"This book disputes the commonly held view that Colombia's armed conflict is a result of state absence or failure, providing broader lessons about the real drivers of political violence in war-torn areas"--
The *Frontier Effect* is a book about Urabá, a region in Colombia near the border with Panama. Urabá is a microcosm of the country's violent conflicts – you can see every element at play. Early on, an "underdeveloped" backwater that grows quickly due to the booming banana industry. Later, a hotspot for guerrilla organizing, especially the FARC and the much less written about EPL. And much later, the place where the paramilitaries exert seemingly unparalleled control over economic and political life.
Ballvé is interested in the role of the state in Colombia's wars and especially Urabá. It is a common refrain that in places like Urabá, the state is weak or absent, and so Hobbesian violence emerges. Ballvé argues that, instead, other kinds of order emerge: imposed first by the guerrillas (who bring significant political infrastructure) and later the paramilitaries.
Ballvé's narrative of the paramilitaries is where the book really shines. In many readings of the conflict, the paramilitaries are shadowy figures with little ideological worldview, notoriously violent and predatory. Ballvé's depiction is surprisingly nuanced. He establishes quickly and convincingly that the paramilitaries, like the guerrillas, relied on social bases of support. And like the guerrillas, they had a vision for the region – confused and incoherent in parts, but not so dissimilar from the guerrillas'.
The level of institution-building the paras took on surprised me. The extent to which they resettled lands with new peasants who expressed some degree of loyalty also surprised me. There are eye-popping anecdotes: the paras' foray into ecotourism, their development of community action boards, the fact that when land restitution ultimately comes to Urabá it is with tacit para approval.
Before reading this, I thought the absence of an effective, legitimate state in large swaths of Colombia's territory was a major factor in the war. After reading, I still mostly feel the same way. The orders Ballvé describes don't seem to last all that long, and they seem normatively worse than an effective, legitimate state.