One of the strong points of Freedman’s (The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy) examination of nuclear strategy is his treatment of the term “strategy” itself. He compares two definitions, one that was used since classical times that essentially means the art of the general, and another used by Basil Liddel Hart which is “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill ends of policy.”
Often within the debate on nuclear weapons, there was a discussion over “strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons (p. xviii). What does this general distinction mean if any? What are we to make of the debate? Freedman leaves us with lingering question if there is any meaningful sense in which “nuclear strategy” can be considered at all, and whether they are any use other than in deterring other nuclear armed states.
Freedman demonstrates how much of early nuclear strategy draws from work on aerial bombardment. What World War II demonstrated was that so long as people could gradually adjust to their situation, bombardment wasn’t very effective (p. 18); what was needed was an effective shock to the system. World War II demonstrates that as the war wore on, norms against the targeting of civilians eventually eroded as well, eventually peaking with the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Air Force’s lukewarm attitude toward intercontinental missiles and their preference for the airman and the bomber shows how the parochial military establishment continues to appear as an ideal type throughout the literature. Because there was no conceivable defense against nuclear weapons it was seen as an ideal weapon for aggressor states—like the Soviet Union; the weapons gave the advantage to the enemy with the least inhibitions against using it (p. 33). Though the basic outlines of nuclear warfare were apparent—the hopelessness of defense, the attraction of sudden attack (p. 42), attempts to twist these nuclear weapons into things that could be workable for traditional conceptions of war were largely failures (counterforce, civil defense, tactical nuclear weapons, defense with nuclear weapons).
A constant question is why did the nuclear bomb have such strong limitations early on—because the bomb could not help the US with defense more than its conventional weapons already did, and because for the US it lacked credibility as a means of employment for coercion, especially on low or medium priority interests. There remained strong normative reason (both internally and externally) why the US could not simply bully others around; the Korean War demonstrated this. Thus, it was quickly relegated to a weapon of last resort until Eisenhower (p. 49). In the policy context of Eisenhower, and the French War with the Vietminh in Indochina, the question remains: was the nuclear option considered? Or, could Eisenhower have tried mad-man politics?
Stalin’s dogma of “permanently operating factors” and Leninist-Marxism had a crippling effect on the ability of the armed forces to develop strategic concepts. Meanwhile, Paul Nitze’s ideologically laden NC-68 presented the Soviet Union as an ideal aggressor; the Soviet Union had a comparative advantage over open societies in their ability to strike with stealth—the document rejected the call for a no first use policy (p. 67).
Throughout the debates on tactical nuclear weapons, extended deterrence, and the rejection of a no first use policy, there was a developing taboo against nuclear use. While it was hoped that adding the word “tactical onto the word nuclear would make it easier to think about their use during warfare—it was frighteningly clear that the term tactical nuclear war was a misnomer (112-113). The issue of counterforce, as a way of winning a nuclear war, continually came up. As in other debates, much of the impetus came from the military as a way of trying to reestablish the cult of the offensive.
Throughout the strategic debates, World War I as an analogy for predetermined offensive strategies getting away from policymaker was repeated (p. 389). While the logic of extended deterrence and an assumption that US and European conventional forces were inferior to Soviet Forces continued to drive nuclear strategy, some liberal defense specialists (McNamara is one) tried to push for a no first strike policy. The question still remains how much the SDI did to push the Soviet political system into its death throws; did the intimation of the SDI really touch a nerve in Soviet strategy?
In any event, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought new problems. One of which was to what extent nuclear weapons were still relevant—and especially how to protect the nuclear arsenal of a weak Russian state. Since the end of the Cold War some interesting ideas have floated about regarding how to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether—one key idea is that of progressive restraint, where through a regular habit of not brandishing nuclear weapons, states would convince themselves of their non-utility (425).
This an outstanding book for anyone looking for a window into nuclear strategy. The book will appeal well to students and academics of the subject who need a handy desk reference. Balanced and well-researched. But that is to be expected from anything by Lawrence Freedman.