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The Superpowers War
This is the inside story of the US-China trade war, how relations between these superpowers unraveled, darkening prospects for global peace and prosperity, as told by two 'Wall Street Journal' reporters, one based in Washington, DC, the other in Beijing, who have had more access to the decision makers in the White House and in China's Zhongnanhai leadership compound than anyone else.
The trade battle between China and the US didn't start with Trump and won't end with him, argue Bob Davis and Lingling Wei. The two countries have a long and fraught political and economic history which has become more contentious over the past three years - an escalation that has negatively impacted both countries' economies and the world at large - and holds the potential for even more uncertainty and disruption. How did this stand-off happen? How much are US presidents and officials who haven't effectively confronted or negotiated with China to blame? What role have Chinese leaders, and US business leaders, who for decades acted as Beijing's lobbyists in Washington, played in driving tensions between the two countries?
'SUPERPOWER SHOWDOWN' is the story of a romance gone bad. Uniquely positioned to tell the story, Davis and Wei have conducted hundreds of interviews with government and business officials in both nations over the seven years they have worked together writing for the 'Wall Street Journal'. Analyzing US-China relations, they explain how we have reached this tipping point, and look at where we could be headed.
Vivid and provocative, 'SUPERPOWER SHOWDOWN' will help listeners understand the context of the trade war and prepare them for what may come next.
©2020 Bob Davis and Lingling Wei (P)2020 HarperAudio
The trade battle between China and the US didn't start with Trump and won't end with him, argue Bob Davis and Lingling Wei. The two countries have a long and fraught political and economic history which has become more contentious over the past three years - an escalation that has negatively impacted both countries' economies and the world at large - and holds the potential for even more uncertainty and disruption. How did this stand-off happen? How much are US presidents and officials who haven't effectively confronted or negotiated with China to blame? What role have Chinese leaders, and US business leaders, who for decades acted as Beijing's lobbyists in Washington, played in driving tensions between the two countries?
'SUPERPOWER SHOWDOWN' is the story of a romance gone bad. Uniquely positioned to tell the story, Davis and Wei have conducted hundreds of interviews with government and business officials in both nations over the seven years they have worked together writing for the 'Wall Street Journal'. Analyzing US-China relations, they explain how we have reached this tipping point, and look at where we could be headed.
Vivid and provocative, 'SUPERPOWER SHOWDOWN' will help listeners understand the context of the trade war and prepare them for what may come next.
©2020 Bob Davis and Lingling Wei (P)2020 HarperAudio
467 pages, Hardcover
First published June 9, 2020
146 people are currently reading
667 people want to read
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September 14, 2020
A journalistic history of trade relations between the United States and China from normalization to present, with a special focus on the first three years of the Trump administration and concluding in January 2020.
It's hard not to think this current confrontation is a dramatic shift in US-China relations, perhaps as decisive as President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and formalized by President Carter in 1979. Crises compound onto each other. COVID-19, Hong Kong, sanctions, Xinjiang -- and the trade war still lingers in the background as the US-China trade deficit widens as much of the world lurches out of a recession.
How did we get to this? Trump would say that the advocates of closer economic integration with China were suckers and mugs. A more damning opinion would be hubris, assuming that China would continue to be more compliant.
Davis and Wei offer a more complete picture. With the benefits of decades of hindsight, we can now point to more mistaken assumptions by the American side about their Chinese counterparts. They did not anticipate the more nationalist, assertive, interventionist turn of Xi Jinping, which was somewhat presaged by his immediate predecessors. However, the Clinton administration was not as compliant as was previously assumed - in order for China to join the WTO, many thousands of regulations had to be adjusted.
The way Davis and Wei tell it, many American businesses jumped at the chance to move capital and facilities to China. Lobbying was extensive, organizations were formed. It was presented at the time as a sound business decision, not a dramatic change in the global economic system. All this is far removed from how the current administration approaches Chinese trade. Its successors may also continue this path of trying to figure out "decoupling".
The bulk of this story, however, is about the ongoing negotiations on the trade war. To be brief, it's a clown show. Multiple factions within the Trump administration are openly opposing each other, the Chinese delegation often had trouble trying to figure out who was in charge. A Chinese representative marvelled at the size of the opposing delegation, without knowing that different American agencies were all trying to have representatives so they would not be sidelined. And then Trump's wild forays into steel and aluminum tariffs against Europe, the NAFTA/USMCA negotiations, etc., etc.
While Vice Premier Liu He and Trump signed a Phase One deal on January 15, it looks to be little more than a cease-fire; it looks as if neither party will be able to reach the targets agreed to as part of Phase One; and Joe Biden, according to reporting by the Wall Street Journal, is skeptical about a repeal of all the tariffs. This war is not short and glorious.
It's hard not to think this current confrontation is a dramatic shift in US-China relations, perhaps as decisive as President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and formalized by President Carter in 1979. Crises compound onto each other. COVID-19, Hong Kong, sanctions, Xinjiang -- and the trade war still lingers in the background as the US-China trade deficit widens as much of the world lurches out of a recession.
How did we get to this? Trump would say that the advocates of closer economic integration with China were suckers and mugs. A more damning opinion would be hubris, assuming that China would continue to be more compliant.
Davis and Wei offer a more complete picture. With the benefits of decades of hindsight, we can now point to more mistaken assumptions by the American side about their Chinese counterparts. They did not anticipate the more nationalist, assertive, interventionist turn of Xi Jinping, which was somewhat presaged by his immediate predecessors. However, the Clinton administration was not as compliant as was previously assumed - in order for China to join the WTO, many thousands of regulations had to be adjusted.
The way Davis and Wei tell it, many American businesses jumped at the chance to move capital and facilities to China. Lobbying was extensive, organizations were formed. It was presented at the time as a sound business decision, not a dramatic change in the global economic system. All this is far removed from how the current administration approaches Chinese trade. Its successors may also continue this path of trying to figure out "decoupling".
The bulk of this story, however, is about the ongoing negotiations on the trade war. To be brief, it's a clown show. Multiple factions within the Trump administration are openly opposing each other, the Chinese delegation often had trouble trying to figure out who was in charge. A Chinese representative marvelled at the size of the opposing delegation, without knowing that different American agencies were all trying to have representatives so they would not be sidelined. And then Trump's wild forays into steel and aluminum tariffs against Europe, the NAFTA/USMCA negotiations, etc., etc.
While Vice Premier Liu He and Trump signed a Phase One deal on January 15, it looks to be little more than a cease-fire; it looks as if neither party will be able to reach the targets agreed to as part of Phase One; and Joe Biden, according to reporting by the Wall Street Journal, is skeptical about a repeal of all the tariffs. This war is not short and glorious.
August 15, 2020
Is it possible for a book to be *too* timely? This came out two months ago and is a very informative primer on the modern history of US-China trade relations and a blow-by-blow account of the most recent trade spat. But even Q1-2020 (when this book ends) feels like halcyon days compared to US-China relations today.
The core thesis of the book is that the Trump administration was right to take on China, but that their tactics and (lack of) strategy doomed it to failure from the beginning. They draw on Clinton-era trade spats with China and Reagan-era trade spats with Japan as cautionary tales.
Having two authors, one primarily plugged into Beijing and the other into Washington, made this standout from other China books. The Beijing-centric commentary was one of my favorite parts of this book. We have all become immune to yet another U.S. official complaining about Trump, but until this book, I had rarely seen Chinese officials complaining about their system to a reporter.
Nonetheless, I'm going with 4 stars because I wish the authors and publishers waited a bit longer to publish this book (TikTok! Houston consulate! Coronavirus!). The story had clearly not played itself out, and the narrative conclusion of this book is hardly satisfying. My guess is that the stakeholders wanted this to come out before the U.S. election. I can respect that decision but it does hold this book (in its first edition, at least) from being elevated to my "must-read" China books.
If the paperback has new chapters and/or a substantial afterword, I'll revise my review.
The core thesis of the book is that the Trump administration was right to take on China, but that their tactics and (lack of) strategy doomed it to failure from the beginning. They draw on Clinton-era trade spats with China and Reagan-era trade spats with Japan as cautionary tales.
Having two authors, one primarily plugged into Beijing and the other into Washington, made this standout from other China books. The Beijing-centric commentary was one of my favorite parts of this book. We have all become immune to yet another U.S. official complaining about Trump, but until this book, I had rarely seen Chinese officials complaining about their system to a reporter.
Nonetheless, I'm going with 4 stars because I wish the authors and publishers waited a bit longer to publish this book (TikTok! Houston consulate! Coronavirus!). The story had clearly not played itself out, and the narrative conclusion of this book is hardly satisfying. My guess is that the stakeholders wanted this to come out before the U.S. election. I can respect that decision but it does hold this book (in its first edition, at least) from being elevated to my "must-read" China books.
If the paperback has new chapters and/or a substantial afterword, I'll revise my review.
April 3, 2022
Carefully researched, vivid stories
I cannot recommend this book enough. Davis and Wei, two longstanding WSJ reporters, give an insightful account of the US China trade war, one that displays a deep understanding of the economic factors at play, and one that is peppered with delightfully detailed and humorous stories of the important personnel involved. As a graduate student in economics, it was satisfying to see how they have read and understood research from our discipline. I was impressed by their ability to capture the perspective of both the US and China, which is difficult because of the vast differences between each country's historical, cultural, and political contexts, and because authors on both sides have a human tendency to display prejudice and animosity towards those who disagree with them. Lastly, the trade war affected the two authors in some touching personal ways, and that adds an extra spark of memorability.
I cannot recommend this book enough. Davis and Wei, two longstanding WSJ reporters, give an insightful account of the US China trade war, one that displays a deep understanding of the economic factors at play, and one that is peppered with delightfully detailed and humorous stories of the important personnel involved. As a graduate student in economics, it was satisfying to see how they have read and understood research from our discipline. I was impressed by their ability to capture the perspective of both the US and China, which is difficult because of the vast differences between each country's historical, cultural, and political contexts, and because authors on both sides have a human tendency to display prejudice and animosity towards those who disagree with them. Lastly, the trade war affected the two authors in some touching personal ways, and that adds an extra spark of memorability.
September 9, 2020
China and America are not friends anymore. Why?
1. When America let China into WTO, it thought that with economic progress would come political progress too. That did not happen. Instead, China grew richer but not more democratic. Instead, the communist party had been regarded by the Chinese people as having the Mandate of Heaven since so many poor people had been lifted out of poverty. Meanwhile, industries moved to China, leaving blue collared workers jobless and vast cities desolate. Only the rich Globalists in America gained from the WTO entry. And now, American anger against China had reached boiling point.
2. There are 2 Trumps: the Globalist real estate tycoon, who is pro-trade, and Blue Collar Nationalist. Mnuchin belongs to the first group and opposes tariffs. Lighthizer is pro-tariffs and is the real negotiator. However the Chinese are confused about who they should negotiate with. Xi has consolidated power to himself and could not afford to look weak. Meanwhile, the Uighur camp and Hong Kong demonstrations cause bipartisan American support for some sort of punishment.
3. The China government has been accused of supporting State enterprises with cheap loans, cheap rent and guaranteed jobs. Thus those enterprises can export at a loss for years, destroying American companies. It also copies American design by forcing companies to submit their goods to a certain government office. It allegedly hacks and steals commercial secrets. American companies in China had wanted Trump to do something, but probably not tariffs. Nonetheless, though they used to side with China, now they stopped speaking up for China because of these Chinese practices.
4. The Americans want structural change written into law, and even regime change; the Chinese Communist Party thinks this is ridiculous, and would only commit to buying more agricultural products.
5. Trade war and decoupling are therefore inevitable. We are experiencing the start of a period of icy relationship between the 2 superpowers. Huawei and other tech companies will continue to be targeted to slow down China’s growth.
I enjoyed this book thoroughly. This decoupling may yet benefit other countries. Vietnam has already seen some businesses moving production there to avoid tariffs. I think South East Asia will benefit.
1. When America let China into WTO, it thought that with economic progress would come political progress too. That did not happen. Instead, China grew richer but not more democratic. Instead, the communist party had been regarded by the Chinese people as having the Mandate of Heaven since so many poor people had been lifted out of poverty. Meanwhile, industries moved to China, leaving blue collared workers jobless and vast cities desolate. Only the rich Globalists in America gained from the WTO entry. And now, American anger against China had reached boiling point.
2. There are 2 Trumps: the Globalist real estate tycoon, who is pro-trade, and Blue Collar Nationalist. Mnuchin belongs to the first group and opposes tariffs. Lighthizer is pro-tariffs and is the real negotiator. However the Chinese are confused about who they should negotiate with. Xi has consolidated power to himself and could not afford to look weak. Meanwhile, the Uighur camp and Hong Kong demonstrations cause bipartisan American support for some sort of punishment.
3. The China government has been accused of supporting State enterprises with cheap loans, cheap rent and guaranteed jobs. Thus those enterprises can export at a loss for years, destroying American companies. It also copies American design by forcing companies to submit their goods to a certain government office. It allegedly hacks and steals commercial secrets. American companies in China had wanted Trump to do something, but probably not tariffs. Nonetheless, though they used to side with China, now they stopped speaking up for China because of these Chinese practices.
4. The Americans want structural change written into law, and even regime change; the Chinese Communist Party thinks this is ridiculous, and would only commit to buying more agricultural products.
5. Trade war and decoupling are therefore inevitable. We are experiencing the start of a period of icy relationship between the 2 superpowers. Huawei and other tech companies will continue to be targeted to slow down China’s growth.
I enjoyed this book thoroughly. This decoupling may yet benefit other countries. Vietnam has already seen some businesses moving production there to avoid tariffs. I think South East Asia will benefit.
February 4, 2021
This account of the trade tensions between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (PRC) is very rich in detail from two outstanding reporters from the Wall Street Journal. While this work concentrates on the machinations during the Trump Administration, it engages with how as far back as President Nixon's opening to the PRC, a key justification for economic engagement was the assumption that it would lead to economic reforms and political liberalization. As we look today the trajectory from over some five decades, particularly since the PRC's accession to the WTO, this has not been the case. Under President Xi, a more ideologically driven approach with the Chinese State playing an even stronger role in the economy and vast resources supporting State Owned Enterprises ever increasing the role of the Chinese Communist Party. The constantly changing dynamic within the Trump Administration is well laid out with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, and National Trade Council advisor Peter Navarro battling each other bureaucratically throughout the negotiations. This contrasted with Vice Premier Liu He, the childhood friend of President Xi who had his confidence. While the writing wraps up shortly after the Phase 1 deal is completed in early 2020, it is hard to not consider President Trump's March 2018 tweet that he closed stating "trade wars are good, and easy to win" as the Chinese retaliatory tariffs disproportionately targeted those American counties that voted strongly in favor of President Trump in 2016.
August 31, 2020
Exhaustively researched, tracks U.S.-China relations from both Chinese and U.S. sides to show how today's mess originated.
October 18, 2020
This book can be thought of as a set of annotations or crib-notes to the past 3 ½ years of simmering Sino-US dialogue, mostly with respect to trade/economic issues. The text starts off by providing a journalistic overview of Sino-US trade relations from the early 90s, at the start of the first Clinton administration, to very recently, circa January/February 2020, and is organized sequentially, with the first ⅓ of the book serving as backgrounder, with half of that section dedicated to the relations from 1993-1999, ending with the negotiations for China to enter the WTO, and the other half of that roughy first ⅓ being dedicated to a brief overview of the relationship during the financial crisis of 2008 and the first few years of the 2010s, coinciding with the start of Xi Jingping’s administration/rule of the country, and his increasing consolidation of that rule during that decade. Though given the contiguous nature of trade issues, this sequential ordering is fairly cohesive from a topical perspective as well (e.g. 1992-1994 is mostly on the ‘opening up period’ with many US companies pushing the Clinton administration to forego political/ideological issues to gain access to China’s market, and 1997 - 99 is mostly focused on the negotiations about the WTO-entrance).
The later ⅔ of the book covers a much smaller period of time, ranging from 2017 to approximately the first 1 - 2 months of 2020 just at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, and coincides exactly with the first (only?) Trump administration. The book’s authors seek to write the “first draft” of the history of this era, and I believe they have largely succeeded in this endeavor. For those who have been paying close attention to the various news snippets and policy analysis over the past 3 years with regards to this relationship, this book will fill in a lot of detail with respect to the undercurrents by providing second and third-hand accounts with respect to both sides of the negotiating table, and the brief occasional first-hand accounts the American half of the co-author duo, Bob Davis, a WSJ journalist, had with President Trump.
What we get from these accounts is not very surprising, but still insightful as validation to what we see in the open-source news stream. The key takeaway to the entire book could be summarized as follows: The President, who could have leveraged his proclivities for bombastic rhetoric by being the “bad Cop” to the “good cop” US negotiating team, essentially playing the “mad man” role (Trump’s Nixon to Lighthizer’s Kissinger say), almost totally failed to achieve any meaningful objective with respect ot the Chinese. This is namely because instead of a Good-Cop/Bad-Cop dynamic, Trump’s team was effectively Bad-Cop/Bad-Cop, and what it essentially did was to at first confuse the Chinese side, who could not believe what they were observing, and eventually stiffened their resolve to resist, which brings us to the start of a new Cold War.
This incoherence in strategy stem from several things, but it’s mostly because Trump is profoundly disorganized as a leader, and he had selected a team of mostly 2nd and 3rd stringers, with the few relatively “normal” principals removed within the first 1 - 2 years of his current term. The resulting confusion also stems from the intra-team squabbling between the 3 remaining principals of Trump’s economic/trade team, Mnuchin, Lighhizer, and Navaro. Further, beyond this, Trump himself is prone to sudden and drastic changes in position triggered by something as fickle as a Lou Dobbs commentary on a news item of the day relating to trade, which could lead him to tweet or make a statement that could shatter weeks of careful negotiations of the respective trade teams. In some ways, it’s comedic. In other ways, it’s fairly sad, as recent analysis by the NY Fed has indicated that the trade war had as of 2019, probably cut almost 2 trillion dollars from the US market cap. I’m still awaiting the analysis on how much consumer surplus was likely diminished from the tariffs, I suspect it’s very substantial.
Overall, I thought this book is a worthy first-attempt at the history of this period. Alone, without any context, a reader would probably not get as much out of it. However, for a reader who is fairly savvy with respect to basic international economics, and had kept up with the talks/events in the popular press (e.g. Bloomberg, WSJ, NYT, FT, FA etc.), this book will be a great review, and provide some non-trivial filler on the events. WIth respect to book pairings, as I was reading this text, I felt the book “Chinese Negotiating Behavior” published by USIP Press well over 1 ½ decade ago, would go very well. Over and over again, the US trade team kept complaining at the long time horizons (3-5 years say) the Chinese negotiating team would provide for implementation of some facet of the deal, and they would reject it. Yet, if one reads this book, one realizes these “long” terms are business-as-usual with respect to the Chinese negotiating/execution philosophy, stemming back to the 60s/70s in established patterns. It is of course obvious that some of these longer-terms could be subterfuge, but from Davis’ accounts of LIghthizer, Navarro et. al, it was almost always assumed that such ranges were subterfuge,and only very recently (circa 2019) did Lighthizer start to come around that his parroting of Trump’s bombastic dominance-driven strategy was unproductive, and that the longer ranges could be worked with. Highly recommended.
The later ⅔ of the book covers a much smaller period of time, ranging from 2017 to approximately the first 1 - 2 months of 2020 just at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, and coincides exactly with the first (only?) Trump administration. The book’s authors seek to write the “first draft” of the history of this era, and I believe they have largely succeeded in this endeavor. For those who have been paying close attention to the various news snippets and policy analysis over the past 3 years with regards to this relationship, this book will fill in a lot of detail with respect to the undercurrents by providing second and third-hand accounts with respect to both sides of the negotiating table, and the brief occasional first-hand accounts the American half of the co-author duo, Bob Davis, a WSJ journalist, had with President Trump.
What we get from these accounts is not very surprising, but still insightful as validation to what we see in the open-source news stream. The key takeaway to the entire book could be summarized as follows: The President, who could have leveraged his proclivities for bombastic rhetoric by being the “bad Cop” to the “good cop” US negotiating team, essentially playing the “mad man” role (Trump’s Nixon to Lighthizer’s Kissinger say), almost totally failed to achieve any meaningful objective with respect ot the Chinese. This is namely because instead of a Good-Cop/Bad-Cop dynamic, Trump’s team was effectively Bad-Cop/Bad-Cop, and what it essentially did was to at first confuse the Chinese side, who could not believe what they were observing, and eventually stiffened their resolve to resist, which brings us to the start of a new Cold War.
This incoherence in strategy stem from several things, but it’s mostly because Trump is profoundly disorganized as a leader, and he had selected a team of mostly 2nd and 3rd stringers, with the few relatively “normal” principals removed within the first 1 - 2 years of his current term. The resulting confusion also stems from the intra-team squabbling between the 3 remaining principals of Trump’s economic/trade team, Mnuchin, Lighhizer, and Navaro. Further, beyond this, Trump himself is prone to sudden and drastic changes in position triggered by something as fickle as a Lou Dobbs commentary on a news item of the day relating to trade, which could lead him to tweet or make a statement that could shatter weeks of careful negotiations of the respective trade teams. In some ways, it’s comedic. In other ways, it’s fairly sad, as recent analysis by the NY Fed has indicated that the trade war had as of 2019, probably cut almost 2 trillion dollars from the US market cap. I’m still awaiting the analysis on how much consumer surplus was likely diminished from the tariffs, I suspect it’s very substantial.
Overall, I thought this book is a worthy first-attempt at the history of this period. Alone, without any context, a reader would probably not get as much out of it. However, for a reader who is fairly savvy with respect to basic international economics, and had kept up with the talks/events in the popular press (e.g. Bloomberg, WSJ, NYT, FT, FA etc.), this book will be a great review, and provide some non-trivial filler on the events. WIth respect to book pairings, as I was reading this text, I felt the book “Chinese Negotiating Behavior” published by USIP Press well over 1 ½ decade ago, would go very well. Over and over again, the US trade team kept complaining at the long time horizons (3-5 years say) the Chinese negotiating team would provide for implementation of some facet of the deal, and they would reject it. Yet, if one reads this book, one realizes these “long” terms are business-as-usual with respect to the Chinese negotiating/execution philosophy, stemming back to the 60s/70s in established patterns. It is of course obvious that some of these longer-terms could be subterfuge, but from Davis’ accounts of LIghthizer, Navarro et. al, it was almost always assumed that such ranges were subterfuge,and only very recently (circa 2019) did Lighthizer start to come around that his parroting of Trump’s bombastic dominance-driven strategy was unproductive, and that the longer ranges could be worked with. Highly recommended.
August 16, 2022
Authors Davis and Wei provide a very detailed journalistic account of American-Chinese trade relations. The book focuses on the Trump administration's confrontation with China over its trade practices that disadvantages American corporations doing business in China. The authors discuss the experience of prior presidents' interactions over trade, primarily president Clinton's dealings which led to Chinese admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Trump selected people with diverse views on trade to join his administration: Globalists such as Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and nationalists led by Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.
Other key players are Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and trade specialist Peter Navarro, the strongest nationalist proponent. The diversity of opinion led to conflicts over primacy in dealing with Chinese counterparts. Various players made end runs around one another. Trump himself held conflicting views: those of the Wall Streeter globalist and as the businessman nationalist. He eventually selected Lighthizer as the lead party on negotiations.
One issue in contention was the imbalance in trade value with China exporting far more than it imported. Also, American businesses reported that they were being forced to share their proprietary technical information with their Chinese partners and to divulge these secrets to Chinese administrators or courts; this information would then be shared with their Chinese competition. Some of those competitors were firms operated by the state, and which were heavily subsidized. In other cases, technology and processing secrets were obtained by theft, cyberspying, or by hiring away of key personnel. Another issue was China's failure to follow through with changes they agreed to make, in particular, purchases of agricultural and other products.
The many meetings described here are repetitious, with both sides coming to the table with the same positions, but with no changes being accepted by the Chinese. As a result, president Trump threatened, and then imposed tariffs on Chinese imports. China retaliated. Trump raised the levels and the two countries were engaged in a trade war. But, negotiations continued.
The authors credit Trump with his willingness to confront the Chinese on their trade practices, His imposition of tariffs was the most since days of the New Deal. They note that, "The Trump team is surely right that tariffs command attention from foreign nations and are a powerful tool that the United States has long ignored. If a Democrat wins the White House, expect him or her to use tariffs for additional goals, including pressuring China and other nations over human rights, worker rights, and climate change."
The authors fault his unilateral approach, suggesting, "a combination of alliance building, backed by the threat of unilateral action, could be a way for a second term Trump presidency or a Democratic alternative to proceed." Some of his team had suggested this approach, they write, but
"Trump rejected the plan" because "he wanted to use tariffs immediately." They have additional suggestions for going forward, as well.
This is a good solid read on a issue that is going to be with us. The Chinese think their approach is succeeding and have no apparent intention of changing it. The book can be recommended for those interested in the linkage between trade and international relations. It is jargon free, in the best journalistic tradition, but cites various academic research that shows the hazards of applying tariffs. There is much to be learned here.
Trump selected people with diverse views on trade to join his administration: Globalists such as Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and nationalists led by Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.
Other key players are Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and trade specialist Peter Navarro, the strongest nationalist proponent. The diversity of opinion led to conflicts over primacy in dealing with Chinese counterparts. Various players made end runs around one another. Trump himself held conflicting views: those of the Wall Streeter globalist and as the businessman nationalist. He eventually selected Lighthizer as the lead party on negotiations.
One issue in contention was the imbalance in trade value with China exporting far more than it imported. Also, American businesses reported that they were being forced to share their proprietary technical information with their Chinese partners and to divulge these secrets to Chinese administrators or courts; this information would then be shared with their Chinese competition. Some of those competitors were firms operated by the state, and which were heavily subsidized. In other cases, technology and processing secrets were obtained by theft, cyberspying, or by hiring away of key personnel. Another issue was China's failure to follow through with changes they agreed to make, in particular, purchases of agricultural and other products.
The many meetings described here are repetitious, with both sides coming to the table with the same positions, but with no changes being accepted by the Chinese. As a result, president Trump threatened, and then imposed tariffs on Chinese imports. China retaliated. Trump raised the levels and the two countries were engaged in a trade war. But, negotiations continued.
The authors credit Trump with his willingness to confront the Chinese on their trade practices, His imposition of tariffs was the most since days of the New Deal. They note that, "The Trump team is surely right that tariffs command attention from foreign nations and are a powerful tool that the United States has long ignored. If a Democrat wins the White House, expect him or her to use tariffs for additional goals, including pressuring China and other nations over human rights, worker rights, and climate change."
The authors fault his unilateral approach, suggesting, "a combination of alliance building, backed by the threat of unilateral action, could be a way for a second term Trump presidency or a Democratic alternative to proceed." Some of his team had suggested this approach, they write, but
"Trump rejected the plan" because "he wanted to use tariffs immediately." They have additional suggestions for going forward, as well.
This is a good solid read on a issue that is going to be with us. The Chinese think their approach is succeeding and have no apparent intention of changing it. The book can be recommended for those interested in the linkage between trade and international relations. It is jargon free, in the best journalistic tradition, but cites various academic research that shows the hazards of applying tariffs. There is much to be learned here.
July 21, 2020
It was well written, but really, there is only so much that can be done with the story of a trade deal. Considering the nature of the topic, the authors do make it readable.
Others have suggested some charts, I think some maps would also have helped. While I have been to most of the Chinese cities mentioned in the book, I doubt that all of the readers have.
I do appreciate that the authors didn't drag us through a chapter where the Ricardian Free Trade Model is explained. After all, a person reading this book probably already knows how free trade is supposed to work. In all, the authors managed to keep a somewhat dreary topic lively and, while not the quintessential page-turner, they managed to produce a book that was readable and provided some insight.
Others have suggested some charts, I think some maps would also have helped. While I have been to most of the Chinese cities mentioned in the book, I doubt that all of the readers have.
I do appreciate that the authors didn't drag us through a chapter where the Ricardian Free Trade Model is explained. After all, a person reading this book probably already knows how free trade is supposed to work. In all, the authors managed to keep a somewhat dreary topic lively and, while not the quintessential page-turner, they managed to produce a book that was readable and provided some insight.
June 29, 2020
Is it really so hard to provide an additional timeline or perhaps a few graphs? Still interesting though, but if you read one book on the topic, read 'Schism' by Paul Blustein instead.
November 1, 2020
Interesting chronology of the progress of trade and tariffs between the U.S. and China. The various perspectives each nation had/has of the other, some accurate, some misguided that influence their posturing, offers/counter-offers during negotiations. Some insight into the negotiators and their relationships with each other and their ultimate bosses Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. Additionally, the difficulties and considerations these leaders have to deal with within their respective governments and citizenry are mentioned.
Overall, authors Bob Davis and Lingling Wei have presented the facts with minimum of gratuitous criticism of the parties involved.
Overall, authors Bob Davis and Lingling Wei have presented the facts with minimum of gratuitous criticism of the parties involved.
October 13, 2020
Brilliant. A masterful page turner that I simply could not put down.
A play by play of the trade war between US and China. Gives much needed context and a lot of colorful anecdotes about Trump and many other characters involved in this tariff war. The anecdotes are downright hilarious although the subject matter is serious.
The trade war also portends slower growth for the world economy. The US government establishment views China the same way it did the USSR in the 90s. The nuances of a trade war is part of a larger design to stem China's rise. A must read considering the perilous times we now live in.
A play by play of the trade war between US and China. Gives much needed context and a lot of colorful anecdotes about Trump and many other characters involved in this tariff war. The anecdotes are downright hilarious although the subject matter is serious.
The trade war also portends slower growth for the world economy. The US government establishment views China the same way it did the USSR in the 90s. The nuances of a trade war is part of a larger design to stem China's rise. A must read considering the perilous times we now live in.
June 13, 2024
An account of two Wall Street Journal journalists (both Americans though one is of Chinese origin) on the US-China trade war and how relations between the two nations unraveled, darkening prospects for global peace and prospects. Based upon interviews and discussions with insiders to the whole drama during the Trump years - both in the US and China - it is a riveting account and a great analysis of the origin of this war and its prognosis going forward. Recommended reading for those wishing to make sense of the brewing Superpower rivalry and the often quixotic manner of operating of the Trump administration and Xi administration.
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August 26, 2024(Audiobook)(3.5 stars)This work is best suited as an introductory work to someone looking for an explanation as to the current "great power" competition between the US and China/Russia. The New Cold Wars can be seen as an apt title, as one can feel as if we are in a new set of Cold Wars with Russia and China, all with the potential to go hot with little to no warning. Admittedly, much of this work does not offer anything new for me, but I can see the value for one just wanting a readable overview of how things got to the way they are and what a way ahead might look like. The rating is the same regardless of format.
March 2, 2021
A thorough, detailed account of the past, present, and future of US China trade relations. Very dense, with no visuals throughout the book (could have used a graph or map here and there) about 1/3 of the book is the background behind these two countries and their earlier relationships, while about 1/2 is about the recent trade war, and the rest speculated about the continuation of tension. I really got to know the characters, from Xi to Trump and all of their aides, and the national perspectives that guide confrontations between us. Excellent read, and a long one too at 420+ pages.
July 17, 2021
A seminal work on us china trade relations
A business book, but so easy to follow and a page turner to boot. For the latest and best lowdown on china us trade problems the go to book. Learnt a lot while enjoying myself reading this book. Hats off and kudos to the authors.
A business book, but so easy to follow and a page turner to boot. For the latest and best lowdown on china us trade problems the go to book. Learnt a lot while enjoying myself reading this book. Hats off and kudos to the authors.
November 2, 2020
You can read my review here: https://www.economist.com/books-and-a...
January 7, 2021
The first draft of history.
February 27, 2021
A very interesting read with a lot to chew on. Data-filled and objective.
February 5, 2025
This book is a detailed account of the (first) US-China trade war, and also delves into longer-term economic ties since China joined the WTO in 2001. I picked the book up to understand US-China economic ties under Trump; the book has informed me about this and far more. It is particularly useful in explaining the personality and policy styles of Donald Trump, and the deep differences of opinion in his economic team during his first term. It is also informative about the relationship between the party, the state, and business (both Chinese and US) in China. It sheds light on the economic aspects of America's inward turn, and offers insights for longer term US-China ties and the factors shaping these. Published in 2020, it does not cover the Biden administration or the impact of COVID, but given that Trump is back in the White House, I would label it essential reading.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 12, 2020
Very dry. Accurate information, some of it insider. Like a journal of U.S.-China discussions about trade and state relations. 3/4 is palace intrigue on the American side. Not judgemental on the Trump administration, other than pointing out tactical mistakes and team disputes. Not very prescriptive other than to go back to traditional polite state diplomacy. Renew friendships, restore alliances, etc. prediction that China will overtake U.S. by 2030, regardless.
August 20, 2020
I'm torn on how to rate this book. Incredible research detail. In the beginning, I was super interested and hooked, but it became too detail-oriented w/ too little organization/analysis for me (this is largely journalistic, i.e. fact reporting). I ended up skimming the latter parts of the book.
This is made for people with a deep IPE interest and best for those who already have significant prior knowledge- otherwise it is very hard to keep up w/ all the individuals introduced.
This is made for people with a deep IPE interest and best for those who already have significant prior knowledge- otherwise it is very hard to keep up w/ all the individuals introduced.
January 10, 2021
Reads like a report card or a timeline between America and China - who said this, who did that, and why this person said this and that.
A genre which I avoid reading is economics because it bores the pants off me; as I write this I am a lil apologetic to the writers because a ton of effort had gone into reproducing this work of art. This book would suit readers who have a strong fascination in Economics.
A genre which I avoid reading is economics because it bores the pants off me; as I write this I am a lil apologetic to the writers because a ton of effort had gone into reproducing this work of art. This book would suit readers who have a strong fascination in Economics.
September 29, 2020
Balanced analysis and good content and detail. Some graphics with charts, timeline and character map would make reading easier and book more useful as reference. Authors take the primacy of Western values as self-evident.
July 26, 2020
Back in the 1950s the United States had to become Red in order to be able to fight the Reds said the leaders. Now they will probably have to become Chinese to "fight" the Chinese.
August 13, 2020
Good information spoiled by clear anti-Trump bias causing me to become annoyed as often as educated by authors information.
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November 7, 2020A Great Book
This was one of the most complete reviews of how politics actually works and a review of how Trump and Xi attempted to remodel their governments.
This was one of the most complete reviews of how politics actually works and a review of how Trump and Xi attempted to remodel their governments.
December 7, 2020
Insightful.
December 24, 2020
A review of America’s relationship with China under President Trump. It was a look at a specific moment in history.
January 10, 2021
Host a book talk on this one on Jan 10. Important accounts of detail reporting by two Wall Street Journal reporters.
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