Over the last couple of years, my go-to book for people looking for a counterweight to popular platitudes has been Thomas Sowell’s Discrimination and Disparities. But Wilfred Reilly’s Taboo is a contender for the best rebuttal to the social justice movement (though, in the end, it may not unseat Sowell’s work).
Taboo is written as a challenge to the identitarianism that has consumed American political discourse over the last several years. Leftist identitarianism – embodied most prominently by the Black Lives Matter movement – has gotten the majority of the press, though Reilly correctly identifies the alt-right movement that exists on the fringes of conservatism as a right-wing answer to leftist identitarians. Reilly organizes his chapters, then, around “Taboo Obvious Facts” that answer common claims by both sides. A political scientist, Reilly tests these claims against empirical data, an approach that, despite its rousing success in most ways, falls short in a few.
The first chapter addresses the familiar claim that endemic racism in the justice system leads police officers to systemically single out black Americans for violence. Not so, says Reilly. Echoing Sowell, he argues that racism cannot simply be assumed as an explanation for police violence, and that other potential variables need to be accounted for. Once other factors are considered, including rates of crime, the power of racism to explain any specific instance of police violence, much less an entire system of racism, diminishes to the vanishing point.
Reilly helpfully includes contextual details about specific incidents of blacks being killed by police officers, noting that they are rarely the result of victims minding their own business and cops looking for a minority victim to kill. This is not, to be sure, a blanket justification of force, but it helps disarm some of the more incendiary claims that often find expression. He also shows how much of the angst on the topic is media-driven, and that white and Hispanic victims of police shootings (which comprise roughly 75% of such events) are covered to a smaller and less sympathetic degree. Furthermore, given the pullback in active policing that social justice agitation results in, Reilly concludes that "Black Lives Matter [has gotten] a ton of Black people killed."
Reilly extends this analysis to high-profile stories of whites allegedly oppressing and harassing blacks at pools, parks, and other public places. These do not, he argues, represent an epidemic of white hatred of black people. Indeed, these cases cannot even be considered racial incidents, since they typically involve normal (if a bit persnickety) people attempting to enforce reasonable regulations. The larger narrative, that whites are waging war on blacks, is not only not backed up by the data, but is positively falsified by it. Reilly notes that the vast majority of crime is racially homogeneous and, furthermore, that at least 75% of the interracial crime that does exist is black-on-white. Again, Reilly notes the media’s role in perpetuating a false narrative, in that stories that appear to confirm their preconceptions get widely shared while those that don’t get suppressed. The danger in this, he writes, is two-fold. First, it gives blacks the false impression that whites hate them (an impression which, if untrue, is positively evil to perpetuate). Second, it can give whites the impression that racial harmony is impossible, which in turn threatens to drive more people into the ranks of the alt-right. This is a key insight. Telling lies to push an agenda has consequences, and Reilly is right to say that we have to seek truth and ignore agendas. Our social harmony depends on it.
Reilly further challenges the systemic racism narrative by, again channeling Sowell, noting that there is no reason to expect different groups to have identical outcomes. He shows that differences in outcomes result primarily from differences in group behaviors. He cites crime statistics to argue that blacks are overrepresented in the prison system not because of systemic racism, but because, as a group, blacks commit (and are the victims of) a higher proportion of crime relative to other ethnic groups. But whites, too, grapple with social pathologies more than other groups, including higher rates of suicide, overdose, and traffic deaths.
Continuing the theme, Reilly shows that differences in IQ scores are not, as the alt-right claims, genetic in nature. Rather, black IQs have been increasing over time (something which the genetic argument has no answer for), and when cultural differences are accounted for, IQ differences narrow, disappear, or are inverted. Group differences, then, are explained best neither by the left’s focus on discrimination nor the far right’s focus on genetics, but rather by a multiplicity of other factors that influence individual development, decisions, and priorities.
The most important of these factors may be the presence of both parents in a child’s home, which much more strongly correlates with a whole host of better outcomes than race does. For instance, the poverty rate is 7% for two-parent black families, but 22% for single-parent white households, calling the pervasiveness and even the existence of “white privilege” into question. This, and other factors, influence cultural attitudes towards work and education, and when these factors are considered in Reilly’s analysis he again finds that they largely mitigate group disparities. The way to address these disparities, then, seems not to be found in pushing a theory of systemic discrimination but rather in encouraging the habits that have proven to contribute to success in manifold ways. As Reilly simply says, “Culture matters.”
Reilly’s analysis along these lines is further buttressed by observing that when these cultural attributes are controlled for within ethnic groups, we see the same outcome disparities that exist between ethnic groups. This applies to whites, where fatherlessness has been growing in recent decades with the predictable rise in poverty and crime, and also to blacks, who experience lower levels of poverty and crime the more that beneficial cultural elements are found. Of note, he observes that black immigrants, who often come from more traditional cultures, often earn higher incomes than whites, another difficult-to-explain fact if discrimination were the cause of disparities.
None of this is to say that discrimination in no way exists in modern America, but that it’s ability to explain disparities (particularly in the context of the affirmative action apparatus in government, education, and business) is much less than cultural considerations.
Midway through the book, Reilly turns his attention from statistical disparities between groups to some of the more theoretical claims of the modern left. He challenges the gathering redefinition of racism from its traditional meaning of antipathy or prejudice toward a group of people based on their race to one that relies on power structures. Readers of Roger Scruton’s Fools, Frauds, and Firebrands will notice the New Left Marxism embodied in this new definition, and it’s one that Reilly finds uncompelling. Such a definition, he notes, would exempt from the charge of racism the Boers in South Africa, who train and propagandize like Nazis but have very little political power. Reilly not only defends the traditional definition, he makes the common sense observation that anyone can be guilty of it – and that, indeed, both white and black Americans are guilty of it. He says this not to intimate that a race war is impending, but to point out the obvious: that racism is real, definable, and needs to be fought against in all its forms.
Similarly, Reilly challenges the notion of cultural appropriation, which he calls "an insanely stupid idea." Despite the flamboyant leftist outrage over the idea that somebody from one culture would use the creations of another, Reilly writes that "No such moral rule…has ever existed. Modern liberals just made it up." He argues that the war against cultural appropriation would ultimately prohibit a multiplicity of different groups from learning from each other, and partaking in the benefits of that shared knowledge. This in turn would have the effect of devolving society back to tribes who would in the best case scenario live segregated lives, and in the worst case scenario war with each other.
In the last two chapters, Reilly deals with immigration policy and the ideas of the alt-right. While he has many good things to say on these topics, it is here that the purely empirical approach begins to show some weaknesses.
On immigration, Reilly writes that that it's not unreasonable for a country to control who crosses its borders, particularly in a "semi-socialist welfare state." He believes that the traditional American policy of requiring immigrants to support themselves should be enforced, indeed strengthened. Other suggestions for reform include ending the policy of allowing distant relatives of immigrants become citizens, and ensuring that new immigrants can contribute to the American society by confirming that they are sane, healthy, employable, and don't have a criminal record. There's no harshness or fear-mongering in Reilly's recommendations, though he does express concern about the long-term political consequences of unchecked immigration.
What Reilly doesn't address are the cultural implications of immigration. Just as it’s reasonable to expect immigrant to support themselves, it seems reasonable to expect immigrants to assimilate into the culture by adopting its symbols, institutions, and history as their own. As Scruton notes in How to be a Conservative, there is in this a reciprocal duty of society to accept these immigrants as full citizens. The liberal opposition to such suggestions, as Reilly notes, is to claim that they are racist, but this tells us more about liberals - who thus reveal themselves as cultural relativists or people who actively detest American society - than it does about the policies.
In the final chapter, Reilly turns his focus to the alt-right, correctly noting that it is largely a reactionary movement oriented against the SJW left. Determining who exactly the alt-right is, though, is a difficult task, Reilly observes, but common traits include genetic racism repackaged as “race realism,” knee-jerk nationalism, oversimplified anti-feminism, and a crass defense, if we can call it that, of traditional morality.
Based on my own observations of the alt-right, this seems like a fair enough list, but it’s still (excepting the first point) not all that helpful at identifying who counts as a member. For instance, Reilly observes that there’s a strong tendency for the alt-right to wish that the 1960s "cultural revolution…had never occurred," but this is problematic because Reilly’s hero (and mine) Sowell, obviously not a member of the alt-right, fits this criterion. The reader, then, doesn’t come away with much clarity, as several points of Reilly’s definition are broad enough to include basically all conservatives except globalist neoconservatives. Herein lies a prime problem with the alt-right (besides their gross views on race): their positions are often perversions of traditional conservative beliefs and thereby mimic, to the casual observer, authentic conservatism.
Moving to the task of assessing the alt-right's contentions, Reilly notes that their attempts to prove, via IQ test scores, that blacks are genetically inferior rely on dated statistics and interpretive fallacies, as does their attempt to draw connection between crime and IQ. To the extent that statistical disparities on IQ scores and crime exist between groups, a multiplicity of factors other than genetics must be considered, just as they must when assessing claims of discrimination. And when they are considered, they are again shown to have a stronger correlation to outcomes than the single factor identified by the alt-right. Interestingly, the alt-right and the SJW left, the two poles of American politics, are thus shown to have essentially identical analytical frameworks.
Reilly further notes that the alt-right routinely confuses ethnic, tribal, religious, and cultural differences with race. He notes how the societies lauded by the alt-right are almost racially identical to many of those they decry. The alt-right's proposed solutions, to the extent they have any (which isn’t much), are unsurprisingly revealed to be no solution at all.
But Reilly’s case for why they're not solutions lands only a glancing blow. He is right to point out the absurdity of, as the alt-right sometimes suggests, splitting up the country based on skin color. But his reason for finding the idea absurd is that it would harm the strength of the American nation and economy, limit our accomplishments in athletics and technology, and reduce the diversity of artistic expression and cuisine. All of this is true enough, but Reilly says nothing about the misunderstanding of culture that pervades both the proposals of the alt-right and the mainstream defense of multiculturalism.
Both viewpoints lack an understanding of what keeps people together, which is a shared belief in common values. A culture with wildly opposed views on religion, tradition, manners, and the purpose of life is unlikely to be a happy one no matter how many ethnic restaurants are in business or how similar the skin tone of its members. Reilly fails to acknowledge the deeper source of social cohesion, instead referencing high-minded but abstract notions of "scientific inquiry, freedom-loving skepticism of government, and absolute equality." And while these ideals are important as far as they go, they don't go very far in giving people a sense of a shared purpose and destiny, and the attempts to ground societies in them, rather than something more concrete, has failed many times over throughout the world.
The alt-right is surely wrong that the values that ground a society are racially-based. But the materialist defense of multiculturalism also fails to provide a proper grounding, particularly without an overt commitment to cultural and political pluralism. The problem with Reilly's analysis, then, is not so much that it's wrong but that it's incomplete. It’s a slightly frustrating end to a fine book, because real conservatives loathe the fallacies and inhumanity of the alt-right, but also understand that diversity and multiculturalism have limitations in a healthy society.
Overall, Taboo is an important book at this moment in our history, one I hope gains a wide audience. To regain the cultural attributes that are essential to our survival, we must defeat the identitarians, left and right. Herein, Wilfred Reilly has contributed mightily to that effort.