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Elections without Order: Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin
Russians want free elections and order. Although their political elites have had no difficulty in supplying candidates and parties in the last decade, predictability in everyday life and the rule of law have suffered. This book is about Russia's attempt to achieve democratization backwards, by holding elections without having created a modern state. This dilemma is the challenge that Russia presents to Vladimir Putin.
- GenresPoliticsNonfiction
274 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
October 25, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Книга как бы поделена на две части, когда в первой половине автор даёт оценку ельцинскому правлению и в частности вопросу построения демократии и развитию выборной системы в РФ, а во второй половине анализируются выборы, происходившие во времена Ельцина. Если первая часть чем-то напоминает анализ ситуации России 90-х политологом Vladimir Gel'man, то вот вторая походит на историческую справку кого поддерживали граждане РФ в те годы. В этом смысле во второй половине книги даётся многочисленные социологические опросы граждан России на предмет их предпочтения тех или иных политических партий, взглядов, желаний и пр. В 2024 году читать об этом не очень интересно, т.к. как правильно замечает сам автор, Ельцин строил не демократическое государство, а авторитарное, пусть и с некоторыми элементами демократии, следовательно, влияние партий было в разы слабее, нежели в Европе.
But Yeltsin preferred to assert personal authority rather than attempt the patient and difficult task of creating modern institutions of governance amidst the wreckage of the Soviet Union. He did not rely on party loyalists or on bureaucrats; instead he relied on the antithesis of a modern state, a coterie of personal advisors to carry out his orders and protect his political interests. In exercising personalistic rule, Yeltsin could be generous and he could be capricious – and he could not be held accountable to political institutions limiting his discretion.
Принятие суперпрезидентской конституции является одним из главных элементов в построении авторитаризма в России и что примечательно, население РФ уже тогда это очень хорошо осознавало. Отсутствие явной поддержки в пользу новой конституции, в то время когда популярность Ельцина ещё не опустилась до того низкого уровня, что была у него начиная с 1996, хорошо показывает запрос граждан РФ на реальную, а не имитационную демократию. Даже прожив 70 лет под гнётом тоталитарного советского режима, граждане РФ очень хорошо осознавали, где их обманывают.
Formally, the constitution gave the Duma impeachment powers, but only through a tortuous process. Although the new constitution established a separately elected legislature and executive, it was not a system of checks and balances like the American Constitution. Instead, it resembled a Latin American document, for it protected the president from interference by the Duma and made the Duma subject to his influence through the threat of unilateral dissolution.
<…>
The vote had not been called in accordance with the existing law on referendums; the turnout figures and vote in favour of the constitution were said to be produced by fraud; and the failure of the Central Electoral Commission to publish full details of the count were assumed to justify suspicions of fraud. When Russians were asked what they thought the new constitution would accomplish, the median group, 36 per cent, were pessimistic supporters; they had voted for the constitution but did not expect it to make Russia a rule-of-law state. The second largest group were pessimistic opponents who had voted against because they thought the constitution would not guarantee the rule of law. Only 22 per cent believed that the new constitution would become the foundation for the rule of law.
Если принятие суперпрезидентской конституции было важным шагом с точки зрения политики, то приватизация, по большей части несправедливая, была важным шагом с точки зрения экономики.
The new regime sought to end state control of the economy by privatizing state assets, but there was no private sector that could buy these assets at a fair market price. Every adult was given a voucher to buy a few shares in privatized enterprises, but this did not make citizens into stakeholders, for many quickly sold or traded their vouchers for tangible goods they could enjoy here and now. Yeltsin-style privatization ended up being private inasmuch as the transfer of wealth occurred without the constraints of public scrutiny or accountability. Privatization without a private sector transferred valuable state assets into the hands of those with political connections in the old nomenklatura, the elite of the party-state.
<…>
Peter Aven, a former Gaidar minister turned banker, has described the system thus:
To become a millionaire in our country it is not at all necessary to have a good head or specialized knowledge. Often, it is enough to have active support in the government, the parliament, local power structures and law enforcement agencies. One fine day your insignificant bank is authorized to, for instance, conduct operations with budgetary funds. Or quotas are generously allotted for the export of oil, timber and gas. In other words, you are appointed a millionaire.
Главной же темой, которой посвящена большая часть книги, является выборы и позиция граждан в этом вопросе. Выборная система в России как была чрезвычайно слабой такой она и осталась. Хотя и была в 90-ых годах предпринята попытка создания и развития института демократических выборов, однако авторитарно ядро никуда не делось. Старый советский принцип, «Ты начальник – я дурак, я начальник – ты дурак» по-прежнему властвует.
The Yeltsin administration confirmed its authority by winning elections, but it did not govern by the rule of law. When Pavel Krasheninnikov was dismissed as minister of justice, President Yeltsin publicly criticized him for not pursuing investigations of the Communist Party assiduously enough, and privately criticized him for not finding grounds ‘to liquidate the party’. One Kremlin official told the outgoing justice minister, ‘You have one problem; you always cite the law’ (quoted in Brown, 2001a: 564). When Boris Berezovsky, a backer of Boris Yeltsin, was threatened with prosecution on corruption charges after falling out with President Putin, he charged that the move was politically motivated, because ‘No one who was active in Russia over the last ten years respected the law’ (quoted in Jack, 2001a; see also Klebnikov, 2000).
Как мне кажется, народ прекрасно видел все эти авторитарные тенденции как в политике и экономике, так и в управлении государством и партийной системе, всё больше и больше приходил к убеждению отсутствия возможности хоть как-то повлиять на власть, т.е. к убеждению, что демократию в России так и не удалось построить.
Even more striking, 46 per cent thought that ordinary people have less influence on Russian government now than in Soviet times, while only 9 per cent said they had more influence; 45 per cent felt that popular influence on government had not changed.
<…>
In the 1998 NRB survey, only 14 per cent trusted the president, 13 per cent trusted the Duma and 7 per cent trusted political parties.
<…>
When asked what a person should do if a government office fails to issue a required permit, only one-fifth say that nothing can be done. Few believe that writing a letter or telephoning to inquire what is happening is sufficient to get public officials to act. The most common strategy, endorsed by 38 per cent, is to use connections to get action, and 32 per cent recommend giving officials a bribe or a present to get what they want.
<…>
To paraphrase an old Soviet-era expression about wages and work, most Russians believe that ‘The government pretends to enforce the law, and we pretend to obey it.’
Всё это напоминает мне эффект выученной беспомощности, политика которой была имплементирована в общество в начале и середине 90-ых. Если подумать, то все действия что предпринимала администрация Ельцина, сводилось к тому, чтобы проводимая политика почти всегда противоречила настроениям в обществе. Однако общество с этим сделать ничего не могло. Какую сферу не возьми, а везде Ельцин добивался своего, а народ всегда проигрывал. Впрочем, это же можно сказать и о демократии, в том смысле, что каждый авторитарный шаг Ельцина всегда был для Ельцина успешным, т.е. демократические инициативы в большинстве случаев всегда проигрывали. Ельцин построил такую систему, где он мог дать стране ровно столько свободы и демократии, сколько он сам решал, а не, сколько хотело общество. В этом смысле выборы 1996 года оказались последней битвой ельцинского авторитаризма с той не построенной демократией, которую ждал народ. В итоге, растеряв всякие иллюзию в отношении демократии в России, народ «поплыл по течению» не в силах что-то изменить (в политике страны).
Before the Duma election campaign, a majority of Russians distrusted both television and newspapers. Only 23 per cent in the seventh NRB survey thought television stations were looking after the interests of ordinary people, and only 22 per cent trusted newspapers.
<…>
Among those identifying a source, the most frequently named was that most impervious to the national media: my own experience and observations.
Такое отношение граждан к СМИ неслучайно, хотя сегодня Альбац, Шендерович, Пархоменко и пр. медиа личности из 90-ых, делают вид, что не понимают, почему народ потерял веру в «независимые СМИ», но на самом деле СМИ во время правления Ельцина были частично независимые, ибо принадлежали олигархам, которые стали олигархами благодаря приватизации устроенной Ельциным. Круг замкнулся.
The book is divided into two parts when, in the first half, the author evaluates Yeltsin's rule and, in particular, the issue of building democracy and the development of the electoral system in Russia, and in the second half, analyzes the elections that took place during Yeltsin's time. If the first part is somewhat similar to the analysis of the situation in Russia in the 90s by political scientist Vladimir Gel'man, the second part looks like a historical reference of who was supported by the citizens of the Russian Federation in those years. In this sense, the second half of the book contains numerous sociological surveys of Russian citizens on their preference for certain political parties, views, wishes, etc. It is not very interesting to read about it in 2024 because, as the author himself correctly notes, Yeltsin did not build a democratic state but an authoritarian one, albeit with some elements of democracy hence, the influence of parties was many times weaker than in Europe.
But Yeltsin preferred to assert personal authority rather than attempt the patient and difficult task of creating modern institutions of governance amidst the wreckage of the Soviet Union. He did not rely on party loyalists or on bureaucrats; instead he relied on the antithesis of a modern state, a coterie of personal advisors to carry out his orders and protect his political interests. In exercising personalistic rule, Yeltsin could be generous and he could be capricious – and he could not be held accountable to political institutions limiting his discretion.
Adoption of a super-presidential constitution is one of the main elements in the construction of authoritarianism in Russia and, remarkably, the Russian population was already very well aware of it. The lack of clear support in favor of the new constitution, at a time when Yeltsin's popularity had not yet fallen to the low level it had been since 1996, is a good indication of the Russian citizens' demand for real, not imitation democracy. Even after 70 years of living under the oppression of the totalitarian Soviet regime, the citizens of the Russian Federation realized very well where they were being deceived.
Formally, the constitution gave the Duma impeachment powers, but only through a tortuous process. Although the new constitution established a separately elected legislature and executive, it was not a system of checks and balances like the American Constitution. Instead, it resembled a Latin American document, for it protected the president from interference by the Duma and made the Duma subject to his influence through the threat of unilateral dissolution.
<…>
The vote had not been called in accordance with the existing law on referendums; the turnout figures and vote in favour of the constitution were said to be produced by fraud; and the failure of the Central Electoral Commission to publish full details of the count were assumed to justify suspicions of fraud. When Russians were asked what they thought the new constitution would accomplish, the median group, 36 per cent, were pessimistic supporters; they had voted for the constitution but did not expect it to make Russia a rule-of-law state. The second largest group were pessimistic opponents who had voted against because they thought the constitution would not guarantee the rule of law. Only 22 per cent believed that the new constitution would become the foundation for the rule of law.
If the adoption of a super-presidential constitution was an important step in terms of politics, privatization, largely unfair, was an important step in terms of economics.
The new regime sought to end state control of the economy by privatizing state assets, but there was no private sector that could buy these assets at a fair market price. Every adult was given a voucher to buy a few shares in privatized enterprises, but this did not make citizens into stakeholders, for many quickly sold or traded their vouchers for tangible goods they could enjoy here and now. Yeltsin-style privatization ended up being private inasmuch as the transfer of wealth occurred without the constraints of public scrutiny or accountability. Privatization without a private sector transferred valuable state assets into the hands of those with political connections in the old nomenklatura, the elite of the party-state.
<…>
Peter Aven, a former Gaidar minister turned banker, has described the system thus:
To become a millionaire in our country it is not at all necessary to have a good head or specialized knowledge. Often, it is enough to have active support in the government, the parliament, local power structures and law enforcement agencies. One fine day your insignificant bank is authorized to, for instance, conduct operations with budgetary funds. Or quotas are generously allotted for the export of oil, timber and gas. In other words, you are appointed a millionaire.
The main topic of the book is elections and the position of citizens on this issue. The electoral system in Russia was extremely weak and remains so. Although an attempt was made in the 90s to create and develop the institution of democratic elections, the authoritarian core has not gone anywhere. The old Soviet principle - “You are the boss - I am a fool, I am the boss - you are a fool” - still reigns supreme.
The Yeltsin administration confirmed its authority by winning elections, but it did not govern by the rule of law. When Pavel Krasheninnikov was dismissed as minister of justice, President Yeltsin publicly criticized him for not pursuing investigations of the Communist Party assiduously enough, and privately criticized him for not finding grounds ‘to liquidate the party’. One Kremlin official told the outgoing justice minister, ‘You have one problem; you always cite the law’ (quoted in Brown, 2001a: 564). When Boris Berezovsky, a backer of Boris Yeltsin, was threatened with prosecution on corruption charges after falling out with President Putin, he charged that the move was politically motivated, because ‘No one who was active in Russia over the last ten years respected the law’ (quoted in Jack, 2001a; see also Klebnikov, 2000).
It seems to me that the people saw all these authoritarian tendencies in politics and economy, as well as in the government and party system, and more and more came to the conviction that there was no possibility to influence the government in any way, i.e., to the conviction that democracy could not be built in Russia.
Even more striking, 46 per cent thought that ordinary people have less influence on Russian government now than in Soviet times, while only 9 per cent said they had more influence; 45 per cent felt that popular influence on government had not changed.
<…>
In the 1998 NRB survey, only 14 per cent trusted the president, 13 per cent trusted the Duma and 7 per cent trusted political parties.
<…>
When asked what a person should do if a government office fails to issue a required permit, only one-fifth say that nothing can be done. Few believe that writing a letter or telephoning to inquire what is happening is sufficient to get public officials to act. The most common strategy, endorsed by 38 per cent, is to use connections to get action, and 32 per cent recommend giving officials a bribe or a present to get what they want.
<…>
To paraphrase an old Soviet-era expression about wages and work, most Russians believe that ‘The government pretends to enforce the law, and we pretend to obey it.’
All this reminds me of the effect of learned helplessness, the policy that was implemented in society in the early and mid-90s. If you think about it, all the Yeltsin administration did was to ensure that the policies it pursued were almost always at odds with the sentiments of society. However, society could do nothing about it. In every sphere, Yeltsin got his way, and the people always lost. However, the same can be said about democracy, in the sense that every authoritarian move Yeltsin made was always successful for Yeltsin, i.e., democratic initiatives were always lost in most cases. Yeltsin built a system where he could give the country exactly as much freedom and democracy as he decided, not as much as society wanted. In this sense, the 1996 elections turned out to be the last battle between Yeltsin's authoritarianism and the unbuilt democracy that the people had been waiting for. As a result, having lost any illusions about democracy in Russia, the people “went with the flow”, unable to change anything (in the country's politics).
Before the Duma election campaign, a majority of Russians distrusted both television and newspapers. Only 23 per cent in the seventh NRB survey thought television stations were looking after the interests of ordinary people, and only 22 per cent trusted newspapers.
<…>
Among those identifying a source, the most frequently named was that most impervious to the national media: my own experience and observations.
This attitude of citizens to the media is not accidental, although today Albats, Shenderovich, Parkhomenko, and other media personalities from the 90s pretend not to understand why people have lost faith in “independent media”, but the media during Yeltsin's reign were partially independent because they were owned by oligarchs who became oligarchs thanks to privatization arranged by Yeltsin. The circle is closed.
Книга как бы поделена на две части, когда в первой половине автор даёт оценку ельцинскому правлению и в частности вопросу построения демократии и развитию выборной системы в РФ, а во второй половине анализируются выборы, происходившие во времена Ельцина. Если первая часть чем-то напоминает анализ ситуации России 90-х политологом Vladimir Gel'man, то вот вторая походит на историческую справку кого поддерживали граждане РФ в те годы. В этом смысле во второй половине книги даётся многочисленные социологические опросы граждан России на предмет их предпочтения тех или иных политических партий, взглядов, желаний и пр. В 2024 году читать об этом не очень интересно, т.к. как правильно замечает сам автор, Ельцин строил не демократическое государство, а авторитарное, пусть и с некоторыми элементами демократии, следовательно, влияние партий было в разы слабее, нежели в Европе.
But Yeltsin preferred to assert personal authority rather than attempt the patient and difficult task of creating modern institutions of governance amidst the wreckage of the Soviet Union. He did not rely on party loyalists or on bureaucrats; instead he relied on the antithesis of a modern state, a coterie of personal advisors to carry out his orders and protect his political interests. In exercising personalistic rule, Yeltsin could be generous and he could be capricious – and he could not be held accountable to political institutions limiting his discretion.
Принятие суперпрезидентской конституции является одним из главных элементов в построении авторитаризма в России и что примечательно, население РФ уже тогда это очень хорошо осознавало. Отсутствие явной поддержки в пользу новой конституции, в то время когда популярность Ельцина ещё не опустилась до того низкого уровня, что была у него начиная с 1996, хорошо показывает запрос граждан РФ на реальную, а не имитационную демократию. Даже прожив 70 лет под гнётом тоталитарного советского режима, граждане РФ очень хорошо осознавали, где их обманывают.
Formally, the constitution gave the Duma impeachment powers, but only through a tortuous process. Although the new constitution established a separately elected legislature and executive, it was not a system of checks and balances like the American Constitution. Instead, it resembled a Latin American document, for it protected the president from interference by the Duma and made the Duma subject to his influence through the threat of unilateral dissolution.
<…>
The vote had not been called in accordance with the existing law on referendums; the turnout figures and vote in favour of the constitution were said to be produced by fraud; and the failure of the Central Electoral Commission to publish full details of the count were assumed to justify suspicions of fraud. When Russians were asked what they thought the new constitution would accomplish, the median group, 36 per cent, were pessimistic supporters; they had voted for the constitution but did not expect it to make Russia a rule-of-law state. The second largest group were pessimistic opponents who had voted against because they thought the constitution would not guarantee the rule of law. Only 22 per cent believed that the new constitution would become the foundation for the rule of law.
Если принятие суперпрезидентской конституции было важным шагом с точки зрения политики, то приватизация, по большей части несправедливая, была важным шагом с точки зрения экономики.
The new regime sought to end state control of the economy by privatizing state assets, but there was no private sector that could buy these assets at a fair market price. Every adult was given a voucher to buy a few shares in privatized enterprises, but this did not make citizens into stakeholders, for many quickly sold or traded their vouchers for tangible goods they could enjoy here and now. Yeltsin-style privatization ended up being private inasmuch as the transfer of wealth occurred without the constraints of public scrutiny or accountability. Privatization without a private sector transferred valuable state assets into the hands of those with political connections in the old nomenklatura, the elite of the party-state.
<…>
Peter Aven, a former Gaidar minister turned banker, has described the system thus:
To become a millionaire in our country it is not at all necessary to have a good head or specialized knowledge. Often, it is enough to have active support in the government, the parliament, local power structures and law enforcement agencies. One fine day your insignificant bank is authorized to, for instance, conduct operations with budgetary funds. Or quotas are generously allotted for the export of oil, timber and gas. In other words, you are appointed a millionaire.
Главной же темой, которой посвящена большая часть книги, является выборы и позиция граждан в этом вопросе. Выборная система в России как была чрезвычайно слабой такой она и осталась. Хотя и была в 90-ых годах предпринята попытка создания и развития института демократических выборов, однако авторитарно ядро никуда не делось. Старый советский принцип, «Ты начальник – я дурак, я начальник – ты дурак» по-прежнему властвует.
The Yeltsin administration confirmed its authority by winning elections, but it did not govern by the rule of law. When Pavel Krasheninnikov was dismissed as minister of justice, President Yeltsin publicly criticized him for not pursuing investigations of the Communist Party assiduously enough, and privately criticized him for not finding grounds ‘to liquidate the party’. One Kremlin official told the outgoing justice minister, ‘You have one problem; you always cite the law’ (quoted in Brown, 2001a: 564). When Boris Berezovsky, a backer of Boris Yeltsin, was threatened with prosecution on corruption charges after falling out with President Putin, he charged that the move was politically motivated, because ‘No one who was active in Russia over the last ten years respected the law’ (quoted in Jack, 2001a; see also Klebnikov, 2000).
Как мне кажется, народ прекрасно видел все эти авторитарные тенденции как в политике и экономике, так и в управлении государством и партийной системе, всё больше и больше приходил к убеждению отсутствия возможности хоть как-то повлиять на власть, т.е. к убеждению, что демократию в России так и не удалось построить.
Even more striking, 46 per cent thought that ordinary people have less influence on Russian government now than in Soviet times, while only 9 per cent said they had more influence; 45 per cent felt that popular influence on government had not changed.
<…>
In the 1998 NRB survey, only 14 per cent trusted the president, 13 per cent trusted the Duma and 7 per cent trusted political parties.
<…>
When asked what a person should do if a government office fails to issue a required permit, only one-fifth say that nothing can be done. Few believe that writing a letter or telephoning to inquire what is happening is sufficient to get public officials to act. The most common strategy, endorsed by 38 per cent, is to use connections to get action, and 32 per cent recommend giving officials a bribe or a present to get what they want.
<…>
To paraphrase an old Soviet-era expression about wages and work, most Russians believe that ‘The government pretends to enforce the law, and we pretend to obey it.’
Всё это напоминает мне эффект выученной беспомощности, политика которой была имплементирована в общество в начале и середине 90-ых. Если подумать, то все действия что предпринимала администрация Ельцина, сводилось к тому, чтобы проводимая политика почти всегда противоречила настроениям в обществе. Однако общество с этим сделать ничего не могло. Какую сферу не возьми, а везде Ельцин добивался своего, а народ всегда проигрывал. Впрочем, это же можно сказать и о демократии, в том смысле, что каждый авторитарный шаг Ельцина всегда был для Ельцина успешным, т.е. демократические инициативы в большинстве случаев всегда проигрывали. Ельцин построил такую систему, где он мог дать стране ровно столько свободы и демократии, сколько он сам решал, а не, сколько хотело общество. В этом смысле выборы 1996 года оказались последней битвой ельцинского авторитаризма с той не построенной демократией, которую ждал народ. В итоге, растеряв всякие иллюзию в отношении демократии в России, народ «поплыл по течению» не в силах что-то изменить (в политике страны).
Before the Duma election campaign, a majority of Russians distrusted both television and newspapers. Only 23 per cent in the seventh NRB survey thought television stations were looking after the interests of ordinary people, and only 22 per cent trusted newspapers.
<…>
Among those identifying a source, the most frequently named was that most impervious to the national media: my own experience and observations.
Такое отношение граждан к СМИ неслучайно, хотя сегодня Альбац, Шендерович, Пархоменко и пр. медиа личности из 90-ых, делают вид, что не понимают, почему народ потерял веру в «независимые СМИ», но на самом деле СМИ во время правления Ельцина были частично независимые, ибо принадлежали олигархам, которые стали олигархами благодаря приватизации устроенной Ельциным. Круг замкнулся.
The book is divided into two parts when, in the first half, the author evaluates Yeltsin's rule and, in particular, the issue of building democracy and the development of the electoral system in Russia, and in the second half, analyzes the elections that took place during Yeltsin's time. If the first part is somewhat similar to the analysis of the situation in Russia in the 90s by political scientist Vladimir Gel'man, the second part looks like a historical reference of who was supported by the citizens of the Russian Federation in those years. In this sense, the second half of the book contains numerous sociological surveys of Russian citizens on their preference for certain political parties, views, wishes, etc. It is not very interesting to read about it in 2024 because, as the author himself correctly notes, Yeltsin did not build a democratic state but an authoritarian one, albeit with some elements of democracy hence, the influence of parties was many times weaker than in Europe.
But Yeltsin preferred to assert personal authority rather than attempt the patient and difficult task of creating modern institutions of governance amidst the wreckage of the Soviet Union. He did not rely on party loyalists or on bureaucrats; instead he relied on the antithesis of a modern state, a coterie of personal advisors to carry out his orders and protect his political interests. In exercising personalistic rule, Yeltsin could be generous and he could be capricious – and he could not be held accountable to political institutions limiting his discretion.
Adoption of a super-presidential constitution is one of the main elements in the construction of authoritarianism in Russia and, remarkably, the Russian population was already very well aware of it. The lack of clear support in favor of the new constitution, at a time when Yeltsin's popularity had not yet fallen to the low level it had been since 1996, is a good indication of the Russian citizens' demand for real, not imitation democracy. Even after 70 years of living under the oppression of the totalitarian Soviet regime, the citizens of the Russian Federation realized very well where they were being deceived.
Formally, the constitution gave the Duma impeachment powers, but only through a tortuous process. Although the new constitution established a separately elected legislature and executive, it was not a system of checks and balances like the American Constitution. Instead, it resembled a Latin American document, for it protected the president from interference by the Duma and made the Duma subject to his influence through the threat of unilateral dissolution.
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The vote had not been called in accordance with the existing law on referendums; the turnout figures and vote in favour of the constitution were said to be produced by fraud; and the failure of the Central Electoral Commission to publish full details of the count were assumed to justify suspicions of fraud. When Russians were asked what they thought the new constitution would accomplish, the median group, 36 per cent, were pessimistic supporters; they had voted for the constitution but did not expect it to make Russia a rule-of-law state. The second largest group were pessimistic opponents who had voted against because they thought the constitution would not guarantee the rule of law. Only 22 per cent believed that the new constitution would become the foundation for the rule of law.
If the adoption of a super-presidential constitution was an important step in terms of politics, privatization, largely unfair, was an important step in terms of economics.
The new regime sought to end state control of the economy by privatizing state assets, but there was no private sector that could buy these assets at a fair market price. Every adult was given a voucher to buy a few shares in privatized enterprises, but this did not make citizens into stakeholders, for many quickly sold or traded their vouchers for tangible goods they could enjoy here and now. Yeltsin-style privatization ended up being private inasmuch as the transfer of wealth occurred without the constraints of public scrutiny or accountability. Privatization without a private sector transferred valuable state assets into the hands of those with political connections in the old nomenklatura, the elite of the party-state.
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Peter Aven, a former Gaidar minister turned banker, has described the system thus:
To become a millionaire in our country it is not at all necessary to have a good head or specialized knowledge. Often, it is enough to have active support in the government, the parliament, local power structures and law enforcement agencies. One fine day your insignificant bank is authorized to, for instance, conduct operations with budgetary funds. Or quotas are generously allotted for the export of oil, timber and gas. In other words, you are appointed a millionaire.
The main topic of the book is elections and the position of citizens on this issue. The electoral system in Russia was extremely weak and remains so. Although an attempt was made in the 90s to create and develop the institution of democratic elections, the authoritarian core has not gone anywhere. The old Soviet principle - “You are the boss - I am a fool, I am the boss - you are a fool” - still reigns supreme.
The Yeltsin administration confirmed its authority by winning elections, but it did not govern by the rule of law. When Pavel Krasheninnikov was dismissed as minister of justice, President Yeltsin publicly criticized him for not pursuing investigations of the Communist Party assiduously enough, and privately criticized him for not finding grounds ‘to liquidate the party’. One Kremlin official told the outgoing justice minister, ‘You have one problem; you always cite the law’ (quoted in Brown, 2001a: 564). When Boris Berezovsky, a backer of Boris Yeltsin, was threatened with prosecution on corruption charges after falling out with President Putin, he charged that the move was politically motivated, because ‘No one who was active in Russia over the last ten years respected the law’ (quoted in Jack, 2001a; see also Klebnikov, 2000).
It seems to me that the people saw all these authoritarian tendencies in politics and economy, as well as in the government and party system, and more and more came to the conviction that there was no possibility to influence the government in any way, i.e., to the conviction that democracy could not be built in Russia.
Even more striking, 46 per cent thought that ordinary people have less influence on Russian government now than in Soviet times, while only 9 per cent said they had more influence; 45 per cent felt that popular influence on government had not changed.
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In the 1998 NRB survey, only 14 per cent trusted the president, 13 per cent trusted the Duma and 7 per cent trusted political parties.
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When asked what a person should do if a government office fails to issue a required permit, only one-fifth say that nothing can be done. Few believe that writing a letter or telephoning to inquire what is happening is sufficient to get public officials to act. The most common strategy, endorsed by 38 per cent, is to use connections to get action, and 32 per cent recommend giving officials a bribe or a present to get what they want.
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To paraphrase an old Soviet-era expression about wages and work, most Russians believe that ‘The government pretends to enforce the law, and we pretend to obey it.’
All this reminds me of the effect of learned helplessness, the policy that was implemented in society in the early and mid-90s. If you think about it, all the Yeltsin administration did was to ensure that the policies it pursued were almost always at odds with the sentiments of society. However, society could do nothing about it. In every sphere, Yeltsin got his way, and the people always lost. However, the same can be said about democracy, in the sense that every authoritarian move Yeltsin made was always successful for Yeltsin, i.e., democratic initiatives were always lost in most cases. Yeltsin built a system where he could give the country exactly as much freedom and democracy as he decided, not as much as society wanted. In this sense, the 1996 elections turned out to be the last battle between Yeltsin's authoritarianism and the unbuilt democracy that the people had been waiting for. As a result, having lost any illusions about democracy in Russia, the people “went with the flow”, unable to change anything (in the country's politics).
Before the Duma election campaign, a majority of Russians distrusted both television and newspapers. Only 23 per cent in the seventh NRB survey thought television stations were looking after the interests of ordinary people, and only 22 per cent trusted newspapers.
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Among those identifying a source, the most frequently named was that most impervious to the national media: my own experience and observations.
This attitude of citizens to the media is not accidental, although today Albats, Shenderovich, Parkhomenko, and other media personalities from the 90s pretend not to understand why people have lost faith in “independent media”, but the media during Yeltsin's reign were partially independent because they were owned by oligarchs who became oligarchs thanks to privatization arranged by Yeltsin. The circle is closed.
December 6, 2019
Informative although quite repetitive at times.
off-tbr-and-into-wpb
November 4, 2015Description: Russians want free elections and order. Although their political elites have had no difficulty in supplying candidates and parties in the last decade, predictability in everyday life and the rule of law have suffered. This book is about Russia's attempt to achieve democratization backwards, by holding elections without having created a modern state. This dilemma is the challenge that Russia presents to Vladimir Putin.
Having chatted with a very knowledgeable person, this is put off the shelf as out of date. True democracy does not exist in Russia at this time so the arguments are moot.
Having chatted with a very knowledgeable person, this is put off the shelf as out of date. True democracy does not exist in Russia at this time so the arguments are moot.
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