What do you think?
Rate this book
Watermelon Democracy: Egypt’s Turbulent Transition
In Egypt, something that fails to live up to its advertised expectations is often called a a grand promise that later turns out to be empty talk. The political transition in Egypt after protests overthrew Husni Mubarak in 2011 is one such watermelon. Stacher examines the uprising and its aftermath to show how the country’s new ruling incumbents deferred the democratic dreams of the people of Egypt. At the same time, he lays out in meticulous fashion the circumstances that gave the army’s well-armed and well-funded institution an advantage against its citizens during and after Egypt’s turbulent transition. Stacher outlines the ways in which Egypt’s military manipulated the country’s empowering uprising into a nightmare situation that now counts as the most repressive period in Egypt’s modern history. In particular, Stacher charts the opposition dynamics during uprisings, elections, state violence, and political economy to show the multiple ways autocratic state elites try to construct a new political regime on the ashes of a discredited one. As they encounter these different aspects working together as a larger process, readers come to grips with the totality of the military-led counterrevolution as well as understand why Egyptians rightfully feel they ended up living in a watermelon democracy.
- GenresEgypt
257 pages, Paperback
Published March 31, 2020
1 person is currently reading
49 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
November 26, 2023
It is painful for a person to read about the disappointments of his country. We read about events that we lived through and participated in. We are overwhelmed with regret and heartbreak. How did we waste our chance to live a better life? How did the train of dignity, justice and freedom miss without us climbing over its windows to enter inside, and between remorse and heartbreak = perhaps benefit lies, and the lesson of history, even if we cannot change, it is enough for the picture of the experience to be complete and honest, far from falsification, so that future generations can benefit from it, Perhaps it will correct the mistakes of this generation.
Hence the importance of this book, “Watermelon Democracy: Egypt’s Turbulent Transition” written by the American academic “Joshua Stacher,” a doctor of political science at Kent State University. “Joshua” was present in Egypt (Mansoura) during the parliamentary elections in 2005, and when One of the Egyptians asked him, “What are you doing here?” He told him that he was watching the democratic process. Here, Al-Masry said to him with a sarcasm that Joshua did not understand, “Watermelon democracy.” Later, Joshua would understand the sarcastic connotation of the word, especially since the man remained present in Egypt and watched the January revolution, then the transitional period and the presidency of Dr. Morsi until the army coup in 2013. During that time point Joshua described the Egyptians as being victims of the melon shift.
The main question in this book is: How did tyranny return again and how was it formed after the January Revolution and the turbulent transitional period in Egypt? The book examines this by showing the process by which a new authoritarian regime is formed on the ruins of one that has already been disrupted by mass protests. Perhaps we can blame the book for its lack of interest in the external factor, such as “Israel” and the Arab Gulf states, as David Kirkpatrick spoke about in his book “ into the hands of the soldiers,” but in my opinion, the external factor cannot play alone without the support of the internal factor, and therefore the book focused on The internal factor (the deep state) that led the counter-revolution in Egypt.
The idea that the Egyptians led a revolution and it did not succeed is, in Joshua’s view, not an exceptional idea in history. The return of an authoritarian regime after a counter-revolution is not a completely new matter, as he says, and since the new is in itself old, the process by which authoritarian regimes return must be understood, and from here he observes Throughout his entire book, Joshua discusses four main areas through which tyranny is evident: (The first): The relationship between popular protests and holding positions of office. (Second): The role of elections in the transitional period. (Third): The use of state violence after the fall of the dictator. (Fourth) Dynamics of the political economy.
Understanding these factors is what makes us answer an important question: Why did Egypt fail to achieve a revolution like what Russia or Iran witnessed? In the first factor, for example, the book believes that the ties between opposition groups are the most important factor in the demonstrators’ ability to overcome the state, and accordingly it says that the military elites took advantage of the divided ties among the opposition to restore their old role. As for the second factor, which is the controversial factor [it surprised me while reading that it is One of the factors that helped the return of the old regime] is “the role of elections in the transitional period.” Elections are usually seen as a tool of the democratic process to reach an elected democratic system, but Joshua explained how the generals used elections (the referendum on constitutional amendments with a yes or no+ Two rounds of presidential elections) in the transitional period to create a new exclusionary political arena that marginalized revolutionary voices.
According to the book, the goal of the elections was to control the revolution in the street, and to create a system that could be dealt with and eliminated. Therefore, any revolutionary protest after the elections would be outside the revolution itself, and may be suppressed.
I do not believe that fair elections can bring back tyranny = It is a dangerous game. Tyranny has returned not because of fair elections, but because of the failure of the regime that reached the elections to eliminate the deep state. There is a point that Joshua did not pay attention to, which is that the division between the opposition preceded the elections. The book analyzes, for example, how the deep ideological disagreement between the secular opposition groups and the Brotherhood contributed to the fragmentation of the opposition front, and even to the secular opposition throwing itself into the arms of the military against the Brotherhood. It was naturally difficult for them to work together on a single front, in light of the secular opposition groups’ belief that the strongest and most equipped among them were The opposition groups are the Brotherhood.
One of the most important factors he talked about in the return of tyranny is “state violence,” and this chapter is one of the painful chapters in the book. Joshua says that the escalation of state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood was also used against the revolutionaries. He recounts many bloody and violent incidents that occurred from 2011-2013. The Maspero massacre. - The events of Muhammad Mahmoud - Virginity tests - The Republican Guard massacre - Rabaa.
And other violent incidents, which Joshua described as the most violent during the Mubarak era. He even described the number of Rabaa deaths as the largest massacres committed by a ruler against his people. These violent behaviors undermined the revolution, by killing, imprisoning, or pushing activists to flee outside the country. Joshua goes with Nazih Al-Ayoubi’s statement that state violence does not indicate its strength as much as it indicates its fragility.
The last and important factor in excluding the new regime and the return of the old regime is the “economic interests” of the deep state. Joshua notes that the post-2013 period does not represent an economic break from the period before 2011, as the deep state, led by the generals, defended their economic interests, and on the eve of 2012 The army made a donation to the state worth one billion Egyptian pounds, which opened the door to questions about the army’s invisible budget, as the book says.
As Joshua says, Morsi rejected an IMF loan in exchange for austerity measures. Morsi increased temporary and permanent government job opportunities, but that was at the expense of a crumbling economy. Morsi faltered economically, and the Gulf states abandoned their support with the exception of Qatar. But here the book makes you feel that the army moved after the Brotherhood’s economic faltering. Without linking this to the role of the deep state in supporting this faltering, the book says that the political economy was getting out of control. Which prompted the army to intervene to preserve their interests. In the end, it is an intervention to preserve private interests. This is the author’s conclusion, without trying to link this to the deliberate failure of the new experiment. Joshua says at the end of his book that the army, despite its proud economic empire, may not be able to keep the wolf away from its door, let alone all of Egypt. They will have no choice but to "double the oppression" with hundreds of thousands of families suffering.
The first edition of Joshua’s book was published in 2020. He says that Egypt is “going through the most repressive period in its modern history.” He explains that current economic and political policies are undermining the Egyptian state, which has been ruled by generals since 1952. He clearly says that the leaders of the Egyptian state are economically besieged.
Hence the importance of this book, “Watermelon Democracy: Egypt’s Turbulent Transition” written by the American academic “Joshua Stacher,” a doctor of political science at Kent State University. “Joshua” was present in Egypt (Mansoura) during the parliamentary elections in 2005, and when One of the Egyptians asked him, “What are you doing here?” He told him that he was watching the democratic process. Here, Al-Masry said to him with a sarcasm that Joshua did not understand, “Watermelon democracy.” Later, Joshua would understand the sarcastic connotation of the word, especially since the man remained present in Egypt and watched the January revolution, then the transitional period and the presidency of Dr. Morsi until the army coup in 2013. During that time point Joshua described the Egyptians as being victims of the melon shift.
The main question in this book is: How did tyranny return again and how was it formed after the January Revolution and the turbulent transitional period in Egypt? The book examines this by showing the process by which a new authoritarian regime is formed on the ruins of one that has already been disrupted by mass protests. Perhaps we can blame the book for its lack of interest in the external factor, such as “Israel” and the Arab Gulf states, as David Kirkpatrick spoke about in his book “ into the hands of the soldiers,” but in my opinion, the external factor cannot play alone without the support of the internal factor, and therefore the book focused on The internal factor (the deep state) that led the counter-revolution in Egypt.
The idea that the Egyptians led a revolution and it did not succeed is, in Joshua’s view, not an exceptional idea in history. The return of an authoritarian regime after a counter-revolution is not a completely new matter, as he says, and since the new is in itself old, the process by which authoritarian regimes return must be understood, and from here he observes Throughout his entire book, Joshua discusses four main areas through which tyranny is evident: (The first): The relationship between popular protests and holding positions of office. (Second): The role of elections in the transitional period. (Third): The use of state violence after the fall of the dictator. (Fourth) Dynamics of the political economy.
Understanding these factors is what makes us answer an important question: Why did Egypt fail to achieve a revolution like what Russia or Iran witnessed? In the first factor, for example, the book believes that the ties between opposition groups are the most important factor in the demonstrators’ ability to overcome the state, and accordingly it says that the military elites took advantage of the divided ties among the opposition to restore their old role. As for the second factor, which is the controversial factor [it surprised me while reading that it is One of the factors that helped the return of the old regime] is “the role of elections in the transitional period.” Elections are usually seen as a tool of the democratic process to reach an elected democratic system, but Joshua explained how the generals used elections (the referendum on constitutional amendments with a yes or no+ Two rounds of presidential elections) in the transitional period to create a new exclusionary political arena that marginalized revolutionary voices.
According to the book, the goal of the elections was to control the revolution in the street, and to create a system that could be dealt with and eliminated. Therefore, any revolutionary protest after the elections would be outside the revolution itself, and may be suppressed.
I do not believe that fair elections can bring back tyranny = It is a dangerous game. Tyranny has returned not because of fair elections, but because of the failure of the regime that reached the elections to eliminate the deep state. There is a point that Joshua did not pay attention to, which is that the division between the opposition preceded the elections. The book analyzes, for example, how the deep ideological disagreement between the secular opposition groups and the Brotherhood contributed to the fragmentation of the opposition front, and even to the secular opposition throwing itself into the arms of the military against the Brotherhood. It was naturally difficult for them to work together on a single front, in light of the secular opposition groups’ belief that the strongest and most equipped among them were The opposition groups are the Brotherhood.
One of the most important factors he talked about in the return of tyranny is “state violence,” and this chapter is one of the painful chapters in the book. Joshua says that the escalation of state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood was also used against the revolutionaries. He recounts many bloody and violent incidents that occurred from 2011-2013. The Maspero massacre. - The events of Muhammad Mahmoud - Virginity tests - The Republican Guard massacre - Rabaa.
And other violent incidents, which Joshua described as the most violent during the Mubarak era. He even described the number of Rabaa deaths as the largest massacres committed by a ruler against his people. These violent behaviors undermined the revolution, by killing, imprisoning, or pushing activists to flee outside the country. Joshua goes with Nazih Al-Ayoubi’s statement that state violence does not indicate its strength as much as it indicates its fragility.
The last and important factor in excluding the new regime and the return of the old regime is the “economic interests” of the deep state. Joshua notes that the post-2013 period does not represent an economic break from the period before 2011, as the deep state, led by the generals, defended their economic interests, and on the eve of 2012 The army made a donation to the state worth one billion Egyptian pounds, which opened the door to questions about the army’s invisible budget, as the book says.
As Joshua says, Morsi rejected an IMF loan in exchange for austerity measures. Morsi increased temporary and permanent government job opportunities, but that was at the expense of a crumbling economy. Morsi faltered economically, and the Gulf states abandoned their support with the exception of Qatar. But here the book makes you feel that the army moved after the Brotherhood’s economic faltering. Without linking this to the role of the deep state in supporting this faltering, the book says that the political economy was getting out of control. Which prompted the army to intervene to preserve their interests. In the end, it is an intervention to preserve private interests. This is the author’s conclusion, without trying to link this to the deliberate failure of the new experiment. Joshua says at the end of his book that the army, despite its proud economic empire, may not be able to keep the wolf away from its door, let alone all of Egypt. They will have no choice but to "double the oppression" with hundreds of thousands of families suffering.
The first edition of Joshua’s book was published in 2020. He says that Egypt is “going through the most repressive period in its modern history.” He explains that current economic and political policies are undermining the Egyptian state, which has been ruled by generals since 1952. He clearly says that the leaders of the Egyptian state are economically besieged.
January 9, 2024
I've read several books on the Arab Spring in Egypt, The Egyptians by Shenker, Arab Fall by Eric Traeger, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen by Kandil, etc. and this is the best of the group from an academic perspective. Stacher provides a grounded and detailed approach to understanding the fall of Mubarak and subsequent years of Egypt's transition.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews