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Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1945-1962
From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the Cold War--how such a crisis arose, and why at the very last possible moment it didn't happen.
In this groundbreaking look at the Cuban Missile Crisis, Martin Sherwin not only gives us a riveting sometimes hour-by-hour explanation of the crisis itself, but also explores the origins, scope, and consequences of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the post WWII world. Mining new sources and materials, and going far beyond the scope of earlier works on this critical face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union--triggered when Khruschev began installing missiles in Cuba at Castro's behest--Sherwin shows how this volatile event was an integral part of the wider Cold War and was a consequence of nuclear arms. Gambling with Armageddon looks in particular at the original debate in the Truman Administration about using the Atomic Bomb; the way in which President Eisenhower relied on the threat of massive retaliation to project U.S. power in the early Cold War era; and how President Kennedy, though unprepared to deal with the Bay of Pigs debacle, came of age during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here too is a clarifying picture of what was going on in Khruschev's Soviet Union. Martin Sherwin has spent his career in the study of nuclear weapons and how they have shaped our world--Gambling with Armegeddon is an outstanding capstone to his work thus far.
In this groundbreaking look at the Cuban Missile Crisis, Martin Sherwin not only gives us a riveting sometimes hour-by-hour explanation of the crisis itself, but also explores the origins, scope, and consequences of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the post WWII world. Mining new sources and materials, and going far beyond the scope of earlier works on this critical face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union--triggered when Khruschev began installing missiles in Cuba at Castro's behest--Sherwin shows how this volatile event was an integral part of the wider Cold War and was a consequence of nuclear arms. Gambling with Armageddon looks in particular at the original debate in the Truman Administration about using the Atomic Bomb; the way in which President Eisenhower relied on the threat of massive retaliation to project U.S. power in the early Cold War era; and how President Kennedy, though unprepared to deal with the Bay of Pigs debacle, came of age during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here too is a clarifying picture of what was going on in Khruschev's Soviet Union. Martin Sherwin has spent his career in the study of nuclear weapons and how they have shaped our world--Gambling with Armegeddon is an outstanding capstone to his work thus far.
624 pages, Hardcover
First published September 22, 2020
156 people are currently reading
1484 people want to read
About the author
Martin J. Sherwin
12 books61 followersMartin J. Sherwin was a Pulitzer Prize-winning American historian whose scholarship focused on the history of the development of atomic energy and nuclear proliferation.
Sherwin received his B.A. from Dartmouth College and his Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Los Angeles. He was the long-time Walter S. Dickson professor of English and American history at Tufts University until his assumption of emeritus status in May 2007. He was also a University Professor at George Mason University.
He received numerous awards and grants besides those listed here.
He and co-author Kai Bird shared the Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 2006, for their book entitled American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Sherwin received his B.A. from Dartmouth College and his Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Los Angeles. He was the long-time Walter S. Dickson professor of English and American history at Tufts University until his assumption of emeritus status in May 2007. He was also a University Professor at George Mason University.
He received numerous awards and grants besides those listed here.
He and co-author Kai Bird shared the Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 2006, for their book entitled American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 47 reviews
August 15, 2022
“The first in a cascade of ominous events began the most dangerous 24 hours of the crisis, perhaps some of the most dangerous hours in world history. Advisors in the White House, the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon, Fidel Castro in Havana, hard-liners in the Kremlin, Soviet submariners in the quarantine area, and a rogue American officer in the missile fields of Okinawa came close to initiating a military confrontation that could have led to a nuclear holocaust.”
Exploration of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It provides the background and context for the Cold War, starting from the first usage of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II. It covers the key players leading up to the crisis, including Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro. The major dramatic set piece is a gripping and detailed analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It emphasizes the role luck played in a handful of direct confrontations, in which thermonuclear war could have easily resulted.
Sherwin used recordings, memorandums, and notes from actual meetings between Kennedy and his advisors. He also provides documentation of Khrushchev’s perspectives, speeches, and personal correspondences with Kennedy. We learn about the US missiles in Turkey and the manner in which an agreement was reached to stand down.
Initially, many people in the US military and political arena wanted to invade Cuba. This book portrays what a bad idea that would have been. It illustrates the importance of leadership, and the willingness to follow a path to diplomacy. Recommended to anyone who wants to understand the Cold War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and how close we came to devastating consequences.
4.5
Exploration of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It provides the background and context for the Cold War, starting from the first usage of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II. It covers the key players leading up to the crisis, including Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro. The major dramatic set piece is a gripping and detailed analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It emphasizes the role luck played in a handful of direct confrontations, in which thermonuclear war could have easily resulted.
Sherwin used recordings, memorandums, and notes from actual meetings between Kennedy and his advisors. He also provides documentation of Khrushchev’s perspectives, speeches, and personal correspondences with Kennedy. We learn about the US missiles in Turkey and the manner in which an agreement was reached to stand down.
Initially, many people in the US military and political arena wanted to invade Cuba. This book portrays what a bad idea that would have been. It illustrates the importance of leadership, and the willingness to follow a path to diplomacy. Recommended to anyone who wants to understand the Cold War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and how close we came to devastating consequences.
4.5
November 10, 2020
Sherwin closely examines the Cuban Missile Crisis and its wider context in this well written, detailed, informative and clearly extensively researched account. It's a rare history book that manages convey so much fascinating knowledge and insight while simultaneously being absolutely engrossing.
January 23, 2025
Outstanding book on the Cuban Missile Crisis, with an introductory section explaining how nuclear policy developed from Hiroshima to 1962.
Reading Sherwin's day-by-day account, you really get the sense of how a dozen or so individuals were trying to feel their way around the contours of the crisis, often based on insufficient or misleading information. It's also excellent for showing how much the government was internally at odds, with Kennedy and McNamara having to spend significant amounts of their attention during key moments just keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff reined in.
Almost inconceivable that the crisis ended without nuclear war, especially since the US was totally unaware there were already nuclear warheads on the island until decades later. Or that one of the submarines running into the blockade had a nuclear torpedo that they almost fired off!
Reading Sherwin's day-by-day account, you really get the sense of how a dozen or so individuals were trying to feel their way around the contours of the crisis, often based on insufficient or misleading information. It's also excellent for showing how much the government was internally at odds, with Kennedy and McNamara having to spend significant amounts of their attention during key moments just keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff reined in.
Almost inconceivable that the crisis ended without nuclear war, especially since the US was totally unaware there were already nuclear warheads on the island until decades later. Or that one of the submarines running into the blockade had a nuclear torpedo that they almost fired off!
August 3, 2021
I was in my junior year in high school during the Cuban missile crisis and I can remember, going home each day, turning on the news and wondering if the world was going to be destroyed by nuclear weapons. The Cuban missile crisis was the closest the US and the Soviet Union had come to an all out war and thank goodness it did not take place. Gambling With Armageddon is a fascinating book to read and underscores how lucky we all were that the worst did not happen. I recommend the book to everyone as a history book, and as a cautionary tale of what can happen if people let their emotions run wild.
October 21, 2022
This book is both terrifying and reassuring. 60 years ago we were closer to nuclear war than perhaps any other moment in history up to now (lol). Khrushchev and Kennedy communicated through various diplomatic channels trying to prevent a war that neither wanted. Both, because of domestic political considerations, were dragged into escalatory steps that heightened the military tension to the point where a series of simple mistakes could have started WW3 and brought about the end of the world. The terrifying part of this is that Kennedy and Khrushchev thought they were in control, but the situation was too complex with too many moving parts for them to really be able to shape what happened. Sherwin asserts, convincingly and terrifyingly, that it was luck, and the actions of two junior military officers (one Soviet and one American), that averted catastrophe. The senior ranking Soviet submarine officer overrode the orders of captain of the submarine he had randomly been assigned to thereby stopping a seriously escalatory action. An American officer received accidental launch orders against targets in China and the UsSR, and had the wherewithal to order the launch stopped because it didnt make sense to him. It is terrifying how close the world came to nuclear war. I’m sure there are other individual actions similar to these two that saved us.
The mind blowing thing is that the NSC recognized that missiles in Cuba had no impact on the strategic environment of the Cold War (from a vulnerability perspective). Someone said it didnt matter whether the missiles were coming from Cuba or Moscow, mutually assured destruction was mutually assured destruction. It is wild, given the acknowledgement of that fact by the president’s advisors, how aggressively the NSC and JCS lobbied for a preemptive strike against Cuba. Scary indeed.
The mind blowing thing is that the NSC recognized that missiles in Cuba had no impact on the strategic environment of the Cold War (from a vulnerability perspective). Someone said it didnt matter whether the missiles were coming from Cuba or Moscow, mutually assured destruction was mutually assured destruction. It is wild, given the acknowledgement of that fact by the president’s advisors, how aggressively the NSC and JCS lobbied for a preemptive strike against Cuba. Scary indeed.
November 28, 2020
Fascinating & illuminating account of the nuclear age & its civilization-destroying capabilities, and how the world has lived with this situation since the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945. Sherwin is a assiduous historian who has read, researched, and taught on the history of the nuclear age for many years. He's also written two other highly regarding books on developments & dilemmas of the nuclear age, including a biography on Oppenheimer, the chief scientist on the Manhattan Project that developed the first nuclear weapon.
This account focuses in on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 under John F. Kennedy's presidency. With new revelations & historical documents & files, Sherwin reveals just how gravely close the U.S. and the Soviet Union (with Cuban proxies) came to unleashing a devastatingly disaster thermonuclear war. "I thought this was my last meal," declared one of Kennedy's White House guests one night in October 1962. Soviet leader Khrushchev's secret deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba initiated the most deadly nuclear standoff between the two most powerful nuclear nations on earth. Oh, how close the standoff came to being ignited, even with the finally-agreed upon US strategy of blockading Cuban, as opposed to an air attack on the Cuban missile sites, followed by an all-out invasion of the island.
A very engaging read; well-written history that places the reader right in the midst of the unfolding action. Borrowed this ebook from the library; read it on my Kindle.
This account focuses in on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 under John F. Kennedy's presidency. With new revelations & historical documents & files, Sherwin reveals just how gravely close the U.S. and the Soviet Union (with Cuban proxies) came to unleashing a devastatingly disaster thermonuclear war. "I thought this was my last meal," declared one of Kennedy's White House guests one night in October 1962. Soviet leader Khrushchev's secret deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba initiated the most deadly nuclear standoff between the two most powerful nuclear nations on earth. Oh, how close the standoff came to being ignited, even with the finally-agreed upon US strategy of blockading Cuban, as opposed to an air attack on the Cuban missile sites, followed by an all-out invasion of the island.
A very engaging read; well-written history that places the reader right in the midst of the unfolding action. Borrowed this ebook from the library; read it on my Kindle.
March 10, 2024
Harrowing. The story that is in this book is harrowing.
I would not recommend this as a bed time story. That is how this originally started and it’s shockingly really hard to read when you are getting ready for bed when every 10th page is “and only by using the luck of the world did we not nuke ourselves!”
I counted 3 stories in there that were completed unrelated to the main plot that were like “yeah so because this one guy was on duty today we didn’t start a nuclear war!” Holy shit! That’s nuts
Let’s talk a little bit about the author and then jump into a book review. Martin J Sherwin did a fantastic job writing this book. He made it difficult to put down and I went out of my way to read his acknowledgements, interesting that he thanked Robert Gottlieb who was Robert Caro’s editor. Gottlieb did not edit this book, but you can definitely see some similarities in writing style. The book was very thoroughly researched and I liked that the author called out where the historical account was in question.
The book was fantastic. It was difficult to put down once I got going and reading it in the afternoon and not at night was definitely the play. It starts with a “how did nuclear policy develop to put ourselves in this situation?” and then moved onto the Cuban Missile Crisis providing a day by day and sometimes hour by hour account. Throughout the book the level of research and the author’s expertise shone through. Would highly recommend a read.
I would not recommend this as a bed time story. That is how this originally started and it’s shockingly really hard to read when you are getting ready for bed when every 10th page is “and only by using the luck of the world did we not nuke ourselves!”
I counted 3 stories in there that were completed unrelated to the main plot that were like “yeah so because this one guy was on duty today we didn’t start a nuclear war!” Holy shit! That’s nuts
Let’s talk a little bit about the author and then jump into a book review. Martin J Sherwin did a fantastic job writing this book. He made it difficult to put down and I went out of my way to read his acknowledgements, interesting that he thanked Robert Gottlieb who was Robert Caro’s editor. Gottlieb did not edit this book, but you can definitely see some similarities in writing style. The book was very thoroughly researched and I liked that the author called out where the historical account was in question.
The book was fantastic. It was difficult to put down once I got going and reading it in the afternoon and not at night was definitely the play. It starts with a “how did nuclear policy develop to put ourselves in this situation?” and then moved onto the Cuban Missile Crisis providing a day by day and sometimes hour by hour account. Throughout the book the level of research and the author’s expertise shone through. Would highly recommend a read.
January 28, 2023
There's a lot of history that tries to capture the structure, underlying causes, etc of the Cuban Missile Crisis and while this book does that just as well as the rest of them, it also perfectly renders something that a lot of them don't: the totally apocalyptic, madness-inducing Vibes of a world teetering on the brink of pointless ruin. With the Joint Chiefs of Staff chomping at the bit for a holy war and oxygen-deprived nuclear submariners getting depth charges dropped on them, Sherwin concludes that the peaceful resolution of the crisis was nothing short of a small miracle and it's hard to disagree with him.
He also makes the novel case that Adlai Stevenson played a critical role in convincing Kennedy to deescalate, which I found interesting and compelling. Thanks, Adlai!
He also makes the novel case that Adlai Stevenson played a critical role in convincing Kennedy to deescalate, which I found interesting and compelling. Thanks, Adlai!
July 6, 2024
An incredible, in-depth review of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the preceding years of the nuclear age leading up to it.
A sobering and harrowing insight into the closest the world has ever been to nuclear destruction, and what little separates us (I.e., luck) from that disastrous end every day.
A sobering and harrowing insight into the closest the world has ever been to nuclear destruction, and what little separates us (I.e., luck) from that disastrous end every day.
June 15, 2024
Nukes were a psychological and political lift for Truman the way 9/11 helped boost Bush II. Massive destruction, unspeakable horror, producing a confident ebullience which enabled the US to “take risks that otherwise would have been unacceptable.” Truman wasn’t ready to accept his responsibilities as president, let alone as commander and chief, and relied on his more hawkish secretary of state, James F. Byres, who led him into dropping the bomb. Thus setting the example for how other world powers would view nukes, coveting them, at the expense of their poor and suffering, to boost their confidence and power, the madness of their indiscriminate destruction notwithstanding. (North Korea comes to mind). Japan was going to surrender anyway, and the US wanted to demonstrate the first nukes in order to take credit for Japan’s defeat and therefore have a greater say in the terms of its surrender. Used “on an essentially defeated enemy,” J. Robert Oppenheimer’s words. Those apologists who supported the first atomic bomb to end the war with Japan, please explain the purpose of the second one, its “almost casual American attitude towards its use?” It was mere revenge, punishment, and to further intimidate the USSR. The Soviet’s desire for a bomb was the same as North Korea; for self-preservation. The bomb didn’t alter the Soviet Union’s pursuit of their own objectives, but it did give the Americans confidence to pursue theirs. Two factions arose: preventing a nuclear arms race vs. nukes for security. After Russia tested its first nuclear bomb, the US frantically sought to build a bigger one, the hydrogen bomb. This step was meant “if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians,” not for military use. Again, North Korea and Iran come to mind. Critic George Kennan said he considered the decision “will impede understanding of things important to a clear policy and will carry us toward the misuse and dissipation of our strength.” Endless war? Sound familiar? Truman used the term “nuclear diplomacy” frequently after 1945. Yet Truman resisted relinquishing presidential control to the military. “...this is not a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women, children, and unarmed people.” Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur after he called for the use of nukes in the Korean War against Chinese targets.
Eisenhower was against the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as Japan was already defeated and he “hated” seeing the US be the first to use that terrible weapon. However, a few weeks after his famous “Chance for Peace” speech, he was advocating the use of nukes in the Korean conflict. Additionally, he supported the idea that our nukes should be the first line of defense and offense, advocating that the US “will consider nuclear weapons as available for use as other munitions.” This set up a dynamic where the Soviet Union felt it could only match the US on an equal footing in diplomacy if it could match her with its own stockpile of nuclear weapons. Again, repeated with North Korea today. Nukes were cheaper than conventional forces - invasion troops need food, water, and medicine. Nukes do not.
Eisenhower was so convinced the Soviet Union was trying to topple governments and impose Communism on the world that he was blind to the fact that America was already doing the same thing, albeit through covert methods (Allen Dulles in the CIA’s covert work in Iran, Guatemala, etc.) They missed an opportunity to ease tensions after Stalin’s death; instead, pushing ahead with all-nukes and strengthening the USA’s posture. He would “rather be atomized than Communized,” he said. The Soviet Union wanted to impose its ‘godless’ doctrine throughout the world, but the Eisenhower administration was willing to destroy the world to stop this perceived threat. Eisenhower’s farewell address warning about the “military-industrial complex” was disingenuous; he’d overseen the massive expansion of the nuclear arsenal, now at over 20,000 weapons.
Eisenhower fired Gen. Matthew Ridgeway, a successful war-hero, when he objected to his “New Look” pro-nuke plan.
New to me: VP Richard Nixon interviewed Fidel Castro in April 1959, during Fidel’s PR tour of the US. Eisenhower had run off to play golf to avoid meeting him. Fidel had no interest in courting Moscow, which was thousands of miles away and had no prior business in the hemisphere. This occurred shortly after he ousted the long time and US-supported dictator Batista. Nixon himself he felt he was more nieve about communism than under communism discipline. In Nixon’s own biography, he selectively quoted from this interview, leaving out the last part, about his thoughts on Fidel Castro’s early relationship with communism. Castro emphatically said he was not a communist nor even a socialist, and was seeking not aid but a partnership with the US. Castro had good press and even Ed Sullivan flew down to interview him. Many were unimpressed, including the Archbishop of New York Francis Spellman and, of course, President Eisenhower. They began economic pressures which eventually forced Cuba to look to the USSR for support. Clearly Fidel wanted a partner in the US, not an adversary. However, the US rejected him so Fidel turned to the Soviets for support. Even US intelligence admitted that the 1959 Fidel was not a communist, but communism was a possible influence (Fidel’s brother was a communist). Instead of trying to win over Cuba with a carrot, they wanted to beat the communist influence with a stick. This approach, of course, backfired, and Cuba went full-communist. The US pressure had the effect of radicalizing the Cubans. Another example of how we are our own worse enemy.
Early in Eisenhower’s administration, Russian premier Khurschev paid a visit. He went to Disney world. The conservative bullhorns and Catholic church were against Khruschev’s visit. Except Commonweal magazine! LOL.
Eisenhower was furious at JFK’s election, and said he would “do almost anything to avoid turning the country over to ‘the young genius.’ He had no moral qualms over clandestine operations either. His actions/attitude sprung from the same poisoned well Oliver North drank. The same well fed by business leaders who feared Castro nationalizing their properties in Cuba.
Eisenhower also went to great lengths to cover up his involvement in instigating the Bay of Pigs debacle. He started it all. However, JFK was all in initially, despite claims to the contrary. Like Ike, JFK wanted to erase any link those efforts had to the US government, aka “plausible deniability.” “Diplomatic civility and compromise.” Ike made no attempt to reach out to the “new forces of economic unity and growth,” and as a result, communism and militarism spread. Increased nuclear proliferation meant more targets, not more security.
The hawkish ExComm felt the crisis between the US and USSR was a private one. “It was a public confrontation playing out on a global stage…” I shudder to think if Reagan, Bush 1, Bush 2 or Trump, all of whom started or supported expeditionary war or were unfit for office, were in power during those days. Both Castro and Kennedy took pains over the wording of their letters to Khruschev. Trump can’t even be bothered to spell check his tweets.
The lessons of the Cuban Missile crisis: Nukes were meant to give us security and peace, but in actuality, can’t solve the crises they create which threatens both. This lesson is resisted because “it marginalizes the value of nuclear weapons.”
“Naturally, common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship….voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacificists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.” - German Reichsmarschall Herman Goering, 1945. Do I share his cynicism? Certainly after 9/11, Bush 2 took a page out of this book and invaded Iraq and keeps us in Afghanistan for 20+ years, the longest-running war in US history.
Interesting contrast; the Calvinist belief that “history is foreordained” because God is all-powerful may have animated the hawks during the Cuban Missile crisis and apologists for the use of the bomb, that is, its use is “foreordained” to affirm their unilateral actions. Mr. Sherwin repeats several times that history is not foreordained, that things didn’t have to happen a certain way. Truman was denounced as a potential dictator by then-presidential candidate Strom Thurmond over Truman’s support of civil rights legislation; Thurmond championed so-called “states rights” and denounced Truman’s efforts as one step towards totalitarianism. My how history repeats itself.
We are told that we must have a strong military to protect us from our enemies to “ensure our freedoms.” We are told the reason we fought WWII was to rid the world of fascism, when in reality we sat on our hands for 2 years while the Nazis ran roughshod over Europe, and indeed many Americans were (are still?) sympathetic with their cause. We entered the war only after Pearl Harbor when our isolationism was politically untenable. Many people believe their 2nd Amendment rights are what keep them safe and free in their own homes. In that view, their safety and freedom are bought only at the threat or exertion of force, which means their safety and freedom can be taken away by force, a cheapening and misunderstanding of true safety and freedom. Comic-book fascism reinforces this word view that unless there are more good guys out there with bigger and badder guns, our freedoms and very society is at risk. Then explain to me the rise of fascism and authoritarianism in our allies? They are doing so without so much a shot fired, but the active acquiescense and marginalization of dissenting voices. China is in a real position to make an argument that democracy is dead and their communist way is better. How many hundreds of millions have they raised out of abject poverty, and how many American dollars do they hold? If freedom is measured in financial growth, not by human rights, China is ahead. The US can cry all it wants about human rights abuses but until it fesses up to its own in various expeditionary wars through the 20th century and beyond, it has no credibility. The US refuses to join the International Criminal Court because it will “supplant the Constitution'' or otherwise hamstring our abilities to conduct affairs internationally. None of this is true, of course, unless we plan to start condoning war crimes as a military tactic. The ICC takes its language from the US Constitution itself and makes no claims on US sovereignty, but holds people credibly charged with heinous crimes that have no domestic equivalent; what are the penalties for genocide and mass murder, rape, and persecution in the US? Until Rand Paul has an answer to that, I’m for joining the ICC.
Eisenhower was against the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as Japan was already defeated and he “hated” seeing the US be the first to use that terrible weapon. However, a few weeks after his famous “Chance for Peace” speech, he was advocating the use of nukes in the Korean conflict. Additionally, he supported the idea that our nukes should be the first line of defense and offense, advocating that the US “will consider nuclear weapons as available for use as other munitions.” This set up a dynamic where the Soviet Union felt it could only match the US on an equal footing in diplomacy if it could match her with its own stockpile of nuclear weapons. Again, repeated with North Korea today. Nukes were cheaper than conventional forces - invasion troops need food, water, and medicine. Nukes do not.
Eisenhower was so convinced the Soviet Union was trying to topple governments and impose Communism on the world that he was blind to the fact that America was already doing the same thing, albeit through covert methods (Allen Dulles in the CIA’s covert work in Iran, Guatemala, etc.) They missed an opportunity to ease tensions after Stalin’s death; instead, pushing ahead with all-nukes and strengthening the USA’s posture. He would “rather be atomized than Communized,” he said. The Soviet Union wanted to impose its ‘godless’ doctrine throughout the world, but the Eisenhower administration was willing to destroy the world to stop this perceived threat. Eisenhower’s farewell address warning about the “military-industrial complex” was disingenuous; he’d overseen the massive expansion of the nuclear arsenal, now at over 20,000 weapons.
Eisenhower fired Gen. Matthew Ridgeway, a successful war-hero, when he objected to his “New Look” pro-nuke plan.
New to me: VP Richard Nixon interviewed Fidel Castro in April 1959, during Fidel’s PR tour of the US. Eisenhower had run off to play golf to avoid meeting him. Fidel had no interest in courting Moscow, which was thousands of miles away and had no prior business in the hemisphere. This occurred shortly after he ousted the long time and US-supported dictator Batista. Nixon himself he felt he was more nieve about communism than under communism discipline. In Nixon’s own biography, he selectively quoted from this interview, leaving out the last part, about his thoughts on Fidel Castro’s early relationship with communism. Castro emphatically said he was not a communist nor even a socialist, and was seeking not aid but a partnership with the US. Castro had good press and even Ed Sullivan flew down to interview him. Many were unimpressed, including the Archbishop of New York Francis Spellman and, of course, President Eisenhower. They began economic pressures which eventually forced Cuba to look to the USSR for support. Clearly Fidel wanted a partner in the US, not an adversary. However, the US rejected him so Fidel turned to the Soviets for support. Even US intelligence admitted that the 1959 Fidel was not a communist, but communism was a possible influence (Fidel’s brother was a communist). Instead of trying to win over Cuba with a carrot, they wanted to beat the communist influence with a stick. This approach, of course, backfired, and Cuba went full-communist. The US pressure had the effect of radicalizing the Cubans. Another example of how we are our own worse enemy.
Early in Eisenhower’s administration, Russian premier Khurschev paid a visit. He went to Disney world. The conservative bullhorns and Catholic church were against Khruschev’s visit. Except Commonweal magazine! LOL.
Eisenhower was furious at JFK’s election, and said he would “do almost anything to avoid turning the country over to ‘the young genius.’ He had no moral qualms over clandestine operations either. His actions/attitude sprung from the same poisoned well Oliver North drank. The same well fed by business leaders who feared Castro nationalizing their properties in Cuba.
Eisenhower also went to great lengths to cover up his involvement in instigating the Bay of Pigs debacle. He started it all. However, JFK was all in initially, despite claims to the contrary. Like Ike, JFK wanted to erase any link those efforts had to the US government, aka “plausible deniability.” “Diplomatic civility and compromise.” Ike made no attempt to reach out to the “new forces of economic unity and growth,” and as a result, communism and militarism spread. Increased nuclear proliferation meant more targets, not more security.
The hawkish ExComm felt the crisis between the US and USSR was a private one. “It was a public confrontation playing out on a global stage…” I shudder to think if Reagan, Bush 1, Bush 2 or Trump, all of whom started or supported expeditionary war or were unfit for office, were in power during those days. Both Castro and Kennedy took pains over the wording of their letters to Khruschev. Trump can’t even be bothered to spell check his tweets.
The lessons of the Cuban Missile crisis: Nukes were meant to give us security and peace, but in actuality, can’t solve the crises they create which threatens both. This lesson is resisted because “it marginalizes the value of nuclear weapons.”
“Naturally, common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship….voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacificists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.” - German Reichsmarschall Herman Goering, 1945. Do I share his cynicism? Certainly after 9/11, Bush 2 took a page out of this book and invaded Iraq and keeps us in Afghanistan for 20+ years, the longest-running war in US history.
Interesting contrast; the Calvinist belief that “history is foreordained” because God is all-powerful may have animated the hawks during the Cuban Missile crisis and apologists for the use of the bomb, that is, its use is “foreordained” to affirm their unilateral actions. Mr. Sherwin repeats several times that history is not foreordained, that things didn’t have to happen a certain way. Truman was denounced as a potential dictator by then-presidential candidate Strom Thurmond over Truman’s support of civil rights legislation; Thurmond championed so-called “states rights” and denounced Truman’s efforts as one step towards totalitarianism. My how history repeats itself.
We are told that we must have a strong military to protect us from our enemies to “ensure our freedoms.” We are told the reason we fought WWII was to rid the world of fascism, when in reality we sat on our hands for 2 years while the Nazis ran roughshod over Europe, and indeed many Americans were (are still?) sympathetic with their cause. We entered the war only after Pearl Harbor when our isolationism was politically untenable. Many people believe their 2nd Amendment rights are what keep them safe and free in their own homes. In that view, their safety and freedom are bought only at the threat or exertion of force, which means their safety and freedom can be taken away by force, a cheapening and misunderstanding of true safety and freedom. Comic-book fascism reinforces this word view that unless there are more good guys out there with bigger and badder guns, our freedoms and very society is at risk. Then explain to me the rise of fascism and authoritarianism in our allies? They are doing so without so much a shot fired, but the active acquiescense and marginalization of dissenting voices. China is in a real position to make an argument that democracy is dead and their communist way is better. How many hundreds of millions have they raised out of abject poverty, and how many American dollars do they hold? If freedom is measured in financial growth, not by human rights, China is ahead. The US can cry all it wants about human rights abuses but until it fesses up to its own in various expeditionary wars through the 20th century and beyond, it has no credibility. The US refuses to join the International Criminal Court because it will “supplant the Constitution'' or otherwise hamstring our abilities to conduct affairs internationally. None of this is true, of course, unless we plan to start condoning war crimes as a military tactic. The ICC takes its language from the US Constitution itself and makes no claims on US sovereignty, but holds people credibly charged with heinous crimes that have no domestic equivalent; what are the penalties for genocide and mass murder, rape, and persecution in the US? Until Rand Paul has an answer to that, I’m for joining the ICC.
April 13, 2021
This book was a huge disappointment. It sprints over the first years and become a transcript of who said what every day of the Cuban Missile Crisis. I mean literally. I couldn't take it anymore and gave up half way through and I am loath to do that ever. Don't waste your time on this one.
March 3, 2021
"What are you going to do? What are you going to do?" the young woman sobbed as the elevator took us up to our dorm rooms in Alice Lloyd Hall at the University of Michigan. It was October 22, 1962. A room filled with residents had just finished listening to President John F. Kennedy report that the Soviet Union had placed offensive nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba, just 90 miles off our Florida coast. The United States was demanding their complete and immediate removal. Having lived our entire lives under the imminent threat of a nuclear holocaust, we completely understood the seriousness of this situation. Afterwards, we filed out quietly and headed to our respective rooms.
My answer to the girl was, "I'm going upstairs to study for my sociology exam. It's tomorrow." She looked at me incredulously, "Study for your exam? But we may be at war tomorrow!" I looked at her, "But we may not, and if we are still here, my professor will be giving out that exam in the morning. I'm going to study for it. It's my job, and it's all I can do." And I did. What else could I do? My parents were making sacrifices for me to be in Ann Arbor so that I could go to class, prepare for my life, and contribute...
I woke up the next morning, went to my exam, and did quite well on it, as I recall. We never did go to war over those Cuban missiles. I graduated, had a family and career. Now, more than 58 years later, I have learned from this book by Martin Sherwin just how close I had come to losing it all in a horror of destruction and radiation. We were so very lucky...
Of course I have read and learned much over the intervening years about the development of nuclear weapons and especially about this very fraught period in 1962 when two powerful leaders faced each other across the world and played "chicken" with all of our lives. I thought I knew quite a bit about it...until I listened to Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1945-1962. I discovered much that was new to me about the events and the human beings who struggled with this existential dilemma while I studied, took my exams, and laughed with my friends during those critical days in October. I had learned to compartmentalize as a child; I had no choice. The skill had served me well. I functioned, having no idea how close to the brink of utter destruction we had come. So much had transpired, hidden from public view while I lived those 58 years. So many people had agonized and argued, as I'm sure they still do in the secret rooms of governments.
So this is my review of the book. The title explains its content. The author gives an excellent overview in the first chapter and then methodically relates the history that led to those infamous "13 days in October." He continues with a detailed account of the events, providing an honest account of the men (They were all men in 1962) themselves. For example, Sherwin praises Kennedy for his ultimate decision to resist the militant, deadly advice of nearly every one of his military and civilian advisors. Finally he exposes the president's duplicity in creating the Cuban Missile Crisis myth that made him the clear winner in this homeric contest with Khruschev. In reality, the result of their dangerous standoff was the best of all possible solutions; both sides gave something, both sides gained what they needed...and the world was not destroyed. Khruschev was not the blundering fool he has been portrayed as in many accounts, and United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson influenced Kennedy enough to probably have saved us all.
I found this book riveting and extremely informative. It answered so much about a major historic event of my life. It also illuminated the role that luck plays in critical human events. I strongly recommend it, especially for those interested in the history of the second half of the 20th century. It helps to explain these events, and the critical people involved in them, clearly. Understanding our past informs our present and influences our future...hopefully to help us make better choices.
My answer to the girl was, "I'm going upstairs to study for my sociology exam. It's tomorrow." She looked at me incredulously, "Study for your exam? But we may be at war tomorrow!" I looked at her, "But we may not, and if we are still here, my professor will be giving out that exam in the morning. I'm going to study for it. It's my job, and it's all I can do." And I did. What else could I do? My parents were making sacrifices for me to be in Ann Arbor so that I could go to class, prepare for my life, and contribute...
I woke up the next morning, went to my exam, and did quite well on it, as I recall. We never did go to war over those Cuban missiles. I graduated, had a family and career. Now, more than 58 years later, I have learned from this book by Martin Sherwin just how close I had come to losing it all in a horror of destruction and radiation. We were so very lucky...
Of course I have read and learned much over the intervening years about the development of nuclear weapons and especially about this very fraught period in 1962 when two powerful leaders faced each other across the world and played "chicken" with all of our lives. I thought I knew quite a bit about it...until I listened to Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1945-1962. I discovered much that was new to me about the events and the human beings who struggled with this existential dilemma while I studied, took my exams, and laughed with my friends during those critical days in October. I had learned to compartmentalize as a child; I had no choice. The skill had served me well. I functioned, having no idea how close to the brink of utter destruction we had come. So much had transpired, hidden from public view while I lived those 58 years. So many people had agonized and argued, as I'm sure they still do in the secret rooms of governments.
So this is my review of the book. The title explains its content. The author gives an excellent overview in the first chapter and then methodically relates the history that led to those infamous "13 days in October." He continues with a detailed account of the events, providing an honest account of the men (They were all men in 1962) themselves. For example, Sherwin praises Kennedy for his ultimate decision to resist the militant, deadly advice of nearly every one of his military and civilian advisors. Finally he exposes the president's duplicity in creating the Cuban Missile Crisis myth that made him the clear winner in this homeric contest with Khruschev. In reality, the result of their dangerous standoff was the best of all possible solutions; both sides gave something, both sides gained what they needed...and the world was not destroyed. Khruschev was not the blundering fool he has been portrayed as in many accounts, and United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson influenced Kennedy enough to probably have saved us all.
I found this book riveting and extremely informative. It answered so much about a major historic event of my life. It also illuminated the role that luck plays in critical human events. I strongly recommend it, especially for those interested in the history of the second half of the 20th century. It helps to explain these events, and the critical people involved in them, clearly. Understanding our past informs our present and influences our future...hopefully to help us make better choices.
March 27, 2021
This book about the Cuban Missile Crisis just came out at the end of 2020 and its author, who was a Navy intelligence officer on board one of the U.S. ships in the middle of the crisis, presents a very meticulously researched and thoroughly examined recounting of the two week period when the world came closest to a nuclear war. While the book's subtitle indicates that it is an study of the history of the nuclear competition between the U.S. and the USSR during the period 1945-1962, two thirds of the book focuses on the two week crisis of October, 1962. I did find the section on Eisenhower's nuclear weapons build-up and his embrace of the strategy of "massive retaliation" an interesting counterpunch to Evan Thomas's 2012 study of the Eisenhower foreign policy, "Ike's Bluff," whose thesis is in the title of the book. Sherwin would contend that Ike was absolutely Not bluffing. In any event, the crux of the study is the Missile Crisis, and how close the world came to a catastrophe that might have had existential repercussions for the future of the entire world. The reader learns that two unknown officers- a Soviet submarine commander and an American captain stationed in Okinawa- may have each averted nuclear war with their brave decisions to overturn illegitimate launch orders. The main emphasis, however, is on Kennedy and Khrushchev, and how these two men were each able to stand up to their own people in order to back away from a conflict that often seemed inevitable, but one that neither one wanted. The book pushes back hard against some of the contentions about the details of the crisis that were first presented in a 1962 Saturday Evening Post article "In Time of Crisis" and in Robert Kennedy's book "13 Days." A number of the famous quotes of those pieces never make it into Sherwin's book and were probably apocryphal. And unlike how the collective American memory now relates it, Robert Kennedy was not the "voice of reason" during the crisis, but was actually one of the many individuals urging the president to engage in military action. According to Sherwin, the real hero of the crisis was United States UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who was the first senior official to urge negotiations and suggest the possibility of the trade of Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey, which was part of the final resolution. But the Kennedy brothers did not like Stevenson (he had been given the UN job as a sop to the Democratic Party's liberal wing), so they immediately downplayed his contributions once the crisis was over. In the end, the book confirmed an analysis that I have always tried to convey to my students: that the missiles in Cuba did not realistically pose a greater risk to the United States than it was already facing from the Soviet arsenal, but that it was all about "credibility"- with the Soviet Union, with our NATO allies, and with the American electorate. It is scary to read about how close the world came to nuclear war due to concerns about reputation and image.
January 21, 2022
A few days ago I was listening to a foreign affairs talking head discussing Putin and Ukraine and he suggested Putin might move to put missiles in Cuba or Venezuela as a move in the current geopolitical chess game. Who knows where that'll go but but it was a curious eyebrow raising coincidence as I was finishing this book.
Most people know that in 1962 the chess game was very real and the chest pieces were quite literally nuclear missiles. Amidst all the histrionics one has to sort through these days (insert subtitle, ...how it changed the world... or, ...the epic story of...) you literally can't exaggerate how close we came to nuclear war in 1962 and this book is now the definitive account.
Sherwin traces the early years of the cold war which culminated in the CMC. And his rendering of that history before the CMC is every bit as suspenseful and illuminating as is his telling of the two weeks in October of 1962.
As for the CMC itself Sherwin shatters the myth of the so called ExComm as the well oiled collaborative body that formed a consensus leading to a peaceful solution. With all due respect to RFK and "Thirteen Days" (and memoirs of course are almost necessarily biased), the ExCom comes across as a nearly dysfunctional mostly annoying distraction for JFK whose chief counsel was a much smaller circle of trusted friends and advisors mostly outside of this group.
Forgive the cliché, but Sherwin really does put you in the room to follow the play-by-play, thanks in part to the then relatively nascent practice of taping everything in the White House, but beyond that great research and piecing together the many cross-currents at play. Among other things, Sherwin sheds light on the various facets of the crisis that Kennedy and Khrushchev had little or no control over and the degree to which chance and luck prevented a horrific outcome. And while not necessarily a new revelation it is incredibly sobering to fully understand how certain members of the ExComm (Joint Chiefs) and also certain congressional leaders looked upon a nuclear exchange as inevitable and matter of fact.
I for one have been someone who feels like the deification of JFK has been a bit overdone over the years (and I don't mean to be insensitive to the events a year later that serve as the foundation for that deification) That said, after reading this account of the CMC, and being someone born in 1963, it's hard not come away thinking "Thank God it was mainly JFK making the decisions, resisting the hawks and plotting the course" (...Nixon anyone?). The only real blemish in the whole affair for JFK is the petty stabbing in the back of Adli Stevenson given his contribution to a peaceful outcome, but hey that's politics.
Let me just say that if you have any interest whatsoever in twentieth century history this is a must read and a great book.
Most people know that in 1962 the chess game was very real and the chest pieces were quite literally nuclear missiles. Amidst all the histrionics one has to sort through these days (insert subtitle, ...how it changed the world... or, ...the epic story of...) you literally can't exaggerate how close we came to nuclear war in 1962 and this book is now the definitive account.
Sherwin traces the early years of the cold war which culminated in the CMC. And his rendering of that history before the CMC is every bit as suspenseful and illuminating as is his telling of the two weeks in October of 1962.
As for the CMC itself Sherwin shatters the myth of the so called ExComm as the well oiled collaborative body that formed a consensus leading to a peaceful solution. With all due respect to RFK and "Thirteen Days" (and memoirs of course are almost necessarily biased), the ExCom comes across as a nearly dysfunctional mostly annoying distraction for JFK whose chief counsel was a much smaller circle of trusted friends and advisors mostly outside of this group.
Forgive the cliché, but Sherwin really does put you in the room to follow the play-by-play, thanks in part to the then relatively nascent practice of taping everything in the White House, but beyond that great research and piecing together the many cross-currents at play. Among other things, Sherwin sheds light on the various facets of the crisis that Kennedy and Khrushchev had little or no control over and the degree to which chance and luck prevented a horrific outcome. And while not necessarily a new revelation it is incredibly sobering to fully understand how certain members of the ExComm (Joint Chiefs) and also certain congressional leaders looked upon a nuclear exchange as inevitable and matter of fact.
I for one have been someone who feels like the deification of JFK has been a bit overdone over the years (and I don't mean to be insensitive to the events a year later that serve as the foundation for that deification) That said, after reading this account of the CMC, and being someone born in 1963, it's hard not come away thinking "Thank God it was mainly JFK making the decisions, resisting the hawks and plotting the course" (...Nixon anyone?). The only real blemish in the whole affair for JFK is the petty stabbing in the back of Adli Stevenson given his contribution to a peaceful outcome, but hey that's politics.
Let me just say that if you have any interest whatsoever in twentieth century history this is a must read and a great book.
November 19, 2020
What an exciting history! And we lived to tell the tale. This book combines the best of historiography with nail-biting cliffhangers and real honest-to-gooodness chances of nuclear war. The timeline and cast of characters is occasionally jumbled, but that corresponds to the events at hand -- jumbled and often confused. I was in elementary school in Georgia at the time, and I remember playground declarations as to the placement of our local air force base on the target list; my father later told me that his job there was to calculate the quantity and quality of evacuation routes, in case of a likely nuclear attack! In this book, the early chapters' accounts of the soviet submarines frantic efforts to avoid apparent capture or destruction by US navy are duly exciting, though strangely not mentioned later in the book. The author's emphasis on the importance of gauging personal intention (on the part of Kennedy and Krushchev) actually resuscitates the woke dismissal of the "Great Man" theory of history -- in this case, those two men truly had the death of the world in their hands. The author focuses also on the incessant warmongering of the ExComm, the blithe way they would order nuclear attack just as a sort of kneejerk response to communist threats -- and though it was less documented, the Politburo and soviet military evidently were similarly ready to pull the trigger without considering longterm effects (let alone morality).
While reading this book I watched the DVD "Missiles of October" that was surprisingly close to the reality uncovered by this author -- the author's review of the secret tape-recordings and analysis of later stories has adjusted the precise sequence of events, and removed much of the genius gloss painted by the Kennedys and McNamara; and yet...it all came down to JFK's recognition of his responsibility to history, his wider view of the conflict. One fascinating sidenote refers to George Ball's later admonition to JFK regarding support for South Vietnam, worrying that we would get bogged down just as the French had: JFK's response "You're crazy, George. That will never happen."
This book is a must-read for any U.S.history student, and any student of history: well-documented, well-written, lessons for today, and exciting to boot.
While reading this book I watched the DVD "Missiles of October" that was surprisingly close to the reality uncovered by this author -- the author's review of the secret tape-recordings and analysis of later stories has adjusted the precise sequence of events, and removed much of the genius gloss painted by the Kennedys and McNamara; and yet...it all came down to JFK's recognition of his responsibility to history, his wider view of the conflict. One fascinating sidenote refers to George Ball's later admonition to JFK regarding support for South Vietnam, worrying that we would get bogged down just as the French had: JFK's response "You're crazy, George. That will never happen."
This book is a must-read for any U.S.history student, and any student of history: well-documented, well-written, lessons for today, and exciting to boot.
Read
March 5, 2025Events overtaking decisions. In "Gambling with Armageddon", Sherwin shows in hour-by-hour detail the development of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Sherwin uses primary documents (notes, recordings) to put us into the room and into Kennedy's (among others) head to unlock their decision making and how the situation almost got away from them due to passion and fear. We see everyone around Kennedy pushing for an early and decisive (and mutually fatal) military action, except for Ambassador to the United Nations — and Kennedy political rival — Adlai Stevenson push for diplomacy and thought. Of all the big names highlighted here, Stevenson is the one who was right from the start. Stevenson is also the one who never got the credit.
Yet Sherwin builds his main argument through two stories of lesser known names: Vasily Arkhipov and William Bassett. Two officers, one from the Soviet Union and one from the United States of America, each received orders to fire nuclear weapons. Each officer refusing — opting for patience and further confirmation before they ended the world. Two individuals whose hesistance saved everyone.
Easy to read something about the inherent commitment to life in the human spirit in these stories (I have!), but Sherwin uses them in context of the famous names to conclude on the inevitability of nuclear disaster. We constructed these weapons that can end the world. It just takes one bad individual in one stop along the line to end it for everyone. Birth of the bomb, as Christopher Nolan shows in "Oppenheimer" (an adaptation of a book Sherwin co-wrote), guarantees humanity's death.
Yet Sherwin builds his main argument through two stories of lesser known names: Vasily Arkhipov and William Bassett. Two officers, one from the Soviet Union and one from the United States of America, each received orders to fire nuclear weapons. Each officer refusing — opting for patience and further confirmation before they ended the world. Two individuals whose hesistance saved everyone.
Easy to read something about the inherent commitment to life in the human spirit in these stories (I have!), but Sherwin uses them in context of the famous names to conclude on the inevitability of nuclear disaster. We constructed these weapons that can end the world. It just takes one bad individual in one stop along the line to end it for everyone. Birth of the bomb, as Christopher Nolan shows in "Oppenheimer" (an adaptation of a book Sherwin co-wrote), guarantees humanity's death.
November 5, 2020
(Audiobook) This work takes a look at the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis through the prism of nuclear deterrence and the great power competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. While the book title suggests that there were multiple instances of nuclear brinkmanship between the US and the USSR, the primary area of focus is the Cuban Missile Crisis. The previous events, from Hiroshima to the various standoffs in Berlin and the U-2 flights over the USSR, all are seen as introductory acts.
Using various archived material and notes from the multitude of conversations, meetings and accounts, this work offers the perspective that the US and the USSR came very close to engaging in nuclear conflict over Cuba. Not that either party had it in their minds to fight a nuclear war over Cuba, but all of the other points of contention between the US and the USSR came to the forefront here. It can sometimes bog down into extensive reviews of the meetings in the White House between JFK, RFK and the various military and civilian advisors, but it just highlights the stakes the author feels the Cuban Missile Crisis placed both nations and the world.
The reader does a good job with the material and the rating is about the same for audiobook as it would be for e-copy/hard copy book. The title can be a little misleading and at times, the work bogs down in recaps, but it is a good overall history that highlights the situation the world faced at that time.
Using various archived material and notes from the multitude of conversations, meetings and accounts, this work offers the perspective that the US and the USSR came very close to engaging in nuclear conflict over Cuba. Not that either party had it in their minds to fight a nuclear war over Cuba, but all of the other points of contention between the US and the USSR came to the forefront here. It can sometimes bog down into extensive reviews of the meetings in the White House between JFK, RFK and the various military and civilian advisors, but it just highlights the stakes the author feels the Cuban Missile Crisis placed both nations and the world.
The reader does a good job with the material and the rating is about the same for audiobook as it would be for e-copy/hard copy book. The title can be a little misleading and at times, the work bogs down in recaps, but it is a good overall history that highlights the situation the world faced at that time.
January 29, 2021
Kitap EXCOMM/NSC toplantı kayıtları, memerondumlar, ordu kayıtları, biyografiler vb. birçok kaynaktan çok detaylı bir çalışmanın sonucu. Küba Füze Krizi'ni ve bu krize giden yolda değişen uluslararası ilişkileri oldukça başarılı bir şekilde anlatmış.
Kitabın temel iddiaları Kennedy ve Kruşçev’in barış yönündeki insiyatifine rağmen nükleer savaştan nasıl şans eseri dönüldüğü ve bu bombaların varlığı devam ettiği sürece dünyanın nükleer bir felakate sürüklenme ihitmalinin çok yüksek olduğu.
Yazarın toplantı konuşmalarına yaptığı yorumları çok başarılı buldum. Ses kayıtlarını, o odadaki yaşanan havayı okuyucunun gözünde başarıyla canlandırıyor. Yazarın ilgili kişilerin hayatlarına ve düşünce tarzlarına hakim olduğu çok belli.
Kitabın demokrasi ile ilgili de iyi bir okuma olduğunu düşünüyorum. Kennedy'nin seçim sürecinde yapmış olduğu Eisenhower eleştirisi, yaklaşan seçimler, daha geniş ifadeyle iç siyasetin iktidarın dış siyasetteki hareket alanını nasıl da sınırladığını güzel örnekliyor.
Kitabın takdire değer başka bir yanı da krizin ve çözümünün nasıl yalan yanlış tarihselleştirildiğine ilişkin bir bölüm ayırmış olması. Diplomasiyle çözüme ulaşmış kriz daha ziyade iktidarların bayıldığı dik duruş anlatısına dönüştürülmüş. Yazar hatta bu yanlış anlatıyı Lyndon Johnson'ın Vietnam'daki ısrarıyla beraber okuduğu söylenebilir.
Bugün hâlâ kitapta anlatılan risklerle karşı karşıyayız. Yanlış hatırlamıyorsam, sadece tetik konumunda olan nükleer silahların sayısı 6 bin civarındaymış. Kitap bu meselelerin önemini hatırlamak için iyi bir okuma.
Kitabın temel iddiaları Kennedy ve Kruşçev’in barış yönündeki insiyatifine rağmen nükleer savaştan nasıl şans eseri dönüldüğü ve bu bombaların varlığı devam ettiği sürece dünyanın nükleer bir felakate sürüklenme ihitmalinin çok yüksek olduğu.
Yazarın toplantı konuşmalarına yaptığı yorumları çok başarılı buldum. Ses kayıtlarını, o odadaki yaşanan havayı okuyucunun gözünde başarıyla canlandırıyor. Yazarın ilgili kişilerin hayatlarına ve düşünce tarzlarına hakim olduğu çok belli.
Kitabın demokrasi ile ilgili de iyi bir okuma olduğunu düşünüyorum. Kennedy'nin seçim sürecinde yapmış olduğu Eisenhower eleştirisi, yaklaşan seçimler, daha geniş ifadeyle iç siyasetin iktidarın dış siyasetteki hareket alanını nasıl da sınırladığını güzel örnekliyor.
Kitabın takdire değer başka bir yanı da krizin ve çözümünün nasıl yalan yanlış tarihselleştirildiğine ilişkin bir bölüm ayırmış olması. Diplomasiyle çözüme ulaşmış kriz daha ziyade iktidarların bayıldığı dik duruş anlatısına dönüştürülmüş. Yazar hatta bu yanlış anlatıyı Lyndon Johnson'ın Vietnam'daki ısrarıyla beraber okuduğu söylenebilir.
Bugün hâlâ kitapta anlatılan risklerle karşı karşıyayız. Yanlış hatırlamıyorsam, sadece tetik konumunda olan nükleer silahların sayısı 6 bin civarındaymış. Kitap bu meselelerin önemini hatırlamak için iyi bir okuma.
February 2, 2021
This is a four and one half star review of a fascinating and insightful look at the Cuban Missile Crisis and the history of events that led up to it. Even though we all know how this ended, Martin Sherwin, a junior officer in the US Navy in October 1962, has written a suspenseful, thriller-like book describing the thought process and actual words of all the major players involved in that event.
If you were fortunate, or unfortunate, to have lived through those times, this history will bring back all the anxiety and angst we all had (I was in grammar school at the time in Manhattan, NYC) as we feared the possibility of nuclear war. Sherwin points out in this book just how close we were to total destruction.
He uses audio taped transcripts, historical records, meeting notes and so much more to describe what President John Kennedy and his advisors, both civilian and military, were discussing from meeting to meeting. And despite all the intelligence of people around JFK, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev too for that matter, Sherwin identifies how simple and pure dumb luck played a major role in averting the nuclear holocaust.
This is an incredibly well written history of those terrifying 13 days and also of the way the world viewed nuclear weapons that led to this showdown.
If you were fortunate, or unfortunate, to have lived through those times, this history will bring back all the anxiety and angst we all had (I was in grammar school at the time in Manhattan, NYC) as we feared the possibility of nuclear war. Sherwin points out in this book just how close we were to total destruction.
He uses audio taped transcripts, historical records, meeting notes and so much more to describe what President John Kennedy and his advisors, both civilian and military, were discussing from meeting to meeting. And despite all the intelligence of people around JFK, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev too for that matter, Sherwin identifies how simple and pure dumb luck played a major role in averting the nuclear holocaust.
This is an incredibly well written history of those terrifying 13 days and also of the way the world viewed nuclear weapons that led to this showdown.
November 17, 2021
Genuinely intriguing way of looking at the Cuban Missile Crisis, one that moves the story earlier than the critical 13 days in October 1962. Rather, Sherwin reached back 17 years to the moment that nuclear weapons were introduced, demonstrating how, since WWII, their diplomatic presence shaped political administrations in the US and the Soviet Union. In essence, Sherwin explains how, despite relative consensus over their usage since the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, JFK bucked convention by deescalating a crisis diplomatically when many expected it to be resolved militarily. He also highlights how important Berlin was to the crisis — an equally critical component to conversations in Washington and Moscow. Also brought out are the various roles played by Fidel Castro and U Thant, among others. More than anything, however, Sherwin notes the roles that many ordinary individuals played in the crisis, revealing that neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev controlled events as they presumed, thus leading to the crisis’ end before things got even more out of hand. Above all else, Sherwin makes pains to note, a lot of luck was at play in ending the crisis — a conclusion Sherwin initially rejected but came to appreciate over the course of writing this book. Smart and enjoyable read.
February 10, 2024
It is a little difficult to categorize this book. The first parts of it give a light overview of American-Soviet relations between WW2 and the Cuban Missile Crises. But the bulk of this book is a deep dive into the Cuban Missile Crises. Sherwin relies heavily on the actual transcripts from Presidential meetings in the few weeks around this time. Indeed, much of this book is just edited and organized transcripts. This provides a good look at what was actually being said behind the scenes, which is interesting. However, it could be a little dry. This is not a book in the form of a popular history, but rather for those looking for a deeper dive into the transcripts.
One of the things that struck me is the difficulty of leadership in a time like this. There were a lot of voices with opinions, and they were often at odds with each other. Some gave poor advice. Even world leaders sometimes have less control than you would think, knowing the couple of instances when atomic missiles were almost fired through a series of unlucky circumstances, and only lucky circumstances lead to them not being fired. You could analogize this to the corporate world too, and what can happen particularly in large organizations.
One of the things that struck me is the difficulty of leadership in a time like this. There were a lot of voices with opinions, and they were often at odds with each other. Some gave poor advice. Even world leaders sometimes have less control than you would think, knowing the couple of instances when atomic missiles were almost fired through a series of unlucky circumstances, and only lucky circumstances lead to them not being fired. You could analogize this to the corporate world too, and what can happen particularly in large organizations.
November 21, 2020
I recall the fear at home and at school in October, 1962 of impending nuclear war. After reading this new account or the Cuban missile crisis, that fear was if anything barely consistent with the situation that developed during those thirteen days. In the first third of the book, Sherwin does a good job of discussing the history of the US and Soviet nuclear programs as they influenced the cold war policies and interactions between the two nations. This appropriately lays the foundation for the decisions that led to the October crisis. Relying on audio recordings, memoranda and later interviews, the author goes into great detail on the interactions among the President and his advisors as well as Khrushchev and his aides. What is striking was both the complicated nature of the dilemma (it included the risk of Soviet action against West Berlin) as well as the fluidity of opinions from hour to hour and the difficulty forming a consensus on how to proceed. The author's ultimate point is well made that it took a combination of good judgement and incredible good luck for a nuclear war to be avoided.
October 31, 2020
This book is a memoir of sorts about the presence of the nuclear threat in American diplomatic history. I started it thinking that it would be a monograph on the changing nature of American strategy, but soon found it to be something quiet different. Books like these are good; they shake up our understanding of the history, and seeing these events from a personal perspective gives historians a new approach and new evidence to view the Cold War. The author's insight sticks with you; his expertise and professional history grounds the story, but at the end of the book, it really is a tale of cautionary history. To consider how close humanity has come to multiple nuclear disasters is striking and a wake up call. It also helps us realize that history is full of lessons for our time.
If you are looking for an extensive, research-based argument about the Cold War, this isn't it. If you're looking for a personal narrative to supplement all those that have been written, Sherwin's book is a must-read
If you are looking for an extensive, research-based argument about the Cold War, this isn't it. If you're looking for a personal narrative to supplement all those that have been written, Sherwin's book is a must-read
May 22, 2024
I knew the general outline of the Cuban missile crisis before I read this. The author filled in many details about the deliberations among JFK's Cabinet about how to respond to Khruschev's placing of missiles in Cuba. I hadn't known how close Kennedy came to siding with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about invading Cuba, before listening to the better angels of his nature -- assuming that the transcripts of the recordings reflected his true intentions.
Some of the accounts were repetitive, which I didn't feel added to the impact. But I understood if the author wanted to get as close to historical accuracy as possible.
The book made very clear that the political calculus around nuclear weapons was and still is insane. How countries can threaten others, explicitly or not, with nukes when the consequences are the destruction of the entire world makes no sense. That we are all still here may be no more a product of dumb luck than anything else.
Some of the accounts were repetitive, which I didn't feel added to the impact. But I understood if the author wanted to get as close to historical accuracy as possible.
The book made very clear that the political calculus around nuclear weapons was and still is insane. How countries can threaten others, explicitly or not, with nukes when the consequences are the destruction of the entire world makes no sense. That we are all still here may be no more a product of dumb luck than anything else.
December 22, 2021
This book takes you through the Cuban missile crisis in every possible detail. It starts with explaining where it is all coming from, in a history that goes from the second world war to the election of Kennedy as president. It then lets you relive the entire crisis, day by day, hour by hour, as detailed as could be. You get a much clearer image than "Kennedy saved the world" or "this or that leader is good or evil". You can follow how the opinions of the main players changed over time, not only on the US side, but on the USSR side as well. All of it is based on thorough research of all meeting notes and recordings.
So how close were we really to total annihilation and who saved us? According to the author, we were much closer than anyone thinks, and were saved 2 times over, by luck and by alert military personnel on both sides.
So how close were we really to total annihilation and who saved us? According to the author, we were much closer than anyone thinks, and were saved 2 times over, by luck and by alert military personnel on both sides.
March 16, 2022
Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it's the leaders of the country who determine the policy, and it's always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it's a democracy, a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism, and exposing the country to greater danger. It works the same in any country.
-- German Riechsmarschall Herman Goering, 1945
-- German Riechsmarschall Herman Goering, 1945
July 3, 2023
The real story behind the fiction of an orderly deployment of nuclear weapons, which is simply madness. We conveniently deceive ourselves into thinking that nuclear policy is no longer a threat to humanity, and can be separated from other evils like climate change, or that other issues should take priority. But how can we be so convinced that we'll make the best decisions about the nukes of today, when we've still not learnt our lessons from 1962?
«The real lesson of the Cuban missile crisis–the lesson that is consistently resisted because it marginalizes the value of nuclear weapons–is that nuclear armaments create ht eperils they are deployed to prevent, but are of little use in resolving them.»
«The real lesson of the Cuban missile crisis–the lesson that is consistently resisted because it marginalizes the value of nuclear weapons–is that nuclear armaments create ht eperils they are deployed to prevent, but are of little use in resolving them.»
March 5, 2023
A very good book. Fast-paced and informative. It's about 450 pages long and it goes by pretty quickly. It's interesting to get a more in-depth look at such an important historical event. I would have like to learned a little bit more about how Castro and the Cubans were interpreting events as they unfolded, but they may have been on the periphery during the crisis so it would make sense to have less info about them. There's a random reference to Leanna Wen in the book which is jarring if you know anything about her, considering how much of a lunatic she's been over the past several years (and I say this as a Democrat). Other than that, pretty good book.
December 17, 2020
Fascinating look at this crisis, informed by White House recordings and meeting minutes.
The perspective is much more an investigation of framing, group dynamics, and the role of luck in weathering the crisis, enhancing other examinations of this time. I found the discrepancies between what was noted in meeting minutes vs what was represented after the fact to be especially telling, giving special insight into the tension between military and civilian leaders and the interpersonal dynamics of those involved.
The perspective is much more an investigation of framing, group dynamics, and the role of luck in weathering the crisis, enhancing other examinations of this time. I found the discrepancies between what was noted in meeting minutes vs what was represented after the fact to be especially telling, giving special insight into the tension between military and civilian leaders and the interpersonal dynamics of those involved.
February 15, 2021
This a fantastic book. I am a lover of history and Biography books. I have read 100’s. Having been a young teenager during this time. I knew the crisis was bad, and the world nearly came to end. The details Sherwin revealed and told the frightening history. The world leaders of the USSR and the USA made the right choices. Due to the speed of information today, I don’t believe we could except the same good results. All the more reasons why REASONABLE HUMANS, have to choose disarmament.
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