شذرات فلسفية

by Søren Kierkegaard, سورين كيركجارد, قحطان جاسم (Translator)

يعتبر كتاب شذرات فلسفية، او شذرة فلسفة، الذي صدر عام 1844، بقلم يوهانس كليماكوس ( وهو اسم مستعار ) واحد من الاعمال الفكرية المهمة التي تناول فيها سورن كيرككورد سؤلا جوهريا شغل بال العديد من الفلاسفة واللاهوتيين على مدى العصور ماهي العلاقي بين التاريخي والماورائي بين الانساني والالهي بين المسيح كحقيقة مطلقة لا نهائية وبين كونه انسانا محددا بالشروط الزمنية وبنشاطه الوجودي وبين العقلانية واللامعقول واذا كانت هناك حقا علاقة بينهما والتي تبدو مفارقة فهل يمكن للانسان ان يفهمها بواسطة العقل المخض ام انه بحاجة الى سلطة اعلى منه تعينه على بلوغ تلك المعرفة.

Genres: Philosophy, Religion, Nonfiction, Theology, Classics, Christianity, Danish

183 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1844

About the author

Søren Aabye Kierkegaard was a prolific 19th century Danish philosopher and theologian. Kierkegaard strongly criticised both the Hegelianism of his time and what he saw as the empty formalities of the Church of Denmark. Much of his work deals with religious themes such as faith in God, the institution of the Christian Church, Christian ethics and theology, and the emotions and feelings of individuals when faced with life choices. His early work was written under various pseudonyms who present their own distinctive viewpoints in a complex dialogue.

Kierkegaard left the task of discovering the meaning of his works to the reader, because "the task must be made difficult, for only the difficult inspires the noble-hearted". Scholars have interpreted Kierkegaard variously as an existentialist, neo-orthodoxist, postmodernist, humanist, and individualist.

Crossing the boundaries of philosophy, theology, psychology, and literature, he is an influential figure in contemporary thought.

Reviews

[Nemo · Rating 4 out of 5]

How Do We Know the Truth?

In Plato's Meno, an argument is raised that there is no such thing as a "truth seeker", because if a man knows the truth already, there is no need to seek, and if he doesn't, he can't seek, since he wouldn't recognize it even if he stumbles upon it. Socrates' solution to Meno's paradox is Recollection, i.e., the soul, which is immortal, already possesses knowledge of all things in herself from eternity, and only needs to remember or recollect them in the moment in time. "All learning is but Recollection"

A teacher or an authority cannot benefit an individual in any significant manner, because the teacher can't give, or "teach", the individual anything that he doesn't already possess in his own soul. For this reason, Socrates likens himself to a "midwife" (Theaetetus), who though barren himself yet helps others give birth to knowledge. "It is quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their delivery", but nothing more.

The Moment of Truth

To advance further than Socrates, Kierkegaard (under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus) posits that if the Teacher or the Moment is to have "decisive significance", the individual has to be devoid of Truth prior to the Moment. This state of being devoid or deprived of Truth is Sin or Error.

Firstly, the individual cannot be in possession of the Truth while being unaware of it, since if he can become aware at any moment, the Moment would not have "decisive significance" -- one moment is just as indistinguishable as another and there is no significant difference in the state of the individual before and after the moment.

Secondly, the individual cannot free himself from the state of Sin of his own will, since if he could will it at any moment, the Moment would lose its significance. IOW, for the Moment to have decisive significance, it must be irreversible, so to speak. "Just as one who throws a stone has power over it until he has thrown it, but not afterwards."

Thirdly, there must be a break in the state or the being of the individual. If his being remains the same before and after the Moment, the Moment would not have "decisive significance". This break is the Conversion, passing from non-being to being, the new birth. "Most assuredly, I say to you, unless one is born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God. ... Unless one is born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." (John 3:3,5-6)

Being is the Requisite of Knowing

ZhuangZi, a Taoist philosopher in ancient China (who was born when, half way around the world,  Plato was entering his 60s), posed another interesting challenge in "Happiness of the Fish" (魚之樂 | 鱼之乐). One day when he and HuiZi were out on a stroll, ZhuangZi observed, "The minnows roam where they please. It's the happiness of the fish." HuiZi asked, "You're not a fish, how do you know their happiness?" ZhuangZi replied, "You're not me, so how do you know I don't know their happiness?"

I suppose ZhuangZi "knew" the happiness of the fish because he reasoned thus: The fish were in a state (of freedom) that a man would enjoy if he were in a similar state, therefore the fish must be happy. This would be true only if man and fish share a likeness in their constitution, which is of course not necessarily the case.

Reason (Man) cannot know the Unknown (God), because they are absolutely unlike each other. Reason only knows itself and another based on itself, but nothing more. IOW, man as a self-centered being measures all things by himself. He is the ground and the reference point to which all other things are compared and evaluated. To comprehend means literally to grasp, but how can a finite being grasp the infinite? Like in the parable of blind men and the elephant, reason can only deduce based on its limited vision and experience. The blind men fail to acknowledge let alone prove the existence of the elephant, instead they think that it is some other things because they "grasp" its likeness to those things.

If a man is in a state of Sin, it is impossible for him to know the Truth, because Sin and Truth are absolutely unlike each other. There is no communion between the two, as there is no common ground. To know the Truth, one must partake of the Truth; To know God, one must partake of the nature of God. "For what man knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him? Even so no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might know the things that have been freely given to us by God." (1 Corinthians 2:11-12)

The Love of Equals

Kierkegaard asserts that the most genuine and noble Love must be between equals. It can not be the relationship between master and slave, or pet owner and his pet, or that between pagan Greek gods and their love conquests, e.g., when Zeus transformed himself into a golden shower to impregnate Danae. In those relationships, there is no mutual understanding between the Lover and the Beloved, no reciprocity.

How can there be mutual understanding between God and Man, if they are absolutely unlike each other? This is the mystery of the Incarnation. “The Word of God Himself. He, indeed, assumed humanity that we might become God.” (St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word)

Christ has become the ladder between Heaven and Earth, in Whom and through Whom Man has Communion with God, not merely a sharing of thoughts and emotions, but a sharing of essence. When a man is joined to his wife, they shall become one flesh, "But he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit with Him." (1 Corinthians 6:17)

Faith and the Paradox

There is a "great gulf fixed" between Man and God, between Reason and the Unknown, between time and eternity, human existence and God's eternal essence, mortality and immortality, and yet Christ has become the Conveyor across that gulf. This is the Paradox, and it is offensive to the individual, because it entails a break, a discontinuity of the individual. Similar instances of the paradox exist in love, in birth and in learning. Since in all three cases, the beloved, the begotten and the learner undergo transformations so profound that they receive a new nature in the process. In Love, self-love is annihilated and yet exalted when the person sacrifices his own being for his beloved; In Birth, the transformation is from non-being to being; In learning, old conceptions are destroyed and new ones come into being in their stead.

Just as an individual cannot will himself to be born, so he cannot will himself unto the Truth. This can only be accomplished by God through Faith, a new organ, without which man cannot accept the Paradox, which is beyond the grasp of Reason and immediate sensation and cognition.

"For whoever desires to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for My sake will find it." (Matthew 16:25)

[Justin Evans · Rating 4 out of 5]

Two interesting works, though both require a fairly hefty amount of background knowledge, and a willingness to wade through K's more-Hegel-than-Hegel style, which is... well, it's as bad as Hegel.

Johannes Climacus, the second work here, was written first, and not finished. The point is fairly clear, nonetheless: it's meant to be a practical refutation of the idea that philosophy should 'begin with doubt.' In vulgar historical terms, Descartes decided that that was how philosophy should be done; K is here attacking that vulgar understanding. And fair enough.

As a work of fiction--which is purports to be--JC is a funny portrait of the earnest, alienated young philosopher, who tries to understand what the older philosophers around him are saying. If philosophy begins with doubt, he wonders, what could that mean? Does it mean 'modern philosophy begins from doubt'? But then, if this philosophy is modern, doesn't that suggest that there is something prior to it, and that therefore modern philosophy begins by doubting something in particular (i.e., pre-modern philosophy), and doesn't that mean that philosophy doesn't begin with doubt, but with something else? Perhaps they just mean "some modern philosophers begin with doubt," which is fine, but that's not what they say--they say modern philosophy, not philosophers. And in doing so they seem to suggest that modern philosophy is both a historical event (inasmuch as it's 'modern') and eternal, since modern philosophy is modern inasmuch as it's correct and systematic--but if it's correct and systematic, then it must also be correct for all time and all places. But that can't be, since there just is philosophy that begins with wonder or faith.

Perhaps they really do mean that *all* philosophy begins with doubt? But that would be self-contradictory, since then he, young philosopher, would have to doubt those who say that all should start from doubt, and start from something else instead. Unless just one philosopher could be said to be the origin in some way, so that "a particular philosopher had doubted for all just as Christ suffered for all," so we didn't have to doubt for ourselves anymore? That doesn't seem right. The young philosopher finds only two options here: either he will let someone else have done the doubting for him, in which case he isn't really a philosopher; or he will do the doubting himself, but then has to doubt the doubting--so he is a philosopher, but there is no philosophy, because he can't accept anything as such.

The outcomes are: first, this is a fine parody of Hegelian thought, but also a legitimate example of Hegelian dialectics. Second, philosophers obviously don't begin with doubt, really, but only say they do, and as such are hypocrites. Finally, it's left unclear whether Johannes' thought here is doubting, or not, or philosophy, or not. It seems fairly obvious to me that JC is, in fact, doing philosophy while he wonders about how he can start doing philosophy. But perhaps not.

*

The longer work in this volume is 'Philosophical Fragments,' which, in true Kierkegaardian fashion, aren't read very often, while his 'Conclusion Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments' is one of his best known works (in philosophy departments). PF asks, more or less, what the relationship is between Socratic education (as depicted in Meno and so on) and Christianity, in what Kierkegaard takes to be the good sense. It's an odd book, but essentially K suggests that the story of Christ's incarnation can be told just as coherently as the story of Socratic coming-to-wisdom, with the caveat that the incarnation, Christ, conversion, and Christianity itself are all paradoxical. But that's okay, because at heart the acquisition of knowledge, too, is a paradox: "to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think." If it can already be thought, we are not acquiring knowledge; if we are content to leave anything outside thought, then we are not acquiring that knowledge. Most of the interest here is really theological: what is Christ, what is God, how do people relate to them? It turns out to be harder than you might expect.

I have no idea who, other than me, would find this interesting, but obviously some people do.

[Miloš Lazarević]

Ne mogu objektivno da ocenim ovo što sam pročitao, jer sam imao Ukronijino izdanje. Ukoliko ikada budete čitali Kjerkegorove "Filozofske mrvice", topla preporuka je da se informišete i potražite prevod koji sadrži komentare koji su ovde, kako u samom pogovoru piše, jednim delom neophodni za razumevanje dela, ali iz nekog razloga se u delu ne nalaze. Ako ste se pre susretali s Kjerkegorom i imate neko znanje o pojmovima koje koristi ( strah, drhtanje, skok vere, vitez vere, bolest na smrt, stadijumi i drugi), biće vam svakako jasnije, s tim da je ova knjiga idejno i u smislu postupka jedan pravi galimatijas. Zanimljive ideje ali, van toga, mršavo i malokrvno.

[Jean Ra · Rating 1 out of 5]

Como cada intento de leer algo de teología, Migajas filosóficas se confirma como una larga serie de sofismas, que conforme progresas la lectura se transforma en un galimatías empachoso. En este caso particular Kierkegaard intenta rebatir a la dialéctica de Hegel, aunque claramente habla ya a los creyentes, si no crees en Dios como único origen del mundo y por lo tanto el ser humano como una pieza de su inmensa obra, te pasará como a mí y te sonará a charlatanería rebuscada de lo más vana. Inútil leerlo a día de hoy puesto que sus razonamientos están ya claramente superados y caducos.

[Nicolas Calfas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Vooraleer men zou denken dat ik elk boek van hem een veel te hoge rating geef vanwege mijn uitdrukkelijke bias, laat mij op zijn minst mezelf eens degelijk verantwoorden zonder dat er een ellenlange paragraaf hoeft geciteerd te worden. Volgens mij verdient Filosofische Kruimels eigenlijk 4 sterren, maar de tekst die erna komt (eigenlijk een onafgewerkte tekst uit 1842, 2 jaar voor Filosofische Kruimels verscheen) is de reden waarom ik het 5 sterren geef.

Filosofische Kruimels is op zijn minst een eigenaardig boek van een eigenaardig pseudoniem, Johannes Climacus, de filosoof die zich afvraagt hoe men tot waarheid komt zonder echter zelf ertoe te komen die waarheid voor zichzelf toe te eigenen. Hij varieert continu met de schrijfstijl: een rare mix van dichterlijke vertellingen over een "ongelukkige liefde tussen een koning en een dienstmeisje" (lees: tussen de god en de mens), hardcore filosofische problematieken omtrent bv. de categorieën "wording", "werkelijkheid", "mogelijkheid" en "noodzakelijkheid" (ironisch genoeg luidt de titel van dit hoofdstuk "tussenspel", alsof het hier gaat om een lichtzinnig intermezzo), en zelfs ingebeelde commentaren die een kritische lezer zou kunnen hebben die al bij voorbaat door Johannes weerlegd worden. Hierdoor is het niet zomaar een droog filosofisch traktaat, maar eerder een psychologisch gedachte-experiment in hoeverre een enkeling via begripsbepalingen tot het geloof komen kan - een uitstekend gebruik van de verlokking van de indirecte mededeling. Niet de inhoud van het geloof staat dus centraal (dat is immers de absolute paradox, de God die mens werd, het raakpunt van het eeuwige in het tijdelijke of het historische, iets volstrekt onbegrijpelijk), maar hoe de enkeling geconfronteerd wordt met de paradox (de tegenstelling tussen de gelijktijdige en de latere discipelen is een schijntegenstelling; voor beiden is het al even onbegrijpelijk dat een god zich zou verlagen tot een schamele mens, een dienaar). En dan blijken er twee mogelijkheden te zijn, ergernis of geloof. Net zoals andere boeken van Kierkegaard zorgen de zwierige schrijfstijl en chaotische denksprongen ervoor dat de ergernis niet eerst en vooral plaatsvind tussen het verstand en de paradox, maar eerder in het feit dat een eerste lezing nooit volstaat om enigszins een helder beeld te vormen waarover het boek nu eigenlijk gaat, en zo is het maar een geluk dat een goed geschreven nawoord een en ander verduidelijkt. Ongeacht dit is het boek nog steeds een meesterwerk.

Maar hetgeen mij echt aangesproken heeft is de vertelling over Johannes Climacus zelf, oftewel, "men moet aan alles twijfelen". Hierin wordt de stelling dat de filosofie begint met de twijfel eens in volle ernst genomen en tot zijn radicale consequentie doorgetrokken - tot vertwijfelens toe. Verder wil ik er niet al te veel over kwijt, behalve dat ik deze tekst aan de geïnteresseerden wel eens met plezier doorsturen wil. Ja, want iedereen die toch enigszins de opgave gesteld heeft het denken als levenstaak op zich te nemen, zou eerst eens moeten stilgestaan hebben bij de vraag of het denken zelf ons de verlossing kan bieden. De aanleiding ervan is immers datgene waardoor we begonnen met denken (de twijfel, de vertwijfeling?), maar kan de verlossing dan geschieden door het denken zelf trachten te begrijpen? Niet getreurd echter, de oplossing van deze aporie ligt in uw antwoord, al zij het op Socratische wijze.

[Enrique · Rating 5 out of 5]

Me equivoque con este libro.

Esperaba encontrar una hagiografia de Socrates, una introduccion a la ironia.

Es mucho más.

Comparado con Foucault y el orden del discurso, Foucault es bastante pobre.

Foucault trata forzar lo inesperado por el lado academico: las leyes de Mendel fueron reconocidas porque el cuerpo de la ciencia cambió para poder incluirlas en su "orden del discurso"

Kierkegaard diria: falso.

Lo que Kierkegaard descubre es el poder del instante: una vez que sabes que estás en pecado ya no puedes ignorarlo.

Es lo que Foucault no entiende, su prejucio: el discurso sufre discontinuidades pero estas a la larga serán parte del discurso.

Kierkegaard lo ve más claro: son imposibles de agotar las discontinuidades, una vez ocurren ellas deciden, ellas destruyen, e incluso pueden acabar con el mismo discurso.

Al lado de Kierkegaard, Foucault parece el beato.

Excelente libro.

[Oumar · Rating 3 out of 5]

Je me suis lancé dans le livre sans savoir à quoi m'attendre exactement. Kierkegaard propose d'explorer le paradoxe suivant : comment chercher la connaissance sachant que si on l'a déjà, il n'y a plus rien à chercher et que si on ne l'a pas, on ne sait même pas ce qu'on doit chercher. OK, de quoi m'accrocher! Il explique d'abord que Socrate avait déjà proposé une solution. Selon ce dernier, on ne cherche pas vraiment des connaissances nouvelles, on ne ferait que se souvenir de ce qu'on a toujours su et qu'on a en quelque sorte oublié. Le rôle du maître est donc d'aider le disciple à faire ce travail de rappel, à la manière d'une sage-femme qui aide à accoucher. Le point de départ du livre est : est-ce qu'il pourrait y avoir une autre solution qui permet de se passer de cette histoire de connaissance éternelle et de rappel? Autrement dit, dans laquelle le disciple est vraiment ignorant et le maître vraiment une source de connaissance. Kierkegaard conclut que si c'est le cas, il doit y avoir un instant "décisif" lors duquel le disciple fait acte de foi et que le maître se révèlera être nul autre que Dieu! Ça c'est pour le premier chapitre qui est assez clair.

Pour la suite, je dois dire que j'ai rien compris. Ce livre est le plus souvent cryptique et impénétrable. Je me suis aussi rendu compte assez vite que je n'ai pas le background nécessaire pour l'apprécier, autant que ce soit possible. Il semble qu'il faut une base très solide en philosophie et en culture religieuse pour s'attaquer à ça...

Ça n'a par contre pas été une pure perte de passer à travers (en lisant en diagonale à la fin). Kierkegaard écrit dans un style bizarre et ironique qu'on voit rarement dans ce genre d'oeuvre. Ça commence dès la préface, dans laquelle il présente son livre comme une simple brochure sans prétention. Des piques du genre sont souvent adressées au lecteur ce qui a le mérite de rendre parfois agréable cette lecture aride. 

Et il y a aussi de beaux passages pris indépendamment, comme celui-ci : 

[...] il ne faut pas penser de mal du paradoxe ; car le paradoxe est la passion de la pensée, et le penseur sans paradoxe est comme l’amant sans passion : un médiocre partenaire. Mais le paroxysme de toute passion est toujours de vouloir sa propre ruine, et c’est aussi la plus haute passion de l’intelligence de vouloir le choc, nonobstant que ce choc, d’une manière ou d’une autre, doive être sa propre ruine. C’est alors le plus haut paradoxe de la pensée que de vouloir découvrir quelque chose qu’elle-même ne peut penser.

Un autre :

Supposons qu’un enfant ait reçu en cadeau un peu d’argent ; il peut, avec cet argent, acheter ou bien un bon livre ou bien un jouet du même prix ; or il a acheté le jouet, peut-il dès lors pour le même argent s’acheter le livre ? Naturellement pas, car l’argent est déjà dépensé. Mais peut-être peut-il aller chez le libraire et lui demander d’échanger le jouet contre le livre. Supposons que le libraire réponde : « Mon cher enfant, ton jouet n’a plus aucune valeur ; il est bien vrai que quand tu avais l’argent tu aurais aussi bien pu acheter le livre que le jouet, mais il y a ceci de particulier avec un jouet qu’une fois acheté, il perd toute valeur. » L’enfant ne pensera-t-il pas que c’est pourtant curieux ? Et de même, il y a eu aussi un temps où, pour le même prix, l’homme pouvait acheter la liberté ou la non-liberté et ce prix était le libre choix de l’âme et l’abandon dans le choix. Alors, il choisit la non-liberté ; mais si, maintenant, il venait demander au dieu s’il ne pourrait pas la lui échanger, il obtiendrait sans doute pour réponse : il y a eu un moment, c’est indéniable, où tu aurais pu acheter ce que tu voulais, mais il en va étrangement avec la non-liberté : une fois achetée elle n’a plus aucune valeur, bien qu’on la paie tout aussi cher. Ne croyez-vous pas que cet homme dirait : c’est pourtant curieux ! [...] « Ni l’impie ni l’homme vertueux n’ont de pouvoir sur leur conduite morale, mais ils avaient, au commencement, le pouvoir de devenir l’un ou l’autre, comme celui qui jette une pierre a pouvoir sur elle avant de la jeter, mais plus après. » (Aristote). Autrement, l’acte de jeter serait une illusion, et celui qui jette la pierre la garderait toujours en main malgré tous ses efforts, puisque, comme « la flèche volante » des sceptiques, elle ne bougerait pas.

[Burak Candan · Rating 5 out of 5]

İlk varoluşçu filozof ve teolog Søren Kierkegaard'ın Johannes Climacus mahlası altında yazdığı Felsefe Parçaları, Sokratik öğretinin ve akılla ölçülebilir olanın ötesine geçmeye çalışan, kişinin iradesinin tecil ettiği an'ın ve ebedi hakikatin peşinde giden bir felsefeyi içeriyor.

Kierkegaard, Platon'un Meno adlı Sokratik diyaloğunda geçen bir paradosktan; 'bir kişinin bildiği şeyi de bilmediği şeyi de arayamayacağı, zira biliyorsa aramasına gerek olmadığı, bilmiyorsa da ne aradığını bilemeyeceği' paradoksundan yola çıkıyor. Buradan hareketle Sokrates, hakikatin kişide halihazırda mevcut olduğu ve bu hakikatin ancak 'anımsama' (recollection) yoluyla edinilebileceği, dolayısıyla kimsenin kimseye halihazırda sahip olduğu bir şeyi öğretemeyeceği, yalnızca 'hatırlatabileceği' (kendisinin de bir hatırlatıcıdan ötesi olmadığı) sonucuna ulaşıyor.

Bir başka deyişle kişi aslında sahip olduğu fakat varlığından bihaber olduğu bir hakikatin yoksunluğu içerisinde bulunuyor. Bu hakikatten yoksun olma halini 'günah' olarak tanımlıyor Kierkegaard. Fakat kişi aynı zamanda 'bilinç-dışı' bir şekilde, yani mutlak bir cehaletle bu durumda bulunuyor. Yani Kierkegaard'a göre kişi farkında olmadan özgür iradesiyle kendini 'esaretlerin en büyüğü' denilebilecek bir duruma sokuyor. İşte kişinin kendine biçtiği böyle bir durumda bir 'irade' söz konusu olduğundan Kierkegaard Sokrates'in 'hatırlatma' fikrine karşı çıkıyor. Bunu iki farklı şekilde açıklıyor Kierkegaard: Birinci olarak, aklın sınırlarının ötesinde bulunan tanrısal bilginin salt eğitim yoluyla öğretilemeyeceği; ikinci olarak ise, böyle bir kişinin -hakikate ulaşmadan evvel- önce kendi kusurunun sebep olduğu bu yoksunluğunu keşfetmesi gerekeceği. Fakat Kierkegaard'a göre bu keşfin yapılabilmesi için aynı zamanda bir 'koşulun' (soru sorabilme/arayabilme yetisi) varlığı da gerekiyor. Ayrıca bu koşulun da -hakikat gibi- kişide (öğrencide) önceden mevcut olması gerekiyor. (Aksi taktirde bunun insani olmayan, çelişkili bir durum olacağını ekliyor Kierkegaard.) Böylece, öğretmenin sırf bir 'vesile' olarak bu koşulu hatırlatmaktan öte bir görevinin olmadığı, iradi bir mesele ortaya çıkıyor.

Daha sonra buradaki 'öğretmen' kavramını açımlıyor Kierkegaard. Kişiyi hakikate ulaştıracak koşulu bir öğretmen hatırlatacağı için, kişide zaten var olan bu koşulu ise kişiye ne kendisi, ne de başka bir insan veremeyeceği için öğretmenin ancak 'Tanrı' olabileceği sonucuna ulaşıyor. Kierkegaard, bu Tanrı'yı -Hristiyanlık öğretisini temel alarak- insanda cisimleşmiş olan Tanrı ile, yani 'Tanrı-İsa' ile açıklıyor. (Bunun İslam tasavvufundaki 'vahdet-i vücud' kavramıyla benzerlik taşıdığını görüyoruz.) Yani Kierkegaard içkin bir Tanrı kavramından, insanın içindeki Tanrısal taraftan bahsediyor. Dolayısıyla kişinin ancak içindeki Tanrısal tarafa yönelmesiyle, (paradoksu/kaosu kabullenmesiyle) yani ancak 'imanla' hakikati elde edebileceğini söylüyor. Böylece Sokratik genelekte bir önemi olmayan, Kierkegaard felsefesinde ise (varoluşçu felsefe) çok önemli olan 'An'ın belirleyici önemi' anlam kazanıyor. Zira bilmemekten bilmeye bir geçişin ve tam bir dönüşümün/yeniden doğuşun yaşandığı, öncesi ve sonrası farklı böyle bir 'an' belirleyici hale geliyor. Bunu, 'bir taş atan kişinin taşı atana kadar onun üzerinde bir hakimiyetinin olması fakat attıktan sonra olmaması' örneğiyle açıklıyor Kierkegaard.

Öte yandan, sanılanın aksine inancın aktarımında tarihselliğin ya da çağdaşlığın bir avantajının olmadığını, örnek alınan kişinin ya da ikna söylemlerinin de hiçbir önemi olamayacağını, yani iman söz konusu olduğunda an'a dayalı, iradi ve kişisel olanın dışındaki her şeyin gerçek imanı elde etmek adına geçersiz olduğunu söylüyor Kierkegaard. Böylece inancın bireyselliğiyle 'geleneksel din' anlayışını kökünden sarsıyor.

**

Kierkegaard eserinde Sokratik bir metod izleyerek imanın mantıksal açıklamasını yapmaya çalışmıyor. Zira böyle bir şeyin aptalca bir çabadan öteye geçmeyeceğini defalarca yinelediğini görüyoruz. Bilakis, kendini olabildiğince akılsal olanın dışında konumlandırarak, paradoksun (Kierkegaard için Tanrı/paradoks/kaos kavramları aynı şeyi ifade ediyor) alanında hareket etmeye çalışıyor. Siyahın beyazdan, doğrunun yanlıştan tamamen farklı olması gibi, paradoks ve iman kavramlarının da akılsal olandan öyle farklı olduğunu anlatmaya çalışıyor.

[Ehab mohamed · Rating 4 out of 5]

هذه خاطرة خطرت لي من وحي الكتاب ورسخت في ذهني بعد فترة طويلة من قراءته فآثرت أن اثبتها هنا، وهي مجرد خواطر، والله أعلى وأعلم.




ليس هناك بحث (مطلق) عن (حقيقة) مطلقة بل بحثك عن الحقيقة يقتضي معرفتك بها سلفا، لكي تصل إليها، فأنت تبدأ رحلتك في البحث محملا بمعرفة ما يجب أن تعثر عليه أو لا تعثر عليه، فإن كنت محملا بالعدم ستصل للعدم دون أن تنطلق، وإن كنت محملا بمعرفة إيجابية - ذاتية أو من الغير - فإنك قد تصل وقد لا تصل وهذا لا يعنى عدم (الحقيقة) بل يعني (عدم) قدرتك على الوصول إليها.

قد تبدو الجملة غريبة ولكن فلنحللها ونحلل معانيها ليتضح لنا صحتها من خطأها.

البحث عن شيء لا يكون إلا عن معرفة بهذا الشيء، إذ كيف ستبحث وتعثر على ما لا تعرفه سلفا؟!، فمن انطلق من العدم وصل للعدم، ومن انطلق من المعرفة والوجود وصل إلى المعروف والموجود.

إذا كنت لا تعرف (الحقيقة) وعلاماتها وقرائنها التي تدل على أنها هي هي فكيف ستجدها؟!، إذا لكي تجدها فلا بد من معرفة سابقة بها تدلك على أنها هي هي.

وبالتالي يكون البحث ليس عن (الحقيقة) ولكن عن (الطريق إلى الحقيقة)

فعندما تشرع في البحث عن (كتاب) مثلا، فإما أن يكون هذا الكتاب كان بحوزتك يوما وفقدته وبالتالي فإن بحثك ليس عن ماهيته وحقيقته فهو معروف لك سلفا بل تبحث عن الطريق إليه، فحقيقته وماهيته معروفة سلفا لك.

وإما ستنطلق في البحث عنه نتيجة تعريف شخص آخر لك، بمعنى أن شخص آخر عرفه عن امتلاك فسيقول لك أن (الكتاب) حقيقته كذا وماهيته كذا وصفته كذا وإذا عثرت على ما ماهيته كذا وصفته كذا فإنك ستكون قد عثرت لا على حقيقته وماهيته ،فهذا معلوم لك سابقا، وإنما عثرت على الطريق إليه، وبذلك تكون انتقلت من المعرفة إلى المعروف، إذ أن الانتقال من العدم لن ينقلك سوى للعدم، فأولا يجب أن تعرف ما هو (الشيء) لتبحث عنه.

وبالتالي من يزعم أنه يبحث عن (الحقيقة) المطلقة، فلابد أن يكون عارفا بها سواء بامتلاك ذاتي سابق لها، أو بتعريف آخرين لها قد عرفوها معرفة مباشرة، ولا يمكنه الانطلاق إلا بزاد ومعرفة توصله للمعروف.

فلا يوجد انطلاق من نقطة الصفر، بل يجب ان تكون محملا بمعرفة ما تبحث عنه.

ولكن ماذا لو أنه ليس هناك حقيقة أصلا، فهذا سيعني أن أي انطلاق سيؤدي إلى اللا حقيقة وإلى (عدم) العثور عليها.


ولكن في هذه الحالة أيضا، فلا بد لكي تبحث، سواء ما تبحث عنه موجود حقيقة أو غير موجود، أن يكون لك تصور عام عن هذا الذي تبحث عنه لكي تجده أو لا تجده، فكما قلنا الانطلاق من العدم للبحث سيصل بنا قبل أن نتحرك أو نخطو خطوة إلى العدم.


إذا لا بد من تصور عام (معرفة عامة) قبل الانطلاق في عملية البحث التي قد تكلل او لا تكلل بالنجاح.

وقد يقول البعض: إذا قد لا يكون هناك وجود للحقيقة إذ ليس كل ما نتصوره نجده.

كلام وجيه، ولكن لا بد لكل ما (نتصوره) ان يكون مأخوذا عن أصل، فالصورة لا تنسخ من العدم، فصورة العدم عدم، أمأ أي تصور آخر وإن كان مشوها فهو على الأقل لا بد أن يدخل حيز الإمكان، إذا (الحقيقة) المطلقة كتصور لا بد أن تكون موجودة، وتصوراتنا حولها تختلف من شخص لآخر، وتختلف قدرة كل شخص على إيجادها اعتمادا على التصور المسبق الذي يحمله، فإذا كان تصورك للحقيقة المطلقة أنها عدم فقد أعلنت مسبقا أنك حصلت على حقيقتك وهي العدم دون أن تتحرك من مكانك، وإنما يفعل ذلك المستسهلون فيقولون: لن نجد شيئا لأنه ليس موجود ولو بحثنا لن نجده لأنه ليس موجود، إذا فقد انطلقت من تصور مسبق لتحصل عليه، فأنت كغيرك انتقلت من المعرفة إلى المعروف، انطلقت من اللاشيء إلى اللاشيء

وآخرون لهم تصور إيجابي، وكما قلنا هذا التصور مبني إما على معرفة ذاتية تؤهلك للبحث عن المعروف، أو بتعريف من الغير.

والسؤال يبقى: ما لم نكن نمتلك نحن بأنفسنا الحقيقة سابقا ثم فقدناها وشرعنا في البحث عنها انطلاقا من معرفة ذاتية لنجدها، فما الذي يجعلنا متأكدين من أن تعريف (الغير) لها تعريف صحيح يصل بنا إلى مطلوب حقيقي موجود؟!

هنا لا بد من أن يكون للحقيقة علامة مميزة بذاتها تنطق بأنها هي الحقيقة بعيدة عن تعريف الآخرين، ولكن لو انها ناطقة بذاتها ودالة على نفسها فلا جدوى من تعريفات (الآخرين) بل يكفي أن تعرف أنها موجودة ودالة على ذاتها لتجدها.

ولكن كيف ستعرف أنها موجودة ودالة على ذاتها؟!

في هذه الحال لا نملك سوى (الإيمان) بأن الحقيقة كذا لكي نجدها.

إذا كل من يبحثون عن (الحقيقة المطلقة) ينطلقون من مسلمات (إيمانية) قبلية تعرفهم ما يبحثون عنه، ولا يمكن الانطلاق من العدم إلا إذا كنت (مؤمنا) سلفا بأنه ليس هناك سوى العدم ولن تصل إلا إلى العدم.


إذا يبقى أن نقول أنه لا وجود سوى لمؤمنين (علما بأن المؤمنين هنا تشير إلى كل من زعم امتلاكه للحقيقة المطلقة مؤمنا بالله كان، أم مؤمنا بوحدة الوجود، أو بالعدم، أو مؤمنا بالمادة!) ولا أدريين لا ينكرون الحقيقة ولكن عندما تساوت لديهم الأدلة (الطرق)، لم يختاروا الخطوة التالية ألا وهي (القفزة الإيمانية) فهم لا ينكرون الحقيقة ولكن ينكرون (قدرتهم) على التوصل للحقيقة التي حتما تتطلب (إيمان) ولكن إيمان عن إيمان يفرق!

[Matthew · Rating 1 out of 5]

As part of an undergraduate degree in philosophy, I was required to complete a course in 19th/20th century philosophy. Knowing nothing of the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, I chose to spend a semester immersed in his major works. To say that this was a mistake would be the height of understatement.

Kierkegaard's writings (all of them as far as I could tell) are gibberish, wrapped in a cloak of supernaturalism, wrapped in a cloak of gibberish. I strained for hours with single sentences, attempting to pull some fragment of meaning from the twisted language. I kid you not that some sentences would be worded as follows (readers of Kierkegaard will immediately recognize the truth of this characterization):

'Being is not a relation; Being is the relation of itself to itself in the relating. The relation of itself to itself is the foundation of despair, which the self discovers in becoming.'

What a load. Even if I dressed up in all black, wore a beret, and hung out at a coffee shop all day reading beatnik poetry, I couldn't match this type of pseudo-intellectual tripe. Kierkegaard is the ultimate coffee shop poseur, and his writings belong with the writings of all those many be-turtlenecked college freshman - in the wastebasket of history.

[Ugnė · Rating 5 out of 5]

Iš visos knygos supratau tik tiek, kad svarbiausia yra apsisprendimo akimirka. Ir to vieno supratimo man visiškai užtenka.

[Sajid · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ahhh,Kierkegaard! You genius!

Kierkegaard begins here what he beings to completion in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, namely, the subjective approach to knowledge acquisition. Johannes Climacus is the author of the Fragments and the Postscript, as well as the posthumous Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est.For Kierkegaard, the pseudonym Johannes Climacus represents the subjective approach to knowledge, though this Climacus is not a believer. The ladder is not then the ascent to God but is meant to call to mind an ascending series of logical plateaus, where the logician, represented particularly by Descartes and Hegel, proceeds from one premise to the next. Johannes rejects this method in spiritual matters, thinking it ridiculous to approach the Absolute in any way except through faith. He is concerned with subjective knowledge and with the leap. Objective knowledge, which is the avowed goal of rational philosophers, is impossible to appropriate by subjective creatures. Moreover, Kierkegaard was concerned with knowledge that would encourage the soul to turn to God. But Johannes claims not to be a Christian, since he has not yet reached that knowledge of God. The rigorous ascent to God toward impassibility has been replaced by the very passionate and subjective approach to truth whereby the believer, by virtue of the absurd, finds himself before Christ.

Kierkegaard, like Plato, though using different methods and conclusions, sought to ground knowledge in the ineffability of subjectivity. For Plato, knowledge comes subjectively (internally); for Kierkegaard, it comes by God's grace through faith. Socrates becomes the facilitator for the slave in the Meno, as does God for the man of faith. Again, Kierkegaard is also concerned with passion. "...the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion; a mediocre fellow" (p. 37). The paradox is necessitated by the metaphysical nature of the inquiry. Only knowledge through faith can approach the paradox since it is by definition beyond our knowledge. Passion must accompany the leap of faith, since knowledge acquisition for the man of faith is guided by God. Philosophical Fragments reflects Kierkegaard's intense interest in epistemology and Plato's theory of recollection, as well as his distaste for apologetics. It would seem to be a work close to his heart since he lists himself as editor, and had listed himself as author in earlier drafts.

Under the subtitle of the work—a Fragment of Philosophy—there is a sub-subtitle: "Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?”This directs the entire study, in that it is practical as well as theoretical. In the preface Kierkegaard calls this work a pamphlet "without any claim to being a part of the scientific-scholarly endeavor in which one acquires legitimacy..." (p. 5). This is evident in the title. Smuler means fragments or scraps. Kierkegaard is not endeavoring to write anything like a treatise, much less form a system like Hegel. This is understandable because he simply presupposes several of his points.

“Immediacy is reality; language is ideality; consciousness is contradiction. The moment I make a statement about reality, contradiction is present, for what I say is ideality.The possibility of doubt, then, lies in consciousness, whose nature is a contradiction that is produced by a duplexity and that itself produces a duplexity.”

[Lauren Collins · Rating 3 out of 5]

Philosophical Fragments: Johannes thinks about what would be required for teaching/learning to occur in a “significant moment,” where the teacher’s relevance never fades. It would require original sin as incapacity to grasp the truth—truth can only be received through the encounter with the god who you ever rely on for your ability to receive the gift. There’s also a long discussion about how a puzzlingly eternal truth made an historical event, such as the event of Jesus Christ, means that everyone in history relates to him and his message equally—whether a contemporary or a person of faith in 2000 AD. The final part ties in some stuff about the three parts of consciousness in Johannes Climicus that I don’t understand. But the essence of it describes faith as a happy passion that drives the understanding to almost destroy itself in the paradox of a God-man.

Johannes Climicus: Esoteric ramblings related to Hegelian philosophy—I do not understand. Johannes tries to figure out what it would mean for philosophy to begin in doubt but keeps meeting dead ends.

So relieved to be done with this after five months of suffering! Maybe one day I will return with greater wisdom and knowledge and give it more stars.

[Micaela Hardyman · Rating 2 out of 5]

In truth, I don’t think I understood 80% of this. What I did wrap my head around seemed sometimes far-fetched and, most of the time, relatively unimportant to examine. To be fair, though, this collection was intended to mostly be Kierkegaard’s “philosophical ramblings,” and so I’ll be interested to see how I like some of his more fleshed out (and popular) works.

[Oscar · Rating 4 out of 5]

Filosofische kruimels 8.2/10

Johannes Climacus 8.5/10

[jeremiah]

From 2014: This pertains to Fragments (or "Crumbs" [Smuler], as it should have been translated), as I haven't read Johannes Climacus yet.

I found this to be an exciting text. Here Kierkegaard, under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, articulates important thoughts regarding his own project of indirect communication fairly early in his career (1844). Climacus writes that Socrates "was and continued to be a midwife, not because he 'did not have the positive,' but because he perceived that this relation is the highest relation a human being can have to another" (10). Similarly, the talk of teacher and learner is reminiscent of his project of indirect communication; as he says in his lecture on indirect communication in his journal, "an 'I' to an 'I.'" There's much more to this text than the insinuation of the method. Climacus's discussion orients the reader so as to conceive of faith as in terms of paradoxes and leaps. What I find most fascinating (and baffling) about "Crumbs" is its relation to The Concept of Anxiety, published a few short days later. Both texts are preoccupied with the way in which eternity intersects with time; Crumbs with the appearance of Jesus Christ ("the god") in time, and Anxiety with the way in which we actualize our possibility to sin in time. Both texts present the formulation of "the moment" (øieblikket) as to explain these ideas, not sure whether it solves anything. Also, I recently discovered that Kierkegaard slapped the Climacus pseudonym on this text soon before publication, which suggests that this "aesthetic" text was not conceived as such.

[Alexander · Rating 4 out of 5]

What a weird, insightful book. It proceeds as a kind of hypothetical argument -- what if Socrates is not enough? what if philosophy is not enough? what if man cannot find truth on his own? what if man requires the condition of truth from another? -- and develops an intriguing sort of hypothetical dialectical conception of Christianity on that basis. I suspect it is more brilliant than I realize; I need to spend much more time with it. I give it four stars rather than five only because one must evaluate Kierkegaard both for his style (which is tied with Plato and Nietzsche as the most excellent within the philosophical canon) and in terms of style the Fragments are very uncertain and hesitant. SK does not seem to have worked out his voice for the pseudonymous author of this work; Climacus emerges as a real personality only in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This is confirmed by the fact that SK didn't assign it a pseudonym until the last minute, suggesting that instead he was intent on the philosophical problem -- ironically, losing a degree of articulateness. So even though the treatment of "the teacher" and the incarnation are extremely interesting and intriguing, I give the work only four stars.

[Barış Çeviker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sağ gösterip sol vuran bir yazım tarzı... Yazımın en sıkıcılaşıp durağanlıştığı yerde en radikal beklenmedik cümlelerin çıka gelmesi. En sert fikrin en görünmez noktada olması yüzünden 'acaba ne kaçırdım' kaygısıyla hep geri dönüp dönüp okuduğum bir kitap.
Bu kitaba sonsöz yazarım belki ileride bir zaman diyerek bitiriyor bu kitabı ve "Felsefe Parçalarına Bilimsel Olmayan Sonsöz" isimli kitabı daha sonra bu kitabın sonsözü niteliğinde yayınlıyor, -ki orjinal kitabın 6 katı uzunlukta-.

Kitabı öğretici olmaktan çok kışkırtıcı, düşündürücü ve ilham verici buldum. Uzundur niyetli olduğum halde ancak başladığım Kierkegaard okumalarına devam edeceğim...

[Ali Reda · Rating 2 out of 5]

The Paradox Of Reason

The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think. This passion is at bottom present in all thinking, even in the thinking of the individual, in so far as in thinking he participates in something transcending himself. But habit dulls our sensibilities, and prevents us from perceiving it.

I cannot know it, for in order to know it I would have to know god, and the nature of the difference between god and man; and this I cannot know, because the Reason has reduced it to likeness with that from which it was unlike. Thus god becomes the most terrible of deceivers, because the Reason has deceived itself. The Reason has brought god as near as possible, and yet he is as far away as ever.

The idea of demonstrating that this unknown something (the God) exists, could scarcely suggest itself to the Reason. For if the God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it; and if he does exist it would be folly to attempt it.

The paradoxical passion of the Reason thus comes repeatedly into collision with this Unknown, which does indeed exist, but is unknown, and in so far does not exist. The Reason cannot advance beyond this point, and yet it cannot refrain in its paradoxicalness from arriving at this limit and occupying itself therewith. It will not serve to dismiss its relation to it simply by asserting that the Unknown does not exist, since this itself involves a relationship. But what then is the Unknown, since the designation of it as the God merely signifies for us that it is unknown? To say that it is the Unknown because it cannot be known, and even if it were capable of being known, it could not be expressed, does not satisfy the demands of passion, though it correctly interprets the Unknown as a limit; but a limit is precisely a torment for passion, though it also serves as an incitement. And yet the Reason can come no further.

The Weaknesses of the Teleological Argument

If it were proposed to prove Napoleon’s existence from Napoleon’s deeds, would it not be a most curious proceeding? His existence does indeed explain his deeds, but the deeds do not prove his existence, unless I have already understood the word "his" so as thereby to have assumed his existence. But Napoleon is only an individual, and in so far there exists no absolute relationship between him and his deeds; some other person might have performed the same deeds. Perhaps this is the reason why I cannot pass from the deeds to existence. If I call these deeds the deeds of Napoleon the proof becomes superfluous, since I have already named him; if I ignore this, I can never prove from the deeds that they are Napoleon’s, but only in a purely ideal manner that such deeds are the deeds of a great general, and so forth.

The works of God are such that only God can perform them. Just so, but where then are the works of the God? The works from which I would deduce his existence are not directly and immediately given. The wisdom in nature, the goodness, the wisdom in the governance of the world -- are all these manifest, perhaps, upon the very face of things? Are we not here confronted with the most terrible temptations to doubt, and is it not impossible finally to dispose of all these doubts? But from such an order of things I will surely not attempt to prove God's existence; and even if I began I would never finish, and would in addition have to live constantly in suspense, lest something so terrible should suddenly happen that my bit of proof would be demolished.

Reason for the Christian God's Manifestation in Human Form

Will you deny the consistency of our exposition: that the Reason, in attempting to determine the Unknown as the unlike, at last goes astray, and confounds the unlike with the like? From this there would seem to follow the further consequence, that if man is to receive any true knowledge about the Unknown (the God) he must be made to know that it is unlike him, absolutely unlike him. This knowledge the Reason cannot possibly obtain of itself; we have already seen that this would be a self-contradiction. It will therefore have to obtain this knowledge from the God. But even if it obtains such knowledge it cannot understand it, and thus is quite unable to possess such knowledge. For how should the Reason be able to understand what is absolutely different from itself? If this is not immediately evident, it will become clearer in the light of the consequences; for if the God is absolutely unlike man, then man is absolutely unlike the God; but how could the Reason be expected to understand this? Here we seem to be confronted with a paradox.

In order to be man’s Teacher, the God proposed to make himself like the individual man, so that he might understand him fully. Thus our paradox is rendered still more appalling, or the same paradox has the double aspect which proclaims it as the Absolute Paradox; negatively by revealing the absolute unlikeness of sin, positively by proposing to do away with the absolute unlikeness in absolute likeness.

Faith is a miracle from God

However, the outward figure is not important in the sense that he would cease to be a believer if he happened to meet the Teacher some day on the street and did not at once recognize him or even walked some distance with him on the way without realizing that it was he. The God gave to the disciple the condition that enables him to see him, opening for him the eyes of Faith. But it was a terrible thing to see this outward figure, to have converse with him as with one of us, and every moment that Faith was not present to see only the servant-form. When the Teacher is gone from the disciple in death, memory may bring his figure before him; but it is not on this account that the disciple believes, but because he received the condition from the God, and hence is enabled again to see, in memory s trustworthy mage, the person of the God. So it is with the disciple, who knows that he would have seen nothing without the condition, since the first thing he learned to understand was that he was in Error.

But in that case is not Faith as paradoxical as the Paradox? Precisely so; how else could it have the Paradox for its object, and be happy in its relation to the Paradox? Faith is itself a miracle, and all that holds true of the Paradox also holds true of Faith.

The disciple at second hand problem

Let us assume that it is otherwise, that the contemporary generation of disciples had received the condition from the God, and that the subsequent generations were to receive it from these contemporaries -- what would follow? We shall not distract the attention by reflecting upon the historical pusillanimity with which the contemporary accounts would presumably be sought after, as if everything depended on that, thus introducing a new contradiction and a new confusion (for if we once begin in this manner, the confusions will be inexhaustible). No, if the contemporary disciple gives the condition to the successor, the latter will come to believe in him. He receives the condition from him, and thus the contemporary becomes the object of Faith for the successor; for whoever gives the individual this condition is eo ipso (cf. the preceding) the object of Faith, and the God.

What then can a contemporary do for a successor? (a) He can inform him that he has himself believed this fact, which is not in the strict sense a communication (as expressed in the absence of any immediate contemporaneity, and in the circumstance that the fact is based upon a contradiction), but merely affords an occasion. For when I say that this or that has happened, I make an historical communication; but when I say: "I believe and have believed that so-and-so has taken place, although it is a folly to the understanding and an offense to the human heart," then I have simultaneously done everything in my power to prevent anyone else from determining his own attitude in immediate continuity with mine, asking to be excused from all companionship, since every individual is compelled to make up his own mind in precisely the same manner. (b) In this form he can relate the content of the fact. But this content exists only for Faith, in the same sense that colors exist only for sight and sounds for hearing. In this form, then, the content can be related; in any other form he merely indulges in empty words, perhaps misleading the successor to determine himself in continuity with the inanity.

Only one who receives the condition from the God is a believer. (This corresponds exactly to the requirement that man must renounce his reason, and on the other hand discloses the only form of authority that corresponds to Faith.) If anyone proposes to believe, i.e., imagines himself to believe, because many good and upright people living here on the hill have believed, i.e., have said that they believed, then he is a fool, and it is essentially indifferent whether he believes on account of his own and perhaps a widely held opinion about what good and upright people believe, or believes a Münchausen. If the credibility of a contemporary is to have any interest for him -- and alas! one may be sure that this will create a tremendous sensation, and give occasion for the writing of folios; for this counterfeit earnestness, which asks whether so-and-so is trustworthy instead of whether the inquirer himself has faith, is an excellent mask for spiritual indolence, and for town gossip on a European scale -- if the credibility of such a witness is to have any significance it must be with respect to the historical fact. But what historical fact? The historical fact which can become an object only for Faith, and which one human being cannot communicate to another.

If we wish to express the relation subsisting between a contemporary and his successor in the briefest possible compass, but without sacrificing accuracy to brevity, we may say: The successor believes by means of (this expresses the occasional) the testimony of the contemporary, and in virtue of the condition he himself receives from the God.

[Gastjäle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Here I am, again. Seduced by the preternatural (and most definitely irrational) allure of Søren Kierkegaard. Once again, the threadbare statement that needs to be said again and again: I don't identify myself as a Christian, nor do I think that Kierkegaard's writings really hold water – how could they, with his inability to state things clearly, and his predilection for pseudonyms (which entails stylistic shifts)!

K's logic (or that of Johannes Climacus, I can never be sure, and hence I will attribute everything to Kierkegaard with due caution) can be strange at times. Firstly, he's willing to negate the idea of an omnipotent God by stating that he must stick by his decision (to become flesh) – now, perhaps it could be a poetic trick, but it seems like a fairly major cock-up from the part of a pious Christian. (Or perhaps it's just poetic licence like the time when he postulated that Love must be the main motivation for God because... it just is.) Secondly, K states that immediate sensations and knowledge cannot lead one astray – well, I don't know what to say to that! I mean, sensations don't exactly give you much information if you don't codify them with concepts, so in that case it could be true – but what about hallucinations? Also, I have no idea what K means by immediate knowledge, but I'm fairly certain it can lead you astray. Thirdly, I think it's simply shallow wordplay to compare "being born" and "being born again" in terms of being able to remember the past life – is K trying to suggest that you cannot be a proper, born-again Christian if you can remember what it was like to live in sin / the untruth? Fourthly, though his reverence towards Socrates is somewhat inspiring, I can't help wondering why he leaves Plato completely in the background and suggests that Socrates acted as a mere midwife, when he was the one voicing Plato's idealistic theories and other confusing things. Lastly, K's way of criticising himself and answering it at the same go is really half-arsed: you can't criticise someone for plagiarism if you can't directly mention who is being plagiarised?

Just to name a couple. Kierkegaard also had some very intriguing ideas, like depriving even the immediate eyewitnesses of the Christ of their advantage in terms of faith, which must be very encouraging for actual believers. Not to mention the way he placed himself beside the great philosophical tradition regarding Truth in his own, humble and contrarian-ish way.

However, the main merit of this book is the way it made me read it and the way I would process the information subsequently.

Usually, when I read the writings of great minds and authors, I find it the most helpful to adapt to their way of thinking, thus absorbing their message more effortlessly, allowing me to process the crux of it later on. Of course, difficult questions and difficult writing require instant meditation, but this is how I tend to roll. However, the downside to this is that I probably leave out some important bits in the process, and it may be more difficult for me to form a proper opinion of my own about it if I simply try to acclimatise myself to the author's mindset.

With K, however, I never relented or let myself be fully receptive to his ideas: it's not because I think he's a shabby pen-pusher or simply wrong when it comes to the fundamental issues of philosophy and life, but... you know, it's a very interesting question. Perhaps I wanted to pay a proper tribute to Kierkegaard by standing my ground? Or perchance I wished to find a proper balance between receptiveness, criticalness, respect, frivolity, and purely theoretical investigation? Or peradventure I finally dared to cast aside the doubt of having to verify my conclusions with someone (whoever that may be: the translator, some eminent scholar, or perhaps K himself!)? Whatever the reason, I could feel its effect: this effect was a forceful confidence booster, part of which I wish to credit to Kierkegaard – a man, who was careful to defend his miniature castle to the last, and who was not afraid to challenge giants like Hegel and the Organised Religion while still retaining his peculiar, polemical and humorous style.

Perhaps I still continue reading Kierkegaard's books because of his penchant for paradox (after all, what is confidence but a big paradox – trusting in oneself in the face of the future by basing the trust on experience). Or perhaps I sense something deeply individual behind the lines. A sense of absolute conviction and wisdom, which I wish to attain only to cast it aside, just like how any true disciple of Zarathustra would be the first to shove him down from the roof.

[Hulda Gilca]

“Iar acum clipa. O asemenea clipa își are propria-i natura. Sigur ca este scurta si vremelnică asemeni clipei trecătoare cum e si clipa, trecută- precum clipa-n clipa următoare, si totuși e hotărâtoare, si totuși e plină de vesnicie. O asemenea clipa va trebui însă sa aibă si un nume aparte, haideți sa-i zicemi; împlinirea vremii (Galateni 4:4). - Soren Kierkegaard

[Riley Steffey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Under his nom de plume Climacus, Kierkegaard artfully articulates how it is not time or history or epistemology separating a Christian from Christ- but only sin. Love love love this piece of existential philosophy that is really just orthodox theology.

[Samuel Sadler · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Philosophical Fragments examine the possibility of teaching, taking up Socrates' Meno Paradox in the context of modern philosophy. This work sets the stage for Practice in Christianity and contributes to understanding Kierkegaard's overarching project.
Johannes Climacus offers a perceptive examination of contemporary philosophy by placing its mode of doubt under heavy scrutiny.
These works proved challenging reading, but are rewarding in their contribution to modern philosophy, their insight into Kierkegaard's other writings, and as practice for the individual philosopher.

[Daniel Stepke · Rating 4 out of 5]

a pair of fascinating books--while i can never quite shake being utterly confused at certain portions, this is an illuminating look into religious epistemology and the nature of philosophy

[Corneel Minne · Rating 5 out of 5]

Vreemd

[Bradley Blaylock · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kierkegaard beautifully reimagines faith through the lenses of philosophy. The centrality of the incarnation in the Kierkegaardian system is one that should be applauded and incorporated into every Christian Theo-Philosophical framework.

The more Kierkegaard I read the more I find him to be under appreciated and undervalued, especially among evangelicals.

[ezgi · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Kişinin bildiği şeyi araması mümkün değildir, bilmediği şeyi araması da aynı ölçüde mümkün değildir, bildiği şeyi arayamaz, çünkü zaten bilmektedir, bilmediği şeyi de arayamaz, çünkü neyi araması gerektiğini dahi bilmez."

Felsefe altyapımın iyi olduğunu düşünüyorum ama yine de bazı sayfalarda zorlanıp tekrar okumak zorunda kaldığım oldu. Felsefeye yeni başlayanlara fazlasıyla ağır gelecektir. Birçok konuda beyin fırtınası yapmamı sağladı. Hegel'e takıntısı ve sık sık bahsedişi kitabı daha zevkli hale getirmiş. Yobaz olmayışı da sevindirdi :)

[John Yelverton · Rating 3 out of 5]

I have mixed feelings about this work. Kierkegaard tries to explain God and Christianity through philosophical reasoning and there are portions of this book which are absolutely brilliant, but he also misses the boat completely when it comes to faith, and explaining why some people have it and other people do not have it.

[João Conrado]

Embora seja possível captar a ideia central do livro, a profundidade do tema e o modo de escrita pouquíssimo claro dificultam a compreensão da obra. Reler para entender.

[Anaxiemre · Rating 3 out of 5]

Sayfa sayısı az bir kitap olmasına karşılık ilk bölümlerde yazanlar 2 ciltlik kitabın detaylarında yer almıyor. Son bölümler biraz sıkıcılaşsa da ilk bölümleri defalarca okuma imkanı sunuyor