The Defense Of The Union Right At Gettysburg
Harry Pfanz, a former Chief Historian of the National Park Service, has written a three-volume narrative of the Battle of Gettysburg. This volume, "Gettysburg, Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill" (1993) covers the fighting on the Union right -- Confederate left part of the line. This aspect of the Battle has not received the attention that has been accorded to Pickett's charge or to Longstreet's assault on the Union left on July 2. But it is an important and interesting component of the Battle nonetheless. Further, Culp and Cemetery Hills were the only parts of the battlefield that saw sustained action during all three days of the fighting.
Pfanz begins, as the story must, with several chapters on the first day of the battle, July 1, 1863. The first day reached its climax with a Confederate victory north and west of Gettysburg which pushed two Union Corps, the first and the eleventh, through the town and unto Cemetery Hill south of town. Cemetery Hill and the adjacent Culp's Hill were crucial to the defense of the entire Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Pfanz' book discusses at length the Confederate failure to pursue the attack on day 1 and to attempt to take these two hills. Pfanz concludes that the Confederate corps commander, Lietenant General Richard Ewell, was probably not at fault by failing to attack and try to take these hills on July 1. This pivotal moment of the Battle is a subject of endless debate among students of Gettysburg.
Pfanz also describes in detail the fighting for Cemetery and Culp's Hills during the evening of July 2, after the Union had heavily occupied and fortified them. Pfanz also offers a good discussion of skirmishing and of fighting in the town of Gettysburg itself -- again a matter that sometimes receives too little attention in other studies. Pfanz' account of the fighting for the hills focuses on the vagaries of battle and of the tremendous cost in human lives and suffering of the war. He points out that the Union basically committed errors involving both Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill that made the positions highly vulnerable. The Confederates fought valiantly but were unable to capture either hill due to the inherent strength of the defensive positions, lack of coordination, mistakes of their own, and fierce Union defense. The Confederates did capture some fortifications on Culp's hill, but were forced to abandon them on July 3. This leads to the third part of Pfanz' story.
On July 3, General Robert E. Lee wanted to coordinate a resumption of the attack on the Union right with a new attack on the Union center and left -- which ultimately became Pickett's charge. But the fighting on the Union right came and went before the action in the center of the line began. There was fierce fighting on Culp's Hill beginning with a Union artillery bombardment at dawn and continuing until 11:00 that morning. The Confederates attacked the Union defenses repeatedly but were repulsed each time with heavy losses.
Pfanz tells his story well and the book is full of detail about the participants, from the generals to the foot soldiers. His account strives to be full and objective and probably could have used more in the way of commentary and analysis. The book is not suitable for the reader with a casual interest in the Battle of Gettysburg or for someone coming to the Battle for the first time. For such readers, a good general account of the Battle would be more suitable. But for those wanting to study the Battle of Gettysburg in detail, Pfanz' work is essential.
Robin Friedman