What do you think?
Rate this book
Ordinary Vices
The seven deadly sins of Christianity (pride, greed, wrath, envy, lust, gluttony and sloth) represent the abysses of character, whereas Judith Shklar’s “ordinary vices” ― CRUELTY, HYPOCRISY, SNOBBERY, BETRAYAL, and MISANTHROPY ― are merely treacherous shoals, flawing our characters with mean-spiritedness and inhumanity.
Shklar draws from a brilliant array of writers ― Montaigne, Hawthorne and Nietzsche on cruelty, Molière and Dickens on hypocrisy, Jane Austen on snobbery, Conrad and Faulkner on betrayal, Shakespeare and Montesquieu on misanthropy ― to reveal the nature and effects of the vices. She examines their destructive effects, the ambiguities of the moral problems they pose to the liberal ethos, and their implications for government and especially for liberalism as a difficult and challenging doctrine that demands a tolerance of contradiction, complexity, and understands the risks of freedom.
Chapters:
1. Putting Cruelty First
2. Let Us Not be Hypocritical
3. What Is Wrong with Snobbery
4. The Ambiguities of Betrayal
5. Misanthropy
6. Bad Characters for Good Liberals
____
“Shklar sketched the character a "good liberal" would need, in terms of avoiding cruelty, snobbery, misanthropy, and betrayal (and also the self-righteousness that so often comes with fighting the good fight against vice); a dose of hypocrisy was tolerated and could even be useful. She noted that "Kant's character is profoundly negative"; so was hers, because "all our virtues are, in fact, avoidance of vices." It was her psychological insight that enabled her to understand both the power and the danger of utopias-the risk that visions of the good will lead to murderous human experiments-and it is that insight that made her focus on avoidance rather than on fulfillment: on evil rather than on good, on fear rather than on virtue ("because fear is the ultimately evil moral condition"), on injustice rather than on justice- because the sense of injustice corresponds to the universal experience of citizens (or exiles) and to the basic language of politics.” (Stanley Hoffmann)
Shklar draws from a brilliant array of writers ― Montaigne, Hawthorne and Nietzsche on cruelty, Molière and Dickens on hypocrisy, Jane Austen on snobbery, Conrad and Faulkner on betrayal, Shakespeare and Montesquieu on misanthropy ― to reveal the nature and effects of the vices. She examines their destructive effects, the ambiguities of the moral problems they pose to the liberal ethos, and their implications for government and especially for liberalism as a difficult and challenging doctrine that demands a tolerance of contradiction, complexity, and understands the risks of freedom.
Chapters:
1. Putting Cruelty First
2. Let Us Not be Hypocritical
3. What Is Wrong with Snobbery
4. The Ambiguities of Betrayal
5. Misanthropy
6. Bad Characters for Good Liberals
____
“Shklar sketched the character a "good liberal" would need, in terms of avoiding cruelty, snobbery, misanthropy, and betrayal (and also the self-righteousness that so often comes with fighting the good fight against vice); a dose of hypocrisy was tolerated and could even be useful. She noted that "Kant's character is profoundly negative"; so was hers, because "all our virtues are, in fact, avoidance of vices." It was her psychological insight that enabled her to understand both the power and the danger of utopias-the risk that visions of the good will lead to murderous human experiments-and it is that insight that made her focus on avoidance rather than on fulfillment: on evil rather than on good, on fear rather than on virtue ("because fear is the ultimately evil moral condition"), on injustice rather than on justice- because the sense of injustice corresponds to the universal experience of citizens (or exiles) and to the basic language of politics.” (Stanley Hoffmann)
268 pages, Paperback
First published July 1, 1984
26 people are currently reading
1979 people want to read
About the author
Judith N. Shklar
27 books49 followersJudith Shklar was born as Judita Nisse in Riga, Latvia to Jewish parents. Because of persecution during World War II, her family fled Europe over Japan to the US and finally to Canada in 1941, when she was thirteen. She began her studies at McGill University at the age of 16, receiving bachelor of art and master of art degrees in 1949 and 1950, respectively. She later recalled that the entrance rules to McGill at the time required 750 points for Jews and 600 for everyone else. She received her PhD degree from Harvard University in 1955. Her mentor was the famous political theorist Carl Joachim Friedrich, who, she later recalled, only ever offered her one compliment: "Well, this isn't the usual thesis, but then I did not expect it to be." Eventually she became his successor.
Shklar joined the Harvard faculty in 1956, becoming the first woman to receive tenure in Harvard's Government Department in 1971. During her first year in the job, the Department permitted her to stay at home with her first child while writing her first book. When it came time for her tenure decision, the Department dithered, so Shklar proposed a half-time appointment with effective tenure and the title of lecturer, partly because she had three children by then. In 1980, she was appointed to be the John Cowles Professor of Government. Her friend and colleague Stanley Hoffmann once remarked, “she was by far the biggest star of the department.” Hoffmann also called her "the most devastatingly intelligent person I ever knew here."
During her career, Shklar served in various academic and professional capacities. For example, she was active in the committee that integrated the American Repertory Theater into the Harvard community.
Throughout her life, Judith Shklar was known as "Dita." She and her husband, Gerald Shklar, had three children, David, Michael, and Ruth
Shklar joined the Harvard faculty in 1956, becoming the first woman to receive tenure in Harvard's Government Department in 1971. During her first year in the job, the Department permitted her to stay at home with her first child while writing her first book. When it came time for her tenure decision, the Department dithered, so Shklar proposed a half-time appointment with effective tenure and the title of lecturer, partly because she had three children by then. In 1980, she was appointed to be the John Cowles Professor of Government. Her friend and colleague Stanley Hoffmann once remarked, “she was by far the biggest star of the department.” Hoffmann also called her "the most devastatingly intelligent person I ever knew here."
During her career, Shklar served in various academic and professional capacities. For example, she was active in the committee that integrated the American Repertory Theater into the Harvard community.
Throughout her life, Judith Shklar was known as "Dita." She and her husband, Gerald Shklar, had three children, David, Michael, and Ruth
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
Want to read
January 28, 2020"Can one of you Janets get me chalkboard and a copy of Judith Shklar’s Ordinary Vices? Oh, and maybe some warm pretzels! If we goin’ out, I’m going out with a belly full of warm pretzels. Yummy yum yum! Yummy!" - Chidi (Season 4, Episode 10)
And here's a handy guide to other books referenced on The Good Place: https://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_...
And here's a handy guide to other books referenced on The Good Place: https://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_...
June 16, 2020
Idee und Anlage sind bedenkenswert und produktiv. In der Tat ist die Furcht vor der Furcht (und die kann nur aus der Ahnung möglicher Grausamkeit entstehen) ein Grund für die Verbiegung des Charakters. Deshalb muss "Grausamkeit" unter Verdikt gestellt werden, um dem Menschen freie Luft zum Atmen zu geben. Das kann freilich nicht durch den Gnadenakt eines milden Despoten geschehen, sondern nur durch das Recht auf körperliche und geistige Unversehrtheit, wie es nur ein Rechtsstaat mit Gewaltenteilung etc. hervorbringen und garantieren kann. Das System bürgerlicher Rechte erfordert also keine moralisch besonders integeren Persönlichkeiten, sondern trägt der Tatsache Rechnung, dass "wir" so nicht sind und auch nicht sein können. Dennoch weiß Judith Shklar um die Spielräume auch gesetzlich eingehegter Macht, weshalb sie den Charakter mit Blick auf Politiker dann doch nicht ganz und gar für unwichtig hält. Wichtig sei jedoch, nicht ein (notwendig heuchlerisches) Muster persönlicher Vollkommenheit an die Spitze zu wählen, sondern den Wahlmechanismus so zu gestalten, dass er eine quasi negative Selektion garantiert. Den Rest müsse die öffentliche Kontrolle leisten, wie sie aus dem Widerstreit der eifersüchtig einander überwachenden Interessen hervor gehe. (Hier lässt der Marktliberalismus mit seiner "unsichtbaren Hand" grüßen!) Ein durch und durch liberales Konzept also, das überzeugend gegen überkommene Tugendmoral argumentiert, die "Glück" in der Hierarchie der Werte an die erste Stelle rücken will. "Glück" verträgt sich, insofern es ein zutiefst persönliches Gefühl ist, sehr wohl mit Unterordnung unter öffentliche oder persönliche Gewalten. (Eben deswegen kommen so viel mehr Leute mit der Idee eines im Wortsinne "paradiesischen" Lebens, in dem ein Herr(Gott) für sie denkt und handelt, klar, als Leute sich für die "Freiheit" erwärmen können, die eben deshalb immer gotteslästerlich ist und etwas Teuflisches hat.) - Soweit, so einverstanden. Das Problem ist, dass dieses am Beispiel der amerikanischen Verfassungsgeschichte abgehandelte Ideal gerade in den USA nicht funktioniert und auch nie funktioniert hat. Wenn Shklar anmerkt, dass der (in der Theorie) fantastische Zusatz zur amerikanischen Verfassung, dass Strafen verboten seien, die eine besondere Grausamkeit darstellen, im Prinzip nie zur Anwendung kommen musste, dann übersieht sie die Praxis der Hinrichtungen auf dem elektrischen Stuhl, die z.T. jahrelangen Aufenthalte in Todeszellen usw. Sie nimmt Bezug auf den Faschismus, aber weder der Vietnam- noch der Korea- Krieg kommen vor und wenn es um "Verrat", "Heuchelei" usw. geht, findet in ihrem Buch keine amerikanische Realpolitik statt. Zu diesem Manko gesellt sich ein darstellerisches Problem: Shklar wollte ausdrücklich unter Zuhilfenahme literarischer Vorbilder "Geschichten" über die behandelten Sachverhalte erzählen und nicht systematisch oder theoretisch an die sie interessierenden Fragen heran gehen. Auf diese Weise werden eine Menge Fragen angeschnitten, die zum Weiterdenken geradezu auffordern, deren Aktualisierung (aus Rücksicht auf ihre akademische Stellung?) jedoch nie vorgenommen wird. Mit der Zeit werden Shakespeare, Nietzsche und Thackerey (zumindest) für denjenigen, der sie auch schon mal gelesen hat, zunehmend uninteressant und die betreffenden Passagen langatmig. Man möchte dann aus der Geschichte heraussteigen ins Hier und Jetzt und sich fragen, was zu tun wäre, um das skizzierte Ideal in Realität zu setzen, doch das verweigert die Autorin so konsequent, dass man das Gefühl bekommt, dass sie solche Fragen entweder nicht beantworten will, oder sie einfach nicht beantworten kann. So gesehen bin ich auf die euphoprische Besprechung des Buches, in der der Text als DIE Wiederentdeckung des Jahres im Bereich politikwissenschaftlicher Literatur erscheint, einfach nur reingefallen. Allerdings geht mir das in jüngster Zeit öfter so. Das hat wohl damit zu tun, dass sich hier eine Generation literaturkritisch engagierter Redakteure etc. zu Wort meldet, der es - ich sage das nicht unbedingt abwertend - schlicht und ergreifend an Leseerfahrung fehlt. Ich weiß, die Jugend kann alles besser und die Digitalisierungstendenzen befördern den schon länger sichtbaren Jugendkult; in Philosophie und Literatur, vielleicht auch im Bereich der Politikwissenschaften und Geschichte zählen allerdings die Jahre. Und mit der Zeit wird man vorsichtiger, was die großen Überraschungen und das scheinbar Noch- Nie- Dagewesene anbelangt. Manchmal hat der/ die Redakteur/in einfach noch nicht genug und womöglich noch nichts Besseres gelesen. Kurz: Das Thema ist anregend und das Buch sei denjenigen empfohlen, die mal sehen wollen, wie man mit Literatur umgehen kann, wenn man sie auf ein bestimmtes Thema hin liest und "ausschlachtet". Wer allerdings mit den so angebotenen Anregungen selbst (noch) nichts anfangen kann, der sollte die Finger von einem Text lassen, der in sich einfach nicht mit seinem Gegenstand fertig geworden ist. Trotzdem gut, dass ich nun Frau Shklar kenne. Drei Sterne sind immerhin ok.
October 19, 2020
Judith Shklar is a philosopher I learned about from reading Aurelian Craiutu's history of the idea of moderation in 20th-century political philosophy, Faces of Moderation: The Art of Balance in an Age of Extremes. Shklar was born in 1928 in Latvia to a Jewish family that fled to the U.S. and later Canada to escape anti-Semitic violence in the years leading up to World War II. She's best known for her idea of a "liberalism of fear," according to which the greatest evil is cruelty, and the job of liberalism is to rein in this worst and most vicious habit of human character. This book, Ordinary Vices, gets at that idea by attempting to remedy a lack of attention in the history of Western philosophy to vices in contrast to virtues.
The first two chapters were the most interesting to me, where she introduces her project of pondering vices, and then talks about the implications of ranking cruelty as the worst in a hierarchy of vices. This is where most of the philosophical meat of the book lies. I think it's an important and underrated point that in a pluralistic society people give different ranks to different vices, and how people rank vices has huge implications for political systems and policies. In subsequent chapters she presents essays about the complexities of other modern vices: hypocrisy, snobbery, disloyalty, and misanthropy. The essays take their direction from literary examples such as Shakespeare and Nathanial Hawthorne as well as from Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers like Montaigne, Montesquieu, Machiavelli, and Kant, and mostly revolve around drawing out the implications of these vices for public and political life as well as for interpersonal relationships. She highlights how the vices can have some positive (or neutral) as well as negative roles for political liberalism - for example, a degree of misanthrope drives some of the constraints of liberal democracy that aim at restraining autocratic cruelties.
Though she doesn't mention Alidair MacIntyre's book After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, which came out a few years before Ordinary Vices and became a foundational work for modern virtue ethics, Shklar's study is an interesting one to read in conjunction with thinking about virtue ethics. Over all, a readable, thought-provoking book full of interesting insights about the human condition and morality.
The first two chapters were the most interesting to me, where she introduces her project of pondering vices, and then talks about the implications of ranking cruelty as the worst in a hierarchy of vices. This is where most of the philosophical meat of the book lies. I think it's an important and underrated point that in a pluralistic society people give different ranks to different vices, and how people rank vices has huge implications for political systems and policies. In subsequent chapters she presents essays about the complexities of other modern vices: hypocrisy, snobbery, disloyalty, and misanthropy. The essays take their direction from literary examples such as Shakespeare and Nathanial Hawthorne as well as from Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers like Montaigne, Montesquieu, Machiavelli, and Kant, and mostly revolve around drawing out the implications of these vices for public and political life as well as for interpersonal relationships. She highlights how the vices can have some positive (or neutral) as well as negative roles for political liberalism - for example, a degree of misanthrope drives some of the constraints of liberal democracy that aim at restraining autocratic cruelties.
Though she doesn't mention Alidair MacIntyre's book After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, which came out a few years before Ordinary Vices and became a foundational work for modern virtue ethics, Shklar's study is an interesting one to read in conjunction with thinking about virtue ethics. Over all, a readable, thought-provoking book full of interesting insights about the human condition and morality.
April 22, 2022
To oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine from the patriotic motive is foolish, because the same motive may heed the drumbeat of our invasion of others. To oppose the death penalty out of pity for the victim is insufficient, because the soft person is unstable and easily becomes a bully in a mob of bullies. War and legal execution of criminals are acts of violence on different orders, but they share the same element of cruelty, and so must be hated by the genuine liberal.
This is just one lesson I took away from reading Judith N. Shklar's 1984 book Ordinary Vices, recommended to me by a dear friend. Born in Riga, Latvia, of Jewish parents, she fled persecution during World War II with her family to Canada. Later, she became the first woman to receive tenure in Harvard's Government Department. Ordinary Vices is written with an eye not on fellow academics but on the ordinary reader. To our current preoccupation with the oppressiveness of political structures and social norms, Shklar counterposes, it seems to me, a private ethics that must have public consequences.
In defense of liberalism as the fear of cruelty, she writes in the introduction of Ordinary Vices:
"Since the eighteenth century, clerical and military critics of liberalism have pictured it as a doctrine that achieves its public goods, peace, prosperity, and security by encouraging private vice. Selfishness in all its possible forms is said to be its essence, purpose, and outcome. This, it is said now as then, is inevitable once martial virtue and the discipline imposed by God are discarded. Nothing could be more remote from the truth. The very refusal to use public coercion to impose credal unanimity and uniform standards of behavior demands an enormous degree of self-control. Tolerance consistently applied is more difficult and morally more demanding than repression. Moreover, the liberalism of fear, which makes cruelty the first vice, quite rightly recognize that fear reduces us to mere reactive units of sensation and that this does impose a public ethos on us. One begins with what is to be avoided, as Montaigne feared being afraid most of all. Courage is to be prized, since it both prevents us from being cruel, as cowards so often are, and fortifies us against fear from threats, both physical and moral. This is, to be sure, not the courage of the armed, but that of their likely victims. This is a liberalism that was born out of the cruelties of the religious civil wars, which forever rendered the claims of Christian charity a rebuke to all religious institutions and parties. If the faith was to survive at all, it would do so privately. The alternative then set, and still before us, is not one between classical virtue and liberal self-indulgence, but between cruel military and moral repression and violence, and a self-restraining tolerance that fences in the powerful to protect the freedom and safety of every citizen, old or young, male or female, black or white. Far from being an amoral free-for-all, liberalism is, in fact, extremely difficult and constraining, far too much so for those who cannot endure contradiction, complexity, diversity, and the risks of freedom. The habits of freedom are developed, moreover, both in private and in public, and a liberal character can readily be imagined. It is, however, by definition not to be forced or even promoted by the use of political authority. That does not render the tasks of liberalism any easier, but it does not undermine its ethical structure."
This is just one lesson I took away from reading Judith N. Shklar's 1984 book Ordinary Vices, recommended to me by a dear friend. Born in Riga, Latvia, of Jewish parents, she fled persecution during World War II with her family to Canada. Later, she became the first woman to receive tenure in Harvard's Government Department. Ordinary Vices is written with an eye not on fellow academics but on the ordinary reader. To our current preoccupation with the oppressiveness of political structures and social norms, Shklar counterposes, it seems to me, a private ethics that must have public consequences.
In defense of liberalism as the fear of cruelty, she writes in the introduction of Ordinary Vices:
"Since the eighteenth century, clerical and military critics of liberalism have pictured it as a doctrine that achieves its public goods, peace, prosperity, and security by encouraging private vice. Selfishness in all its possible forms is said to be its essence, purpose, and outcome. This, it is said now as then, is inevitable once martial virtue and the discipline imposed by God are discarded. Nothing could be more remote from the truth. The very refusal to use public coercion to impose credal unanimity and uniform standards of behavior demands an enormous degree of self-control. Tolerance consistently applied is more difficult and morally more demanding than repression. Moreover, the liberalism of fear, which makes cruelty the first vice, quite rightly recognize that fear reduces us to mere reactive units of sensation and that this does impose a public ethos on us. One begins with what is to be avoided, as Montaigne feared being afraid most of all. Courage is to be prized, since it both prevents us from being cruel, as cowards so often are, and fortifies us against fear from threats, both physical and moral. This is, to be sure, not the courage of the armed, but that of their likely victims. This is a liberalism that was born out of the cruelties of the religious civil wars, which forever rendered the claims of Christian charity a rebuke to all religious institutions and parties. If the faith was to survive at all, it would do so privately. The alternative then set, and still before us, is not one between classical virtue and liberal self-indulgence, but between cruel military and moral repression and violence, and a self-restraining tolerance that fences in the powerful to protect the freedom and safety of every citizen, old or young, male or female, black or white. Far from being an amoral free-for-all, liberalism is, in fact, extremely difficult and constraining, far too much so for those who cannot endure contradiction, complexity, diversity, and the risks of freedom. The habits of freedom are developed, moreover, both in private and in public, and a liberal character can readily be imagined. It is, however, by definition not to be forced or even promoted by the use of political authority. That does not render the tasks of liberalism any easier, but it does not undermine its ethical structure."
August 15, 2012
Interesting, but often wayward, discussion of a peculiar set of human vices. A few worthwhile thoughts scattered, but no real sustained attempt at persuasion that these vices (cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, betrayal, misanthropy) ought to be avoided above all others. The obvious arguments for the primacy of a more traditional set of virtues/vices go largely unaddressed, as do arguments for the value of the supposed "ordinary vices" when indulged in moderation. Are there really no evils inherent in attempts to eliminate these behaviors?
August 3, 2023
Una especie de continuación de «El liberalismo del miedo» que adolece de los mismos problemas: identifica cuestiones interesantes, pero las resuelve en el seno de un pensamiento según el cual vivimos en el mejor de los mundos posibles. Una especie de negacionismo de la profunda desigualdad y miseria en la que sumerge el neoliberalismo a una gran parte de la especie humana.
En este libro además profundiza en su perspectiva individualista. El problema —dice— no son ya las desigualdades sistémicas, sino los «vicios ordinarios». La crueldad, la misantropía o el esnobismo pasan así a un primer plano. Los males de nuestro tiempo son más psicológicos que políticos. O más bien, defiende, son políticos porque son psicológicos.
Bastante despropósito todo a decir verdad.
En este libro además profundiza en su perspectiva individualista. El problema —dice— no son ya las desigualdades sistémicas, sino los «vicios ordinarios». La crueldad, la misantropía o el esnobismo pasan así a un primer plano. Los males de nuestro tiempo son más psicológicos que políticos. O más bien, defiende, son políticos porque son psicológicos.
Bastante despropósito todo a decir verdad.
gave-up-on
June 5, 2023Laina-aika loppui, pitää palaa tän pariin myöhemmin uudestaan!
January 16, 2024
A must read.
Had to re-read to find this: "Justice itself is only a web of legal arrangements required to keep cruelty in check."
Had to re-read to find this: "Justice itself is only a web of legal arrangements required to keep cruelty in check."
January 30, 2025
Quotes:
"Fear destroys freedom."
"By putting cruelty unconditionally first with nothing above us to excuse or to forgive acts of cruelty, one closes off any appeal to any order other than that of actuality. To hate cruelty with utmost intensity is perfectly compatible with Biblical religiosity, but to put it first does place one irrevocably outside the sphere of revealed religion. For it is a purely human verdict upon human conduct and so puts religion at a certain distance. The decision to put cruelty first is not, however, prompted merely by religious skepticism. It emerges, rather, from the recognition that the habits of the faithful do not differ from those of the faithless in their brutalities, and that Machiavelli had triumphed long before he had ever written a line."
"Putting cruelty first might help one to decide who the victim at any moment is, but not without some very real doubts and uncertainties, of just the sort that ideologies disperse so readily. To have standards is not a way of avoiding doubt; only faith can offer us that, and then only at vast intellectual and moral cost."
"Inequality, moreover, generates illusions. Montaigne thought that it dims our common sense so badly that we forget that 'the pedestal is no part of the statue.'"
"Only victims can rise to true fortitude, because fortune had obviously deserted them."
"Now when this city is fallen, and the Phrygians slain,
this baby terrified you? I despise the fear
which is pure terror in a mind unreasoning." (The Trojan Women 1164-65)
"The physical discharge of cruelty had been blocked by Christianity and turned inward against the self. Such a psyche was made to suffer cruelly from sin, guilt, and bad conscience."
"More commonly people just change and become angled. That cannot be foreseen, and we have to trust each other precisely because we cannot know all the changes that will affect us in the future. Trust is the response to the limits of foresight."
"Montaigne thought that tyrants were driven from cruelty to cruelty as their fears of real and fancied enemies increased with each one of their crimes. The very idea of an economically rational use of cruelty was and is a psychological fantasy and a part of the illusion of violent efficiency."
"[Misanthropy] reminds one that it is not impersonal forces or institutions that commit atrocities: it is always a human being who is cruel and another who is a victim."
"The real point for Montesquieu, however, as for Kant, is not to paint the free citizen as a virtuous person, but to insist that without freedom everyone is intolerably paralyzed or demeaned. In Montesquieu's eyes, fear is so terrible, so physiologically and psychologically damaging, that it cannot be redeemed by consequences. That is why there cannot be a price set on liberty."
"Putting cruelty first is, however, an altogether different matter. It is a turning away from sin entirely, and from divine punishment as well. It knows only two figures and one place: victimizers and victims here and now."
"Fear destroys freedom."
"By putting cruelty unconditionally first with nothing above us to excuse or to forgive acts of cruelty, one closes off any appeal to any order other than that of actuality. To hate cruelty with utmost intensity is perfectly compatible with Biblical religiosity, but to put it first does place one irrevocably outside the sphere of revealed religion. For it is a purely human verdict upon human conduct and so puts religion at a certain distance. The decision to put cruelty first is not, however, prompted merely by religious skepticism. It emerges, rather, from the recognition that the habits of the faithful do not differ from those of the faithless in their brutalities, and that Machiavelli had triumphed long before he had ever written a line."
"Putting cruelty first might help one to decide who the victim at any moment is, but not without some very real doubts and uncertainties, of just the sort that ideologies disperse so readily. To have standards is not a way of avoiding doubt; only faith can offer us that, and then only at vast intellectual and moral cost."
"Inequality, moreover, generates illusions. Montaigne thought that it dims our common sense so badly that we forget that 'the pedestal is no part of the statue.'"
"Only victims can rise to true fortitude, because fortune had obviously deserted them."
"Now when this city is fallen, and the Phrygians slain,
this baby terrified you? I despise the fear
which is pure terror in a mind unreasoning." (The Trojan Women 1164-65)
"The physical discharge of cruelty had been blocked by Christianity and turned inward against the self. Such a psyche was made to suffer cruelly from sin, guilt, and bad conscience."
"More commonly people just change and become angled. That cannot be foreseen, and we have to trust each other precisely because we cannot know all the changes that will affect us in the future. Trust is the response to the limits of foresight."
"Montaigne thought that tyrants were driven from cruelty to cruelty as their fears of real and fancied enemies increased with each one of their crimes. The very idea of an economically rational use of cruelty was and is a psychological fantasy and a part of the illusion of violent efficiency."
"[Misanthropy] reminds one that it is not impersonal forces or institutions that commit atrocities: it is always a human being who is cruel and another who is a victim."
"The real point for Montesquieu, however, as for Kant, is not to paint the free citizen as a virtuous person, but to insist that without freedom everyone is intolerably paralyzed or demeaned. In Montesquieu's eyes, fear is so terrible, so physiologically and psychologically damaging, that it cannot be redeemed by consequences. That is why there cannot be a price set on liberty."
"Putting cruelty first is, however, an altogether different matter. It is a turning away from sin entirely, and from divine punishment as well. It knows only two figures and one place: victimizers and victims here and now."
January 3, 2025
Inspired by his account of this book in David Runciman’s always-interesting History of Ideas podcast, I found a second-hand copy of this 1984 work of political philosophy. And loved it. Drawing deeply on 18th, 19th and 20th Century literature to illuminate her arguments, Shklar presents a thoughtful account of five vices, cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, betrayal and misanthropy. With the exception of cruelty which, following Montaigne, she suggests we should reject utterly, Shklar explores the ambiguities and ambivalent manifestations, in both public and private, of these vices. Each argument is interesting in itself, and all add to a wider argument on the challenge and nature of liberalism which, “far from being an amoral free-for-all… is, in fact, extremely difficult and constraining, far too much so for those who cannot endure contradiction, complexity, diversity and the risks of freedom.” Another one I look forward to re-reading.
March 30, 2022
One of the most morally impactful books I’ve read. I feel like I’ve been given a vocabulary for my own philosophy.
Shklar argues for “putting cruelty first” as the most important vice to avoid, for cruelty creates fear and fear obliterates everything and everyone. It’s a morality I intuitively agree with and find incredibly beneficial to hear it described.
It’s also a simply great book to read, drawing on a wide array of (western) literature to make its arguments and provide countless examples.
Instantly one of the ten best books I’ve ever read.
Shklar argues for “putting cruelty first” as the most important vice to avoid, for cruelty creates fear and fear obliterates everything and everyone. It’s a morality I intuitively agree with and find incredibly beneficial to hear it described.
It’s also a simply great book to read, drawing on a wide array of (western) literature to make its arguments and provide countless examples.
Instantly one of the ten best books I’ve ever read.
August 29, 2025
W sumie nie wiedziałam jak ocenić tą książkę bo ona autentycznie w połowie jest nie do wydania i mimo, że autorka ma świadomość swojego braku oryginalności i miesza ze sobą przeciwne poglądy, pamiętając o tym, że się wykluczają to dalej w to brnie przez co tak ważne tematy tracą na znaczeniu
Finalne wykonanie kiepskie bo autorka pisze dla siebie a nie dla czytelnika ale samodzielnie dużo wyciągnęłam jak rozłożyłam tezy na części
Finalne wykonanie kiepskie bo autorka pisze dla siebie a nie dla czytelnika ale samodzielnie dużo wyciągnęłam jak rozłożyłam tezy na części
August 20, 2023
As usual Shklar never misses. I found this book to be more entertaining as she drew on from literary characters to explore her points. Maybe I'm biased because I love Shklar in general but I really believe that this book is a must-read for those who want get a more nuanced perspective of human condition.
February 2, 2023
Interesting, but ethereal in its aim. Quite right about why vices matter and the different perspectives we ought to take when tackling them.
The analysis of Cruelty is, to me, the most interesting one: Montaigne and Montesquiau are glossed carefully.
The analysis of Cruelty is, to me, the most interesting one: Montaigne and Montesquiau are glossed carefully.
April 16, 2023
Philosophy of betrayal and loyalty and how betrayal is everywhere in our day to day life.
September 20, 2022
I enjoyed reading some of its pages, but overall it was not really what I was looking up to read. It has some valuable Insights and remarks, but it does not give a clear and concise purpose and/or methodology for assessing other political institutions (e.g.Right-wing politics, extreme left, etc.)
1. The book outlines some subjective values of different spectrums of justifiability and attempts to establish them as pillars of so-called "liberal thinking."
2. The author did not establish who a liberal is, but went on to point out possible ethical flaws in some attributes that can hardly be exclusively "liberal."
3. Also, it is worth noting that Schklar did not provide a criteria or methodology to determine what are the "vices." Nor, does she provide any justification for having them as so essential to the being of "liberalism."
4. In trying to establish the "liberal faith" as a fact of necessary contradiction, Schklar fixates on the shadows of liberal shortcomings—human factor. She fails to attack "liberalism" itself, but rather the perceived image of proponents of such ideologies.
5. Puritans got thrown into the mix, somehow.
1. The book outlines some subjective values of different spectrums of justifiability and attempts to establish them as pillars of so-called "liberal thinking."
2. The author did not establish who a liberal is, but went on to point out possible ethical flaws in some attributes that can hardly be exclusively "liberal."
3. Also, it is worth noting that Schklar did not provide a criteria or methodology to determine what are the "vices." Nor, does she provide any justification for having them as so essential to the being of "liberalism."
4. In trying to establish the "liberal faith" as a fact of necessary contradiction, Schklar fixates on the shadows of liberal shortcomings—human factor. She fails to attack "liberalism" itself, but rather the perceived image of proponents of such ideologies.
5. Puritans got thrown into the mix, somehow.
December 1, 2015
Hypocritical and limited in scope; the vices that she describes need expansion.
Nevertheless, Shklar was--and remains--one of the best theoretical writers in all of political philosophy, and this book was an eye-opening read during my junior year.
-bb
Nevertheless, Shklar was--and remains--one of the best theoretical writers in all of political philosophy, and this book was an eye-opening read during my junior year.
-bb
July 31, 2011
Shklar's "liberalism of fear" is a particularly interesting concept...
March 19, 2013
Her masterpiece, and a must-read for anyone concerned with either American political philosophy or the history of ideas. Even though I think it's kind of a dumb title.
Read
November 3, 2016checked out from Washington Co. Cooperative Library Services, 11/13 list.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Read
December 23, 2018Lec ob. 4o filosofía. Aprovechando el trabajo de Shklar pude leer sus trabajos. El capítulo dedicado a Poner la crueldad en primer lugar es imprescindible, pero su crítica negativa del esnobismo o su advertencia sobre la misantropía son muy impresionantes. Y el texto dedicado a la hipocresía muy profundo.
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews