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The Path To Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia
What path led Americans to Vietnam? Why and how did the United States become involved in this conflict? Drawing on materials from published and unpublished sources in America and Great Britain, historian Andrew Rotter uncovers and analyzes the surprisingly complex reasons for America's fateful decision to provide economic and military aid to the nations of Southeast Asia in May 1950.
- GenresHistory
290 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 1988
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January 1, 2022
The books I have read so far maintain that it was Truman's decision to allocate $10 million in military aid for the French struggle in Indochina that marked the shift in American foreign policy toward Southeast Asia most decisively. However, Andrew Jon Rotter argues that this was just one of several steps toward the reorientation of Washington toward the region in 1949. Yes, Truman's decision did solidify America's position in Southeast Asia, and especially in Vietnam, was important, but, as Rotter writes, a careful analysis of 1949 US foreign policy shows other significant steps down the road toward involvement in the region.
I agree with Rotter's claim that it was after the fall of China to Communism that American policymakers found that Southeast Asia was the critical theater in their efforts to contain Communism and to effect the recovery of the developed, non-Communist nations. By the spring of 1950, the Truman administration had indeed concluded that this recovery rested on Southeast Asia, and it was prepared to take several steps, including the extension of economic and military aid, to secure the success of these nations.
Interestingly, though, Rotter also emphasizes something worth mentioning but never mentioned in other works: the distinction between containment and the pursuit of a free world. While the two goals complement each other – containment, properly implemented, would prevent Communist encroachments on the non-Communist world, and the economic revival of Western countries would make their inhabitants less susceptible to Communist propaganda – containment was still a negative strategy. It defined what policy-makers did not want, and it could not by itself restore prosperity and stability to those nations the United States counted as its closest allies and best trading partners. The West also needed a program for recovery on its side of the containment wall, and American policymakers believed that this program should be based on a distinctly American ideology.
What exactly could be considered American diplomatic ideology? Rotter, while agreeing that this ideology is hard to label, describes its six main features: the belief that people have the right of self-determination; the belief that no people will choose Communism or authoritarianism because all people want representative political institutions; the belief that economic progress and political freedom can exist only where the industry is mostly private; the idea that free trade among all nations will keep the world prosperous; the belief that economies should specialize in "what they do best" – developed nations should export manufactured goods and underdeveloped countries should sell food and raw materials; and the idea that political and economic reforms are necessary for human progress and essential to prevent revolutionary discontent. Behind all those beliefs and ideas was, of course, the firm conviction that America's moral rectitude is beyond question and the confidence that American power would persuade those who were not convinced.
The thesis of Rotter's book is that by 1949 this ideology had become hopelessly compromised by the Truman administration's acceptance of the containment doctrine.
The Americans discovered that the mere imposition of American diplomatic ideas on the non-Communist world was insufficient to ensure its recovery. The revival of the West demanded American economic aid on an enormous scale. The European Recovery Program, approved by Congress in early 1948, signified the American recognition that the ideal world was still a few years off.
As it turned out, even the massive increase of American assistance was not enough. By the summer of 1949, the success of U.S. foreign policy seemed unlikely. The economic recovery of Great Britain, considered by American policymakers to be vital for the post-war world, was slow – in response to a small American recession, for instance, the British dollar reserves diminished dangerously. The French government was opposed by France's powerful Communist labor movement and, largely because of French unwillingness to consider the entrance of West Germany into NATO, Western Europe remained vulnerable to invasion, political subversion, and economic collapse. In the Far East, China had fallen to the Communists, and there were rebellions in Indochina, Burma, British Malaya, and Indonesia, while Japan was still severely dependent on American economic aid. On top of everything, US policy-makers saw the menacing shadow of increased Soviet hostility hanging over all those events.
How could the United States respond? The developed, non-Communist nations did not seem to possess the resources or imagination to solve their own problems, so Truman made the first contribution to the new policy of 1949 by announcing the Point Four program, which marked his administration's first step toward a comprehensive policy for the underdeveloped world. Point Four combined a proposal for a small amount of American technical assistance for underdeveloped nations with an attempt to encourage business to invest in these countries. At the time of the inaugural speech, the president had only a vague notion of why such a policy was necessary, but he justified it in terms of praise to disguise his uncertainty. Therefore, although Point Four soon became obsolete, the plan for the new policy grew directly from the grandiose rationale offered for Point Four.
Truman and proponents of Point Four had recognized that the Third World demanded American attention, yet they were unsure precisely how to express this attention. During those months, policymakers realized that the problems of the most important Western nations were linked to those in the underdeveloped world and that those problems could be solved only if conditions in the Third World improved. Southeast Asia suddenly emerged as the most important underdeveloped region. Because China had gone red, the non-Communist world was deprived of a strategic bulwark against the Soviet Union, and a potentially vast market for European and Japanese exports. These responsibilities now fell to Southeast Asia. The recovery of Japan became even more urgent because of Mao's victory in China and appeared to depend on the growth of trade between Japan and Southeast Asia. The reduction of Great Britain's dollar debt, essential to the recovery of the British economy, was possible only if exports to the dollar-rich United States increased. The partial solution to this problem could be found in the revival of triangular trade between the United States, Great Britain, and British Malaya, which held the key position in the triangle because of its rubber and tin. Finally, the Truman administration understood that French political problems and the unification of Western Europe, including West Germany, could be addressed most effectively if the French committed their resources to strictly European concerns. Their struggle in Indochina prevented the French from attending to matters of higher priority in Europe. At the same time, American policy-makers believed it was essential for France to fight Communism in Southeast Asia. That is why Truman's famous solution was to relieve the French of part of their burden by throwing American aid behind French forces.
The trouble with reading many different studies on the same subject is that the reader has to sift many and diverse perspectives to form an opinion. Do I or do I not agree with Rotter? He proves his thesis persuasively, so it is hard not to agree. At the same time, no less brilliant works I have read, such as Mark Lawrence's Assuming the Burden for example, support slightly, or drastically different, views just as persuasively. Lawrence maintains that it was indeed Truman's decision to support the French in Indochina that dragged the United States into Southeast Asia. Other authors argue that America had implanted itself into the region as early as the Second World War and that it was Roosevelt, not Truman, who had taken the first step toward involvement. So many theories, so many claims to question – especially for a reader who does not have access to primary sources (yet). To quote a corollary of Murphy's law, Every theory can be proved if one finds enough arguments, and to quote a famous Chinese proverb, There is my truth, your truth, and the truth. Nevertheless, THE PATH TO VIETNAM is undoubtedly a useful book and will contribute yet another interesting observation to any Vietnam buff's understanding of the origins of American involvement in Southeast Asia.
I agree with Rotter's claim that it was after the fall of China to Communism that American policymakers found that Southeast Asia was the critical theater in their efforts to contain Communism and to effect the recovery of the developed, non-Communist nations. By the spring of 1950, the Truman administration had indeed concluded that this recovery rested on Southeast Asia, and it was prepared to take several steps, including the extension of economic and military aid, to secure the success of these nations.
Interestingly, though, Rotter also emphasizes something worth mentioning but never mentioned in other works: the distinction between containment and the pursuit of a free world. While the two goals complement each other – containment, properly implemented, would prevent Communist encroachments on the non-Communist world, and the economic revival of Western countries would make their inhabitants less susceptible to Communist propaganda – containment was still a negative strategy. It defined what policy-makers did not want, and it could not by itself restore prosperity and stability to those nations the United States counted as its closest allies and best trading partners. The West also needed a program for recovery on its side of the containment wall, and American policymakers believed that this program should be based on a distinctly American ideology.
What exactly could be considered American diplomatic ideology? Rotter, while agreeing that this ideology is hard to label, describes its six main features: the belief that people have the right of self-determination; the belief that no people will choose Communism or authoritarianism because all people want representative political institutions; the belief that economic progress and political freedom can exist only where the industry is mostly private; the idea that free trade among all nations will keep the world prosperous; the belief that economies should specialize in "what they do best" – developed nations should export manufactured goods and underdeveloped countries should sell food and raw materials; and the idea that political and economic reforms are necessary for human progress and essential to prevent revolutionary discontent. Behind all those beliefs and ideas was, of course, the firm conviction that America's moral rectitude is beyond question and the confidence that American power would persuade those who were not convinced.
The thesis of Rotter's book is that by 1949 this ideology had become hopelessly compromised by the Truman administration's acceptance of the containment doctrine.
The Americans discovered that the mere imposition of American diplomatic ideas on the non-Communist world was insufficient to ensure its recovery. The revival of the West demanded American economic aid on an enormous scale. The European Recovery Program, approved by Congress in early 1948, signified the American recognition that the ideal world was still a few years off.
As it turned out, even the massive increase of American assistance was not enough. By the summer of 1949, the success of U.S. foreign policy seemed unlikely. The economic recovery of Great Britain, considered by American policymakers to be vital for the post-war world, was slow – in response to a small American recession, for instance, the British dollar reserves diminished dangerously. The French government was opposed by France's powerful Communist labor movement and, largely because of French unwillingness to consider the entrance of West Germany into NATO, Western Europe remained vulnerable to invasion, political subversion, and economic collapse. In the Far East, China had fallen to the Communists, and there were rebellions in Indochina, Burma, British Malaya, and Indonesia, while Japan was still severely dependent on American economic aid. On top of everything, US policy-makers saw the menacing shadow of increased Soviet hostility hanging over all those events.
How could the United States respond? The developed, non-Communist nations did not seem to possess the resources or imagination to solve their own problems, so Truman made the first contribution to the new policy of 1949 by announcing the Point Four program, which marked his administration's first step toward a comprehensive policy for the underdeveloped world. Point Four combined a proposal for a small amount of American technical assistance for underdeveloped nations with an attempt to encourage business to invest in these countries. At the time of the inaugural speech, the president had only a vague notion of why such a policy was necessary, but he justified it in terms of praise to disguise his uncertainty. Therefore, although Point Four soon became obsolete, the plan for the new policy grew directly from the grandiose rationale offered for Point Four.
Truman and proponents of Point Four had recognized that the Third World demanded American attention, yet they were unsure precisely how to express this attention. During those months, policymakers realized that the problems of the most important Western nations were linked to those in the underdeveloped world and that those problems could be solved only if conditions in the Third World improved. Southeast Asia suddenly emerged as the most important underdeveloped region. Because China had gone red, the non-Communist world was deprived of a strategic bulwark against the Soviet Union, and a potentially vast market for European and Japanese exports. These responsibilities now fell to Southeast Asia. The recovery of Japan became even more urgent because of Mao's victory in China and appeared to depend on the growth of trade between Japan and Southeast Asia. The reduction of Great Britain's dollar debt, essential to the recovery of the British economy, was possible only if exports to the dollar-rich United States increased. The partial solution to this problem could be found in the revival of triangular trade between the United States, Great Britain, and British Malaya, which held the key position in the triangle because of its rubber and tin. Finally, the Truman administration understood that French political problems and the unification of Western Europe, including West Germany, could be addressed most effectively if the French committed their resources to strictly European concerns. Their struggle in Indochina prevented the French from attending to matters of higher priority in Europe. At the same time, American policy-makers believed it was essential for France to fight Communism in Southeast Asia. That is why Truman's famous solution was to relieve the French of part of their burden by throwing American aid behind French forces.
The trouble with reading many different studies on the same subject is that the reader has to sift many and diverse perspectives to form an opinion. Do I or do I not agree with Rotter? He proves his thesis persuasively, so it is hard not to agree. At the same time, no less brilliant works I have read, such as Mark Lawrence's Assuming the Burden for example, support slightly, or drastically different, views just as persuasively. Lawrence maintains that it was indeed Truman's decision to support the French in Indochina that dragged the United States into Southeast Asia. Other authors argue that America had implanted itself into the region as early as the Second World War and that it was Roosevelt, not Truman, who had taken the first step toward involvement. So many theories, so many claims to question – especially for a reader who does not have access to primary sources (yet). To quote a corollary of Murphy's law, Every theory can be proved if one finds enough arguments, and to quote a famous Chinese proverb, There is my truth, your truth, and the truth. Nevertheless, THE PATH TO VIETNAM is undoubtedly a useful book and will contribute yet another interesting observation to any Vietnam buff's understanding of the origins of American involvement in Southeast Asia.
February 5, 2024
This was a book that went in depth to the events that ultimately led to the Vietnam war. The US' need to prevent the spread of communism under FDR and Truman led to two proxy wars between Russia and the US which cost millions of people their lives. I liked it, but it was dense during parts that didn't need to be as dense, and lightly touched on things I wanted to read more about. It gave me a deeper insight to US foreign policy and how small events can snowball into something as dangerous, devastating, and destructive as war.
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