I hadn’t heard about Perry and Collina’s most excellent book The Button. As far as I know, it wasn’t reviewed in the publications I follow and its publisher is named after the socialist founder of Algeria, hardly reassuring as a source of cogent writing about nuclear policy. It’s a pity this book hasn’t achieved the popularity it deserves, for it delivers devastating criticism at the policy as it stands. Said policy in the US is based on (1) the single authority of the president to launch nukes; (2) the US will launch a nuclear strike based on the warning of a launch directed at the US or any of its allies, without having verified whether there has actually been an attack; (3) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are a key component of the nuclear triad (ground-based ICBMs, misales launched by supersonic fighter planes and sea based missiles launched by nuclear submarines); (4) the US maintains the right to nuclear strike first and unprovoked; (5) the US will maintain and develop a missile defense initiative, to strike down incoming nukes before they strike; (6) the US will match the nuclear buildup by rivals, notably Russia; (7) limited nuclear is possible (limited to tactical rather than strategic use), it may not escalate and it is a viable military option.
All the components of this policy are wrong:
(1) single authority was assumed by President Truman in 1945 to avoid the military leadership from being able to launch nukes by itself. I wasn’t aware that a third nuclear bomb was nearly dropped on Japan without Truman even being aware of it. It has been said single authority is necessary because of the short times (about 10 minutes) available to decide to launch on warning. However, this is a consequence of the launch on warning component, to which I now refer.
(2) launch on warning is, prima facie, a solid policy, for how may one be sure one’s ability to retaliate a nuclear attack will survive the first wave thereof? But things are not so clear. Given that nuclear submarines and fighter jets are highly mobile, most or all of them would survive a first strike and be available for retaliation. Given they carry Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), a single nuclear sub has enough ammunition to nuke the 50 major cities in Russia. So the retaliatory capability will be there even if ICBMs are all totaled.
(3) and (4) may be dealt with jointly. First strike is not really an option for any nuclear power as long as the power to retaliate against it remains, as it does either all the major ones. So it is a worthless threat without any strategic value and should be dispensed with. ICBMs are also worthless (because their locations are known and they can’t be moved, they can be blown up in the ground). They are only useful for a first strike option, which is not viable, as noted. Also, they are the only component of the nuclear triad that can’t be recalled once launched. This, associated with the launch on warning component, is really tantamount to playing Russian roulette with nukes, since it has happened that the nuclear attack detection systems both in the US and Russia have failed repeatedly for decades and are subject to a hack by hostile actors. So, if one were to renounce the first strike option (which only a crazy US president would engage, since retaliation is assured), dismantling ICBMs is mandatory.
(5) The missile defense initiative is a non starter for the US. It could work if deployed for a single city or for a military site, but there is no way to protect the entire country. This was very clearly shown in Annie Jacobsen’s recent book Nuclear War: it only works about 50% of the time, which is about as good as coin toss. Would we entrust all we hold dear to a coin toss? It is also a distraction. The population has been led to believe this is a working defense for a nuclear strike, which it isn’t and will never be, since, if it evolves, attack capabilities will keep pace, and in the end the bomb will get through. It also has dissuaded US leadership (particularly the Republicans, who have been in this, as in other matters, most irresponsible actors over the past 30 years) from maintaining and extending arms control treaties with the Russians, which are the only way to bring down the danger from nuclear annihilation.
(6) The foregoing is why matching nuclear buildup is a mistake: it generates groups interested in a buildup that never ends (the military-industrial complex) and it won’t make anyone safer. The only way forward is cutting down the number of total nukes, not increasing it.
(7) Limited nuclear war is but possible, there are too many factors that would lead to escalation. As the leaders of nuclear powers have said, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
Reading this book, which narrates the 70 year experiences of former defense secretary William Perry with nuclear weapons (as I write this, he is 96), is sensible, fact based and always practical. I am saddened that its recommendations will like not be heeded (although he does quote senator Kamala Harris on the nuclear matters, which indicates she has given it some thought) because they contradict the established interests. If president Trump is reelected come November, he is guaranteed to pursue the policy of dismantling nuclear control treaties he followed in hiatus first term. We were lucky there weren’t nuclear emergencies in that term. Will we all be so lucky a second time?