TMI 25 Years Later: The Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant Accident and Its Impact

by Bonnie A. Osif, Anthony J. Baratta, Thomas W. Conkling

Three Mile Island burst into the nation's headlines twenty-five years ago, forever changing our view of nuclear power. The dramatic accident held the world's attention for an unsettling week in March 1979 as engineers struggled to understand what had happened and brought the damaged reactor to a safe condition. Much has been written since then about TMI, but it is not easy to find up-to-date information that is both reliable and accessible to the nonscientific reader. TMI 25 Years Later offers a much-needed "one-stop" resource for a new generation of citizens, students, and policy makers. The legacy of Three Mile Island has been far reaching. The worst nuclear accident in U.S. history marked a turning point in our policies, our perceptions, and our national identity. Those involved in the nuclear industry today study the scenario carefully and review the decontamination and recovery process. Risk management and the ability to convey risks to the general population rationally and understandably are an integral part of implementing new technologies. Political, environmental, and energy decisions have been made with TMI as a factor, and while studies reveal little environmental damage from the accident, long-term studies of health effects continue. TMI 25 Years Later presents a balanced and factual account of the accident, the cleanup effort, and the many facets of its legacy. The authors bring extensive research and writing The authors bring extensive research and writing experience to this book. After the accident and the cleanup, a significant collection of videotapes, photographs, and reports was donated to the University Libraries at Penn State University. Bonnie Osif and Thomas Conkling are engineering librarians at Penn State who maintain a database of these materials, which they have made available to the general public through an award-winning website. Anthony Baratta is a nuclear engineer who worked with the decontamination and recovery project at TMI and is an expert in nuclear accidents. The book features unique photographs of the cleanup and helpful appendixes that enable readers to investigate further various aspects of the story.

194 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2004

Reviews

[Andrew Skretvedt · Rating 3 out of 5]

Nuclear power technology buffs will appreciate this assessment of the TMI accident written from the perspective of 25 years later.

The accident sequence is presented in plenty of detail, though it does not try too hard to go into complete and precise detail from an engineering and physics standpoint. Just enough information is there to give you what you need to know to understand how the accident came about and how it progressed through crisis to resolution. I found this adequate, though slightly unsatisfying. I wanted to dig deeper into the why aspect of the accident sequence and explore a bit of the not-taken back alleyways of informed speculation about the other ways the accident could have unfolded, but didn't.

Beyond the accident sequence itself, the stabilization and cleanup is considered, and then the long term analysis of policy, health effects, and industry impact. This information is rather dry, but necessary for a complete understanding of how TMI impacted nuclear power in America, and for characterizing the risks of nuclear power (at least as implemented in the design of pressurized-water reactors like TMI's).

I was motivated to read this in the wake of the serious meltdown disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in March of 2011. Several reactors and associated facility suffered much more extreme damage than did TMI, and the radiation release has been far more serious.

This book gave me the ability to compare and contrast the two accidents. At TMI, radiation was almost 100% contained within the containment and adjacent facility. Some lightly radioactive gasses were vented at a few specific stages, and some modestly contaminated cooling water was contained onsite and later processed clean. The health effects from the radiation that did make it off the site and into the environment were small enough that 25 years on, the signal of excess cancers has not been strong enough statistically to come above the background noise of naturally occurring cancer rates. The real human impact has been in the fear sparked by the accident emergency, and the psychological trauma left by knowledge that the government and industry were not adequately prepared to manage the crisis smoothly, and the specter (now shown unwarranted) of potential long-term health risks. A spoiling of innocence about the nature and promise of nuclear power, rather than a physical disaster.

At Daiichi the six-month aftermath paints a picture far more bleak. The reactor design and containment was insufficient to keep the radiation onsite. The prolonged failure of the cooling systems caused critical overheating of fuel assemblies which generated hydrogen gas quantities at many of the site's reactors. This caused multiple explosions at Daiichi leading to substantial facility damage and a greater hampering of efforts to regain control of the situation and manage cooling.

Hydrogen was also generated at TMI as it's fuel melted, and this gas burned there too, but for reasons this book did not detail, the impact of the burning hydrogen was limited to the reactor pressure vessel and the facilities within the containment, and did not cause damage outside. The lack of significant destruction helped workers regain control of the situation. (The book shows a photo from inside the containment building showing a half-melted telephone at a worker's desk. The hydrogen burn caused heat-related damage, but apparently little or no blast damage.)

I've learned one thing well for the future, regarding boiling or pressurized water reactors which are the dominant type in the world today. If there is a nuclear incident or accident in progress, and there is a report about hydrogen being present, you can bet that despite any media commentary or official statements, fuel is or has been melting. The hydrogen is created as part of a chemical reaction which takes place when the fuel's zirconium-alloy cladding overheats. It's significant because it means the fuel is softening, melting, or distending from its original shape. The cladding (among other functions) keeps the radioactive fission products contained in the fuel itself. Allowing the fuel to overheat means that required cooling water later will carry away more radiation. This raises the risk that radiation will escape the facility.

Hydrogen is key, so long as there is no H, the risk to the public at that moment can be considered very low. Once hydrogen is mentioned, fuel is or has melted, and the risk goes up.

At TMI, despite the initial difficulties, the risk was successfully managed, and for public safety, the outcome was excellent. At Fukushima Daiichi, the hydrogen explosions complicated efforts to restore cooling dramatically. Much damaged fuel, combined with much damaged infrastructure, made radiation releases much more likely.

This book prompts me to think about what key safety differences exist between the boiling-water and pressurized-water reactor designs. Now I would like to know why the hydrogen situations led to such different outcomes in the accident sequence between TMI and Daiichi, and why the radiation released from TMI was so small in magnitude, and so benign in form (almost all as inert and quickly dissipated noble gasses); while at Daiichi, the radiation release was composed mostly of more serious and difficult to manage elements (like iodine and cesium). Is there an aspect to reactor design than can influence what sort of radiation gets released when a major disaster occurs? I've learned that not all radiation is created equal in terms of its environmental impact (most of that not from this book, however).

For more on the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, I recommend the series of interviews of former nuclear power engineer Mark Mervine, conducted for the web by his daughter, geologist Evelyn Mervine.

http://georneys.blogspot.com/2011/03/...

[Alex Perkins 2020 · Rating 3 out of 5]

My Novel is TMI 25 years later by Bonnie A. Osif, Anthony J. Baratta, and Thomas W. Conkling. This is a nonfiction book that goes into a lot of detail about the ways that the three authors lives are affected when the nuclear power plant that they work at on Three Mile High Island has an issue.

In this book the more you read the more you learn. This is what made it so great. In this book you will be introduced to many key parts of a Nuclear Power plant. This book is all about the lives of the three authors and how working at this Nuclear Power plant has changed there lives. This book will bring you in an take you on a short journey of what they go through on a day to day basis. Read this book to find out just what happens to them one day at work.

I would recommend this book to anyone who likes learning about crazy things like nuclear power. I think that you would really enjoy this book if you are a slower reader like I am that likes to get all the small and behind the scenes details on some of the most powerful and dangerous parts of working in one of these power plants. I really liked this book because as you read deeper into the book and got closer to the climax the small details got even small making it a very fun read. About that only thing that I didn’t like was the three perspectives, sometimes I got a little confuse.

[Nicole · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting read. Found it after i saw a documentary. There might be a spin from the nuclear power side or might be truth. You need to decide for yourself.