What do you think?
Rate this book


416 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1991
“[The Promised Land] won a number of awards and was selected by a New York University panel of journalists and scholars as one of the top one hundred works of twentieth-century American journalism. The Promised Land first came to fruition five years earlier as an ambitious two-part series in The Atlantic, where Lemann had worked as a national correspondent from 1983 to 1998. Lemann wrote ‘The Origins of the Underclass’ out of a conviction that traditional economic arguments, whether liberal or conservative, did not adequately explain why, two decades after the civil rights movement, millions of African Americans continued to live under conditions of unendurable poverty.”The editor then adds this remarkable statement (my emphases):
Such a provocative thesis, coming from a white journalist, was fated to be controversial; the Harvard sociologist William Julius Wilson, for one, called Lemann’s hypothesis “fundamentally incorrect.” But Lemann’s reporting was so exhaustively researched and so deeply rooted in real-life characters that it drew plaudits from both ends of the political spectrum—from Garry Wills to George Will.
“The Promised Land is must reading for anyone interested in the problems of urban migration and the way policy makers addressed them.I mention this anecdote about Wilson's changed view because I think—in regards to the history of ideas—it would be good to know exactly what Wilson disliked about the Atlantic Magazine rough draft, what Lemann changed/cut in order to win his blessing, and how Lemann feels about those edits in hindsight.
—William Julius Wilson, University of Chicago”
“My feeling is that the possibilities of pure narrative have been exhausted, and that it is not intellectually exciting,” he says. “I think what we [New Journalists] do is to write narrative that serves an idea.” https://archive.ph/pvBx7In his May 1989 WaPo oped cited above (https://archive.ph/KPZth) Lemann makes several fascinating remarks that I wish he had included in TPL. Notice his emphasis upon ideas in these excerpts (my emphases):
George Kennan, the magisterially gloomy diplomat, [who] said to [Walter] Heller, "I hear you're working on the problem of the poor. The poor are always with you. If you lift up the poor, you'll just create more poor" (134).That anecdote comes, unsurprisingly, from Heller; one wishes that a footnote indicated that Kennan had confirmed it.
there seems to be a conviction that we don’t know what can possibly help the ghettos, ... that some unbridgeable gap between blacks and whites makes the amelioration of any problem related to race unlikely. These sentiments ... turn out to be merely resistance to change wearing the garb of pessimism. (343)===========================
. . . the idea that the government can’t accomplish anything is a smokescreen obscuring the useful and encouraging results of a quarter century’s worth of research on antipoverty programs—research of a kind that didn’t exist when the war on poverty began. (349)
The real impediment in the short run is not a lack of political support—which in racial matters always comes after the fact, if it comes at all—but a weakness of spirit. (351)
The danger in the notion of ghetto development is not in the ghettos themselves but in the realm of ideas. ... we should change our reigning idea about what will help most.... (348)
the racial situation as it stands today is not permanent—is not, should not be, will not be. (7)
Lemann is guilty of a huge liberal leap of faith....
Lemann has failed to come to grips with the central dilemma of post-1960s liberalism, which has hurt or put in jeopardy the well-being of precisely the people its [welfare] programs were meant to help....
Liberal advocates of the poor, challenging policies that had once coercively and repressively maintained social order, forced the elimination of regulations governing behavioral norms—that public housing tenants be married, for example. The revolution extending rights to the poor, including the right to refuse menial labor and the right to bear children out of wedlock with no loss of taxpayer-financed support, collided with the values of working- and lower-middle-class voters. The political victim was liberalism.
The very social disorder that Lemann describes as commonplace among the residents of Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes—out-of-wedlock childbearing, welfare dependency, pregnant mothers addicted to cocaine, endemic crime, paternal abandonment—has forced to the forefront of the national policy debate a confrontation between liberals and conservatives over values and rights. This confrontation, in turn, has split the traditional liberal coalition down the middle, and has driven the country sharply to the right.
Not only have the behavior patterns that Lemann describes provoked a conflict over values that has damaged liberalism; those patterns have themselves challenged the legitimacy and efficacy of liberal initiatives. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the civil rights movement produced the broadest reforms in the nation's history, and when social spending to fight poverty, to improve schools, and to feed the hungry rose sharply, the rates of crime, unwed motherhood, welfare dependency, and chronic black urban unemployment also began to skyrocket. These trends posed a dilemma that continues to plague what can broadly be described as the American left.
At the same time, a disproportionate dependence on government jobs—over half of the blacks with professional and managerial-level jobs work for the government, compared with just over a quarter of such whites—has, in turn, imposed significant costs on middle-class blacks themselves. For this dependence has profound political ramifications. It has left the black community vulnerable to the ideological vagaries of the electorate, and voter attitudes toward the public sector have become increasingly vulnerable to conservative and Republican racial polarization strategies that capitalize, in part, on the fact that government employment is increasingly black. Black middle-class dependence on government employment dovetails with disproportionate black use of government welfare services.
There was a longstanding feud at the University of Chicago between the sociology department and the School of Social Service Administration. The social workers, strongly influenced by Freudian psychology, saw the slums as a mass of individual problems rooted in poor early-childhood development; to the sociologists, the slums were a part of a vast urban organism, and their problems were a natural part of the life of the city. (120)In that feud Lemann sides with the sociologists but I'd side with the Freudians.
that the problems of the ghettos are new, the idea that they can be solved in a single dramatic stroke—by [1] welfare reform, or by [2] the emergence of new black leaders (or white leaders), or by [3] the construction of more jails, or by [4] eliminating drugs, or by [5] changing the schools (346-7).
On the one hand, his study is granular. He examines details of a few individuals and families, whom he follows over some 70 years from their lives as sharecroppers picking and hoeing cotton in the Mississippi Delta to their years in Chicago’s Southside and Westside ghettos. One becomes a welfare mother and grandmother, one becomes a manager of ghetto apartment buildings, and one becomes a storefront preacher.
Meanwhile, he turns the spotlight on national politics, starting with President Kennedy and then, especially, President Lyndon Johnson along with Robert F. Kennedy. What could these leaders do, not only about the persistent issues of segregation in the South, but about poverty in the fast-growing Black ghettos of America’s industrial cities? I found it fascinating to read about bureaucratic infighting among such figures as Sargent Shriver, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Willard Wirtz, and Joseph Califano, and others whose prominence grew for years after these stories.
Similarly, Lemann reports on the tensions within the Civil Rights movement as well as between that movement and Black nationalism or Black Power. The background of these tensions is the sharp disagreement between Booker T. Washington, the former slave who founded the Tuskegee Institute, and W.E.B. DuBois, who came from a free Black family. Washington had no confidence in government solutions to Black poverty; instead, he concentrated on self-help by teaching skills that would help sharecroppers become more self-sufficient. DuBois, a leader in the NAACP, fought for legal equality and desegregation, and he believed that the government needed to facilitate achieving these goals.
Along with these conflicts, there were the tensions between federal programs and local politics, namely the machine run by Mayor Daley of Chicago. Although Daley acquiesced to segregation, he built schools and low-cost housing for the Black people migrating by the thousands to Chicago. He welcomed federal support but not at the expense of his control over the budgets and programs involved.
As time passes in the narrative from sharecropping days to the migration to the urban North, Black ghettos evolve into being “among the worst places to live in the world.” However, a key factor in this decline is that those who get education and training and then jobs and increased income leave the ghetto to join the Black middle class. If the ghettos aren’t shrinking, it’s because the birth rate there outpaces the death rate.
I chose to read The Promised Land because I’m interested in the changes and challenges of race relations not only in the South but in the cities. I learned much about the rise of the Black middle class as part of the mainstream population of America, and about the isolation of the ghettos, cut off from the rest of the Black population. Overall, the quality of life for Black Americans has improved since the days of slavery, since the days of Jim Crow laws and legalized segregation, and since the prevalence of sharecropping. But the quality of life in the ghettos is as bad or worse than any of those periods.
Many of the efforts that the federal government has made have contributed to this progress. For example, Head Start programs have made a measurable difference in the likelihood of success for a Black child. The one effort that has been a miserable failure is housing, especially the rows of high-rise apartments that are dangerous and almost unmanageable. If, in the 34 years since his book was published, ghetto life is as horrible as ever, Lemann would say it’s because of “a loss of moral urgency.” (p. 353)
Soon I plan to read a book more recent by 19 years with the same theme—The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration, by Isabel Wilkerson. It will be interesting to compare her views to those of Lemann.