أكبر حملة عسكرية فالتاريخ، لكن إن لم تكن مهتم بالحرب العالمية الثانية او الموضوع جديد عليك وتريد البدء فالقراءة عنها فهذا الكتاب ليس لك كونه يحتوي على الكثير من التفاصيل ولا يتحدث عن الحرب إلا من وجهة نظر واحدة.
أما للأشخاص الشغوفين بالحرب فهو كتاب يستحق القراءة، ملاحظة أخيرة نسختي من الكتاب أظنها النسخة العربية الوحيدة وهي من دار الرافدين للأسف احتوت على الكثير جدا من الأخطاء الإملائية لكن أتمنى علاجها في النسخ الجديدة.
April 6, 2023
very good story of Ike’s views and actions from just before the war til just after
I enjoyed the book and it was written in a reader’s digest, easy to read style. He did mention during the book he had to paraphrase messages he reproduced in the text for code security. This seems a little excessive especially for msgs that were five and six years old but after 29 years in the USAF nothing stupid from security surprises me. Also as is well known now he left out a lot of items that were deep classified then but since declassified such as ULTRA and the details on the Bari incident.
I especially liked his description of interactions with political leaders at all levels and working with Allies. I also liked his description of motivating our own men especially explaining why they are fighting and frequent unit visits by senior leaders. I can say that in general this practice is not done today. And I speak from participation in various armed festivities over my 29 years of service. Also as does Churchill in his works he refrains from speaking ill of his fellow leaders both political and military.
At any rate the book is a fun and enlightening read. I enjoyed the book and if you are interested in this phase of US history I highly recommend the book.
I enjoyed the book and it was written in a reader’s digest, easy to read style. He did mention during the book he had to paraphrase messages he reproduced in the text for code security. This seems a little excessive especially for msgs that were five and six years old but after 29 years in the USAF nothing stupid from security surprises me. Also as is well known now he left out a lot of items that were deep classified then but since declassified such as ULTRA and the details on the Bari incident.
I especially liked his description of interactions with political leaders at all levels and working with Allies. I also liked his description of motivating our own men especially explaining why they are fighting and frequent unit visits by senior leaders. I can say that in general this practice is not done today. And I speak from participation in various armed festivities over my 29 years of service. Also as does Churchill in his works he refrains from speaking ill of his fellow leaders both political and military.
At any rate the book is a fun and enlightening read. I enjoyed the book and if you are interested in this phase of US history I highly recommend the book.
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