The Metaphysics of Apes: Negotiating the Animal-Human Boundary

by Raymond Corbey

Tracing the interpretation of the human-like great apes and ape-like earliest ancestors of present-day humans, this study demonstrates how from the days of Linnaeus to the present, the sacred and taboo-ridden animal-human boundary was constantly tested. The unique dignity of humans, a central value in the West, was, and to some extent still is, on the minds of taxonomists, ethnologists, primatologists, and archaeologists. This book thus offers an anthropological analysis of the burgeoning anthropological disciplines in terms of their own cultural taboos and philosophical preconceptions.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Anthropology, Natural History

238 pages, Paperback

First published March 14, 2005

Reviews

[J.D. Steens · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Metaphysics of Apes is a well-written history of animal-human boundaries, focusing predominately on the primate and human boundary. Corbey comes at this subject from a naturalistic bias that values our primate ancestry, but his book is an account of the history of those who have been gatekeepers for human specialness (exceptionalism), i.e., not ape, not primate, and especially, not animal. Thus, for example, we have Aristotle's and Descartes' rational man and its dualistic opposite, animal passion. We have Christain (not animal) soul, and we have modern intellectual history that makes a rather sudden anthropological ("scientific") break between us, who are "fully human," from our distinct primate cousins. It's not so clear why Corbey uses the title he does as his history only bounces along the surface of metaphysics (first principles of things). This beomes clear in his last chapter where he tries to resolve this historical dualism by some intellectual process ("epistemological ontology"?) that is unconvincing (and impenetrable). Regarding this dualism, the more relevant approach is to probe deeply into why this boundary issue is an issue at all. This is an emotional, not an intellectual issue. Why is it so important to keep animals in their place? Why is it so important that we not see ourselves as apes, even special apes? Why can't we see ourselves as animals with a strong rational faculty (that serves what?)? Do we not seek food and sexual partners? Do we not deficate and urinate? Do we not become ill and die? Do apes, akin to man, not have mind? Do all beings, like us, not seek to be free? These book's last chapter would have benefited more by pursuing these types of metaphysical questions.

[Kristin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Encountered this book first through the footnotes of Andrew Westoll's The Chimps of Fauna Sanctuary. The more intriguing musings on animal consciousness were always linked to Corbey, so I figured my dissatisfaction with Westoll's mainly descriptive account might be remedied by reading some philosophy.

The bulk of the book is not philosophy, but a history of anthropology, specifically how anthropologists through the past few centuries have exhibited an unwritten and often unexamined devotion to human specialness in their tacit acceptance of a boundary between humans and animals (I'll admit, I'm quite inclined to believing in this specialness myself, especially given that the former of these two groups writes books about metaphysics, and reviews them online).

The book was good for bringing attention to pervasive dichotomies in the way that we look at the world: nature-culture, animal-human, ancient-modern. Corbey's own "solution" (if it can be called that) is to take a pragmatist, skeptical view of knowledge, and to realize that rationality is local, is always embedded in a context. In other words, there is no way of attaining a "God's eye view" of essential truth, therefore our narratives about ourselves and our relation to animals must be based on pragmatic workability, not universals. Not sure what that really looks like.

I feel like Corbey also negates his own solution by embracing a naturalistic position (human culture as just another branch of evolutionary biology). Ascribing everything to the blind forces of natural selection (even the theory of natural selection itself?) is just as much an essentialist narrative as the animal-human boundary. I think you are pulling a rabbit out of a hat either way.

[Melissa · Rating 4 out of 5]

I want to give this a full five stars but can't because Corbey does not not fully tackle the issue of what makes humans, bonobos and chimpanzees differ from one another. I believe him and agree with him that our similarities are many and are very important. But how can we understand our differences as well? I accept and agree with his point that if we focus too much time on our differences, it becomes easier to emphasize them and fall into the old patterns of stressing them in order to distance ourselves from our closest relatives and make them animals we can exploit ... but the vast lay public sees primarily those differences. We need to be able to talk to people who are unconvinced that we are as close to other apes as we actually are and understanding our similarities and differences together rather than denying that there are any differences at all would likely be more productive.

I did LOVE the insights into the history of anthropology as a discipline he offers through his tracing of evolving philosophical questions related to studies on primates, from taxonomic to theoretical investigations. The history of the science and the philosophical questions at the basis of the development of anthropology are especially useful and a great addition to any historical look at the growth of the discipline.

[Dipika · Rating 4 out of 5]

teases out a few meanings of metaphysics in this context and traces apes through four centuries in western europe and england. At one point, makes a comparison between "outcastes" in India and apes (or is it someone he cites who does this? Mary Douglas?)--that both occupy "dirty" places so to speak and that their placement in the hierarchy is considered natural.