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Great Campaigns of the Civil War
Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy
"The fall of Atlanta in September 1864 was an important strategic and psychological victory for the war-weary North, virtually assuring that the Union would win the Civil War while assisting Lincoln in his reelection efforts. This concise volume by McMurry . . . closely examines this significant military campaign, places the struggle in its social and political contexts, and includes useful topical appendices and a bibliographical essay. Given its brevity, focus, and the author's unique insights, this readable and well-documented volume will be welcomed by Civil War enthusiasts and scholars alike." -Library Journal
"[McMurry writes] with a clarity and economy of style that provide a succinct and lucid military narrative and relate it to political events and public opinion in both North and South. He also offers incisive analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of the commanding generals in this campaign." -New York Review of Books
"McMurry . . . incorporates conventional military history at strategic, operational and tactical levels, but also pays attention to wider factors. . . . Clear prose and unrushed presentation make this a thoroughly satisfying outing." -Publishers Weekly
"[McMurry writes] with a clarity and economy of style that provide a succinct and lucid military narrative and relate it to political events and public opinion in both North and South. He also offers incisive analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of the commanding generals in this campaign." -New York Review of Books
"McMurry . . . incorporates conventional military history at strategic, operational and tactical levels, but also pays attention to wider factors. . . . Clear prose and unrushed presentation make this a thoroughly satisfying outing." -Publishers Weekly
236 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 2000
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
January 6, 2015
Richard M McMurry's Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy (copyright 2000, University of Nebraska Press) is an exceptionally good book.
Recounting the story of the chess game played by William T Sherman and Joseph E Johnston between Chattanooga and Atlanta, McMurry's deft touch insures that all the significant moves, and many of the more subtle feints as well, receive their just due. Given the tremendous impact of this particular campaign on the history of the Civil War, and on Lincoln's re-election bid, and on the fate of slavery and of the United States, too often these particular stories are given short-shrift elsewhere. McMurry corrects that oversight in this concise yet detail-packed slender volume.
McMurry successfully holds at bay the legends and myths of the men involved, devoting considerable time to their foibles, personal limitations, and strategic and tactical errors and outright blunders. No more is this more evident than in his treatment of both Sherman's and Johnston's behaviors and choices during the campaign. But there is no sign that McMurry has a personal axe to grind. He is more interested in divesting the myth to reveal the raw and dirty facts of the fight than he is to advance the agenda of either side over the other.
Often in books of Civil War campaigns we are told merely what happened, which direction some army or other elected to travel on a map. McMurry refreshingly always provides insight as to what informed these often pivotal decisions: for this reason alone this book is superior to about ninety percent of its competition in the genre, and all writers in this arena would do well to seriously consider emulating the model presented here.
Also worthy of mention is McMurry's consideration of the influence of politics and personal foibles that significantly impacted these events. For example, Sherman later claimed he launched the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain because he was concerned about his army becoming rusty from not fighting. McMurry shows that Sherman was also feeling political pressure to have a fight even if he doubted he could win it, and one is reminded of similar actions by Sherman at Chickasaw Bayou and in the early fruitless attacks on the stronghold of Vicksburg. Also, I'd long been mystified by the strange Federal failures at Utoy Creek, and McMurry illuminates the scandal of John Palmer's dereliction of duty on the field which led to a crisis here and subsequent loss of life.
This isn't a difficult book to read, but that doesn't mean it's easy to breeze through, either. This is a book that requires some degree of concentration, but it rewards that attention in abundance. Rarely would I give a book like this such a high rating, but McMurry has done a superb job with his subject, and his book deserves the highest praise and recommendation.
Recounting the story of the chess game played by William T Sherman and Joseph E Johnston between Chattanooga and Atlanta, McMurry's deft touch insures that all the significant moves, and many of the more subtle feints as well, receive their just due. Given the tremendous impact of this particular campaign on the history of the Civil War, and on Lincoln's re-election bid, and on the fate of slavery and of the United States, too often these particular stories are given short-shrift elsewhere. McMurry corrects that oversight in this concise yet detail-packed slender volume.
McMurry successfully holds at bay the legends and myths of the men involved, devoting considerable time to their foibles, personal limitations, and strategic and tactical errors and outright blunders. No more is this more evident than in his treatment of both Sherman's and Johnston's behaviors and choices during the campaign. But there is no sign that McMurry has a personal axe to grind. He is more interested in divesting the myth to reveal the raw and dirty facts of the fight than he is to advance the agenda of either side over the other.
Often in books of Civil War campaigns we are told merely what happened, which direction some army or other elected to travel on a map. McMurry refreshingly always provides insight as to what informed these often pivotal decisions: for this reason alone this book is superior to about ninety percent of its competition in the genre, and all writers in this arena would do well to seriously consider emulating the model presented here.
Also worthy of mention is McMurry's consideration of the influence of politics and personal foibles that significantly impacted these events. For example, Sherman later claimed he launched the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain because he was concerned about his army becoming rusty from not fighting. McMurry shows that Sherman was also feeling political pressure to have a fight even if he doubted he could win it, and one is reminded of similar actions by Sherman at Chickasaw Bayou and in the early fruitless attacks on the stronghold of Vicksburg. Also, I'd long been mystified by the strange Federal failures at Utoy Creek, and McMurry illuminates the scandal of John Palmer's dereliction of duty on the field which led to a crisis here and subsequent loss of life.
This isn't a difficult book to read, but that doesn't mean it's easy to breeze through, either. This is a book that requires some degree of concentration, but it rewards that attention in abundance. Rarely would I give a book like this such a high rating, but McMurry has done a superb job with his subject, and his book deserves the highest praise and recommendation.
January 23, 2016
This is an excellent account of the Sherman's campaign of maneuver approaching and taking Atlanta in 1864. The author captures the action with engaging prose while also doing an excellent job of analyzing the personalities of the various commanders and the political repercussions of the campaigns.
The only weaknesses I found involve the maps. The maps are clear and nicely presented graphically. However they do not show a single formation or troop movement. This might be off putting for some readers. I found that it left the maps very clean and easy to read. What McMurry does is describe troops movements in the text in excellent, easy to follow detail. Still, for many readers, this will make the movements more difficult to follow than a more graphical approach.
The second issue with the maps is one I found more annoying. Often the names of features on the map do not match those used in the text. For example, the text mentions that Mill Creek Gap is locally know as Buzzard's Roost Gap. The map has the latter name, but the text consistently refers to the former name. This happens with a few other places as well. And there are spelling discrepancies as well, Noyes creek on the map is referred to as Nose Creek in the text.
Still this is a well written, approachable treatment of the campaign which I'd recommend to anyone interested in the theater/period.
The only weaknesses I found involve the maps. The maps are clear and nicely presented graphically. However they do not show a single formation or troop movement. This might be off putting for some readers. I found that it left the maps very clean and easy to read. What McMurry does is describe troops movements in the text in excellent, easy to follow detail. Still, for many readers, this will make the movements more difficult to follow than a more graphical approach.
The second issue with the maps is one I found more annoying. Often the names of features on the map do not match those used in the text. For example, the text mentions that Mill Creek Gap is locally know as Buzzard's Roost Gap. The map has the latter name, but the text consistently refers to the former name. This happens with a few other places as well. And there are spelling discrepancies as well, Noyes creek on the map is referred to as Nose Creek in the text.
Still this is a well written, approachable treatment of the campaign which I'd recommend to anyone interested in the theater/period.
December 11, 2025
The Atlanta Campaign has been a well covered time period. This edition take a more detailed approach to the commanders, their decisions and its impact on the wide strategic threat to both countries. The election to retain President Lincoln in offer hinged on a victory and the Virginia Campaign and its bloody results were not helping. Although slow in its result, Sherman's capture of Atlanta and the corresponding battle victories in the Shenandoah Valley sealed the reelection.
The book has some photos, illustrations and the broad area maps to show the places spoke of in the book. No battles are covered in detail but gives a general summary.
The book has some photos, illustrations and the broad area maps to show the places spoke of in the book. No battles are covered in detail but gives a general summary.
May 3, 2022
This is an excellent overview of the Atlanta Campaign. This study stays on the strategic level and looks at how the campaign folded into the larger events of 1864. It heavily examines the interplay of the main leaders on each side.
July 7, 2023
A quick, lucid account of the battles in Tennessee and Georgia. Easy to read. The author is often quite critical of Sherman as well as CSA generals Bragg, Johnstone and Hood. Part of the Great Campaigns of the Civil War series. Enjoyed thoroughly.
August 17, 2018
Living in Atlanta, it's an interesting read of Sherman's march down from Chattanooga through Atlanta.
April 28, 2016
I have a real love of history and the Civil War is one of my favorite periods. This book goes into great detail how Sherman was able to take Atlanta. Grant knew that a victory was needed to assure Lincoln won the nomination his plan was to make sure the South lost at all costs.
Jefferson Davis was his own worst enemy when it came to the running of the war, especially in this battle. His extreme dislike of Johnston led his decisions instead of what was best for the Confederacy. It was interesting to see that the victory Sherman had was not as seamless as some made it out to be. There were serious blunders on all sides.
If you like the Civil War, this is a good book to read.
Jefferson Davis was his own worst enemy when it came to the running of the war, especially in this battle. His extreme dislike of Johnston led his decisions instead of what was best for the Confederacy. It was interesting to see that the victory Sherman had was not as seamless as some made it out to be. There were serious blunders on all sides.
If you like the Civil War, this is a good book to read.
September 19, 2011
While Castel's "Decision in the West" is still the definitive book on the campaign, McMurry's critical overview of the Atlanta campaign is a great introduction to the events in north Georgia in 1864. Readers may come away with surprising views of the generalship of William T. Sherman, which is a good thing. I agree with reviewers on Amazon & elsewhere that its lack of maps is a pretty big problem. I know the basic layout of the region from Dalton to Jonesboro but still need maps placed in the relevant spots in the text.
January 11, 2013
Detailed tactical explanations of Sherman's campaign to take Atlanta following the battle of Chattanooga, and the retreat of the Confederate army from Chattanooga to Atlanta. It also contains good information about the various commanders in the field, and the politics with which they had to deal. It filled in some details and gaps in my understanding. If you are interested in Civil War military history, this is a good book.
April 7, 2017
"They [Northerner's] resented the higher taxes that took an increasing part of their wealth, the draft that forced thousands of unwilling young men into military service, and the infringements on civil liberties that marked the Lincoln administrations sometimes clumsy efforts to deal with its domestic critics." (3)... [This last claim needs some clarification. Lincoln suspended secessionist agitators-not "critics" the South on the other hand began arresting political opponents to secession before the bombardment of Sumter]
If this book were to be renamed McMurry's own: "Sometimes clumsy efforts" would be a brilliant choice. It's amusing to read McMurry trying desperately to transform Southern political, military, and social incompetency into good things spoiled by meandering Yankees. If only Joseph Johnston or John Bell Hood had McMurray's skill in maneuver they'd have shot their own army, spared Atlanta, and lost the war sooner.
We've had 150 years of Southern apologists writing about the battle for Atlanta and McMurry is neither first nor last in that regard but he is probably among the worst I've read. At least Gone With the Wind has cinematic beauty.
McMurry?
He gives us this: "What Jefferson Davis did- the work of a minister of war- he usually did fairly well. What he sometimes left undone- the work of a commander-in-chief-did not get done. As a result, a partial vacuum often existed at the top of the Confederate military hierarchy." (9) So...Jefferson Davis gets to be judged based on what he did, not what he DIDN'T do despite the fact that what he DIDN'T do is also important and that furthermore what he did was only "fairly well"?! Personally I would argue that minister of war and commander in chief are two positions that are really just synonymous terms or at the very most separate tasks of one job that Jefferson Davis assumed which is something McMurry had agreed on just four pages prior: "The Confederate president was a man of considerable military experience...He took literally his constitutional designation as commander-in-chief of his nation's armed forces." (5) But... no... according to McMurry he didn't take his job that literally otherwise there would never have been "a partial vacuum at the top of the...military hierarchy." View then the Lost Cause in a microcosm: Jefferson Davis was both a well seasoned capable military man who did things very well even though he wasn't very capable and didn't do things very well. Joseph Johnston was both a good commander faced with undue criticism from Davis and Bragg and yet he pulled back from carefully arranged fortifications minus any real plan for defending Atlanta.
The only place where McMurry is clear is on his disdain for Sherman specifically, but the Northern strategy overall. William Tecumseh Sherman in fact couldn't "handle an army well." (51) While Grant's strategy "did not work." (193) The BEST statement on Sherman's conduct from McMurry was that he was "not innept." (183) Now, viewing the situation from the present I'd argue the contrary. Since Grant won and Sherman won I think we can argue that Grant's strategy actually did work and that Sherman having captured Atlanta seems to have been a little bit better than "not innept." In terms of military capabilities McMurry is either unable or unwilling to acknowledge that Sherman was simply a better general. He proved that by smashing the Confederate Army in the West and while I agree thatwhile Lee was a fine tactician and indeed one better than Grant- Grant's strategy proved the superior to Lee's tactical brilliance.
If this book were to be renamed McMurry's own: "Sometimes clumsy efforts" would be a brilliant choice. It's amusing to read McMurry trying desperately to transform Southern political, military, and social incompetency into good things spoiled by meandering Yankees. If only Joseph Johnston or John Bell Hood had McMurray's skill in maneuver they'd have shot their own army, spared Atlanta, and lost the war sooner.
We've had 150 years of Southern apologists writing about the battle for Atlanta and McMurry is neither first nor last in that regard but he is probably among the worst I've read. At least Gone With the Wind has cinematic beauty.
McMurry?
He gives us this: "What Jefferson Davis did- the work of a minister of war- he usually did fairly well. What he sometimes left undone- the work of a commander-in-chief-did not get done. As a result, a partial vacuum often existed at the top of the Confederate military hierarchy." (9) So...Jefferson Davis gets to be judged based on what he did, not what he DIDN'T do despite the fact that what he DIDN'T do is also important and that furthermore what he did was only "fairly well"?! Personally I would argue that minister of war and commander in chief are two positions that are really just synonymous terms or at the very most separate tasks of one job that Jefferson Davis assumed which is something McMurry had agreed on just four pages prior: "The Confederate president was a man of considerable military experience...He took literally his constitutional designation as commander-in-chief of his nation's armed forces." (5) But... no... according to McMurry he didn't take his job that literally otherwise there would never have been "a partial vacuum at the top of the...military hierarchy." View then the Lost Cause in a microcosm: Jefferson Davis was both a well seasoned capable military man who did things very well even though he wasn't very capable and didn't do things very well. Joseph Johnston was both a good commander faced with undue criticism from Davis and Bragg and yet he pulled back from carefully arranged fortifications minus any real plan for defending Atlanta.
The only place where McMurry is clear is on his disdain for Sherman specifically, but the Northern strategy overall. William Tecumseh Sherman in fact couldn't "handle an army well." (51) While Grant's strategy "did not work." (193) The BEST statement on Sherman's conduct from McMurry was that he was "not innept." (183) Now, viewing the situation from the present I'd argue the contrary. Since Grant won and Sherman won I think we can argue that Grant's strategy actually did work and that Sherman having captured Atlanta seems to have been a little bit better than "not innept." In terms of military capabilities McMurry is either unable or unwilling to acknowledge that Sherman was simply a better general. He proved that by smashing the Confederate Army in the West and while I agree thatwhile Lee was a fine tactician and indeed one better than Grant- Grant's strategy proved the superior to Lee's tactical brilliance.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews