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The Firebird: The Elusive Fate of Russian Democracy
Andrei Kozyrev was foreign minister of Russia under President Boris Yeltsin from August 1991 to January 1996. During the August 1991 coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev, he was present when tanks moved in to seize the Russian White House, where Boris Yeltsin famously stood on a tank to address the crowd assembled. He then departed to Paris to muster international support and, if needed, to form a Russian government-in-exile. He participated in the negotiations at Brezhnev’s former hunting lodge in Belazheva, Belarus where the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus agreed to secede from the Soviet Union and form a Commonwealth of Independent States. Kozyrev’s pro-Western orientation made him an increasingly unpopular figure in Russia as Russia’s spiraling economy and the emergence of ultra-wealthy oligarchs soured ordinary Russians on Western ideas of democracy and market capitalism.
The Firebird takes the reader into the corridors of power to provide a startling eyewitness account of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the struggle to create a democratic Russia in its place, and how the promise of a better future led to the tragic outcome that changed our world forever.
350 pages, Kindle Edition
Published September 24, 2019
About the author
Andrei Kozyrev
4 books3 followersAndrey Vladimirovich Kozyrev was the foreign minister of the Russian Federation between 1990-1996, and member of the Duma (Russian Parliament) till 2000. In 1998 he accepted an appointment to the board of Directors of the US Company, ICN Pharmaceuticals and since is a member of the board of a number of Russian and international companies. He is a professor at the Moscow Institute of International Relations.
Andrei was educated at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and has PHD history. He received an Honorary degree from Columbia University in 1996. In 1968 he became a member of staff of the former U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he held various posts including Head of the Department of International Organisations and rank of ambassador by 1990. His outstanding diplomatic career is enriched by vast business experience.
Take a privileged look into Russian policies, and hear his views on the economic implications, and potential impact on the world of business. Andrei is the author of numerous books and articles, television and radio commentaries and interviews, on domestic and international, political, economic and business issues.
Eloquent and an expert on Russian and East European topics, his presentations are glorious and he is often called back to present again.
He presents in Russian and English.
Andrei was educated at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and has PHD history. He received an Honorary degree from Columbia University in 1996. In 1968 he became a member of staff of the former U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he held various posts including Head of the Department of International Organisations and rank of ambassador by 1990. His outstanding diplomatic career is enriched by vast business experience.
Take a privileged look into Russian policies, and hear his views on the economic implications, and potential impact on the world of business. Andrei is the author of numerous books and articles, television and radio commentaries and interviews, on domestic and international, political, economic and business issues.
Eloquent and an expert on Russian and East European topics, his presentations are glorious and he is often called back to present again.
He presents in Russian and English.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
April 24, 2021
I gave this three stars as it is quite useful to my research on this time period, despite the fact that it is not particularly well written or interesting. (To people who are not interested in this time.)
There’s a heavy amount of hindsight in this memoir (as with every one), but I think there’s a particular vindication in having your warnings turn out to be true, in the case of Andrew Kozyrev’s warnings of “neo-Soviet” politics in Russian foreign affairs. However, Kozyrev’s repeated defense of American diplomacy as striving towards democracy strikes as hypocritical, when in some cases they exhibited the very same underhanded behaviors Kozyrev criticized in his Russian colleagues. While he does acknowledge that American actions complicated things for Russian integration into the West, he stops short of recognizing what America’s foreign policy has often confirmed for most of the world: that America puts America first, not democracy. I find it particularly glaring to ignore this reality in the post-9/11 world, even if this memoir focuses on Kozyrev’s time as FM. It’s supposedly unthinkable that Americans would have the same short-sighted nationalism and corrupt economics that drove factions of Russian politics after the collapse of the USSR. Both places share similar problems: hyper-militarization, propaganda-driven nationalism, paranoia, deep involvement in the affairs of other nations. We are more alike than different, I think. And while this book does make that point in some parts, it fails to deeply explore the parallels sufficiently. Especially as this book was published at the beginning of Trump’s presidency, one would think that Kozyrev would see more parallels between Russia’s slide into authoritarianism and America’s than he notes in his memoir. Perhaps some of that world famous American optimism has rubbed off on Kozyrev. Either way: too much hindsight about the rise of nationalism, to the point where it obscures the chaotic nature of that time, and not enough hindsight about America’s grab for power after “winning the Cold War.”
There’s a heavy amount of hindsight in this memoir (as with every one), but I think there’s a particular vindication in having your warnings turn out to be true, in the case of Andrew Kozyrev’s warnings of “neo-Soviet” politics in Russian foreign affairs. However, Kozyrev’s repeated defense of American diplomacy as striving towards democracy strikes as hypocritical, when in some cases they exhibited the very same underhanded behaviors Kozyrev criticized in his Russian colleagues. While he does acknowledge that American actions complicated things for Russian integration into the West, he stops short of recognizing what America’s foreign policy has often confirmed for most of the world: that America puts America first, not democracy. I find it particularly glaring to ignore this reality in the post-9/11 world, even if this memoir focuses on Kozyrev’s time as FM. It’s supposedly unthinkable that Americans would have the same short-sighted nationalism and corrupt economics that drove factions of Russian politics after the collapse of the USSR. Both places share similar problems: hyper-militarization, propaganda-driven nationalism, paranoia, deep involvement in the affairs of other nations. We are more alike than different, I think. And while this book does make that point in some parts, it fails to deeply explore the parallels sufficiently. Especially as this book was published at the beginning of Trump’s presidency, one would think that Kozyrev would see more parallels between Russia’s slide into authoritarianism and America’s than he notes in his memoir. Perhaps some of that world famous American optimism has rubbed off on Kozyrev. Either way: too much hindsight about the rise of nationalism, to the point where it obscures the chaotic nature of that time, and not enough hindsight about America’s grab for power after “winning the Cold War.”
October 26, 2023
It would be useful to actually get a more expanded version of Andrey’s position though. What role did he expect Russia to have in the institutions he wanted to join? What was the purpose of signing PFP in the end? It seems like it achieved nothing for Russia’s national interest and if it did what exactly? He says that it is fine for NATO to expand but why does he think so? What about the EU membership that seems to go hand in hand with NATO membership? It seemed also that in the authors opinion foreign policy and domestic policy is really very intertwined. Why can’t Russia pursue a realist foreign policy and still be a democracy? And why 25 million displaced Russians should not be an important concern for Russian government in his view? There were a lot of missing bits I thought.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews