America and Iran: A History 1720 to the Present

by John Ghazvinian

An important, urgently needed book--a hugely ambitious, illuminating portrait of the two-century long entwined history of Iran and America, the first book to examine in all its aspects, the rich and fraught relations between these two powers, once allies, now adversaries. By admired historian, author of Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil ("he would do Graham Greene proud" --Kirkus Reviews).

In this rich, fascinating history, John Ghazvinian traces the complex story of the relations of these two powers back to the eighteenth-century's Persian Empire, the subject of great admiration of Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams and for the Iranians, an America seen as an ideal to emulate for its own government.

Drawing on years of archival research both in the US and Iran--including access to Iranian government archives rarely available to western scholars--the Iranian-born, Oxford-educated historian leads us through the four seasons of US-Iran relations: the 'spring' of mutual fascination; the 'summer' of early interactions; the 'autumn' of close strategic ties; and the long, dark 'winter' of mutual hatred.

Ghazvinian, with grasp and a storyteller's ability, makes clear where, how, and when it all went wrong. And shows why two countries that once had such heartfelt admiration for each other became such committed enemies; showing us, as well, how it didn't have to turn out this way.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Middle East, Iran, Politics, American History, World History

688 pages, Hardcover

First published August 4, 2020

About the author

John Ghazvinian is an Iranian-American journalist and historian. He is the Executive Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.

Reviews

[Maziyar Yf · Rating 2 out of 5]

ایران و آمریکا کتابی است از جان قزوینیان ، نویسنده و روزنامه نگار ایرانی ، آمریکایی . او در این کتاب کوشیده تا به روابط پر فراز و نشیب و البته بسیار بیشتر رو به زوال میان ایران و آمریکا بپردازد . اگر قسمت قبل از قاجارها ، ، یعنی بخشی که نویسنده ادعا کرده که فجایع اصفهان با تاخیر در روزنامه های آمریکا انعکاس پیدا می کردند و همدردی و همدلی آمریکاییان را بر می انگیختند را در نظر نگیریم ، کتاب قزوینیان را می توان به سه بخش رابطه در زمان قاجارها ، در زمان پهلوی و سرانجام ، رابطه پس از انقلاب و سقوط پهلوی تقسیم کرد .
اولین و مهمترین نکته بی ارزش بودن مطلق دو بخش رابطه ایران و آمریکا در زمان پهلوی و پس از انقلاب است ، این دو قسمت که اکثریت کتاب را هم شامل شده ، یا به خاطر متن و کلام نویسنده و یا به هر سبب دیگر ، کاملا نظر و نگاه پس از انقلاب را بازگو می کند ، نظر و عقیده ای که شاه را فردی بی اختیار و کاملا در بند آمریکا می داند و ایران پس از انقلاب را در موضعی اخلاقی برتر و بالاتر از آمریکا . به این ترتیب آقای قزوینیان را باید فردی متفاوت با عباس میلانی و یا آرش رییسی نژاد دانست که معتقدند شاه برای منافع ایران ، البته از نگاه خودش با آمریکا گاهی دچار تضاد هم می شده و لزوما در تمامی موارد ، اقدامات شاه با منافع آمریکا هم راستا نبوده است .
جالبترین قسمت کتاب را باید شروع روابط ایران با آمریکا و آغاز یا ادامه سیاست دعوت از قدرت سوم برای محدود کردن نفوذ انگلیس و روسیه در ایران دانست . رابطه ای که با افتتاح کنسول گری آمریکا در ایران و سپس ایران در آمریکا و فرستادن حسینقلی صدرالسلطنه یا همان حاجی واشنگتن معروف رسما شروع شد . نویسنده به اقدامات صدرالسلطنه و تلاش او برای گسترش روابط دوکشور پرداخته ، حاجی واشنگتن در تاریخ ایران شاید فردی پیچیده و جنجالی باشد ، او گرچه با ذبح و شقه شقه کردن گوسفند در بالکن هتل ، آمریکا و آمریکاییان را شوکه کرد اما برای گسترش روابط و گرفتن بودجه از شاه شهید تلاش زیادی کرد ، بودجه ای که آخر سر هم به او نرسید و اولین فرستاده ایران ، با ناکامی به وطن بازگشت .
آمریکایی های سرشناس در ایران :

یکی ازنخستین و سرشناس ترین آمریکایی ها که به ایران آمد جان پرکینز بود . او که عنوان مبلغ به ایران آمده بود ، فعالیت خود را در ارومیه شروع کرد ، جایی که بعدها به یکی از مراکز مهم آموزش و خدمات پزشکی برای آشوری ها تبدیل شد. او در ارومیه مدارس مدرن ابتدا برای پسران و سپس مدرسه شبانه روزی برای دختران افتتاح کرد و با کمک پزشکی آمریکایی خدمات بهداشتی در ارومیه را گسترش داد .

تنها فرق من با این مردم، زادگاهم است و این فرق بزرگی نیست .
هوارد باسکرویل؛ معلم جوانی که هم‌زمان با اوج‌گیری انقلاب مشروطه، به ایران آمد تا در مدرسهٔ مموریال تبریز تدریس کند ، آمریکایی سرشناس دیگری بود که سرنوشت او فقط به آموزش ختم نشد. وقتی محمدعلی‌شاه مجلس را به توپ بست و تبریز در محاصرهٔ نیروهای استبداد قرار گرفت، باسکرویل تصمیم گرفت از کلاس درس بیرون بیاید و به صف مجاهدان مشروطه‌خواه بپیوندد. باسکرویل در جریان نبردی در تبریز کشته شد . این گونه باسکرویل، در حافظهٔ تاریخی ایرانیان، نه فقط یک معلم، بلکه شهید آزادی نام گرفت ، کسی که از مرز ملیت گذشت و به نام انسانیت، در راه مشروطه جان داد.
آمریکاییان سرشناس دیگری مانند دکتر ساموئل جردن و مورگان شوستر معروف هم به ایران آمدند و آن ها هم منشا خدمات بسیاری شدند . این گونه آمریکا و آمریکاییان در ذهن مردم ایران به جایگاهی رفیع رسیدند که احتمالا هیچ قدرت خارجی دیگری در تاریخ ایران به آن نرسیده بود .

دکترین مونرو ، اروپا برای اروپایی‌ها، آمریکا برای آمریکایی‌ها
پنجمین رییس حمهور آمریکا ، جیمز مونرو، سیاستی را بنیان گذاشت که نزدیک به یک قرن پایه و اساس ، سیاست خارجی آمریکا شد و مرز تازه‌ای میان دنیای قدیم و دنیای جدید ترسیم کرد. دکترین مونرو، در ظاهر یک بیانیهٔ دفاعی بود، اما در بطن خود حامل یک پیام ژئوپلیتیک بود: جهان باید به دو حوزهٔ نفوذ تقسیم شود—اروپا برای اروپایی‌ها، آمریکا برای آمریکایی‌ها. و البته، منظور از آمریکا قاره آمریکا و منظور از آمریکایی‌ها مردم ایالات متحده بود . در بی خبری قاجارها از سیاست بین الملل ، این قانون در اصل پایان سیاست استفاده از قدرت سوم برای محدود کردن قدرت های انگلستان و روسیه بود . اصلی که هیچ یک از پادشاهان قاجار و حتی مشروطه خواهان هم جدی بودن آنرا درک نکردند و این گونه روابط و انتظارات را از آمریکا به بن بست رساندند .
به این ترتیب دخالت نکردن آمریکا در انقلاب مشروطه و عدم حمایت کافی ویلسون از شرکت ایران در مجمع جامعه جهانی پس از جنگ جهانی اول ، دلخوری های جدی و اساسی در ایران ایجاد کرد . درک نکردن سیاست بین الملل در دوران رضاشاه هم ادامه داشت ، این بار سیاست آمریکا در دوران جنگ ، مداخله بر اساس منافع خود و متحدینش بود . این گونه روزولت پاسخ رضاشاه در دوران اشغال را با تاخیر داد ونه تنها اقدامی برای پایان اشغال نکرد ، بلکه خود هم با آن همراه شد .
واضح است که بزرگترین ضربه به رابطه هم چنان رو به رشد ایران و آمریکا را کودتا 28 مرداد و سپس حمایت قاطع آمریکا از رژیم دیکتاتوری شاه وارد کرد . آمریکا این گونه ابتدا در کنار بریتانیا استعمارگر ایستاد و سپس کم کم جای بریتانیا را هم گرفت و خود بازیگر اصلی در ایران شد . سیاست صد ساله ایران هم عملا بدون هیچ دستاوردی به پایان رسید .
این گونه بخشهای خوب کتاب به پایان می رسد ، انتهای کتاب پر است از کلماتی ی مانند اورانیوم ، کیک زرد ، سانتریفیوژ ، غنی سازی ، اتم ، میز ، گزینه های روی میز ، برجام ، روح برجام ، فرجام برجام ، 5+1 ، تروییکای اروپایی ، تحریمهای اولیه ، تحریم های ثانویه ، تحریم های فلج کننده و دیگر کلماتی که به قدر کافی و البته بسیار بیشتر از آن روح و روان ملت را خراشیده است .
امروزه بحران میان ایران و آمریکا هم چنان شدت دارد و هیچ پایانی هم برای آن نمی توان متصور شد . در حقیقت امید به داشتن رابطه میان دو کشور ، حتی از امید به ثبات در اقتصاد و کاهش تورم و کسری بودجه هم کمتر است . شرایط جدید اشتباه بودن پیش بینی و تحلیل های بسیاری از افراد ، از جمله آقای قزوینیان را نشان می دهد . در پایان خواننده احتمالا به این نتیجه می رسد که بررسی روابط ایران و آمریکا بسیار زود بوده و برای داشتن دیدگاهی بی طرفانه از روابط دو کشور از 80 سال گذشته ، احتمالا هم چنان باید صبر کرد .

[Mohammad · Rating 4 out of 5]

این کتاب، روابط ایران با امریکا رو از زمانی که کسی امریکا رو نمی شناخت تا چند سال اخیر بررسی میکنه. سخت میشه نویسنده ایرانی امریکایی رو که مواضعش رنگ و بوی چپی میده بیطرف ارزیابی کرد، اما بررسی های تاریخی و تحلیلهاش در مجموع جذاب و خوندنیه.

یکی از نکات جالب خدمات امریکایی ها در اخر قاجار و پهلوی اوله. در صورتی که از اواسط دوره پهلوی دوم رویکرد کشیش مسیحی امریکایی ها به سیاست خارجی یهودی نزدیکتر میکنه و منفعت بیشتری طلب میکنن. این آغاز چالش ایران و امریکاست.
از مسائل جدید مطرح شده اینکه چندجای کتاب مثل زمان بوش پدر و پسر نشون میده با وجود ارسال پیام ایران بر اینکه از مواضعمون در مورد همه چی دست می کشیم ما رو بیخیال شو، امریکا دست رد به سینه ایران میزنه و تهاجمی تر میشه.

کتاب نیازی به اطلاعات پایه خواننده نداره. اگرچه حجیمه ولی روان بودن باعث میشه خوندنش راحت باشه.

[Rowena Abdul Razak · Rating 5 out of 5]

A readable and accessible history of US-Iran relations. It attempts to understand why relations haven’t been restored since the revolution but also points to how much There is to gain for both if diplomatic relations were re-established. All in all an enjoyable read.

[Shahin Keusch · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was such an interesting book. I learned so much about Iran and its relationship with the United States. It was written in a balanced way up until the last sections when it seemed that Iran tried many times to repair the relationship, only to have the US and Israel block any such moves. But that may just be true. 


I particularly enjoyed the sections on Mossadegh ( who is quickly becoming my favorite historical person) and Mohammed Reza Shah (I really lost a lot of respect for him). So many mistakes were made in this period by both Iran and the US. Who knows what could have been.  I also found the section on the nuclear "crisis" very interesting. 


I think it is so important that Iran and the world  repair their relationship. The people of Iran are really suffering. It was looking so good during the Obama administration. But history keeps on repeating itself with Iran getting betrayed, even though they had done all that was asked of them. 


I will give this book 5 stars. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the current events in the Middle East. It was just so educational. 

[Jared · Rating 5 out of 5]

When I was an undergrad, after I declared History as my major my roommate asked me, "Why history?" I responded, "Because there's nothing more interesting than learning the truth." It's books like America and Iran that remind of why I love history and why it's so important to study it and keep it in our thoughts as we witness emotionally charged political events and policy decisions.

As John Ghazvinian mentions at the start of his book... if you ask an American where the US-Iran story begins, they'd say 1979 (the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran). If you ask an Iranian they'd say 1953 (the CIA's overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh). But both sides ignore the long and colorful history between the two nations, and how the recent hostilities were almost an accident of history--and one that could still potentially change.

America and Iran is a well-written, accessible revisionist history of US-Iranian relations from 1720 to the present. Ghazvinian explores the relationship from both sides; doing an exemplary job of laying out the sociopolitical climate of both countries and explaining the domestic and international pretexts that laid the foundation for the 1953 and 1979 conflicts. The book continues up to the US's unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Pres. Trump, and finishes with the author musing on the current state of affairs. Although Ghazvinian admits it's not his place as a historian to provide policy recommendations, he essentially does so, albeit in a rather evenhanded and scholarly way.

It's clear to the reader the author--an Iranian-American--would prefer for the US and Iran to get along better than they do, and that there were so many chances for our shared history to evolve differently. In that regard, this is a very unusual history book. It has an almost palpable moralizing tone to it. Nevertheless, it's understandable. Overall a very good book and one I'd recommend to anyone interested in Western or Central Asian history, political science, or international relations.

[Isaac · Rating 2 out of 5]

What starts off as an interesting history falls apart somewhere around the Carter administration. Instead of a balanced account of the complications of the America-Iran relationship, we're presented with a myopic narrative in which Iran has shown nothing but non-stop eagerness to repair its relationship with the US, only to be unfairly rebuffed time and time again. What's standing between these two? The all-mighty Israel, which manages to control nearly all events on the world stage. Is there an element of truth in this argument? Sure, but the reality is more complex and I would have expected a more balanced analysis given the strong start to this book.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had this book on my shelf for the past couple years because I found the topic something that piqued my interest. After I had started reading the book, I learned that the situation between Israel and Iran was escalating, so this book was certainly timely.

I learned a lot from this book. Prior to recent times, Iranians and Americans were fascinated with each other's countries. For example, "For generations of New England Puritans, especially, raised on years of Sunday school and Bible study, Persia was forever the of the Three Magi-the 'wise men from the East' who come to Bethlehem bearing gold, frankincense, and myrrh for the baby Jesus." Americans were enraged when a war started between Afghan rebels against the cruel Ottomans. Persia was sacred to many Americans. Young Americans learned about King Xerxes, and he was used as an example for the letter X for teaching students how to read and write. Persians were fascinated by the US.

At times Iran was a better ally to the US than the United Kingdom despite these two countries claim that they have a "special relationship." Americans loved seeing exhibits from Persia and Persians loved hearing about the US. Visitors from Persia found the US impressive with its modernity.

Then, as we know, things changed. John Ghazvinian wrote an excellent book that people who want to learn about the relationship between the US and Iran should read. It really provides a historical context that explains how we got to where we are today.

[Ali Nazifpour · Rating 3 out of 5]

قضاوت درباره این کتاب دشوار است. در آغاز این کتاب از دوران قاجار به ریشه روابط ایران و آمریکا می‌پردازد حتی پیش از آن‌که روابط رسمی شروع شود. این تکه از کتاب فوق‌العاده است و خواندنش حتی برای متخصصین نیز مفید چون حقیقتا اغلب کتابهای تاریخی درباره این موضوع از کودتای ۲۸ مرداد شروع می‌کنند و از آغاز روابط غافل می‌شوند اما دانستن درباره این پیش‌زمینه بسیار مفید است. اما هنگامی که کتاب از این آغاز درخشان دور می‌شود و به امروز نزدیک می‌شود نکته تازه‌ای دربر ندارد. این را هم می‌توان پذیرفت چون مخاطب کتاب خواننده غربی است که این مسائل را نمی‌داند و ممکن است آشنایی با این جنبه‌ها بسیار مفید باشد. البته اگر بگذریم از اشتباهات متعدد، مثلا این‌که نویسنده نوشته که دولت کارتر پس از انقلاب فقط با لیبرال‌های دولت موقت مذاکره کرده و نه با اطرافیان آیت‌الله خمینی که یعنی نویسنده مذاکرات مفصل آمریکا با آیت‌الله بهشتی را نادیده گرفته است. اما هنگامی که کتاب به دوره باراک اوباما می‌رسد روایتی آن‌چنان جانب‌دارانه و یکسونگرانه ارائه می‌کند که انگار می‌شد در روزنامه کیهان هم چاپ شود و قطعا به زده شدن مخاطب غربی هم منجر خواهد شد و هرچه کتاب رشته کرده بود پنبه می‌شود تا همدردی مخاطب آمریکایی نسبت به ایران جلب شود. بنابراین شروع کتاب عالی، وسط آن متوسط، و پایان آن بسیار بد است

من کتاب را با ترجمه محسن عسگری جهقی خواندم که ترجمه بسیار ضعیفی بود که اندکی از سطح گوگل ترنسلیت فراتر بود. تقریبا تلفظ یک اسم درست ضبط نشده بود و سراسر کتاب پر از اشتباهات خنده‌دار بود، مثلا این که آمریکا خودش را یک قدرت خوشخیم می‌داند

[Hunter Hall · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was, undoubtedly, one of the best history books I’ve read, and one that should be required reading for people interested in US relations with Iran and the broader Middle East. It was insightful; it honestly assessed the intentions and moves of everyone involved, pulling no punches; and it was well-written, with clear research and context balanced with phrases like “here to see a man about regime change” or “nuking each other off the face of the planet.”

My main critique is that the writing became repetitive and, at times, a little hyperbolic. Everything was “for the first time ever” or “the most pressure ever” or “the closest in their history”, and so by the end of the book I didn’t trust the author’s comparisons through time.

[emily · Rating 5 out of 5]

Truly one of my favorites this year— Ghazvinian presents the history of Iranian/US relations over the past 300 years (covers the 1720s' british settlers in Bostons' Persophilia) as a cogent, intriguing story that I had a hard time putting down. My main takeaway from this book is that, at every possible opportunity, the US-Isr@el-UK axis of evil has strengthened autocratic rulers in Iran who allow them to plunder Iran of their natural resources for pennies on the dollar. The pennies, of course, go directly to the shah. And, in response to the uncountably large numbers of olive branches presented by the Iranian government, the US cuts deals where they militantly police Iran’s commitments while exclusively failing to honor their own. Here is my (highly lacking) review of the book, touching on my favorite parts:

In the present day, the idea of a “nuclear Iran” has enamored the American legislature with unilateral support from AIPAC. This is, of course, laughable, as Iran has not even reached the double digits in uranium enrichment (19.75% is required for energy, which Iran desperately needs as a result of the devastating sanctions IMPOSED BY THE US that prevent them from refining their own oil, and 90% is required for a nuclear weapon). The evidence is indisputable, as Iran is the only country that has given the IAEA a blank check as to its investigative privileges, and the result of countless illegal American and Israeli drones is an admission in released government documents that they are certain that Iran is nowhere near developing a nuclear capability. Moreover, as Iran proved in the Iraq-Iran war (really all of the global superpowers + Iraq vs. Iran), even when Iraq used chemical weapons on Iranians and Iranians had the proven capability to develop and use chemical weapons themselves, they did not because:

“Ayatollah Khomeini considered all weapons of mass destruction— nuclear, chemical, or biological— to be a sin against Islam. They were a Western abomination, he said, the kind of flashy foreign novelty the shah had been excessively enamored of.” (Ghazvinian, 453)

Moreover,

“Israel’s response [to forecasted peace talks between the Obama administration and Iran] was to assassinate another Iranian nuclear scientist. On January 11, 2012, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a thirty-two-year-old physicist working at the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, was killed in broad daylight, along with his driver… one day day before the attack, the head of Israel’s military, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, had told a parliamentary panel that 2012 would be a ‘critical year’ for Iran, in part because of ‘things that happen to it unnaturally.’” (Ghazvinian, 516)

This is obviously a political tactic (ratcheted up to its most concerning height in November 2012 when Isnotreal threatened war with Iran during Obama’s reelection campaign, an embarrassingly transparent arbitrary deadline used to influence the course of American politics.

Britain has been a largely historical actor, claiming full ownership over Iranian oil reserves and robbing Iran of trillions of dollars’ worth of oil, limiting the Iranian (the shah’s) share to $5-20 million per year. The near-unanimous 1953 win of Mossadeq, then, who won the hearts of his constituents through pledging to nationalize Iran’s oil supplies to directly benefit the Iranian public, frightened the axis of evil. So much so that the US (with support from Britain) staged a coup, instating the wildly unpopular Mohammed Reza Shah, known for his repressive regime, with public executions becoming the norm. One can only imagine, if the Iranian secret service had staged a coup of an American president in favor of one sympathetic to the Islamic republic, how much public backlash there would be. Not to mention that this theoretical American president (as in Mossadeq’s case) was so revered by his constituents that he had to tell his police to protect his detractors. In order to understand this point, a quote on why the Islamic republic has survived to this day despite the proven track record of the Iranian people to stage a revolution:

“For starters, it is worth remembering that a people who perceive themselves to be under siege from a foreign power will not generally turn against their own leaders. One is hard-pressed to find examples from history in which a nation subjected to economic embargoes, currency debasements, medical shortages, sanctions, acts of terror, drone flights, computer viruses, and threats of war— all directed at it from a hostile overseas power— has reacted with anything more than a stalwart show of patriotic defiance and unity.” (Ghazvinian, 536)

And another, when Britain took Iran to the UN to protest Iran’s sovereignty over its own natural resources:

“Mossadeq found it ironic that Britain claimed Iran’s actions were a threat to world peace. ‘Having first concentrated its warships along our coasts and paratroopers at nearby bases,’ Britain now ‘makes a great parade of its love for peace,’ he mused. ‘It required a deficient sense of humor, to suggest that a nation as weak as Iran can endanger world peace… Iran has stationed no gunboats in the Thames.’” (Ghazvinian, 177)

Finally, a quote mainly interesting to me since IAD is the airport I fly into to visit my parents. I am revolted to learn this is the legacy of its namesake.

“Dulles was ‘licking his chops’ after Iran and became such a proponent of foreign-policy-by-coup that he had to be told, ironically by [Kermit] Roosevelt, that ‘you just can’t go around the world doing this kind of thing.’ Nevertheless… his name [is] still associated with every flight into and out of Washington’s largest airport.” (Ghazvinian, 202).

[I. David · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Historical Context Behind the Endless Hostility Between America and Iran

Please visit I. David’s blog at: https://www.goodreads.com/author/show...

In America and Iran: A History 1720 to the Present author John Ghazvinian describes the history of the relationship between America and Iran. Ghazvinian is a historian, author and former journalist who was born in Iran and educated in England. He is currently the Executive Director of the Middle East Center in the School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. He wrote this history to provide context for the current status of the relationship between America and Iran. And he has done as excellent job.

America and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since 1979 when, after the Islamic Revolution, Iranian students stormed the United States embassy in Tehran and held American diplomats hostage for more than 400 days. Efforts at rapprochement since then have been unsuccessful with each side blaming the other for increasing hostility. Ghazvinian’s warm feelings for both Iran and America are clearly evident in this book. He seems like a man who cannot understand why two beloved feuding relatives cannot put their petty differences behind them and just start to get along.

Ghazvinian asserts that, from a historical perspective, there was every reason to believe that America and Iran should have had friendly relations. He explains that, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Iran was dominated by Russia and England. Iranians thought that America, a former colony that had obtained its own freedom from England, would be sympathetic to Iran’s plight and would help Iran wrest its freedom from the two European imperialists.

America, however, took little interest in Iran until the early 1950s when, to retain its rights in Iranian oil, England convinced American diplomats that Iran’s newly elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, was going to align the country with the Soviet Union. In the shadow of the Cold War the Central Intelligence Agency, working with England, engineered a coup that replaced Mosaddegh with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

America supported the Shah and his ruthless dictatorship for the next 26 years until he was finally overthrown by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Ghazvinian explains that America’s participation in the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s freely elected government and its continuing support of the Shah have made Iranians suspicious of virtually every American action. Because of the 1979 hostage crises and the subsequent belligerence of Iran’s leaders, Americans have been equally suspicious of every Iranian action.

But this endless dispute between America and Iran appears to be as much a matter of perception as it is a matter of reality. Ghazvanian demonstrates this difference between reality and perception through Iran’s recent effort to develop a nuclear capability. The reality is that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear capability. The perception in America, according to its government and the media, is that Iran is hell-bent on developing a nuclear bomb which it could use to destroy Israel or even the United States. The perception in Iran, as described by Ghazvinian, is that Iran is only interested in using its “nuclear capability” for peaceful purposes, that Iran would not be interested in building a bomb because such a weapon would be against the principals of Islam, and that the position of the American government and the American media is based largely on influence from Israel which is mostly concerned that improved relations between America and Iran would cause Israel to lose its position as America’s most important ally in the Middle East.

Because America and Iran have lacked diplomatic relations for so long each country has been forced to develop its own interpretation of the other’s words and actions. Misunderstandings and misrepresentations are unavoidable. In describing the combustible relationship between the two countries authoritative resources are likely to provide conflicting viewpoints. Therefore, while America and Iran: A History 1720 to the Present is a highly readable book that comprehensively covers the history of the relationship between America and Iran it should be viewed as an excellent starting point for further understanding of that relationship. I give it a 4 star rating.

Thanks to #netgalley and to Alfred A. Knopf for my early release copy of this book in exchange for my honest review.

[Zach Clark · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great primer for those uninitiated with Iran's complex history but fails with some of its post 1979 observations. The objective eye of a historian begins to flail in the latter chapters, seemingly falling for the trappings of a less informed geopolitical analyst.The author seems to intentionally mischaracterize Iran's strategic decision to support terrorism abroad. This is apparent in a lack of input on Iran's decision to provide safe harbor to al-Qaeda'a senior most leaders, directing the Khobar Towers attack, and the successful and attempted assassination of several diplomats to name a few.

[Margie · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5 rounded up for keeping me thoroughly engaged for almost 700 pages. The older history was completely new to me and the modern history provided much food for thought.

[Steven Z. · Rating 4 out of 5]

In a world where the war in Ukraine and economic sanctions dominate foreign policy discussions relations with Iran could have been pushed to the back burner instead they are now coming to the fore. As the Russian army continues its bloody war against Ukrainian civilians, the need to sanction Moscow’s energy industry which finances its genocide is paramount. The Biden administration is focusing on increasing the world’s supply of energy and to this end has reengaged with Iran after the Trump administration abrogated the Iran nuclear deal negotiated during the Obama administration. The odds of coming to a quick agreement with Iran is very low, in part because Russia was a signatory of the original agreement and Iran’s contorted history with the United States since the 1950s. To understand the background to the American relationship with Iran which emphasizes the viewpoints from Washington and Tehran John Ghazvinian, a former journalist, and currently the Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania has filled this major gap with his new book, AMERICA AND IRAN: A HISTORY 1720 TO THE PRESENT. Written in a clear and concise style Ghazvinian provides insightful analysis, a deep understanding of the issues between Iran and the United States, and with a degree of subjectivity focuses on the motivations and actions of the major historical figures involved.

In tackling the American-Iranian conundrum one comes across many watershed moments and dates be it the competition between England and Russia during the 19th century through World War II better known as “the Great Game,” the emergence of the United States filling the vacuum created by London’s withdrawal from the region, the American “love affair” with Reza Pahlavi Shah beginning with the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism spear headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 1979 hostage situation, the Iran-Iraq War, and the overt and covert war between the two countries that continues to this day. For scholars and the general public these issues are quite familiar, however, Ghazvinian brings a deft pen and immense knowledge in presenting a fresh approach to this historical relationship.

Ghazvinian goal was objectivity, hoping to avoid casting dispersions on either side, and dispensing with the ideological baggage that has encumbered past writings on the subject. Despite this goal, periodically he falls into the trap of bias. Having been born in Iran he conducted ten years of research and was allowed access to Iranian sources that were not available to most western scholars. One of Ghazvinian’s major themes is that the United States and Iran, at least in the 18th and 19th centuries through the end of World War I could have been natural allies. Decade after decade Iranian governments looked to the United States as a “third force” that could counteract the pressures of Britain and Russia. Presenting the early American thoughts of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, Iran perceived the United States as an anti-colonial power so there seemed to be a community of fate between the two countries that Ghazvinian successfully investigated.

Ghazvinian explores America’s romanticized version of “Persophilia” and Washington’s impact on Iran through missionary work that provided hospitals, schools, and trade with Tehran. It is clear that the United States, despite its interest in Iran was hindered by an amateurish group of “diplomats” who were sent to Tehran during the late 19th century to promote American interests. Most had little or no foreign experience and they did little to foster a new relationship. With the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, Iran could no longer play off the two competing powers against each other so Tehran invited the United States to assume the role of counterbalancing the “new” allies to the point of inviting and allowing an American citizen who would become a hero to the Iranian people, W. Morgan Shuster to take control of Iran’s convoluted finances. The author goes on to trace Iranian attitudes and hopes that were fostered by Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points and the concept of self-determination.

A second dominant theme that Ghazvinian introduces is Iran’s battle to achieve modernity and not being viewed as a backward desert kingdom that was more than a source of oil. To that end it seemed that no matter who was the Shah this issue had to be dealt with which resulted in policies that provided wealth and a lifestyle for the Pahlavi Dynasty but poverty and ignorance for the masses.

The concept that historian J.C. Hurewitz developed dealing with the Middle East that regional actors “never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity” applies to Iranian-American relations after World War II. Ghazvinian skillfully explores the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq and his removal from power in 1953 by the CIA and as he does in a number of instances sets straight the historical record. The issue for the United States was its fear of communism as is evidenced by the Russian refusal to withdraw from northern Iran in 1946. Supposedly the stalemate was settled when Harry Truman issued an ultimatum to Moscow, which Ghazvinian points out that there was no record of such an ultimatum. However, the fear of Russian expansion in the Persian Gulf drove American policy. In addition to this fear of the Soviet Union, Washington had to deal with British arrogance and stupidity (repeatedly referring to Tehran as Persian pip-squeaks) in trying to establish a sound relationship with the Mosaddeq government.

Mosaddeq was not a communist, he was an Iranian nationalist, but in the American diplomatic lexicon nationalist meant communist. The result was that the Eisenhower administration ignored reports that Mosaddeq was “a Western educated aristocrat with no reason to be attracted to socialism or communism.” Rather than listen to the advice of his own spies and bureaucrats, Eisenhower supported a policy designed to undermine Mosaddeq’s government which would lead to his overthrow and assist the return of the Shah to Tehran where despite his autocratic and megalomaniac tendencies the US would support at various levels until his overthrow in 1979.

Another major theme put forth by Ghazvinian is the role played by the 1953 coup in Iranian ideology. From the end of World War II to the arrival of the Ayatollah Khomeini the Shah was faced with three domestic enemies that wanted to curb his power or overthrow his monarchy - the Iranian left made up of a diverse group of Marxists that leaned toward the Soviet Union, the religious establishment, and a coalition of secular liberals, democrats, and progressive nationalists. Despite the diverse nature of the opposition, they all believed that the 1953 coup could be repeated at any time should the Shah’s reign end. This belief forms the background to any American-Iranian negotiation, particularly the 1979 hostage situation.

Ghazvinian cleverly compares the attitudes of the different presidents towards the Shah. For Eisenhower, named the “coup president” by historian Blanche Wiesen Cook, his policy was driven by the anti-communism of the Dulles brothers to provide the Shah with loans and military hardware. Once John F. Kennedy assumed the oval office he put pressure on the Shah to reform his reign, but once he was assassinated the Shah was relieved since Lyndon Johnson was too busy with Vietnam and appreciated an anti-communist ally who would help control rising Arab nationalism and the Persian Gulf. The key was Richard M. Nixon who developed a friendship with the Shah during the Eisenhower administration and with pressure from the likes of Henry Kissinger to honor any military requests that the Shah asked for resulted in billions for the American military-industrial complex and advanced weaponry for the Iranian army. The result was a man who believed he had card blanche from the United States resulting in violent domestic opposition against the Shah in Iran. Finally, Jimmy Carter’s human rights rhetoric scared the Shah, but he too would give in to the Shah’s demands until his overthrow.

Ghazvinian’s discussion of the rise of Khomeini and American ignorance concerning the proliferation of his ideas and support in Iran is well thought out. From exile in Iraq and later Paris the United States made no attempt to understand the reasons behind Khomeini’s rise and the conditions of poverty and oppression that existed among the Iranian masses. Washington’s blindness and tone deafness is highlighted by the appointment of former CIA Director Richard Helms as US Ambassador to Iran in 1973.

Once the Shah is overthrown Ghazvinian explains the different factions that existed in Iran and that it was not a foregone conclusion that Islamic fundamentalism would be victorious. American intelligence underestimated Khomeini’s skill as a politician, not just a religious leader. The reader is exposed to intricate details about the creation of the Islamic Republic, the hostage situation, and the Iran-Iraq War which found the US playing a double game of supporting both sides. This would lead to the Iran-Contra scandal that showed the duplicitous nature of the Reagan administration that should have ended the Reagan presidency.

Though Ghazvinian breezy history is immensely readable it becomes biased as he delves into the post 1988 Iranian-American relations. The author discusses efforts by George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama to reset the relationship between Teheran and Washington ultimately to be thwarted by disinterest after the Soviet Union collapsed and the role of the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu whose bombast was designed to block any Iranian-American rapprochement. At times slipping into partiality, Ghazvinian downplays the bombast of the Iranian government and its avoidance of the nuclear issue, its role in Lebanon with its ally Hezbollah, and arming Hamas in the West Bank. I realize the many flaws and general stupidity of Bush’s neocon gang, but the soft presentation of Iran under Mahmoud Ahmadinjad also leaves a lot to be desired.

Despite some areas that could be developed further, Ghazvinian has produced a needed reappraisal of his subject and the quality of the writing makes the book an easy read for the general public which makes it a valuable contribution despite some shortcomings.

[Kemp · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting. I’m glad it started in 1720 so that a deeper and richer review of Iran’s history was possible. It also was far enough back to cover the European colonial age and its impact on Iran. Several books I’ve read in the last eighteen months highlight attempts at nation building and manipulation. Britain and Russia jockeyed for influence and control over Iran from the chapters of the book. The fight for Iran’s oil started as The Great War waned. Russia was guilty of nation building and influence peddling long before the communism took control.

Iran’s desire for diplomatic relations with the United States and their attempts at establishing it were enlightening. And disappointing in their failure. I knew the US supported the Shah and even propped up his regime but Ghazvinian’s description of the CIA’s support of the British instigated coup in 1953 really started the US and Iran on a combative course deferred only during the Shah’s rule.

John Ghazvinian seems to have researched this book extensively. It was both interesting and confusing.

Not having a perspective of Iran, I reached out to a coworker who is Iranian to get her perspective. Turns out the author is the cousin of her friend. Less than six degrees of freedom and, while it doesn’t alleviate the need to question what is written, it strengthens my tendency to accept Ghazvinian’s points. Perhaps I’m guilty of familiarity bias.

My confusions are how much to believe the author’s assertions of Iran’s attempts at reconciliation with the US. He cites numerous examples of Israeli influence to manipulate US support (which I find easy to believe) but not the only force stifling reconciliation. Ghazvinian cites efforts by Iran to free US hostages in Syria at the behest of Bush’s commenting he would view it a favorable move by Iran but failed to reciprocate in a quid-pro-quo which led to Iran’s president being forced out of office. He also cites Obama’s inauguration speech and a video recorded for the Iranian people attempting to open dialogue that was thwarted by both Israeli lobbyists and government hardliners including Hillary Clinton.

Some injustices are apparent. An easy example is depriving Iran of low-grade nuclear material used in medical treatments like cancer forcing suspense or cancellation of treatments. Iran needs to process some low-grade material or purchase it. Ghazvinian says they’ve run out of their medical supplies that’s a shame and the US shouldn’t be stopping it.

It seems the lack of communication between governments made missed opportunities more likely and that, as much as Israeli lobbying, have prevented reconciliation. The real losers here are the people of Iran.

A really interesting first half providing a historical perspective on Persia but more of a political tit-for-tat in the back half. Great fading to good as my reading progressed.

[Ana Diamond · Rating 4 out of 5]

John writes ambitiously and unreservedly, with deep passion and clear rigour, and he has a great grip of Iran-US relations. If you want to have a glimpse into that relationship, this is a great book and does not disappoint.

My only concern lies with John’s impartiality and whether he has been able to maintain it throughout. Although his criticism toward the hardliners of the Iranian government and the traditional “war-mongering hawks of the DC” was evident, I felt he put too much emphasis on certain parts of history while ignoring others (did he do this intentionally? Or did he feel sympathetic to certain actions, leading to certain events?)

For example, the lengthy chapter on Mossadeq and the 1953 coup would make an unfamiliar reader think that all of Iran’s problems were caused by the coup and that all would have ended well had the US + U.K. not orchestrated it.

Or another example: John was also very eager to portray the Rafsanjani administration as the “gate opener of Iran to the world” and giving an impression of him as the “lesser of the evils”, ignoring that Rafsanjani was responsible for some of the most cruel chain murders in Iran. But then again, the human rights record of the IRI was never a central component of the book anyway.

I would’ve appreciated a bit more stern stance on Iran, and certainly the conclusion I felt was too forcibly optimistic (re: possibility of being strategic allies). For as long as there are hard liners in place, making a career out of this enmity with the US-Iran, there will be no peace (similarly certain lobbyists in the US).

In every chaos lies opportunity, and sometimes you perpetuate a chaos yourself in order to foster opportunities. And that’s where Iran is currently at. But here’s hoping for better days...

Overall 4/5. Thank you, John.

[Jacob Hudgins · Rating 5 out of 5]

A splendid, big-hearted history.

If you’ve ever asked the question, “why do they hate us so much?”, this book will make you say, “oh, I get it.” The author traces the surprisingly close relationship of America and Iran through the centuries. He has a special gift for noting the missed opportunities the nations have had for real breakthroughs of understanding and partnership at pivotal moments. As time goes by, these moments add up and the effect is tragic.

I especially appreciated the Iranian perspective. It was fascinating to hear from the other side in a way that American media rarely portray.

Ghazvinian is very critical of Israel and the influence Israel has over American foreign policy. He also seems to lay a lot of blame for the disconnect at the feet of America. Oddly, once he gets into the 1980s, he begins to treat the Iranian government as monolithic. I wonder if this is because it is harder to get sources that are more current (or maybe bc the old guys are out of power?). At times he seems overly apologetic for Iranian positions. But on the whole, it was fascinating and powerful.

[Anna · Rating 5 out of 5]

Such a good book explaining why Iran-US relations are the way they are. I loved learning about the history of Persia in the beginning of the book. I feel like looking back so many US presidents could’ve made different choices and things would’ve been so much better now for US-Iran relations. But that is why we learn history, so we can know not to make the same mistakes.
I found the part about Mossadegh especially interesting. And the CIA’s part in all of it appalling. The Iran nuclear crises part was especially eye-opening. Especially that we could’ve a nuclear deal so much earlier on if not for other countries interfering in politics here in the US. Overall, I think this is such a good overview of history in the past few hundred years. I hope one day, the people who descend from ancient Persia and the people of the US can become friends once again.

[Miguel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thorough and very engaging history of Iran and the impact that the US has had (and vice versa) over the past 200 years. There’s so much ‘new’ here for someone not well versed in the topic. Standouts for me were early involvement of American Christian missionaries as well as the somewhat ham fisted initial stabs at diplomacy from the US in the mid 18th century. Perhaps the best section is the one about Mosaddegh which the author does an admirable job in teasing out just the right amount of background on this interesting character and leads one to think about a lot of what-ifs had the coup in ’53 not been successful. The meatiest section is of course on the revolution and the ousting of the Shah, but this isn’t before touching on the Shah’s tenure. There’s also quite a bit on the nuclear negations and the US shortcomings in partnering with Iran in the wake of 9/11. The writing is top notch and though the author is clearly very sympathetic to Iran, it doesn’t feel dogmatic or solely one sided.

[Catherine Woodman · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a fascinating telling of the relationship between the United States and Iran going back to before the US was an independent country. The book starts there, when things were good, and then goes through a very detailed retelling of how it went wrong over and over again up until the present day.
Iran had so much promise as an ally in the Middle East. Somehow along the way that perspective got warped. Iran was different religiously than many of the other countries in the region with a predominantly Shiite population, and one where the separation between mosque and state was established. They had a colonial relationship with Britain they were eager to shed and had no love of Russia back in the beginning of the 20th century. There were so many mistakes made along the way, but the fist one was installing the Shah in 1953, which squashed democracy in its infancy and as time went on, the Shah made the country ripe for revolution. The subsequent chain of events pushed Iran further from the west, and then the demonizing was ramped up to what is possibly the point of no return. Very sad course of events.

[Emad Shahnoushi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Honestly one of the best books I've read about Iran-US relations. I think that often there is this Eurocentric gaze when writing about Iran that tends to get it extremely wrong, but Ghazvinian does no such thing. The book felt like a novel, and the people etched into this history felt like characters you followed along, making this text not only accessible to a wide audience but also one that's intriguing and lacks the generic icy boringness of historical works. It provides a strong analysis of an Iranian perspective that an American audience could use some severe insight on. Absolutely one of my favorites and will be recommending to friends.

[Shayan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great read overall. Definitely recommended. I liked the objective tone of the author throughout the book, stating the facts and great details about a lot of events many Iranians never heard of. However, in the final chapters of the book (post revolution), the author seems to ease his moral criticism of the rulers and brings close to zero attention to many of the regime's violent actions. The most surprising point for me was that Fordow was not mentioned at all in the "atoms for peace" chapter.

[Jeffery James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent history of Iran from the 19th century to the present. The author has a clear agenda in painting Iran as a benevolent actor in the years after the Revolution of 1979. This book is well researched and very well written for such a long academic history. It makes me want to read more on Iran from a more critical perspective.

[Jaylani Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

Awesome book! I really love how author was able to discuss the history of Iran first and then do in details about the relationship of the different emperors and kings and their relationship with USA and presidents of each nation. Excellent research!!

[Eric Siu · Rating 5 out of 5]

A real eye opener and one of the most engaging history books I've ever read.

[Stacey · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was so well researched and written! It's a great book for anyone looking to delve into the world of America's role in the making of the modern Middle East.

[Laura · Rating 5 out of 5]

As fascinating as it is thought-provoking. It took me forever to read because every few pages sparked an hour-long discussion in my house where, whether or not we all reached the same conclusions as Ghazvinian, all learned a lot and gained new perspective. Highly recommend.

[Z · Rating 4 out of 5]

god... the west is sickeningly stupid and racist and absolutely vile. netanyahu you jackass you will pay for your crimes.

[Καιρὸς · Rating 3 out of 5]

I enjoyed this book, but after Reza Khan was overthrown, most of the book devolved into glazing Mossadeq and Iranian reformists like Rafsanjani.

[Joe Ballschneider · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice overview of a tragic relationship. Poor Mossadegh :(

Criminal lack of discussion regarding Taleqani.