An excellent and well-paced if journalistic history of the Berlin Wall, covering all of the important events from the actual building of the wall and its collapse, with great coverage of all the relevant issues. Taylor successfully shows both the big-picture significance of all of these events and how they affected ordinary people on both sides of the wall.
Taylor’s writing is engaging and flows well, and he does a great job telling the wall’s compelling story. Taylor describes the conference at Potsdam where Germany was divided and Berlin occupied. At first, the US had no intention of maintaining any occupation forces in the city until the crisis of 1948. Afterwards, thousands of German escaped to the west through Berlin for several years. The Soviets closed the border but they left Berlin alone.The German communists pressured the Soviets to support the building of a wall, which they refused since it would harm their image and believed it to be impossible. After several years of pestering, Khrushchev gave his grudging approval, fully aware of the confrontation this might cause with the west.
Taylor shows all of the high-level maneuvering of the crisis of 1961 and afterwards, as well as all of the personal stories of triumph and tragedy that resulted from escape attempts by east Germans. Of course, he covers all of the famous ones, like Conrad Schumann (the soldier who escaped over the barrier but eventually hanged himself). He covers such topics as the psychology of the border guards and the economic problems of East Germany.
As Taylor reminds us, the collapse of the wall was more a result of accidents and local pressures, and the role of American foreign policy in general and Ronald Reagan in particular can easily be exaggerated. At the time of Reagan’s presidency a policy of coexistence had been adopted by both Germanys, giving the East German regime a new international respectability that made it easy for them to dismiss any challenge to their authority and legitimacy. The East German government had settled on a hard line ideologically, while allowing a certain degree of liberal reform elsewhere. Relaxed travel restrictions, nationalist protests in the Baltic, Hungary’s détente with Austria, electoral protests in East Germany, and Gorbachev’s public repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine all played an important role. Comically, at one point the East German government forbade the distribution of certain Soviet publications, and Gorbachev’s reform efforts were roundly criticized by East German newspapers.
In 1989, the East German regime was more or less paralyzed by the refugee problem and the discontent of the masses. At first the regime tried to ignore the refugee problem, then decided that its people would simply be allowed to leave--with their citizenship revoked. As it happened, few East Germans felt shunned or humiliated, and eagerly abandoned their East German citizenship. Many East Germans favored Gorbachev over Honecker (who refused to discuss any reforms with Gorbachev). Eventually, however, the East German politburo ousted Honecker from office, and when demonstrations began in East Germany, the regime’s security forces refused to fire (possibly on Honecker’s orders). Honecker would leave the government with a bankrupt East Germany in his wake. Taylor deftly describes the collapse of the wall, which was more or less an accidental result of the confusion of the East German Politburo’s spokesman. The East German regime’s spokesman was intending to announce stricter travel regulations, but he mistakenly announced an opening of the border to all citizens after failing to read his instructions carefully (he figured it was so ho-hum that he didn’t even read it before the press conference started). When a journalist asked him to clarify a statement regarding relaxed travel restrictions, he “clarified” by saying they would be dropped right away. The resulting frenzy at the border proved to be too much for the East German police to handle, and they declined from firing for fear of sparking a revolution.
Interesting and well-written, with the compelling stories of people both ordinary and high-level. The writing can get somewhat too breezy, conversational, and even cheesy at times, and Taylor often includes such historical no-nos like "we do not know precisely what is said, but we can imagine that..." when he should just stick to what is actually known. Also, the book is not entirely focused; his first chapter is an overview of European history, but it has a simplistic, flippant tone to it. And his writing includes such oddities as “brains trust,” and “unwisdom” and “escapers,” and “none the less,” instead of “nonetheless.” Similarly, Dean Rusk is described as a “toughie,” and one of Kennedy’s Georgetown dinners "included a number of young women... reputedly, shall we say, on friendly terms with the President." It gets pretty clunky: "Then Brandt arrived for a private meeting. Now real conversation could be had. Business could be got down to." But it gets better once Taylor actually gets to his point.
The writing gets pretty clumsy at times:
-”The two million abortions a year carried out in West Germany in the immediate postwar period, mostly in the Soviet zone, witnessed unimaginable suffering.” (Witnessed or caused?)
-”Werner was elderly and becoming somewhat vague.”
-”What Stalin had, he held--at least until it was prised from his stubby grasp, from the fingers that the long-since liquidated Russian poet Osip Mandelstam had described as ‘thick...fat like worms.’ “
Still, a fairly good history of an iconic landmark.