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Hitler's Great Gamble: A New Look at German Strategy, Operation Barbarossa, and the Axis Defeat in World War II
On June 22, 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, one of the turning points of World War II. Within six months, the invasion bogged down on the outskirts of Moscow, and the Eastern Front proved to be the decisive theater in the defeat of the Third Reich. Ever since, most historians have agreed that this was Hitler's gravest mistake. In Hitler's Great Gamble, James Ellman argues that while Barbarossa was a gamble and perverted by genocidal Nazi ideology, it was not doomed from the start. Rather it represented Hitler's best chance to achieve his war aims for Germany which were remarkably similar to those of the Kaiser's government in 1914. Other options, such as an invasion of England, or an offensive to seize the oil fields of the Middle East were considered and discarded as unlikely to lead to Axis victory.
In Ellman's recounting, Barbarossa did not fail because of flaws in the Axis invasion strategy, the size of the USSR, or the brutal cold of the Russian winter. Instead, German defeat was due to errors of Nazi diplomacy. Hitler chose not to coordinate his plans with his most militarily powerful allies, Finland and Japan, and ensure the seizure of the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok. Had he done so, Germany might well have succeeded in defeating the Soviet Union and, perhaps, winning World War II. Drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary sources (including many recently released), Hitler's Great Gamble is a provocative work that will appeal to a wide cross-section of World War II buffs, enthusiasts, and historians.--Stephen Kinzer, author of The True Flag and Poisoner in Chief
In Ellman's recounting, Barbarossa did not fail because of flaws in the Axis invasion strategy, the size of the USSR, or the brutal cold of the Russian winter. Instead, German defeat was due to errors of Nazi diplomacy. Hitler chose not to coordinate his plans with his most militarily powerful allies, Finland and Japan, and ensure the seizure of the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok. Had he done so, Germany might well have succeeded in defeating the Soviet Union and, perhaps, winning World War II. Drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary sources (including many recently released), Hitler's Great Gamble is a provocative work that will appeal to a wide cross-section of World War II buffs, enthusiasts, and historians.--Stephen Kinzer, author of The True Flag and Poisoner in Chief
272 pages, Kindle Edition
Published September 20, 2019
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
June 16, 2021
An interesting book, but a somewhat flawed one. It has its strengths, however, and is worth the read if you can spare some time: It is not long.
The author is a businessman rather than a historian, but he seems well-read in the topic and have developed his ideas consistently. There are a few obvious warning flags when he cites authors such as Mosier and "Suvorov" (pseudonym of Vladimir Rezun), whose works should be handled with great caution. That suggests Ellman didn't always handle his sources (all of them secondary) critically. But the book is a very well constructed, systematic development of Ellman's thesis.
The strength of his book is his investigation of the logic by which Hitler considered it necessary and timely, in June 1941, to invade the USSR. Ellman makes a good point that this has too often been easily dismissed as reckless folly by historians, but that if the leadership of the III. Reich objectively considered its options, it may well have appeared to be the best one available. Of course that doesn't mean that it was a good option, and the author silently overlooks the many people in Germany who were deeply worried by the prospect. But a quick German victory in a war with the USSR, Ellman reminds us, did look plausible in 1941, and American and British observers expected it too. Ellman has a good argument that, aside from the deep-seated ideological motivation to conquer Lebensraum in the East, it looked like a fleeting opportunity. In the summer of 1941 the USSR was deep in a complicated re-armament process. New equipment was reaching combat units, but they often had not been trained on it or did not have spare parts or even the corresponding ammunition. We know that Hitler was aware of this, and he managed to take advantage of a moment of weakness. The USSR would have been a lot stronger in 1942.
Ellman also highlights that the German actions after the invasion, in late 1941, were perhaps not as poorly planned as later critics claimed. Generals writing their memoirs found it easy to blame Hitler for not concentrating all forces to take Moscow, but Ellman's reasoning that this was not such an obvious best choice is at least interesting, and partially convincing. Perhaps he does buy too easily into Hitler's obsession with the natural resources of the Ukraine and Caucasus, but the case for operations in the north and south, instead of the center, is very well developed on the basis of military logic.
The book steps on much less solid ground from chapter 14 onwards, where Ellman starts defending a what-if counterfactual history argument. He argues that Germany could have won the war with the USSR if it had successfully enlisted the full support of Finland (which made a somewhat half-hearted contribution) and above all Japan. This has certain logic behind it, as it would certainly have increased the probability of victory. The problem is that he represents this as an opportunity that was missed by a narrow margin though diplomatic neglect. However, if one cross-checks this with (for example) the study that Eri Hotta made of Japanese decision making in 1941, one sees that this was not such a near-miss after all; foreign minister Matsuoka was very much isolated in his insistence that Japan should join forces with Germany against the USSR. Ellman's counterfactual is built on quicksand.
More dubiously, Ellman insists that this diplomatic failure was the exception rather than the rule. But Nazi diplomacy was notable for being atrociously bad. Apart from the well-known incompetence of foreign minister von Ribbentrop, the stark reality was that Hitler was a too narrow-minded German nationalist to bind himself to agreements from which his negotiating partners would gain a lasting advantage, as Mark Mazower described in detail in his book on Hitler's Empire. The alliance with Italy and Japan was a model of lack of coordination, in that not even an attempt was made to align on strategy or operations. Ellman skips a bit too easily over the evidence for this, such as Mussolini's decision to invade Greece without even notifying his ally in advance, because he felt slighted by Hitler's equally unilateral actions. Ellman highlights the arrival of foreign volunteers on the Eastern front, such as the Spanish "Blue Division", as a diplomatic success, without recognising that this was a fig-leaf for a diplomatic failure to get full participation.
In the end, Ellman's insistence on a few keys points, with little consideration for possible counter-arguments, is a bit overdone. Having knocked down his straw men, he continues to stomp on them for too long. As an alternative history, it is an interesting game to play. But to my mind the weakness of counterfactuals like this is that they pretend that history would have hinged on a single decision point, while the development of reality flowed from a long stream of decisions and actions.
The author is a businessman rather than a historian, but he seems well-read in the topic and have developed his ideas consistently. There are a few obvious warning flags when he cites authors such as Mosier and "Suvorov" (pseudonym of Vladimir Rezun), whose works should be handled with great caution. That suggests Ellman didn't always handle his sources (all of them secondary) critically. But the book is a very well constructed, systematic development of Ellman's thesis.
The strength of his book is his investigation of the logic by which Hitler considered it necessary and timely, in June 1941, to invade the USSR. Ellman makes a good point that this has too often been easily dismissed as reckless folly by historians, but that if the leadership of the III. Reich objectively considered its options, it may well have appeared to be the best one available. Of course that doesn't mean that it was a good option, and the author silently overlooks the many people in Germany who were deeply worried by the prospect. But a quick German victory in a war with the USSR, Ellman reminds us, did look plausible in 1941, and American and British observers expected it too. Ellman has a good argument that, aside from the deep-seated ideological motivation to conquer Lebensraum in the East, it looked like a fleeting opportunity. In the summer of 1941 the USSR was deep in a complicated re-armament process. New equipment was reaching combat units, but they often had not been trained on it or did not have spare parts or even the corresponding ammunition. We know that Hitler was aware of this, and he managed to take advantage of a moment of weakness. The USSR would have been a lot stronger in 1942.
Ellman also highlights that the German actions after the invasion, in late 1941, were perhaps not as poorly planned as later critics claimed. Generals writing their memoirs found it easy to blame Hitler for not concentrating all forces to take Moscow, but Ellman's reasoning that this was not such an obvious best choice is at least interesting, and partially convincing. Perhaps he does buy too easily into Hitler's obsession with the natural resources of the Ukraine and Caucasus, but the case for operations in the north and south, instead of the center, is very well developed on the basis of military logic.
The book steps on much less solid ground from chapter 14 onwards, where Ellman starts defending a what-if counterfactual history argument. He argues that Germany could have won the war with the USSR if it had successfully enlisted the full support of Finland (which made a somewhat half-hearted contribution) and above all Japan. This has certain logic behind it, as it would certainly have increased the probability of victory. The problem is that he represents this as an opportunity that was missed by a narrow margin though diplomatic neglect. However, if one cross-checks this with (for example) the study that Eri Hotta made of Japanese decision making in 1941, one sees that this was not such a near-miss after all; foreign minister Matsuoka was very much isolated in his insistence that Japan should join forces with Germany against the USSR. Ellman's counterfactual is built on quicksand.
More dubiously, Ellman insists that this diplomatic failure was the exception rather than the rule. But Nazi diplomacy was notable for being atrociously bad. Apart from the well-known incompetence of foreign minister von Ribbentrop, the stark reality was that Hitler was a too narrow-minded German nationalist to bind himself to agreements from which his negotiating partners would gain a lasting advantage, as Mark Mazower described in detail in his book on Hitler's Empire. The alliance with Italy and Japan was a model of lack of coordination, in that not even an attempt was made to align on strategy or operations. Ellman skips a bit too easily over the evidence for this, such as Mussolini's decision to invade Greece without even notifying his ally in advance, because he felt slighted by Hitler's equally unilateral actions. Ellman highlights the arrival of foreign volunteers on the Eastern front, such as the Spanish "Blue Division", as a diplomatic success, without recognising that this was a fig-leaf for a diplomatic failure to get full participation.
In the end, Ellman's insistence on a few keys points, with little consideration for possible counter-arguments, is a bit overdone. Having knocked down his straw men, he continues to stomp on them for too long. As an alternative history, it is an interesting game to play. But to my mind the weakness of counterfactuals like this is that they pretend that history would have hinged on a single decision point, while the development of reality flowed from a long stream of decisions and actions.
February 1, 2020
What an interesting book and take on the failure of Hitler in WWII. I found it very thought provoking and the options available to Germany had never been thought through by so many. I highly recommend this book if you are interested in WWII
June 19, 2023
Listened to on Audible and thoroughly enjoyed. The book explores a “what-if” scenario had Japan and Finland attacked the Soviet Union simultaneously along with Germany in WW II, thereby allowing Germany to win the war in the east.
September 19, 2019
A wonderful book.
The author explains why Nazi germany lost in the eastern front.
In the first part of the book the author explain why differnets strategy couldn't work. First for Operation Sealion(the invasion of England by Germany) the Kriegsmarine had only a handfull of destroyers and few escorts ships to escort a landing fleet of river barges that were not strong enought to withstand a sea crossing. The Royal Navy would have had a field day massacring this haphazard fleet. Also the Kriegsmarine didn't have enoufgh U-Boats to starve England and their torpodoes were defective in 1940.
The author with supported sources debunks that a Mediterean strategy could have won the war for Hitler. First Malta was a tough nut to crack and the Royal Navy had superiority over the Axis. Second, its the logistic, it would have taken too much trucks to load the supply to Rommel. Third, well its a global perspective, even if Rommel would have taken Suez that left time for a rearming Soviet Union to rearm and be a toufgher nut to crack.
The second part deals with why barbarossa failed and how it could have succeded. First its not the size of the Heer, smaller army defeated bigger army in history and in 1917 Imperial Germany defeated Tsarist Russia with a mainly infantry army. The second point is that its not the weather or Operation Marita that defeated the germans in the eastern front. The thaw in spring 1941 was later so the Germans would have had the problems in June 1941 than October 1941 instead. Also a fall of Moscow didn't mean the end of the Soviet Union. Stalin had already planed to withdraw is capital to Kubiyashev. A more enlighten policy toward soviet POW was impossible according to the logistic and the mindset of the nazis. Even with harsh genodical policy the nazis had willing collaborators.
The main argument is that cut mouth and the rest will die by starvation. Finland take Murnmansk and Imperial Japan blockade or take Vladivastok and the Soviet Union fall by lack of suppluy(mainly waht supports an army , food, spare parts, trucks, locomotives, rails, medecine, radios, tools) and weapons. A short contrefactual is written at the conclusion.
A well written book that deserve to be read and gives a new view on the reason of Hitler failure to defeat the Soviet Union in WWII.
The author explains why Nazi germany lost in the eastern front.
In the first part of the book the author explain why differnets strategy couldn't work. First for Operation Sealion(the invasion of England by Germany) the Kriegsmarine had only a handfull of destroyers and few escorts ships to escort a landing fleet of river barges that were not strong enought to withstand a sea crossing. The Royal Navy would have had a field day massacring this haphazard fleet. Also the Kriegsmarine didn't have enoufgh U-Boats to starve England and their torpodoes were defective in 1940.
The author with supported sources debunks that a Mediterean strategy could have won the war for Hitler. First Malta was a tough nut to crack and the Royal Navy had superiority over the Axis. Second, its the logistic, it would have taken too much trucks to load the supply to Rommel. Third, well its a global perspective, even if Rommel would have taken Suez that left time for a rearming Soviet Union to rearm and be a toufgher nut to crack.
The second part deals with why barbarossa failed and how it could have succeded. First its not the size of the Heer, smaller army defeated bigger army in history and in 1917 Imperial Germany defeated Tsarist Russia with a mainly infantry army. The second point is that its not the weather or Operation Marita that defeated the germans in the eastern front. The thaw in spring 1941 was later so the Germans would have had the problems in June 1941 than October 1941 instead. Also a fall of Moscow didn't mean the end of the Soviet Union. Stalin had already planed to withdraw is capital to Kubiyashev. A more enlighten policy toward soviet POW was impossible according to the logistic and the mindset of the nazis. Even with harsh genodical policy the nazis had willing collaborators.
The main argument is that cut mouth and the rest will die by starvation. Finland take Murnmansk and Imperial Japan blockade or take Vladivastok and the Soviet Union fall by lack of suppluy(mainly waht supports an army , food, spare parts, trucks, locomotives, rails, medecine, radios, tools) and weapons. A short contrefactual is written at the conclusion.
A well written book that deserve to be read and gives a new view on the reason of Hitler failure to defeat the Soviet Union in WWII.
June 26, 2022
Hitler’s Great Gamble
By James Ellman
- [ ] I have been wanting to read this for a while now. I am fascinated by the eastern front
- [ ] Thesis: it was not poor planning, the obsession on securing Moscow, the Russian winter, Hitler’s genocidal ideology, or the Russian army that caused Barbarossa to fail, it was Hitler’s lack of coordination with Finland and Japan that caused German to loose to Russia. If he had planned with his allies, Germany would have beaten the Russians
- [ ] This book sets out to dispel the commonly accepted narrative of Germany’s failure in Russian and look at it through a geopolitical lens and Hitler’s poor coordination with his Allies
- [ ] Japan was Russia’s eastern neighbor, there was a strategic number of Russian troops in the Far East but they would be moved to reenforce in the west and provide a needed boost in the fight against Germany at a time that Russia was in dire straits
- [ ] Finland fought the Russian attack but they never went past their own boarder. The Finland - Russian war
- [ ] Italy never had the strong army that Germany needed to support the war. Instead of helping Germany, Italy would be a drain on its resources
- [ ] Germany’s aim was never world domination, it was living and agricultural land for the German people
- [ ] Invading in ‘41 was a strategic choice because it was seen as the best chance of victory against the Soviets. War between Germany and Russia was inevitable based on their diametrically opposed ideologies
- [ ] How are Bolshevism and Nazism different
- [ ] Prior to ‘43 it was widely considered by world leaders that the Germans had the upper hand and would soundly defeat the Russians
- [ ] Hitler did utilize the peoples that he was invading that had suffered under Stalin and would have joined Hitler
- [ ] Hitler laid his plan out in Mein Kampf; the aim was always to take land back, to rearm Germany, to invade Russia. If any of the European leaders had read the book and taken it seriously they would have known that Hitler was not interested in diplomacy and appeasement was only playing into his hand
- [ ] The other European powers could not fight a war on their own. The failed policy of appeasement
- [ ] Germany has a geographic advantage of their many navigable rivers, being centrally located, and having agricultural space. The disadvantage is they did not have enough space to feed their people, and the vast Eastern European between Berlin and Moscow provided no geographic defense. Germany had coal but did not have oil or vital precocious metals
- [ ] Germany had a history of educated and disciplined military corp, a corp that was eager for a rematch against the Allied powers. The Allied powers were not trepidations about another deadly war. The Allies were hoping to avoid war that their two potential enemies, Germany and Russia would fight each other
- [ ] Operation Sea Lion did not have a strong chance of success - the British had too many men, the channel was too challenging to cross, and the Germans did not have the skills to undertake the massive invasion to be successful
- [ ] The British were prepared to use mustard gas on landing forces
- [ ] A siege of England was also not possible
- [ ] It was not clear that a capture of Moscow would have made the Russians surrender. The city was heavily defended, the battle would likely have been an urban siege similar to Stalingrad, and the Soviet government was already preparing to move and survive away from Moscow
- [ ] A summary of the events of the eastern front
- [ ] The mud, winter, and poor supply lines did hamper the Germans. Russia did not have paved roads and the Germans were largely still using horses. The Germans were not fully mechanized, but they also needed oil. It’s all about resources
- [ ] It is equally remarkable the Russia was not defeated and that they were able to win
- [ ] USSR rejected Germany’s offer to join the tripartite agreement. There was never a strong coordination between the signatories
- [ ] Germany kept Operation Barbarossa a secret from the Japanese - this was a huge mistake
- [ ] Common misconception - u-boats spent most of their time above water. Most subs were sunk from planes or ships, not from other subs. Subs were slow underwater. They were fragile with weak defenses
- [ ] More people died from famine and Stalin’s purges than died in all of WWI
- [ ] The Soviets were economically, militarily, politically, and geographically weak. They suffered from the purges. They had giant plains from Germany to Moscow, lacking mountains, seas, or other geographical defenses - the winter, mud, and giant space protected them. They were rebuilding economically and militarily but it was slow. They had few if any natural or formal allies. Russia was the weakest of the big powers
- [ ] On paper it makes sense that Germany would invade Russia. In fact it is extraordinary that Russia was able to turn the tide and defeat Germany
- [ ] I am mid way through the book. I read a few reviews that critiqued the book for relaying on to many counterfactual claims, a few weak sources, not being written by a historian, playing down some important points, and placing emphasis on flimsy points. Not that the book is bad but a point to keep in mind
- [ ] The Soviet war with Finland killed hundreds of thousands of Soviets
- [ ] Finland and Japan could have also cut off American supply lines providing crucial American resources to Russian ports
- [ ] The massive amounts of aid to Russia from America through Land Lease significantly helped turned the tides and helped Russia defeat Germany. The materials, weapons, and supplies were vital, they can not be understated, at the same time if Japan and Finland had cut off port access it could have turned the tides in the Germans favor
- [ ] Finland allied itself with Germany but was unwilling to commit to helping Germany win the war
- [ ] They sat at the gates of Leningrad watching a siege and doing nothing
- [ ] In ‘44 as Germany was falling Russia would invade and after five brutal weeks Finland would be defeated
- [ ] The conclusion relies on way to many counterfactuals. This is a fun book of possibilities but is more of a thought experiment than serious academic work
- [ ] I do wonder: Japan was forced to bring America into the war because Japan needed the resources. But if they did not attack American, instead they attacked Russia, when would America have been brought into the war and would Japan have gotten it’s needed resources in Russia?
There are more notes in the bookmarks of the book
By James Ellman
- [ ] I have been wanting to read this for a while now. I am fascinated by the eastern front
- [ ] Thesis: it was not poor planning, the obsession on securing Moscow, the Russian winter, Hitler’s genocidal ideology, or the Russian army that caused Barbarossa to fail, it was Hitler’s lack of coordination with Finland and Japan that caused German to loose to Russia. If he had planned with his allies, Germany would have beaten the Russians
- [ ] This book sets out to dispel the commonly accepted narrative of Germany’s failure in Russian and look at it through a geopolitical lens and Hitler’s poor coordination with his Allies
- [ ] Japan was Russia’s eastern neighbor, there was a strategic number of Russian troops in the Far East but they would be moved to reenforce in the west and provide a needed boost in the fight against Germany at a time that Russia was in dire straits
- [ ] Finland fought the Russian attack but they never went past their own boarder. The Finland - Russian war
- [ ] Italy never had the strong army that Germany needed to support the war. Instead of helping Germany, Italy would be a drain on its resources
- [ ] Germany’s aim was never world domination, it was living and agricultural land for the German people
- [ ] Invading in ‘41 was a strategic choice because it was seen as the best chance of victory against the Soviets. War between Germany and Russia was inevitable based on their diametrically opposed ideologies
- [ ] How are Bolshevism and Nazism different
- [ ] Prior to ‘43 it was widely considered by world leaders that the Germans had the upper hand and would soundly defeat the Russians
- [ ] Hitler did utilize the peoples that he was invading that had suffered under Stalin and would have joined Hitler
- [ ] Hitler laid his plan out in Mein Kampf; the aim was always to take land back, to rearm Germany, to invade Russia. If any of the European leaders had read the book and taken it seriously they would have known that Hitler was not interested in diplomacy and appeasement was only playing into his hand
- [ ] The other European powers could not fight a war on their own. The failed policy of appeasement
- [ ] Germany has a geographic advantage of their many navigable rivers, being centrally located, and having agricultural space. The disadvantage is they did not have enough space to feed their people, and the vast Eastern European between Berlin and Moscow provided no geographic defense. Germany had coal but did not have oil or vital precocious metals
- [ ] Germany had a history of educated and disciplined military corp, a corp that was eager for a rematch against the Allied powers. The Allied powers were not trepidations about another deadly war. The Allies were hoping to avoid war that their two potential enemies, Germany and Russia would fight each other
- [ ] Operation Sea Lion did not have a strong chance of success - the British had too many men, the channel was too challenging to cross, and the Germans did not have the skills to undertake the massive invasion to be successful
- [ ] The British were prepared to use mustard gas on landing forces
- [ ] A siege of England was also not possible
- [ ] It was not clear that a capture of Moscow would have made the Russians surrender. The city was heavily defended, the battle would likely have been an urban siege similar to Stalingrad, and the Soviet government was already preparing to move and survive away from Moscow
- [ ] A summary of the events of the eastern front
- [ ] The mud, winter, and poor supply lines did hamper the Germans. Russia did not have paved roads and the Germans were largely still using horses. The Germans were not fully mechanized, but they also needed oil. It’s all about resources
- [ ] It is equally remarkable the Russia was not defeated and that they were able to win
- [ ] USSR rejected Germany’s offer to join the tripartite agreement. There was never a strong coordination between the signatories
- [ ] Germany kept Operation Barbarossa a secret from the Japanese - this was a huge mistake
- [ ] Common misconception - u-boats spent most of their time above water. Most subs were sunk from planes or ships, not from other subs. Subs were slow underwater. They were fragile with weak defenses
- [ ] More people died from famine and Stalin’s purges than died in all of WWI
- [ ] The Soviets were economically, militarily, politically, and geographically weak. They suffered from the purges. They had giant plains from Germany to Moscow, lacking mountains, seas, or other geographical defenses - the winter, mud, and giant space protected them. They were rebuilding economically and militarily but it was slow. They had few if any natural or formal allies. Russia was the weakest of the big powers
- [ ] On paper it makes sense that Germany would invade Russia. In fact it is extraordinary that Russia was able to turn the tide and defeat Germany
- [ ] I am mid way through the book. I read a few reviews that critiqued the book for relaying on to many counterfactual claims, a few weak sources, not being written by a historian, playing down some important points, and placing emphasis on flimsy points. Not that the book is bad but a point to keep in mind
- [ ] The Soviet war with Finland killed hundreds of thousands of Soviets
- [ ] Finland and Japan could have also cut off American supply lines providing crucial American resources to Russian ports
- [ ] The massive amounts of aid to Russia from America through Land Lease significantly helped turned the tides and helped Russia defeat Germany. The materials, weapons, and supplies were vital, they can not be understated, at the same time if Japan and Finland had cut off port access it could have turned the tides in the Germans favor
- [ ] Finland allied itself with Germany but was unwilling to commit to helping Germany win the war
- [ ] They sat at the gates of Leningrad watching a siege and doing nothing
- [ ] In ‘44 as Germany was falling Russia would invade and after five brutal weeks Finland would be defeated
- [ ] The conclusion relies on way to many counterfactuals. This is a fun book of possibilities but is more of a thought experiment than serious academic work
- [ ] I do wonder: Japan was forced to bring America into the war because Japan needed the resources. But if they did not attack American, instead they attacked Russia, when would America have been brought into the war and would Japan have gotten it’s needed resources in Russia?
There are more notes in the bookmarks of the book
November 25, 2020
(Audiobook) (3.5 stars)This work attempts to dispel some of the accepted myths about the German strategy with their invasion of the USSR and their subsequent actions. Ellman, unlike most, does not consider Hitler's strategy a mistake. The author felt that at least in the timing, Hitler was justified, in that it was likely that Stalin would have eventually moved against Hitler in the next few years, especially if England was still in the war. He does not condemn the Nazi adventures in the Balkans that delayed the offensive by a month, noting that the Nazis would have still had issues no matter when they invaded Russia.
What Ellman views as the fatal flaws for the offensive were the strategic level failings of Finland and Japan not supporting the Nazis. By not aiding Germany, Finland allowed Leningrad and the Northern front to hold off against the Nazis, as brutal as that siege was on the Soviet people. For the Japanese, that they maintained their neutrality pact with the Soviet Union proved especially damaging to Germany's strategic position. By not threatening the Far East, it allowed Stalin to move forces from the East to buttress the Western Front and ultimately hold off the Nazis.
It is a theory that has plenty of logic. There is also the consideration that the Nazis did not pay sufficient attention to winter logistics. However, some may have trouble with Ellman not outright condemning the Nazi actions. Still, he tries to view this dispassionately, and he does note how the Nazis failed to take advantage of a willing group of Ukrainians, blinded by their racial prejudices.
This book is better suited for those already familiar with the basics of World War II and Operation Barbarossa. There are a few too many detours to other theaters and actions that detract from the overall focus on Russia. Still, worth at least one read, if for no other reason than a different perspective on that part of World War II.
What Ellman views as the fatal flaws for the offensive were the strategic level failings of Finland and Japan not supporting the Nazis. By not aiding Germany, Finland allowed Leningrad and the Northern front to hold off against the Nazis, as brutal as that siege was on the Soviet people. For the Japanese, that they maintained their neutrality pact with the Soviet Union proved especially damaging to Germany's strategic position. By not threatening the Far East, it allowed Stalin to move forces from the East to buttress the Western Front and ultimately hold off the Nazis.
It is a theory that has plenty of logic. There is also the consideration that the Nazis did not pay sufficient attention to winter logistics. However, some may have trouble with Ellman not outright condemning the Nazi actions. Still, he tries to view this dispassionately, and he does note how the Nazis failed to take advantage of a willing group of Ukrainians, blinded by their racial prejudices.
This book is better suited for those already familiar with the basics of World War II and Operation Barbarossa. There are a few too many detours to other theaters and actions that detract from the overall focus on Russia. Still, worth at least one read, if for no other reason than a different perspective on that part of World War II.
April 14, 2022
An excellent book giving the arm chair quarterback views as valid "What ifs" that may have changed the world then and the repercussions that may have been a reality today. Very well researched and deeply interesting, this book touches at the many partners, Allied, Axis and otherwise who participated fully or restrained and did so at their own interest though the outcomes may not have benefited their ultimate goals. England's potential defenses if they would have been invaded by Germany, if Germany would have invaded Russia earlier, the importance of Finland and Japan in the war, and just for fun, why Hitler's moustache just so, will take you down several rabbit holes of "Back to the Future" scenarios that are plausible. A great read for World War II buffs and by far one of the best I've read.
August 11, 2025
I read the first couple of chapters - they were not uninteresting - but gave up at the start of Chapter 3 "The planned invasion of England". So, the Germans were planning to leave Scotland and Wales alone?
Sorry, but a historian who can't tell the difference between Britain and England isn't worth listening to. Yes, to some that might be pernickety, but firstly many other authors know the difference between the two, and secondly I know of no historians who confuse Texas and the United States, or Bavaria and Germany.
There are plenty of other books on this subject.
Sorry, but a historian who can't tell the difference between Britain and England isn't worth listening to. Yes, to some that might be pernickety, but firstly many other authors know the difference between the two, and secondly I know of no historians who confuse Texas and the United States, or Bavaria and Germany.
There are plenty of other books on this subject.
May 6, 2023
A not especially convincing argument that the German invasion of Russia was not only “logical” in the context of German war aims, but had a reasonable chance of success. Rather than a blunder, it was a gamble that failed. The book fluctuates between poorly defended counterfactuals and bouts of armchair generalship. The attempts at bucking the conventional wisdom on the war was fun to read, but only reinforced the arguments it attempted to rebuke.
June 28, 2023
A great and well-researched book that debunks the mindless and repeatedly made claim that Hitler was mindless/foolish/insane/suicidal when he ordered the attack on the USSR.
The second half of the book convincingly explains how Germany could have won the war (or at least crushed the Soviet Union) had they convinced Japan and Finland that they needed to do their utmost to help defeat the Soviet Union or would be defeated themselves.
The second half of the book convincingly explains how Germany could have won the war (or at least crushed the Soviet Union) had they convinced Japan and Finland that they needed to do their utmost to help defeat the Soviet Union or would be defeated themselves.
November 3, 2024
Nope. Not buying it. The author skirts around pretty much everything to do with logistics, when that's what wars almost always boil down to in the end. He also treats the Axis powers as a true alliance, then seems surprised when they don't behave accordingly. There are some interesting ideas in here, but I would recommend avoiding it without reading something better first (maybe even by a trained historian?!?).
February 15, 2025
Very interesting and Fresh look at a densely covered subject. The author points out that the move to the East was not fool hardy but while still a gamble was the best of Hitler's option at the time. He adds the greatest failure point was not the logistics, or weather or other factors covered intensely but the failure of diplomacy to bring in Japan and or get Finland to be more aggressive at the right time. I will look for more by this author.
August 18, 2025
This is a great book for those who are willing to question some of the major consensus opinions about how and why the Second World War played out in the 1940s.
Logically and crisply written the author makes his points in a reasonable amount of pages (215 or so) rather than handing us a doorstop of a book that forces us to wade through minutiae.
Logically and crisply written the author makes his points in a reasonable amount of pages (215 or so) rather than handing us a doorstop of a book that forces us to wade through minutiae.
December 29, 2020
This is a very different book overall with interesting conclusions. I agree with his point about Hitler didn't get enough help from his two best allies, the Japanese and the Finns. I'm not sure I agree with his point Lend Lease aid being the decisive factor in the war.
Philip Kuhn
Philip Kuhn
September 13, 2022
Along with McMeekin's "Stalin's War", the book gives a far better understanding of what the real power politics, regime and national survival, situations were leading up to this huge conflict. De-pablumized history is far more interesting than the usual junk.
July 19, 2024
was a great insight to the halt order and the secret and blatant disregard of it to save various army group center soldiers life. wish it went into the actions a little deeper but it was great.
April 25, 2022
Hitler's Great Gamble argues convincingly that despite the inherent risk of Operation Barbarossa, the decision to invade the Soviet Union was a calculated one that could well have succeeded if not for the failure of Germany's allies, Finland and Japan, to cut the flow of Anglo-American aid to the USSR arriving at the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok. In the first half of the book, Ellman lays out four strategies available to Hitler in 1941: Operation Seelöwe (invasion of Britain), blockade of Britain (previously tried in WW1), Mediterranean campaign to seize oil fields in Iraq/Iran, and an invasion of the Soviet Union. The second half of the book makes the case that Barbarossa was indeed Germany's best option. Recommended to anyone who enjoys military history on a grand-scale!
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