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Ruská kocovina: Putinův svět a přízraky minulosti
Rozpad sovětského světa vedl v Rusku k dlouhé a bezvýchodné kocovině, na niž Putinův režim aplikoval jednoduchý lék: Národní hrdost. Téma vítězství ve Velké vlastenecké válce však přináší mnohá nebezpečí spojená s temnými proudy dějin. Cílené manipulaci podléhá historie vzdálenější i nedávná. Do pozitivního obrazu Ruska se nehodí vzpomínky na Stalinovy oběti, Gulag či deportace, ale mizí také pravda o čečenské válce, o olympiádě v Soči nebo o Krymu. Čím víc se Rusko upíná k minulosti, tím víc si zavírá cestu k solidní vizi budoucnosti a reálnému řešení problémů. Reportér Shaun Walker se nezaměřuje jen na Putinovu politiku. Navštívil různé kouty rozlehlé ruské říše a přinesl zprávu o ztracené generaci: Svůj stát ztratily miliony Rusů, kterým se politici dokola snaží navrátit smysl života a pocit sebeurčení, třeba i metodami naprosto cynickými.
„Investigativní reportéři jsou hrdinové naší doby postmoderních mýtů. Shaun Walker odvedl nejen těžkou a potřebnou práci reportéra v Rusku a na Ukrajině, ale s nevšední historickou a literární vnímavostí se také zamyslel, co to znamená, když moc úplně rezignuje na svou budoucnost a místo toho nabídne minulost jako zboží.“
-- Timothy Snyder, autor knih Krvavé země a Tyranie
„Investigativní reportéři jsou hrdinové naší doby postmoderních mýtů. Shaun Walker odvedl nejen těžkou a potřebnou práci reportéra v Rusku a na Ukrajině, ale s nevšední historickou a literární vnímavostí se také zamyslel, co to znamená, když moc úplně rezignuje na svou budoucnost a místo toho nabídne minulost jako zboží.“
-- Timothy Snyder, autor knih Krvavé země a Tyranie
336 pages, Hardcover
First published December 1, 2017
79 people are currently reading
1470 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 125 reviews
April 18, 2022
Found a lot of audiobooks about Russia and about Putin and was a little unsure which one to pick up first but I think this was a great place to start. Gave a good overview (at least I think so) over Russia over time and gave a lot of interesting information. Woke up an interested to learn more
November 20, 2018
I had been expecting more about how Russia created Putin, and how Putin manipulated that to his own advantage, which covered in the first section of the book. However, much of the story has to do with the author's on-the-scene experience in Chechnya and Crimea. I'm afraid I came to the conclusion that the "Putin" aspect served as clickbait for those reminiscences, which proved rather deep-in-the-weeds for me. So, I wouldn't say it's one for a general reader looking for post-Soviet background. Audio narration was fine.
March 17, 2018
It is kinda my hobby to look for malarkey in books on modern Russia, Ukraine, the war in Ukraine - you name it. Almost none was found here even though I stayed vigilant and alert through all the 270 pages. There was one place, however, where Shaun Walker got lost in his liberal views on Ukrainian nationalism and sort of started contradicting himself. See if you can spot it; I won't spoil here.
All in all, can't recommend this book enough if you want to know the following:
1. Who is Putin?
2. Why is he such a mean little thing?
3. Who started it in Ukraine?
Language and writing--you can't ask for more.
All in all, can't recommend this book enough if you want to know the following:
1. Who is Putin?
2. Why is he such a mean little thing?
3. Who started it in Ukraine?
Language and writing--you can't ask for more.
February 23, 2018
In this accessible and jargon-free exploration of contemporary Russia and the rise of Putin, who has so expertly manipulated the nation’s sense of identity by emphasising Russia’s victory in the Second World War, the author provides an insightful and comprehensible window into the Russian psyche. He knows Russia well and has a firm grasp of how ordinary Russians view the world. His first-hand knowledge of the country gives authority to the book, and it’s a clear-sighted and comprehensive attempt to explain Putin and the country he rules so successfully. I found the examination of the situation in Ukraine particularly useful and I now understand the conflict there much more fully. Walker’s journalistic skills allowed him to gain the confidence of many interviewees throughout the country, thus gathering many points of view and enabling him to give a balanced and thorough account. Essential reading for anyone interested in modern Russia.
January 19, 2022
This book is a great introductory read to Russian politics and its recent history. Overall, a very enjoyable and accessible reading experience. The book is a great introductory read to Russian politics and its recent history.
Shaun Walker paints a very broad picture of Putin’s Russia and manages to paint the backdrop of why and how Putin is in power. The author mostly focuses on regions within Russia’s sphere of influence, so the title can be a little misleading.
The best thing about this book is the format of storytelling. He manages to weave through his personal experiences as an investigative journalist and this really brought more value to the story.
Shaun Walker paints a very broad picture of Putin’s Russia and manages to paint the backdrop of why and how Putin is in power. The author mostly focuses on regions within Russia’s sphere of influence, so the title can be a little misleading.
The best thing about this book is the format of storytelling. He manages to weave through his personal experiences as an investigative journalist and this really brought more value to the story.
March 11, 2022
I liked the book a lot. It is a (foreign) journalist's account of the Russian life and mindset: insightful, well paced, witty.
Loved the many interviews, especially the ones with the Russian separatists in Ukraine, because yes, a large part of the book talks about the war in Ukraine: how it all started and what were the reasons in Russia's history that brought us to this point.
It might not be too shocking or new to those of us living next to Russia who read about all this daily from the papers and have maybe better access to books from Russian authors about all this, but still a very good read, and I would for sure suggest it! Especially to people who are not super well informed about the beginnings of the Ukrainian war and feel like they want to understand Putin's way of thinking a little better.
All in all I think it is a great book.
Loved the many interviews, especially the ones with the Russian separatists in Ukraine, because yes, a large part of the book talks about the war in Ukraine: how it all started and what were the reasons in Russia's history that brought us to this point.
It might not be too shocking or new to those of us living next to Russia who read about all this daily from the papers and have maybe better access to books from Russian authors about all this, but still a very good read, and I would for sure suggest it! Especially to people who are not super well informed about the beginnings of the Ukrainian war and feel like they want to understand Putin's way of thinking a little better.
All in all I think it is a great book.
August 1, 2022
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 produced tremendous corruption, poverty, lawlessness, food and other consumer goods shortages, among many other negative occurrences. These aspects that are normally discussed when dealing with decade of the 1990s, however, there is another major circumstance that needs to be stressed, the loss of identity. Former Soviet citizens and soldiers immediately lost their affiliation to the only country they had known and asked themselves, “who are they?” Since 1991 people were required to reformat their view of national ideology, the geopolitical balance, and for over 250 million people their psychological makeup. The result people was that were ripe for manipulation to fill the void of their loss of identity with the passing of the Soviet Union. Shaun Walker’s book THE LONG HANGOVER: PUTIN’S NEW RUSSIA AND THE GHOSTS OF THE PAST explores how Vladimir Putin attempted to fill that void and “forge a new sense of nation and purpose in Russia.”
As the Moscow correspondent to the Guardian holding a command of the Russian language, Walker has the sources and language skills to present a concise and searing argument that will allow the reader to acquire a true understanding of the underpinnings of Putin’s propaganda when applied to the February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine. Though written in 2018, the narrative presents a clear argument that is difficult to find fault with. The focal point of Walker’s book centers around Putin’s strategy of turning the Russian people toward World War II, the Great Patriotic War as a means of reuniting the Russian people and gaining support for his imperial ambitions. In order to accomplish this Putin, Walker argues, must eradicate certain historically factual events from the pre-war and war periods that do not reflect very highly on Joseph Stalin and the former Soviet Union. The need to create “willful amnesia” among Stalin and Putin’s victims was required. In Walker’s account the concept has been applied extensively and effectively.
Walker clearly describes the tableau of the 1990s concluding with Boris Yeltsin’s resignation in December 1999 and the failure of the “decade of democracy.” As people lost their savings and pensions, dealt with the Chechen war and terrorism it created a yearning for stability and normalcy. Despite the fact that oil prices increased in 2004 resulting in a promising standard of living in the major cities, the vast majority of people living in towns and the countryside across Russia’s Eurasian land mass, poverty, drugs, addiction, and disease remained pervasive. Putin believed that the poverty and divisions were a symptom of a broader malaise. For Putin, the health of the state was most important and if Russia’s station in the world could be regained, people’s well-being would automatically improve. Putin was tapping into the long held Russian political creed that fetishized the strength of the state and sovereignty.
In all of Russian history there has been only one event that could catalyze Russian unity and create the foundation to bring the country together – the victory in World War II. Walker concludes that “pride in the defeat of Nazism transcended political allegiance, generation, or economic status, and had been used by later Soviet leaders to cement the regime’s legitimacy. Putin would once again draw on the war victory as the key to creating a consolidated, patriotic country.”
From the outset Putin had to deal with the “truths” about the pre-war and war periods unleashed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. With archives opened people began questioning certain events; i.e., the Nazi-Soviet Pact and its side agreements to seize half of Poland and other areas; Stalin’s purges of the 1930s which included the officer class reducing the effectiveness of the Soviet military at the outset of the war which led to disaster throughout 1941; admission to the Katyn Forest Massacre of Polish officers; and the massive deportations that took place in the east. Nationalities like the Kalmyks, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, ethnic Germans and other smaller groups were deported to central Asia and Siberia. This involved thousands of soldiers when the war was not going well, but it was a priority for Stalin. If Putin’s narrative of the Great Patriotic War was to be accepted, many of Stalin’s actions and the plight of the deported nationalities had to remain unexplored and forgotten.
The rhetoric Walker describes reflects an amazing campaign of misinformation and warnings about what was to be believed and what was to be whitewashed. Even the meaning of “Victory Day” was altered as “under Putin gradually but inexorably the day became less about remembering the war dead and honoring the survivors, and more about projecting the military might of contemporary Russia. The message was one of unity, around the idea of a resurgent victorious nation,” especially after the successful invasion of Georgia in 2008.
In describing how this was achieved Walker travels throughout the Gulag and interviews survivors of the prison system and family members who know what happened to relatives. Interviews and travel with people like Olga Gureyva who spent years in the island prison of Kolyma, arrested at 17, spent over a decade in captivity working in freezing tin mines; Petr Nechiporenko, a Professor at Kiev State University who fought for the Bolsheviks in the Civil War but was arrested and accused of being a fascist terrorist who was turned in by colleagues and killed; Eveniya Ginzburg, the Russian writer and Gulag chronicler is arrested and sent to prison as a supposed Nazi terrorist for over a decade, just scrape the surface of the thousands upon thousands imprisoned and died in the Gulag. But people like Walker’s guide, Ivan Panikarov who built a museum in his own home describing the Gulag argued that Stalin’s crimes may have been necessary to industrialize and defeat the Nazis. Many of the people who Walker interviewed wanted to forget the past and move on as it just hindered the development of a strong Russia. Walker’s description of what they wanted to forget is in line with historians like Robert Conquest and Amy Knight, along with Russian writers Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Vasily Grossman.
Walker mentions an interesting point that although Nikita Khrushchev’s De Stalinization speech of February 1956 created hopes of a more liberal Russia, he focused on the crimes of the Communist Party, and the vast network of camps was never discussed publicly. Walker also asks an important question; was everyone guilty in perpetuating the system? He concludes that there “were many varying shades of guilt and innocence. But almost everyone was at least partially a victim, almost everyone was at least partially a perpetrator.”
Putin’s strategy helped create a feeling of victimhood and martyrdom which would be offset by his perception of a successful Winter Olympics at Sochi, coming to terms with the Chechens after two wars and numerous terrorist attacks, and the successful invasion of Georgia in 2008 when Ukrainian president Mikheil Saakashvili decided to join the European Union and turned down a trade arrangement with Moscow, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Western media attacks assisted Putin in creating the narrative that the west wanted to blunt any attempt by Russia to return to greatness. Putin turned loose his domestic media to carry his message and the FSB and company made sure that protest and the wrong mind set would not get out of control.
The latter half of the narrative focuses on the evolving conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014. He zeroes in on Kyiv’s Euromaidan protests, the annexation of Crimea, and the eruption of further conflict in the industrial Donbass region. The developing conflict between Ukrainian and Russian identity is presented within an excellent historical perspective and analysis.
If one examines Putin’s justification for invading the Ukraine on February 24th of this year it is clear he is turning to the Great Patriotic War as he accused the Kyiv regime of being made up of Nazis that had to be rooted out, and Ukraine was not a country because it was part of Russia and wanted to be reunited with its countrymen.
Walker has written a well-researched, provocative, and insightful book whose arguments seem accurate. He uses the voices of authentic everyday Russians to tell his story. He is careful to avoid viewing the west as morally superior. Further, he provides a clear picture of Putin’s mindset and how he recaptured the faith of the Russian people in the state as well as in his leadership. In Putin’s mind he has created a mindset for a whole new generation of Russians who will continue to influence the collective Russian psyche long after Putin finally leaves the Kremlin. In the final analysis it is clear that though Walker authored his book in 2018, he foresaw the events of 2022 which are playing out in front of our eyes.
As the Moscow correspondent to the Guardian holding a command of the Russian language, Walker has the sources and language skills to present a concise and searing argument that will allow the reader to acquire a true understanding of the underpinnings of Putin’s propaganda when applied to the February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine. Though written in 2018, the narrative presents a clear argument that is difficult to find fault with. The focal point of Walker’s book centers around Putin’s strategy of turning the Russian people toward World War II, the Great Patriotic War as a means of reuniting the Russian people and gaining support for his imperial ambitions. In order to accomplish this Putin, Walker argues, must eradicate certain historically factual events from the pre-war and war periods that do not reflect very highly on Joseph Stalin and the former Soviet Union. The need to create “willful amnesia” among Stalin and Putin’s victims was required. In Walker’s account the concept has been applied extensively and effectively.
Walker clearly describes the tableau of the 1990s concluding with Boris Yeltsin’s resignation in December 1999 and the failure of the “decade of democracy.” As people lost their savings and pensions, dealt with the Chechen war and terrorism it created a yearning for stability and normalcy. Despite the fact that oil prices increased in 2004 resulting in a promising standard of living in the major cities, the vast majority of people living in towns and the countryside across Russia’s Eurasian land mass, poverty, drugs, addiction, and disease remained pervasive. Putin believed that the poverty and divisions were a symptom of a broader malaise. For Putin, the health of the state was most important and if Russia’s station in the world could be regained, people’s well-being would automatically improve. Putin was tapping into the long held Russian political creed that fetishized the strength of the state and sovereignty.
In all of Russian history there has been only one event that could catalyze Russian unity and create the foundation to bring the country together – the victory in World War II. Walker concludes that “pride in the defeat of Nazism transcended political allegiance, generation, or economic status, and had been used by later Soviet leaders to cement the regime’s legitimacy. Putin would once again draw on the war victory as the key to creating a consolidated, patriotic country.”
From the outset Putin had to deal with the “truths” about the pre-war and war periods unleashed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. With archives opened people began questioning certain events; i.e., the Nazi-Soviet Pact and its side agreements to seize half of Poland and other areas; Stalin’s purges of the 1930s which included the officer class reducing the effectiveness of the Soviet military at the outset of the war which led to disaster throughout 1941; admission to the Katyn Forest Massacre of Polish officers; and the massive deportations that took place in the east. Nationalities like the Kalmyks, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, ethnic Germans and other smaller groups were deported to central Asia and Siberia. This involved thousands of soldiers when the war was not going well, but it was a priority for Stalin. If Putin’s narrative of the Great Patriotic War was to be accepted, many of Stalin’s actions and the plight of the deported nationalities had to remain unexplored and forgotten.
The rhetoric Walker describes reflects an amazing campaign of misinformation and warnings about what was to be believed and what was to be whitewashed. Even the meaning of “Victory Day” was altered as “under Putin gradually but inexorably the day became less about remembering the war dead and honoring the survivors, and more about projecting the military might of contemporary Russia. The message was one of unity, around the idea of a resurgent victorious nation,” especially after the successful invasion of Georgia in 2008.
In describing how this was achieved Walker travels throughout the Gulag and interviews survivors of the prison system and family members who know what happened to relatives. Interviews and travel with people like Olga Gureyva who spent years in the island prison of Kolyma, arrested at 17, spent over a decade in captivity working in freezing tin mines; Petr Nechiporenko, a Professor at Kiev State University who fought for the Bolsheviks in the Civil War but was arrested and accused of being a fascist terrorist who was turned in by colleagues and killed; Eveniya Ginzburg, the Russian writer and Gulag chronicler is arrested and sent to prison as a supposed Nazi terrorist for over a decade, just scrape the surface of the thousands upon thousands imprisoned and died in the Gulag. But people like Walker’s guide, Ivan Panikarov who built a museum in his own home describing the Gulag argued that Stalin’s crimes may have been necessary to industrialize and defeat the Nazis. Many of the people who Walker interviewed wanted to forget the past and move on as it just hindered the development of a strong Russia. Walker’s description of what they wanted to forget is in line with historians like Robert Conquest and Amy Knight, along with Russian writers Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Vasily Grossman.
Walker mentions an interesting point that although Nikita Khrushchev’s De Stalinization speech of February 1956 created hopes of a more liberal Russia, he focused on the crimes of the Communist Party, and the vast network of camps was never discussed publicly. Walker also asks an important question; was everyone guilty in perpetuating the system? He concludes that there “were many varying shades of guilt and innocence. But almost everyone was at least partially a victim, almost everyone was at least partially a perpetrator.”
Putin’s strategy helped create a feeling of victimhood and martyrdom which would be offset by his perception of a successful Winter Olympics at Sochi, coming to terms with the Chechens after two wars and numerous terrorist attacks, and the successful invasion of Georgia in 2008 when Ukrainian president Mikheil Saakashvili decided to join the European Union and turned down a trade arrangement with Moscow, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Western media attacks assisted Putin in creating the narrative that the west wanted to blunt any attempt by Russia to return to greatness. Putin turned loose his domestic media to carry his message and the FSB and company made sure that protest and the wrong mind set would not get out of control.
The latter half of the narrative focuses on the evolving conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014. He zeroes in on Kyiv’s Euromaidan protests, the annexation of Crimea, and the eruption of further conflict in the industrial Donbass region. The developing conflict between Ukrainian and Russian identity is presented within an excellent historical perspective and analysis.
If one examines Putin’s justification for invading the Ukraine on February 24th of this year it is clear he is turning to the Great Patriotic War as he accused the Kyiv regime of being made up of Nazis that had to be rooted out, and Ukraine was not a country because it was part of Russia and wanted to be reunited with its countrymen.
Walker has written a well-researched, provocative, and insightful book whose arguments seem accurate. He uses the voices of authentic everyday Russians to tell his story. He is careful to avoid viewing the west as morally superior. Further, he provides a clear picture of Putin’s mindset and how he recaptured the faith of the Russian people in the state as well as in his leadership. In Putin’s mind he has created a mindset for a whole new generation of Russians who will continue to influence the collective Russian psyche long after Putin finally leaves the Kremlin. In the final analysis it is clear that though Walker authored his book in 2018, he foresaw the events of 2022 which are playing out in front of our eyes.
March 7, 2023
As someone with relatively no knowledge of the USSR or modern day Russia, I came away from this book with a much more informed idea of the history of the region. (Not to say I’m an expert by any means.) Walker doesn’t hold back from sharing his opinion about the atrocities committed by the Soviets against their own people. But he also gives voice to people with differing views and creates a holistic picture of the different political ideologies and attitudes towards the past. Thoroughly engrossing and relevant. I also recommend the interview Walker did with NPR’s Fresh Air (how I came to read this book to begin with).
December 17, 2019
Bardzo podoba mi się podejście autora: od szczegółu do ogółu. Wiele przeprowadzonych wywiadów i sprawdzonych historii pojedynczych ludzi (analiza szczegółowa) daje autorowi punkt wyjścia do syntezy: jak Rosja (czytaj: Putin) prowadzi politykę historyczną, jak odbudowuje patriotyzm, jak buduje wspólnotę narodową, wokół jakich idei i jakimi środkami.
Wartościowa pozycja.
Wartościowa pozycja.
July 17, 2018
Outstanding modern history of Putin-era Russia by Shaun Walker, journalist at The Guardian who spent the last 10+ years living in and covering Russia and E. Europe. Having read several other modern histories of Russia—such as Pomerantsev's "The Invention of Russia" and Garrels' "Putin Country: A Journey Into The Real Russia," Walker's book is the best, providing both nuance and clarity.
September 6, 2022
Rusko pro mě bylo díky své politice odpudivé. Vadilo mi (z mnoha zjevných důvodů). Nezajímalo mě. Nebylo mi ničím blízké.
To se teď bohužel změnilo a můj „pocit viny, který je typicky západní”(cituju Martina M. Šimečku v podcastovém rozhovoru pro Týdeník Respekt) logicky otřásl mým pohodlným světem. Nutně jsem potřebovala líp pochopit ruské historické souvislosti a politické události.
To se teď bohužel změnilo a můj „pocit viny, který je typicky západní”(cituju Martina M. Šimečku v podcastovém rozhovoru pro Týdeník Respekt) logicky otřásl mým pohodlným světem. Nutně jsem potřebovala líp pochopit ruské historické souvislosti a politické události.
March 15, 2022
Must read dla wszystkich, którzy tak jak ja nie byli na bieżąco ze wschodnią polityką i od początku wojny zachodzili w głowę, co się tej Rosji ubzdurało z tą walką z faszyzmem oraz dla tych, którym się w głowie nie mieści, jak tak wielki naród może być aż tak zmanipulowany. Ten reportaż bardzo kompleksowo podchodzi do tematu relacji Rosji z krajami postsowieckimi, ale środek ciężkości (o ołowianej wadze btw) jest położony na polityce i historii, mniej na socjologii, co mnie w sumie zaskoczyło, bo zasugerowałam się pierwszym członem tytułu.
Read
February 26, 2022mostly a tour of post-Soviet places like Chechnya and Crimea that uncover the mix of nostalgia and grievances that people there, leaders and laymen alike, feel for the USSR and Russia
December 1, 2023
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Мне нужен враг, чтоб обрести покой.
Чтоб все бессмысленное стало объективно,
Чтобы роняло искры за моей спиной
Пожара ненависть черное огниво.
Мне нужен враг, чтоб можно было жить
Спокойно, зная, что он где-то рядом,
Чтоб день со днем сшивала злобы нить,
Чтоб ложь гремела взорванным снарядом.
Во-первых, книга похожа на сборник дополнительных материалов, которые изначально собирались автором для написания статей для газеты «The Guardian». Все представлены в книге истории, друг с другом почти никак не связаны. Во-вторых, где-то половина книги посвящена событиям 2014 года, между РФ и Украиной. Поэтому в какой-то момент книга воспринимается не как книга о путинской России, а как книга о современной Украине. К слову сказать, многим украинцам, скорее всего, не понравится, как автор изобразил их и их страну. В-третьих, почти вся книга основана на интервью, как с гражданами РФ, так и с гражданами Украины.
В книге явно прослеживается идея войны и судьбы человека поставленного в центр этого явления. Книга начинается историями людей, чьи родственники пострадали от сталинских репрессий. Причём для этой цели автор выбрал представителей национальных меньшинств. Далее следует тема чеченской войны через призму отношения к этой войне нынешних чеченцев, в том числе их решение прекратить вооружённое сопротивление. Далее коротко автор опишет дух открытие Олимпиады в Сочи, а дальше будет самая большая тема, которая займёт всю оставшуюся часть книги – военный конфликт между Россией и Украиной в 2014 году (включая события в Крыму).
Книга рассказывает истории людей, которые так или иначе, связаны с военными конфликтами и всем тем, что окружает это страшное слово - «война». Какова цель всего этого? Как я понял автора, целью является показать читателям, что на пространстве Украины и России шла непрекращающаяся война. Сталинские репрессии, в особенности репрессии которые постигли украинское население, которое советское руководство подозревало и в нелояльности и в работе на нацистов (т.е. чтобы быть репрессированным, не обязательно было работать на нацистов). Далее чеченская война с тем же паттерном жестокости как будто Сталин вовсе и не умирал. И далее главная трагедия – военный конфликт России и Украины. Во всех трёх историях, трагедия человека на фоне великих идей. Для кого-то это было сражение за построение прекрасного коммунистического будущего, для других – война за независимость, а для кого-то ещё – война за справедливость. Такое чувство, что у каждого своя правда, и каждый ведёт свою «справедливую» войну. Однако лично я увидел во всех этих войнах за какую-то идею, проигрыш всех.
Истории сталинских репрессий, как их признание, так и их отрицание, абсолютно типичны. Для одних это не заживляющаяся рана, для других – «допустимые потери» необходимые для того чтобы построить «великое» государство. Для одних чеченский вопрос является символом сопротивления метрополии, для других – необходимостью не дать расползтись стране. Для одних Крым является вопросом «исторической справедливости», а для других – вопросом соблюдения международных договоров. Для одних военный конфликт на Донбассе является посягательством на целостность страны, а для других – единственно оставшимся способом сказать «нет» столице. Получается, правы одновременно и все и никто? И да, и нет. Во всех историях можно найти более светлые пятна истории и более тёмные. Так как истории со сталинскими репрессиями и чеченские войны были для меня уже довольно хорошо известны, меня эти разделы книги не слишком увлекли. А вот что меня увлекло, это история, стоящая за конфликтом на Донбассе.
Автор довольно коротко, но ёмко пересказывает всю хронологию событий 2014 года на востоке Украины, включая появление «маленьких зелёных человечков» и последующие события. Интересным тут является только истории связанные с татарским меньшинством в Крыму. Тут автор совершит экскурс в историю, а также как нынешние российские власти решали этот вопрос. Далее – Донбасс. Честно сказать, в тот период я не сильно интересовался этой темой и всю информацию получал из либеральных СМИ, которые все настроены проукраински. Поэтому мне было интересно узнать историю противоположного лагеря. Автор рассказывает, кто такие бандеровцы и что они делали с евреями в период гитлеровской оккупации. Это, конечно, довольно неприятный момент и именно поэтому сегодня либеральные российские СМИ (в изгнании) стараются не замечать эту тему. Возможно, они руководствуются правилом «лож во благо» или просто не хотят трогать такую болезненную тему, так как считают, что иначе они немедленно будут обвинены в поддержке Путина. Если в либеральных российских СМИ поднимается тема Бандеры и того, что многие сегодня в Украине его считают героем, комментаторы говорят что, мол, это дело украинцев и не стоит в это дело влезать. Я так не считаю и с моей точки зрения, либеральные российские СМИ и российские политики должны дать оценку Бандере и прямо заявить, что он ничем не лучше сталинских палачей. Забавно, конечно, что и в России так называемая патриотическая общественность водрузила на свой пьедестал палачей и украинские так называемые патриоты водрузила уже на свой пьедестал палачей. Разница между ними не велика: если одни топили в крови собственных советских граждан, то другие топили в крови евреев и поляков. Это печально, ибо ожидаешь, что люди изменились, а оказывается и те и другие считают, что есть какие-то «великие идеалы», которые оправдывают убийства невинных л��дей. Тут я согласен с Крашенинниковым, который как раз и говорит, что нельзя делать исключения, если ты объявил права человека неприкосновенными. Правда, и в другую крайность тоже не стоит впадать, как это делают российские власти с тем же Бандерой. Со временем популярность Бандеры сведётся к тем же 10-20% процентам, т.е. небольшой группе радикально настроенных людей, которые есть в каждом обществе.
Но главное, что меня заинтересовало, это интервью с сепаратистами из Донбасса. Во-первых, автор начинает с истории вопроса, т.е. какой была жизнь людей все эти годы, на этой территории начиная с 1991 года. Примечательно, что жизнь была очень похожа на жизнь россиян в тот же период времени, т.е. бандитизм, мафия, нищета, появление украинских олигархов и их управление страной. В общем, всё то, что было и в России. И вот на фоне нищеты и бандитского беспредела происходят события в столице, Киеве. Как реагирует на это общество в восточной Украине? За все 30 лет ничего хорошего сделано не было, жизнь только ухудшается, мы хотим назад в СССР, мы наконец-то выбрали «своего президента» (Януковича) и тут какие-то бандеровцы его свергают. Как это выглядит в глазах пророссийских украинцев? Мы терпели вашего прозападного Ющенко, но когда пришёл наш пророссийский Янукович, вы его свергли. Конечно, это вовсе не значит, что взрыв сепаратизма на Донбассе был гарантирован, вовсе нет. Тут я согласен с общепринятым мнением, что если бы не Гиркин, т.е. не открытое вмешательство России, ничего бы не было. Речь идёт о том, что общество на Донбассе было подготовлено для взрыва, т.е. это была бочка с динамитом, к которой нужно было лишь поднести спичку, чтобы всё рвануло. Гиркин и был той спичкой, после которой весь регион взорвался. Безусловно, российская пропаганда также сыграла важную роль. Автор описывает, какие люди пришли к власти. Это была та же матросня, что пришла к власти в России после 1917 года, только без интеллектуалов типа Ленина и Троцкого. В данном случаи это было самое дно общества проживавшего на Донбассе и видевшее во всём новом, угрозу. На Донбассе к власти пришли самые деклассированные элементы. Но они пришли именно потому, что за 30 лет независимой Украины там ничего не было создано. Как в России, которая жила и продолжает жить на том, что осталось от Советского Союза, так и жители Донбасса жили благодаря тому, что досталось от СССР и поэтому видели в СССР надежду. Но Киев рисовал роскошную жизнь при правильно выбранном (европейском) пути, а её всё не было и не было. Вместо этого одни олигархи сменялись другими, но существенных изменений не происходило. Зачем выбирать европейский путь, если он ничего не меняет, а Россия предлагает хотя бы почти что бесплатный газ? Автор пишет о первых жертвах со стороны сепаратистов и то, что украинские войска особо не заморачивались по поводу гибели мирных жителей. Трещина появилась и далее, при поддержке Кремля, она только ширилась. Насколько можно верить этой информации? Я не знаю. Насколько эта ситуация актуальна для 2023? Не знаю. До этого момента я ничего не знал о жизни на Донбассе (возможно, другие книги о Донбассе скажу что-то другое). Может, я ошибаюсь и официальный Киев прав? Может быть и так. Пытаюсь ли я оправдать действия России как в 2014, так и в 2022? Нет, не пытаюсь. Я пытаюсь разобраться, что же произошло в Украине, помимо известных событий (сегодня сделать это почти невозможно, ибо со всех сторон льётся пропаганда, «своя правда»). Как кто-то сказал, не плакать и не смеяться, а – понять.
Firstly, the book is like a collection of supplementary material that was originally collected by the author to write articles for The Guardian. All the stories presented in the book have almost nothing to do with each other. Secondly, half of the book is devoted to the events of 2014 between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Therefore, at some point, the book is perceived not as a book about Putin's Russia but as a book about modern Ukraine. By the way, many Ukrainians will probably not like the way the author portrayed them and their country. Third, almost the entire book is based on interviews with both Russian and Ukrainian citizens.
The book traces the idea of war and the fate of the person at the center of this phenomenon. The book begins with the stories of people whose relatives suffered from Stalin's repressions. The author has chosen representatives of national minorities for this purpose. Then follows the theme of the Chechen war through the prism of the attitudes of present-day Chechens to the war, including their decision to end armed resistance. Next, the author will briefly describe the spirit of the opening of the Sochi Olympics, and then there is the biggest topic that will take up the rest of the book - the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 (including the events in Crimea).
The book tells the stories of people who, in one way or another, are connected with military conflicts and everything that surrounds this terrible word - "war". What is the purpose of all this? As I understood the author, the purpose is to show readers that there was an ongoing war in Ukraine and in Russia. Stalin's repressions, especially the repressions that befell the Ukrainian population, which the Soviets suspected of disloyalty and of working for the Nazis (i.e., to be repressed, one did not have to work for the Nazis). Then, the Chechen war with the same pattern of brutality as if Stalin had not died at all. And then, the main tragedy - the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In all three stories, the tragedy of man against the backdrop of great ideas. For some, it was a battle to build a beautiful communist future, but for others, it was a war for independence, and for still others, it was a war for justice. It feels like everyone has their own truth; everyone is fighting their own "just" war. However, I saw all of these wars for some idea as a lose-lose for everyone.
The stories of Stalin's repressions, both their recognition and denial, are absolutely typical. For some, it's a wound that will never heal; for others, it is the "acceptable losses" necessary to build a "great" state. For some, the Chechen issue is a symbol of resistance to the metropolis; for others, it is the need to keep the country from sprawling. For some, Crimea is a question of "historical justice," while for others, it is a question of compliance with international treaties. For some, the military conflict in Donbas is an attack on the integrity of the country, while for others, it is the only way left to say "no" to the capital. So everyone and no one is right at the same time? Yes and no. In all stories, you can find the brighter spots of history and the darker ones. Since the stories of Stalin's repression and the Chechen wars were already pretty well known to me, I wasn't too interested in those sections of the book. What fascinated me was the story behind the conflict in Donbas.
The author rather briefly but succinctly retells the entire chronology of the events of 2014 in eastern Ukraine, including the appearance of "little green men" and subsequent events. The only interesting thing here is the story related to the Tatar minority in Crimea. Here, the author makes an excursion into history, as well as how the current Russian authorities solved this issue. Next - Donbass. Frankly speaking, at that time, I was not very interested in this topic and all the information I got from the liberal media, which are all pro-Ukrainian. So, it was interesting to me to learn the narrative of the opposite camp. The author tells who the Banderites are and what they did to Jews during Hitler's occupation. This, of course, is quite unpleasant, and that is why today's liberal Russian media (in exile) try to ignore this topic. Perhaps they are guided by the rule of "lies for good (a good lie)," or they simply don't want to touch such a painful topic because they think that, otherwise, they will be immediately accused of supporting Putin. If the liberal Russian media brings up the topic of Bandera and the fact that many people in Ukraine today consider him a hero, commentators (ru) say that it's a matter for the Ukrainians and we shouldn't get involved. I do not think so, and from my point of view, the liberal Russian media and Russian politicians should evaluate Bandera and directly state that he is no better than Stalin's executioners. It is funny, of course, that the so-called patriotic public in Russia has put executioners on their pedestal, and the Ukrainian so-called patriots have put executioners on their pedestal. The difference between them is not great: if one drowned in the blood of their own Soviet citizens, the other drowned in the blood of Jews and Poles. It is sad because you expect people to have changed, but it turns out that both believe that there are some "great ideals" that justify the murder of innocent people. Here, I agree with Krasheninnikov, who says that you cannot make exceptions if you declare human rights inviolable. However, one should not go to the other extreme either, as the Russian authorities are doing with Bandera. In time, Bandera's popularity will be reduced to the same 10-20% percent, i.e., a small group of radicalized people that exist in every society.
But the main thing that interested me was the interview with separatists from Donbas. First, the author starts with the background, i.e., what was the life of people all these years, on this territory since 1991. It is noteworthy that life was very similar to the life of Russians in the same period of time, i.e., banditry, mafia, poverty, the emergence of Ukrainian oligarchs and their management of the country. In general, everything that was also in Russia. And now, against the backdrop of poverty and gangster lawlessness, events are taking place in the capital, Kyiv. How does the society in eastern Ukraine react to this? For all 30 years, nothing good has been done, and life is only getting worse; we want to go back to the USSR; we finally elected "our president" (Yanukovych), and then some Banderites overthrow him. How does this look in the eyes of pro-Russian Ukrainians? We tolerated your pro-Western Yushchenko, but when our pro-Russian Yanukovych came to power, you overthrew him. Of course, this does not mean that the explosion of separatism in Donbas was guaranteed, not at all. Here, I agree with the common opinion that if it hadn't been for Girkin, i.e., Russia's open intervention, nothing would have happened. We are talking about the fact that society in Donbas was prepared for an explosion, i.e., it was a barrel of dynamite to which it was only necessary to bring a match to make everything explode. Girkin was that match, after which the entire region exploded. Of course, Russian propaganda also played an important role. The author describes what kind of people came to power. It was the same sailors that came to power in Russia after 1917, only without intellectuals like Lenin and Trotsky. In this case, it was the very bottom of the society living in Donbas and saw everything new as a threat. In Donbas, the most declassified elements came to power. But they came precisely because, for 30 years of independent Ukraine, nothing had been created there. Just as in Russia, which lived and continues to live on what was left of the Soviet Union, the inhabitants of Donbas lived on what was left of the USSR and, therefore, saw hope in the USSR. But Kyiv was painting a luxurious life under the right (European) path, but that life never appeared. Instead, some oligarchs were replaced by others, and there were no significant changes. Why should we choose the European way if it changes nothing, and Russia offers at least almost free gas? The author writes about the first casualties on the part of separatists and the fact that Ukrainian troops did not care much about the deaths of civilians. The crack appeared, and then, with the support of the Kremlin, it only grew wider. How much can we believe this information? I don't know. How relevant is this situation for 2023? I don't know. Until then, I knew nothing about life in Donbas (perhaps other books about the Donbas will say something different). Maybe I am wrong, and official Kyiv is right? Maybe. Am I trying to justify Russia's actions in both 2014 and 2022? No, I'm not. I am trying to understand what happened in Ukraine besides the known events (today, it is almost impossible to do this because from all sides propaganda is pouring out, "their truth"). As someone said, "No to laugh, not to lament, not to detest, but to understand."
Мне нужен враг, чтоб обрести покой.
Чтоб все бессмысленное стало объективно,
Чтобы роняло искры за моей спиной
Пожара ненависть черное огниво.
Мне нужен враг, чтоб можно было жить
Спокойно, зная, что он где-то рядом,
Чтоб день со днем сшивала злобы нить,
Чтоб ложь гремела взорванным снарядом.
Во-первых, книга похожа на сборник дополнительных материалов, которые изначально собирались автором для написания статей для газеты «The Guardian». Все представлены в книге истории, друг с другом почти никак не связаны. Во-вторых, где-то половина книги посвящена событиям 2014 года, между РФ и Украиной. Поэтому в какой-то момент книга воспринимается не как книга о путинской России, а как книга о современной Украине. К слову сказать, многим украинцам, скорее всего, не понравится, как автор изобразил их и их страну. В-третьих, почти вся книга основана на интервью, как с гражданами РФ, так и с гражданами Украины.
В книге явно прослеживается идея войны и судьбы человека поставленного в центр этого явления. Книга начинается историями людей, чьи родственники пострадали от сталинских репрессий. Причём для этой цели автор выбрал представителей национальных меньшинств. Далее следует тема чеченской войны через призму отношения к этой войне нынешних чеченцев, в том числе их решение прекратить вооружённое сопротивление. Далее коротко автор опишет дух открытие Олимпиады в Сочи, а дальше будет самая большая тема, которая займёт всю оставшуюся часть книги – военный конфликт между Россией и Украиной в 2014 году (включая события в Крыму).
Книга рассказывает истории людей, которые так или иначе, связаны с военными конфликтами и всем тем, что окружает это страшное слово - «война». Какова цель всего этого? Как я понял автора, целью является показать читателям, что на пространстве Украины и России шла непрекращающаяся война. Сталинские репрессии, в особенности репрессии которые постигли украинское население, которое советское руководство подозревало и в нелояльности и в работе на нацистов (т.е. чтобы быть репрессированным, не обязательно было работать на нацистов). Далее чеченская война с тем же паттерном жестокости как будто Сталин вовсе и не умирал. И далее главная трагедия – военный конфликт России и Украины. Во всех трёх историях, трагедия человека на фоне великих идей. Для кого-то это было сражение за построение прекрасного коммунистического будущего, для других – война за независимость, а для кого-то ещё – война за справедливость. Такое чувство, что у каждого своя правда, и каждый ведёт свою «справедливую» войну. Однако лично я увидел во всех этих войнах за какую-то идею, проигрыш всех.
Истории сталинских репрессий, как их признание, так и их отрицание, абсолютно типичны. Для одних это не заживляющаяся рана, для других – «допустимые потери» необходимые для того чтобы построить «великое» государство. Для одних чеченский вопрос является символом сопротивления метрополии, для других – необходимостью не дать расползтись стране. Для одних Крым является вопросом «исторической справедливости», а для других – вопросом соблюдения международных договоров. Для одних военный конфликт на Донбассе является посягательством на целостность страны, а для других – единственно оставшимся способом сказать «нет» столице. Получается, правы одновременно и все и никто? И да, и нет. Во всех историях можно найти более светлые пятна истории и более тёмные. Так как истории со сталинскими репрессиями и чеченские войны были для меня уже довольно хорошо известны, меня эти разделы книги не слишком увлекли. А вот что меня увлекло, это история, стоящая за конфликтом на Донбассе.
Автор довольно коротко, но ёмко пересказывает всю хронологию событий 2014 года на востоке Украины, включая появление «маленьких зелёных человечков» и последующие события. Интересным тут является только истории связанные с татарским меньшинством в Крыму. Тут автор совершит экскурс в историю, а также как нынешние российские власти решали этот вопрос. Далее – Донбасс. Честно сказать, в тот период я не сильно интересовался этой темой и всю информацию получал из либеральных СМИ, которые все настроены проукраински. Поэтому мне было интересно узнать историю противоположного лагеря. Автор рассказывает, кто такие бандеровцы и что они делали с евреями в период гитлеровской оккупации. Это, конечно, довольно неприятный момент и именно поэтому сегодня либеральные российские СМИ (в изгнании) стараются не замечать эту тему. Возможно, они руководствуются правилом «лож во благо» или просто не хотят трогать такую болезненную тему, так как считают, что иначе они немедленно будут обвинены в поддержке Путина. Если в либеральных российских СМИ поднимается тема Бандеры и того, что многие сегодня в Украине его считают героем, комментаторы говорят что, мол, это дело украинцев и не стоит в это дело влезать. Я так не считаю и с моей точки зрения, либеральные российские СМИ и российские политики должны дать оценку Бандере и прямо заявить, что он ничем не лучше сталинских палачей. Забавно, конечно, что и в России так называемая патриотическая общественность водрузила на свой пьедестал палачей и украинские так называемые патриоты водрузила уже на свой пьедестал палачей. Разница между ними не велика: если одни топили в крови собственных советских граждан, то другие топили в крови евреев и поляков. Это печально, ибо ожидаешь, что люди изменились, а оказывается и те и другие считают, что есть какие-то «великие идеалы», которые оправдывают убийства невинных л��дей. Тут я согласен с Крашенинниковым, который как раз и говорит, что нельзя делать исключения, если ты объявил права человека неприкосновенными. Правда, и в другую крайность тоже не стоит впадать, как это делают российские власти с тем же Бандерой. Со временем популярность Бандеры сведётся к тем же 10-20% процентам, т.е. небольшой группе радикально настроенных людей, которые есть в каждом обществе.
Но главное, что меня заинтересовало, это интервью с сепаратистами из Донбасса. Во-первых, автор начинает с истории вопроса, т.е. какой была жизнь людей все эти годы, на этой территории начиная с 1991 года. Примечательно, что жизнь была очень похожа на жизнь россиян в тот же период времени, т.е. бандитизм, мафия, нищета, появление украинских олигархов и их управление страной. В общем, всё то, что было и в России. И вот на фоне нищеты и бандитского беспредела происходят события в столице, Киеве. Как реагирует на это общество в восточной Украине? За все 30 лет ничего хорошего сделано не было, жизнь только ухудшается, мы хотим назад в СССР, мы наконец-то выбрали «своего президента» (Януковича) и тут какие-то бандеровцы его свергают. Как это выглядит в глазах пророссийских украинцев? Мы терпели вашего прозападного Ющенко, но когда пришёл наш пророссийский Янукович, вы его свергли. Конечно, это вовсе не значит, что взрыв сепаратизма на Донбассе был гарантирован, вовсе нет. Тут я согласен с общепринятым мнением, что если бы не Гиркин, т.е. не открытое вмешательство России, ничего бы не было. Речь идёт о том, что общество на Донбассе было подготовлено для взрыва, т.е. это была бочка с динамитом, к которой нужно было лишь поднести спичку, чтобы всё рвануло. Гиркин и был той спичкой, после которой весь регион взорвался. Безусловно, российская пропаганда также сыграла важную роль. Автор описывает, какие люди пришли к власти. Это была та же матросня, что пришла к власти в России после 1917 года, только без интеллектуалов типа Ленина и Троцкого. В данном случаи это было самое дно общества проживавшего на Донбассе и видевшее во всём новом, угрозу. На Донбассе к власти пришли самые деклассированные элементы. Но они пришли именно потому, что за 30 лет независимой Украины там ничего не было создано. Как в России, которая жила и продолжает жить на том, что осталось от Советского Союза, так и жители Донбасса жили благодаря тому, что досталось от СССР и поэтому видели в СССР надежду. Но Киев рисовал роскошную жизнь при правильно выбранном (европейском) пути, а её всё не было и не было. Вместо этого одни олигархи сменялись другими, но существенных изменений не происходило. Зачем выбирать европейский путь, если он ничего не меняет, а Россия предлагает хотя бы почти что бесплатный газ? Автор пишет о первых жертвах со стороны сепаратистов и то, что украинские войска особо не заморачивались по поводу гибели мирных жителей. Трещина появилась и далее, при поддержке Кремля, она только ширилась. Насколько можно верить этой информации? Я не знаю. Насколько эта ситуация актуальна для 2023? Не знаю. До этого момента я ничего не знал о жизни на Донбассе (возможно, другие книги о Донбассе скажу что-то другое). Может, я ошибаюсь и официальный Киев прав? Может быть и так. Пытаюсь ли я оправдать действия России как в 2014, так и в 2022? Нет, не пытаюсь. Я пытаюсь разобраться, что же произошло в Украине, помимо известных событий (сегодня сделать это почти невозможно, ибо со всех сторон льётся пропаганда, «своя правда»). Как кто-то сказал, не плакать и не смеяться, а – понять.
Firstly, the book is like a collection of supplementary material that was originally collected by the author to write articles for The Guardian. All the stories presented in the book have almost nothing to do with each other. Secondly, half of the book is devoted to the events of 2014 between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Therefore, at some point, the book is perceived not as a book about Putin's Russia but as a book about modern Ukraine. By the way, many Ukrainians will probably not like the way the author portrayed them and their country. Third, almost the entire book is based on interviews with both Russian and Ukrainian citizens.
The book traces the idea of war and the fate of the person at the center of this phenomenon. The book begins with the stories of people whose relatives suffered from Stalin's repressions. The author has chosen representatives of national minorities for this purpose. Then follows the theme of the Chechen war through the prism of the attitudes of present-day Chechens to the war, including their decision to end armed resistance. Next, the author will briefly describe the spirit of the opening of the Sochi Olympics, and then there is the biggest topic that will take up the rest of the book - the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 (including the events in Crimea).
The book tells the stories of people who, in one way or another, are connected with military conflicts and everything that surrounds this terrible word - "war". What is the purpose of all this? As I understood the author, the purpose is to show readers that there was an ongoing war in Ukraine and in Russia. Stalin's repressions, especially the repressions that befell the Ukrainian population, which the Soviets suspected of disloyalty and of working for the Nazis (i.e., to be repressed, one did not have to work for the Nazis). Then, the Chechen war with the same pattern of brutality as if Stalin had not died at all. And then, the main tragedy - the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In all three stories, the tragedy of man against the backdrop of great ideas. For some, it was a battle to build a beautiful communist future, but for others, it was a war for independence, and for still others, it was a war for justice. It feels like everyone has their own truth; everyone is fighting their own "just" war. However, I saw all of these wars for some idea as a lose-lose for everyone.
The stories of Stalin's repressions, both their recognition and denial, are absolutely typical. For some, it's a wound that will never heal; for others, it is the "acceptable losses" necessary to build a "great" state. For some, the Chechen issue is a symbol of resistance to the metropolis; for others, it is the need to keep the country from sprawling. For some, Crimea is a question of "historical justice," while for others, it is a question of compliance with international treaties. For some, the military conflict in Donbas is an attack on the integrity of the country, while for others, it is the only way left to say "no" to the capital. So everyone and no one is right at the same time? Yes and no. In all stories, you can find the brighter spots of history and the darker ones. Since the stories of Stalin's repression and the Chechen wars were already pretty well known to me, I wasn't too interested in those sections of the book. What fascinated me was the story behind the conflict in Donbas.
The author rather briefly but succinctly retells the entire chronology of the events of 2014 in eastern Ukraine, including the appearance of "little green men" and subsequent events. The only interesting thing here is the story related to the Tatar minority in Crimea. Here, the author makes an excursion into history, as well as how the current Russian authorities solved this issue. Next - Donbass. Frankly speaking, at that time, I was not very interested in this topic and all the information I got from the liberal media, which are all pro-Ukrainian. So, it was interesting to me to learn the narrative of the opposite camp. The author tells who the Banderites are and what they did to Jews during Hitler's occupation. This, of course, is quite unpleasant, and that is why today's liberal Russian media (in exile) try to ignore this topic. Perhaps they are guided by the rule of "lies for good (a good lie)," or they simply don't want to touch such a painful topic because they think that, otherwise, they will be immediately accused of supporting Putin. If the liberal Russian media brings up the topic of Bandera and the fact that many people in Ukraine today consider him a hero, commentators (ru) say that it's a matter for the Ukrainians and we shouldn't get involved. I do not think so, and from my point of view, the liberal Russian media and Russian politicians should evaluate Bandera and directly state that he is no better than Stalin's executioners. It is funny, of course, that the so-called patriotic public in Russia has put executioners on their pedestal, and the Ukrainian so-called patriots have put executioners on their pedestal. The difference between them is not great: if one drowned in the blood of their own Soviet citizens, the other drowned in the blood of Jews and Poles. It is sad because you expect people to have changed, but it turns out that both believe that there are some "great ideals" that justify the murder of innocent people. Here, I agree with Krasheninnikov, who says that you cannot make exceptions if you declare human rights inviolable. However, one should not go to the other extreme either, as the Russian authorities are doing with Bandera. In time, Bandera's popularity will be reduced to the same 10-20% percent, i.e., a small group of radicalized people that exist in every society.
But the main thing that interested me was the interview with separatists from Donbas. First, the author starts with the background, i.e., what was the life of people all these years, on this territory since 1991. It is noteworthy that life was very similar to the life of Russians in the same period of time, i.e., banditry, mafia, poverty, the emergence of Ukrainian oligarchs and their management of the country. In general, everything that was also in Russia. And now, against the backdrop of poverty and gangster lawlessness, events are taking place in the capital, Kyiv. How does the society in eastern Ukraine react to this? For all 30 years, nothing good has been done, and life is only getting worse; we want to go back to the USSR; we finally elected "our president" (Yanukovych), and then some Banderites overthrow him. How does this look in the eyes of pro-Russian Ukrainians? We tolerated your pro-Western Yushchenko, but when our pro-Russian Yanukovych came to power, you overthrew him. Of course, this does not mean that the explosion of separatism in Donbas was guaranteed, not at all. Here, I agree with the common opinion that if it hadn't been for Girkin, i.e., Russia's open intervention, nothing would have happened. We are talking about the fact that society in Donbas was prepared for an explosion, i.e., it was a barrel of dynamite to which it was only necessary to bring a match to make everything explode. Girkin was that match, after which the entire region exploded. Of course, Russian propaganda also played an important role. The author describes what kind of people came to power. It was the same sailors that came to power in Russia after 1917, only without intellectuals like Lenin and Trotsky. In this case, it was the very bottom of the society living in Donbas and saw everything new as a threat. In Donbas, the most declassified elements came to power. But they came precisely because, for 30 years of independent Ukraine, nothing had been created there. Just as in Russia, which lived and continues to live on what was left of the Soviet Union, the inhabitants of Donbas lived on what was left of the USSR and, therefore, saw hope in the USSR. But Kyiv was painting a luxurious life under the right (European) path, but that life never appeared. Instead, some oligarchs were replaced by others, and there were no significant changes. Why should we choose the European way if it changes nothing, and Russia offers at least almost free gas? The author writes about the first casualties on the part of separatists and the fact that Ukrainian troops did not care much about the deaths of civilians. The crack appeared, and then, with the support of the Kremlin, it only grew wider. How much can we believe this information? I don't know. How relevant is this situation for 2023? I don't know. Until then, I knew nothing about life in Donbas (perhaps other books about the Donbas will say something different). Maybe I am wrong, and official Kyiv is right? Maybe. Am I trying to justify Russia's actions in both 2014 and 2022? No, I'm not. I am trying to understand what happened in Ukraine besides the known events (today, it is almost impossible to do this because from all sides propaganda is pouring out, "their truth"). As someone said, "No to laugh, not to lament, not to detest, but to understand."
January 1, 2018
In 1962, the former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson observed that, “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.” Britain could at least take comfort from the fact that, whilst far from painless, its experience of decolonisation was nothing like as traumatic as that of the French or Dutch, and it could, moreover, bask in the moral authority which came from its being the only European state to have fought Nazi Germany continuously from September 1939 until victory in May 1945. Indeed, Churchill’s prophecy regarding “our finest hour” seems to have been realised and pride in its part in the Second World War has become, at least according to some foreign observers, a defining characteristic of British national identity.
The only other country which celebrates the Second World War with the same degree, or even greater, fervour, and whose culture is as deeply impregnated by the conflict is Russia, although for Russians it is, of course, the ‘Great Patriotic War’ of 1941-45 that is commemorated.
Although the victory cult dates from Brezhnev, it is under Putin that the presentation of this aspect of the Soviet past - affording most Russians something of which they could be proud - has assumed centre stage, as Putin strove to offset the domestic and international humiliations of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin years and restore Russia to the status of a first-tier nation.
How this happened and its consequences for Russia’s relations with other nationalities which were once part of the USSR is what Shaun Walker addresses in his excellent book ‘The Long Hangover. Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past’.
Walker is a first-rate journalist (first for ‘The Independent’ and now for ‘The Guardian’) and at the heart of his book are many interviews with both the powerful and the powerless, many of which were conducted in perilous circumstances, all of which are recalled very vividly and some of which are very moving. In addition to a superb eye for detail, Walker has a great turn of phrase, for example, talking of the way in which some interviewees would gradually open up to reveal new layers of confidences he refers to a “matryoshka nesting doll of painful memories.”
Putin is shown by Walker as having been very successful in manipulating the past so as to give Russia a new sense of national identity and purpose, filling the void left by the 1991 triple blows of implosion of the Soviet system, transformation of the USSR into the Russian Federation, and the loss of lands on the imperial periphery. The human costs of that process are also coolly examined, particularly in relation to the people of Ukraine. Indeed, a secondary theme is how Ukraine, or at least elements in western Ukraine, developed their own rival, anti-Russian, national-historical narrative centring upon the Second World War.
The Orwellian nature of such enterprises is well illustrated by reference to the Kremlin’s ‘Commission to Prevent the Falsification of History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests’, which as Walker points out, carries in its name the implication that falsifying history for the benefit of Russian interests is considered quite acceptable. Most, if not all, countries have their historical blind-spots but Russia has employed all the means open to the state to engage in forced amnesia on a positively industrial scale.
The book is open to criticism on some grounds. Walker’s understanding and application of the term ‘genocide’, equating it with physical extermination, is unduly narrow. He could also be accused of overstating his case when he claims that in addition to his strategic concerns, Putin “could not countenance a Ukraine in which the Soviet period was viewed as an occupation, and the glorious Russian war narrative was turned on its head.” On the contrary, the threat to the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea was quite sufficient to explain Russian intervention, just as the threat to the Russian naval base at Tartus is sufficient to explain Putin’s intervention to support the Assad regime in Syria. I also think the book deserves a title which better represents its contents, such as ‘Putin’s manipulation of the past’ or ‘Contested versions of the Great Patriotic War in the former Soviet Union’ but these are very minor quibbles when set against the book’s general excellence.
Reading ‘The Long Hangover’ will greatly profit all those seeking to understand recent events in Russia and Ukraine. Gerard Depardieu, Hilary Swank, Seal, Jean-Claude van Damme and Vanessa Mae would do especially well to read it, as even their desire to profit by lending their names to celebrate Kadyrov’s Chechnya might, one hopes, be tempered if they knew more about the nature of the regime there.
The only other country which celebrates the Second World War with the same degree, or even greater, fervour, and whose culture is as deeply impregnated by the conflict is Russia, although for Russians it is, of course, the ‘Great Patriotic War’ of 1941-45 that is commemorated.
Although the victory cult dates from Brezhnev, it is under Putin that the presentation of this aspect of the Soviet past - affording most Russians something of which they could be proud - has assumed centre stage, as Putin strove to offset the domestic and international humiliations of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin years and restore Russia to the status of a first-tier nation.
How this happened and its consequences for Russia’s relations with other nationalities which were once part of the USSR is what Shaun Walker addresses in his excellent book ‘The Long Hangover. Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past’.
Walker is a first-rate journalist (first for ‘The Independent’ and now for ‘The Guardian’) and at the heart of his book are many interviews with both the powerful and the powerless, many of which were conducted in perilous circumstances, all of which are recalled very vividly and some of which are very moving. In addition to a superb eye for detail, Walker has a great turn of phrase, for example, talking of the way in which some interviewees would gradually open up to reveal new layers of confidences he refers to a “matryoshka nesting doll of painful memories.”
Putin is shown by Walker as having been very successful in manipulating the past so as to give Russia a new sense of national identity and purpose, filling the void left by the 1991 triple blows of implosion of the Soviet system, transformation of the USSR into the Russian Federation, and the loss of lands on the imperial periphery. The human costs of that process are also coolly examined, particularly in relation to the people of Ukraine. Indeed, a secondary theme is how Ukraine, or at least elements in western Ukraine, developed their own rival, anti-Russian, national-historical narrative centring upon the Second World War.
The Orwellian nature of such enterprises is well illustrated by reference to the Kremlin’s ‘Commission to Prevent the Falsification of History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests’, which as Walker points out, carries in its name the implication that falsifying history for the benefit of Russian interests is considered quite acceptable. Most, if not all, countries have their historical blind-spots but Russia has employed all the means open to the state to engage in forced amnesia on a positively industrial scale.
The book is open to criticism on some grounds. Walker’s understanding and application of the term ‘genocide’, equating it with physical extermination, is unduly narrow. He could also be accused of overstating his case when he claims that in addition to his strategic concerns, Putin “could not countenance a Ukraine in which the Soviet period was viewed as an occupation, and the glorious Russian war narrative was turned on its head.” On the contrary, the threat to the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea was quite sufficient to explain Russian intervention, just as the threat to the Russian naval base at Tartus is sufficient to explain Putin’s intervention to support the Assad regime in Syria. I also think the book deserves a title which better represents its contents, such as ‘Putin’s manipulation of the past’ or ‘Contested versions of the Great Patriotic War in the former Soviet Union’ but these are very minor quibbles when set against the book’s general excellence.
Reading ‘The Long Hangover’ will greatly profit all those seeking to understand recent events in Russia and Ukraine. Gerard Depardieu, Hilary Swank, Seal, Jean-Claude van Damme and Vanessa Mae would do especially well to read it, as even their desire to profit by lending their names to celebrate Kadyrov’s Chechnya might, one hopes, be tempered if they knew more about the nature of the regime there.
January 15, 2019
An interesting if sometimes rather disjointed account of the memory politics in the former Soviet Union and these politics relationship to the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
This book jumps back and forth and is not always clearly connected. This appears to be an expansion of the reporting that Walker has done working for the Guardian, which contributes to this disjointed feel. That would not necessarily detract from the book, but Walker needs to do more work to connect these things.
The book is focused on memory politics in the former Soviet Union, but this was not clear to me until once the narrative got going.
More problematic is the way he repeatedly ciritcizes different groups for not memorializing events sufficently. Is it problematic that Ukraine, which used to have several million Jews, has little in the way to memorialize their murders during World War II? Of course. Is it problematic that they are memorializing the Second World War in the city where many Tartars were forced to leave their homeland with the war used as a conveint excuse? Absolutely.
But he never really provides a solution to the problem...make a monument for everything bad that happened. He points out interesting problems, but his attempts at a solution are pretty unsophisticated.
Still, this short book is worth the read for anyone who wantts to better understand the role memory politics plays in the Soviet sphere, particularly in the conflict within Ukraine.
This book jumps back and forth and is not always clearly connected. This appears to be an expansion of the reporting that Walker has done working for the Guardian, which contributes to this disjointed feel. That would not necessarily detract from the book, but Walker needs to do more work to connect these things.
The book is focused on memory politics in the former Soviet Union, but this was not clear to me until once the narrative got going.
More problematic is the way he repeatedly ciritcizes different groups for not memorializing events sufficently. Is it problematic that Ukraine, which used to have several million Jews, has little in the way to memorialize their murders during World War II? Of course. Is it problematic that they are memorializing the Second World War in the city where many Tartars were forced to leave their homeland with the war used as a conveint excuse? Absolutely.
But he never really provides a solution to the problem...make a monument for everything bad that happened. He points out interesting problems, but his attempts at a solution are pretty unsophisticated.
Still, this short book is worth the read for anyone who wantts to better understand the role memory politics plays in the Soviet sphere, particularly in the conflict within Ukraine.
August 22, 2022
I found the book hard to follow. Sometimes Walker mentions a date and then several pages later he talks about "3 months later" - so when exactly? I guess it is supposed to increase readability but since the book jumps back and forth in time I found myself continually having to flip back through pages to find out which year or month we were talking about now.
I have seen some people calling this book a great introductory read - I disagree. I find that the book assumes a lot of prior knowledge about Russia and the Soviet Union. It also uses acronyms without explaing them (e.g. OUN).
Despite its shortcomings, it was an interesting book to read and I learned many new things. It also piqued my curiosity to learn more about Russia and the USSR's history.
I have seen some people calling this book a great introductory read - I disagree. I find that the book assumes a lot of prior knowledge about Russia and the Soviet Union. It also uses acronyms without explaing them (e.g. OUN).
Despite its shortcomings, it was an interesting book to read and I learned many new things. It also piqued my curiosity to learn more about Russia and the USSR's history.
March 1, 2022
Highly recommended. An extremely timely read in these days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to finish what it started in ‘14. The book is well written, empathetic, and wry, and gives many illustrations of the manner in which the reverberations of WW2 continue to shape world events now, right this minute, for Russia and its neighbors. The audiobook is available at this writing on Scribd.
May 1, 2023
Toto je tak dobré, že si to dávam odznova.
Výborný mix private a public - investigatívnej žurnalistiky Shauna Walkera z Guardianu a jeho osobné zážitky z rôznych ruských regiónov. Rozhovory s rôznymi ľuďmi - od vojaka bojujúceho v Donbase, krivo obvinenú ženu z vlastizrady, ktorá skončila v gulagu, až po učiteľku histórie, ponúkajú rôzne nuansy a perspektívy.
Na otázku prečo je Rusko také, aké je nachádza autor v prístupe k vlastnej histórii, najmä v obraze druhej svetovej vojny. Pre každého, kto sa snaží pochopiť Rusko.
Výborný mix private a public - investigatívnej žurnalistiky Shauna Walkera z Guardianu a jeho osobné zážitky z rôznych ruských regiónov. Rozhovory s rôznymi ľuďmi - od vojaka bojujúceho v Donbase, krivo obvinenú ženu z vlastizrady, ktorá skončila v gulagu, až po učiteľku histórie, ponúkajú rôzne nuansy a perspektívy.
Na otázku prečo je Rusko také, aké je nachádza autor v prístupe k vlastnej histórii, najmä v obraze druhej svetovej vojny. Pre každého, kto sa snaží pochopiť Rusko.
June 9, 2023
A really interesting, well-written and researched (footnotes and bibliography, thank you) non-fiction where the author is trying to not even find an answer about why Putin is so popular in Russia but more about how the events in the last century shaped the collective mind frame of Russian citizens. The author speaks with people all around the huge country, doesn't shy from difficult topics without making them just shocking issues and everywhere tries to see people in people, on both sides of the barricade. Sure, he has his opinions and he can be critical but there is respect in this book and I appreciated it. It was an informative read, helping me see how many dots connect and despite some obvious judgements that a person can have, the statement "It is not that simple" or "It is not black and white" are valid here. The author doesn't try to excuse aggression, the situation in Chechnya and so on, far from it, he tries to show why people are fighting on both sides, what are the problems, why society is so divided and so on. A really good book!
July 18, 2018
The Long Hangover is an introduction to several key topics in Modern Russia (Chechnya, the Sochi Olympics, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Putin, and general gestalt of the population) through the lens of the collapse of the Soviet Union and how that process influenced where we are today. I found it to be incredibly eye opening. As a child of the 90s, the Soviet Union had already been replaced by China as the Great Other and Rival to American Hegemony by high school. And we did not discuss Russia much as a result. Putin meanwhile is depicted as a despotic caudillo, and Crimea was apparently a great tragedy and act of agression. There are elements of truth in those characterizations -- but like most things reality is far, far more complex and The Long Hangover excavates the layer beyond the superficial.
We begin with Putin's inheritence of the Russian Federation of the late 90s and early 00s: squalid, poor, stray dogs, brutal winters. A significant portion of the population drinking chemical ethanol, which gets you drunk but may burn a hole in your esophagus (15). You begin to understand why the percentage of Russians expressing regret over collapse of the Soviet Union went from 63% to 75% from 1993 to 2000 (14). It was not that people were espeically fond of the Soviet Union, but per Putin himself: "I wanted something different to rise in its place. And nothing different was proposed. That's what hurt. They just dropped everything and went away" (11). With living standards stagnant or declining, at least the Soviet Union had some kind of national spirit and purposefulness. Russia was a vacuum, Rome after Romulus Augustulus.
How do you unite a people and rebuild a nation from there? If you're Vladimir Putin, you start a program of worship around the Soviet victory over the Nazis in WW2. There is an annual Victory Day parade, complete with re-enactment of the storming of the Reichstag (63). Putin revived the orange and black St. George's ribbon, a symbol of the successful war effort, and it begins showing up everywhere. It is important to appreciate just how big of a deal this is in modern Russia, the latest great and celebrated success of a people. Banks offer "VICTORY IS OURS" accounts with special discounts on 5/9, billboards throughout Moscow flash "ONWARDS TO BERLIN" and most ominously "1941-1945. We can do it again if necessary" (37-38).
In light of the cult of Victory Day, Chechnya, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine make more sense. Chechnya: how could Putin possibly permit any kind of devolution mere months into his presidency? Crimea: can the same country that beat the Nazis possibly give up its best warm water port and access to the Mediterranean? (side note -- Crimea had a lot else going on as well... vast majority of the population was unsupportive of the Ukranian government and favored closer union with Russia). Walker dives deeply into these stories.
In this deep diving is where the book really shines -- the personalities, the anecdotes, the interviews that give credence to the larger narrative conveyed by the book. There is the tragic story of Olga (68-77), deported to Siberian hell-hole Magadan in the 60s and doomed to remain there for the rest of her days. And Oleg (97) who runs a museum for the Gulag Olga was sent to. While they are obviously critical of the Soviet Union, they have no lack of pride in Russia and have much harsher words for Gorbachev and Yeltsin than Stalin and Putin: qualified competency trumps chaos. Then there are the Ukranian rebels, the pro-Russian warlord of eastern Ukraine known as "The Demon" (212-215), journalists, minor government officials. These depictions are rich and lovely and could be read on their own for pure enjoyment.
Overall: I recommend the book, especially to my Sinophile 90's-baby friends.
And a thought: what if Russia formed its national cult around Yuri Gargarin and the Soviet space victory instead of the military victory of WW2? It's a cool alternative universe to imagine.
We begin with Putin's inheritence of the Russian Federation of the late 90s and early 00s: squalid, poor, stray dogs, brutal winters. A significant portion of the population drinking chemical ethanol, which gets you drunk but may burn a hole in your esophagus (15). You begin to understand why the percentage of Russians expressing regret over collapse of the Soviet Union went from 63% to 75% from 1993 to 2000 (14). It was not that people were espeically fond of the Soviet Union, but per Putin himself: "I wanted something different to rise in its place. And nothing different was proposed. That's what hurt. They just dropped everything and went away" (11). With living standards stagnant or declining, at least the Soviet Union had some kind of national spirit and purposefulness. Russia was a vacuum, Rome after Romulus Augustulus.
How do you unite a people and rebuild a nation from there? If you're Vladimir Putin, you start a program of worship around the Soviet victory over the Nazis in WW2. There is an annual Victory Day parade, complete with re-enactment of the storming of the Reichstag (63). Putin revived the orange and black St. George's ribbon, a symbol of the successful war effort, and it begins showing up everywhere. It is important to appreciate just how big of a deal this is in modern Russia, the latest great and celebrated success of a people. Banks offer "VICTORY IS OURS" accounts with special discounts on 5/9, billboards throughout Moscow flash "ONWARDS TO BERLIN" and most ominously "1941-1945. We can do it again if necessary" (37-38).
In light of the cult of Victory Day, Chechnya, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine make more sense. Chechnya: how could Putin possibly permit any kind of devolution mere months into his presidency? Crimea: can the same country that beat the Nazis possibly give up its best warm water port and access to the Mediterranean? (side note -- Crimea had a lot else going on as well... vast majority of the population was unsupportive of the Ukranian government and favored closer union with Russia). Walker dives deeply into these stories.
In this deep diving is where the book really shines -- the personalities, the anecdotes, the interviews that give credence to the larger narrative conveyed by the book. There is the tragic story of Olga (68-77), deported to Siberian hell-hole Magadan in the 60s and doomed to remain there for the rest of her days. And Oleg (97) who runs a museum for the Gulag Olga was sent to. While they are obviously critical of the Soviet Union, they have no lack of pride in Russia and have much harsher words for Gorbachev and Yeltsin than Stalin and Putin: qualified competency trumps chaos. Then there are the Ukranian rebels, the pro-Russian warlord of eastern Ukraine known as "The Demon" (212-215), journalists, minor government officials. These depictions are rich and lovely and could be read on their own for pure enjoyment.
Overall: I recommend the book, especially to my Sinophile 90's-baby friends.
And a thought: what if Russia formed its national cult around Yuri Gargarin and the Soviet space victory instead of the military victory of WW2? It's a cool alternative universe to imagine.
May 17, 2025
This was a truly great overview of Russian politics and the historic dispute between Russia and Ukraine. This doesn't go in-depth to a very complicated history but it triumphs at giving the western perspective on both countries. It doesn't feel like this slants pro-Russia or pro-Ukrainian but looks through the lens of Western sensibilities.
This sets up a very digestible timeline that gave me context other histories skip and assume you know.
This sets up a very digestible timeline that gave me context other histories skip and assume you know.
April 21, 2021
Wyjątkowa i otwierająca oczy książka. Bogata w trudno dostępną wiedzę, bezpośrednio z 'linii frontu'. Shaun Walker napisał jeden z najlepszych reportaży jakie czytałam. Szczerze polecam, bo takiej Rosji nie poznacie w mass media.
April 4, 2018
Amazing book and easy to read and understand even English is not my first language. Couldn’t put it down! Wish to read more similar books! If you know some please recommend!
April 27, 2018
+1 for well done audio version. Well written, solid research. Nice incite into the Putin/Russian situation.
January 24, 2020
Książka bardzo dobrze napisana, pełna celnych spostrzeżeń i ciekawych wniosków. Duży plus za aktualność poruszonych spraw.
August 8, 2023
*2.5
Książka o bardzo rzetelnej zawartości, która niestety traci punkty ze względu na swoją nudną i długotrwałą treść. Autor przedstawia głębokie spojrzenie na Rosję Putina, ale sposób przedstawienia materiału może być męczący dla czytelnika.
Książka o bardzo rzetelnej zawartości, która niestety traci punkty ze względu na swoją nudną i długotrwałą treść. Autor przedstawia głębokie spojrzenie na Rosję Putina, ale sposób przedstawienia materiału może być męczący dla czytelnika.
May 21, 2023
3.5, I think.
I was hoping for more on the rise of Putin and the various oligarchs, and generally a broader view of current Russian society.
However, the author does a great job presenting a balanced take on separatism in Crimea and the Donbas and Russia's intervention there from 2014 onwards.
All in all, it's short and worth reading if you are interested in modern Russian.
I was hoping for more on the rise of Putin and the various oligarchs, and generally a broader view of current Russian society.
However, the author does a great job presenting a balanced take on separatism in Crimea and the Donbas and Russia's intervention there from 2014 onwards.
All in all, it's short and worth reading if you are interested in modern Russian.
January 18, 2018
I've long been a fan of Shaun Walker's coverage of Russia. He's been in the region a long time and really understands the Russian ethos, and asks the right questions, and I was not disappointed in this book, which traces the alarming rate of growth of Russian World War II patriotism and Soviet nostalgia as the present-day Russia gets worse and worse.
Going through this book and through Shaun's interviews with people throughout the former Soviet Union is like talking to a really smart friend who distills the essence of the situation down for you. Most of this history was known to me, but Shaun really adds a personal element that ties the narrative together.
The epilogue is probably the strongest part of the book and where he should have started, with a quote from Stalin's daughter that will now stick forever in my mind, " With one hand we try to catch the moon itself, but with the other we are obliged to dig potatoes, the same way it was done a hundred years ago."
Going through this book and through Shaun's interviews with people throughout the former Soviet Union is like talking to a really smart friend who distills the essence of the situation down for you. Most of this history was known to me, but Shaun really adds a personal element that ties the narrative together.
The epilogue is probably the strongest part of the book and where he should have started, with a quote from Stalin's daughter that will now stick forever in my mind, " With one hand we try to catch the moon itself, but with the other we are obliged to dig potatoes, the same way it was done a hundred years ago."
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