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The Crusader Armies: 1099–1187
A major new history of the Crusades that illuminates the strength and sophistication of the Western and Muslim armies
During the Crusades, the Western and Muslim armies developed various highly sophisticated strategies of both attack and defense, which evolved during the course of the battles. In this ambitious new work, Steve Tibble draws on a wide range of Muslim texts and archaeological evidence as well as more commonly cited Western sources to analyze the respective armies’ strategy, adaptation, evolution, and cultural diversity and show just how sophisticated the Crusader armies were even by today’s standards.
In the first comprehensive account of the subject in sixty years, Tibble takes a fresh approach to Templars, Hospitallers, and other key Orders and makes the controversial proposition that the Crusades were driven as much by sedentary versus nomadic tribal concerns as by religious conflict. This fluently written, broad-ranging narrative provides a crucial missing piece in the study of the West’s attempts to colonize the Middle East during the Middle Ages.
During the Crusades, the Western and Muslim armies developed various highly sophisticated strategies of both attack and defense, which evolved during the course of the battles. In this ambitious new work, Steve Tibble draws on a wide range of Muslim texts and archaeological evidence as well as more commonly cited Western sources to analyze the respective armies’ strategy, adaptation, evolution, and cultural diversity and show just how sophisticated the Crusader armies were even by today’s standards.
In the first comprehensive account of the subject in sixty years, Tibble takes a fresh approach to Templars, Hospitallers, and other key Orders and makes the controversial proposition that the Crusades were driven as much by sedentary versus nomadic tribal concerns as by religious conflict. This fluently written, broad-ranging narrative provides a crucial missing piece in the study of the West’s attempts to colonize the Middle East during the Middle Ages.
424 pages, Paperback
Published June 30, 2020
65 people are currently reading
249 people want to read
About the author
Steve Tibble
10 books11 followersSteve Tibble is honorary research associate at Royal Holloway, University of London, and the author of Monarchy and Lordships in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1099–1291. He lives in London.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
September 18, 2020
Tibble's book, misleadingly entitled "The Crusader Armies," is in fact an analysis of warfare in the Near East in the twelfth century, focusing on the armies of the crusader kingdoms (the Franks) and their main opponents in Egypt and Syria. While it does an excellent job of shredding still all-too-pervasive stereotypes about "Muslims vs Christians" and "evil invaders vs peace-loving natives" (all cliches long since discredited by scholars), it fails to adequately support Tibble's own thesis that the crusades were really just a "primal social conflict" between nomads and settlers.
Nevertheless, the book makes a major contribution to crusades scholarship in its analysis of the composition and tactics employed by the various participants. It is particularly enlightening in its depiction of the infantry levies involved on both sides, rightly redressing the sloppy tendency to 1) ignore the infantry and its importance and 2) blithely assume that the Frankish infantry was made up "Franks." Tibble convincingly depicts the base of Frankish armies as native Christian troops and "poulains" (second and third generation settlers of mixed blood.) He is absolutely correct in noting that the vast majority of men in the armies of the crusader states had never seen Europe. These were local troops defending their homeland -- and mostly speaking Arabic.
He is equally effective in dissecting the composition of Saracen armies, highlighting ruthlessly the degree to which these were largely alien mercenaries. The "Egyptian" army, as he shows, had virtually no Egyptians in it at all. It was composed mostly of "Nubian" (largely black slave contingents from what is now the Sudan) infantry and Armenian cavalry with some Turic and Bedouin auxiliaries.
He makes a another valuable contribution to our understanding to the twelfth century Near East by his excellent analysis of the differences between the Egyptian (Fatimid) and Syrian (Turic) armies, their strengths, weaknesses and tactics. Finally, he does a good job explaining Saladin's unique accomplishments with respect to military reforms after the shock of Montgisard.
However, the book has a number of serious weaknesses. The most obvious is that he ends it after the Battle of Hattin and Tibble summarizes the book by saying, in effect ,"so we see that the defeat of the crusader states was systemic and inevitable." NO. Wrong. And his book doesn't fails utterly to prove this point.
Ignoring the fact that within five years half of Saladin's successes had been nullified is not good history. Ignoring the fact that within six years Saladin was dead and his fragile empire was already splintering into warring factions is even worse history. It can be -- had has been -- argued far more convincingly that Hattin was the aberration not the "inevitable." Certainly a strong, unified Muslim empire stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates was the exception not the rule in the history of the Middle East. Tibble's conclusions therefore greatly detract from the sound work he has done in describing the situation.
Less important but nevertheless irritating to people familiar with the primary and scholarly sources, Tibble is highly erratic -- not to say manipulative -- in his use of sources. His entire description of Montgisard, for example, appears to be based primarily on a (self-adulatory) Templar account, while utterly ignorig not only the brilliant analysis of Michael Ehrlich ("St. Catherines Day Miracle -- The Battle of Montgisard") and more reprehensibly the primary sources William of Tyre and Ernoul. All three of the later sources make it explicitly clear that Reynald de Chatillon was NOT the commander at Montgisard. This canard thrown out by Muslim sources (who had no inside knowledge of the Christian command structure) was intended to paint Chatillon an enemy of Islam who deserved his fate (i.e. justifying the violation of Sharia law that Saladin committed by executing a surrendered prisoner). It has nothing to do with reality. William of Tyre on the other hand was the Chancellor of Jerusalem at the time of the Battle. He knew the inside workings of government intimately. He states unequivocally that Reynald was appointed commander of the army during a period of the king's illness and he was to lead ONLY "if the king was unable to appear in person." Baldwin IV was VERY MUCH present IN PERSON at the Battle of Montgisard. Baldwin was the commander at Montgisard and all attempts -- whether by Saladin's apologists or Mr. Tibble -- to denigrate his role is shameful -- not to mention shoddy scholarship.
Tribble' account of Montgisard also utterly ignores the role of the lord in whose territory it was held -- the Lord of Ramla and Mirabel -- who in accordance with the custom of the Kingdom of Jerusalem led the van -- not Tibble's beloved Templars.
Tibble also manages to describe the entire Battle of Hattin without once mentioning the commander of the rearguard -- again a man mentioned in multiple contemporary accounts of the battle. Again, Tibble gives all the credit to the Templars, who were led by one of their most incompetent and corrupt Masters ever. He likewise ignores the fact that this same nobleman succeeded in breaking through the Saracen encirclement, possibly with thousands of infantry, or that he succeeded in holding Jerusalem against Saladin long enough to force a negotiated surrender that saved tens of thousands of lives. There is no legitimate reason for Tibble tinkering with the historical record in this way and it detracts from the work as a whole.
In short, this is a valuable book which contributes many new insights, but must be read with caution and in conjunction with other scholarly works such as John France's many publications.
Nevertheless, the book makes a major contribution to crusades scholarship in its analysis of the composition and tactics employed by the various participants. It is particularly enlightening in its depiction of the infantry levies involved on both sides, rightly redressing the sloppy tendency to 1) ignore the infantry and its importance and 2) blithely assume that the Frankish infantry was made up "Franks." Tibble convincingly depicts the base of Frankish armies as native Christian troops and "poulains" (second and third generation settlers of mixed blood.) He is absolutely correct in noting that the vast majority of men in the armies of the crusader states had never seen Europe. These were local troops defending their homeland -- and mostly speaking Arabic.
He is equally effective in dissecting the composition of Saracen armies, highlighting ruthlessly the degree to which these were largely alien mercenaries. The "Egyptian" army, as he shows, had virtually no Egyptians in it at all. It was composed mostly of "Nubian" (largely black slave contingents from what is now the Sudan) infantry and Armenian cavalry with some Turic and Bedouin auxiliaries.
He makes a another valuable contribution to our understanding to the twelfth century Near East by his excellent analysis of the differences between the Egyptian (Fatimid) and Syrian (Turic) armies, their strengths, weaknesses and tactics. Finally, he does a good job explaining Saladin's unique accomplishments with respect to military reforms after the shock of Montgisard.
However, the book has a number of serious weaknesses. The most obvious is that he ends it after the Battle of Hattin and Tibble summarizes the book by saying, in effect ,"so we see that the defeat of the crusader states was systemic and inevitable." NO. Wrong. And his book doesn't fails utterly to prove this point.
Ignoring the fact that within five years half of Saladin's successes had been nullified is not good history. Ignoring the fact that within six years Saladin was dead and his fragile empire was already splintering into warring factions is even worse history. It can be -- had has been -- argued far more convincingly that Hattin was the aberration not the "inevitable." Certainly a strong, unified Muslim empire stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates was the exception not the rule in the history of the Middle East. Tibble's conclusions therefore greatly detract from the sound work he has done in describing the situation.
Less important but nevertheless irritating to people familiar with the primary and scholarly sources, Tibble is highly erratic -- not to say manipulative -- in his use of sources. His entire description of Montgisard, for example, appears to be based primarily on a (self-adulatory) Templar account, while utterly ignorig not only the brilliant analysis of Michael Ehrlich ("St. Catherines Day Miracle -- The Battle of Montgisard") and more reprehensibly the primary sources William of Tyre and Ernoul. All three of the later sources make it explicitly clear that Reynald de Chatillon was NOT the commander at Montgisard. This canard thrown out by Muslim sources (who had no inside knowledge of the Christian command structure) was intended to paint Chatillon an enemy of Islam who deserved his fate (i.e. justifying the violation of Sharia law that Saladin committed by executing a surrendered prisoner). It has nothing to do with reality. William of Tyre on the other hand was the Chancellor of Jerusalem at the time of the Battle. He knew the inside workings of government intimately. He states unequivocally that Reynald was appointed commander of the army during a period of the king's illness and he was to lead ONLY "if the king was unable to appear in person." Baldwin IV was VERY MUCH present IN PERSON at the Battle of Montgisard. Baldwin was the commander at Montgisard and all attempts -- whether by Saladin's apologists or Mr. Tibble -- to denigrate his role is shameful -- not to mention shoddy scholarship.
Tribble' account of Montgisard also utterly ignores the role of the lord in whose territory it was held -- the Lord of Ramla and Mirabel -- who in accordance with the custom of the Kingdom of Jerusalem led the van -- not Tibble's beloved Templars.
Tibble also manages to describe the entire Battle of Hattin without once mentioning the commander of the rearguard -- again a man mentioned in multiple contemporary accounts of the battle. Again, Tibble gives all the credit to the Templars, who were led by one of their most incompetent and corrupt Masters ever. He likewise ignores the fact that this same nobleman succeeded in breaking through the Saracen encirclement, possibly with thousands of infantry, or that he succeeded in holding Jerusalem against Saladin long enough to force a negotiated surrender that saved tens of thousands of lives. There is no legitimate reason for Tibble tinkering with the historical record in this way and it detracts from the work as a whole.
In short, this is a valuable book which contributes many new insights, but must be read with caution and in conjunction with other scholarly works such as John France's many publications.
December 31, 2019
If it wasn't for the author's bias and self-contradictions, I would have given the book 3 and maybe 4 stars because of its excellent details and anecdotes.
There is a golden rule for good writing: show don't tell. The author here did the opposite; he believed that by repeating the word nomads vs sedentary, this makes it true, well it doesn't. he argues that religion has little to do with the crusades and that it was motivated by climate change and a struggle between nomadic and sedentary societies and at the same time says that once the first crusade was over, most of the Europeans went home after their religious mission was done!. In the details of the battles he gives a thorough descriptions of the religious rituals which shows how important religion was among crusaders.
The author was very biased in his narrative which was annoying at first and then became silly and obstructive when he reached the war with Saladin. Why did he describe "Turkic"fighters as mercenaries in Muslim armies and "Turcopoles" in the christian army?! why did he always put volunteers in the Muslim army between "" implying they weren't really volunteers but joined for the booty?! the whole crusades came here for booty and wealth as mediocre knights and feudal rulers of Europe sough the wealth of the east and a higher status for themselves while hiding behind religion! why are you calling it a Muslim army if it was a battle between nomadic and sedentary societies! He said Saladin wasn't a champion as he is promoted to be but he fought fellow Muslims more than Christians and then he says that was necessary to create enough power and momentum to face the crusader states which hows his ultimate goal was the crusaders!. if there was no religious element, why didn't "Foreign Turkic"mercenaries who were only interested in booty and plunder agree with the crusaders and just get along together maintaining the status quo? why did they had to go through the pains of fighting?!
The use of sources was biased, relying heavily on christian sources and using Muslim sources when convenient and when they confirm what the christian sources say.
I felt the author was an apologist just like the Muslim sources he criticized. Compare this to the disciplined work of "Crusading Warfare, 1097 1193" by R.C. Smail and you see the difference.
كتاب متحيز و متناقض لكن به تفاصيل ووصف ممتاز. أتمنى لو تتم ترجمته والتعليق عليه من احد المتخصصين العرب لتفنيده ولتعظم الاستفادة.
There is a golden rule for good writing: show don't tell. The author here did the opposite; he believed that by repeating the word nomads vs sedentary, this makes it true, well it doesn't. he argues that religion has little to do with the crusades and that it was motivated by climate change and a struggle between nomadic and sedentary societies and at the same time says that once the first crusade was over, most of the Europeans went home after their religious mission was done!. In the details of the battles he gives a thorough descriptions of the religious rituals which shows how important religion was among crusaders.
The author was very biased in his narrative which was annoying at first and then became silly and obstructive when he reached the war with Saladin. Why did he describe "Turkic"fighters as mercenaries in Muslim armies and "Turcopoles" in the christian army?! why did he always put volunteers in the Muslim army between "" implying they weren't really volunteers but joined for the booty?! the whole crusades came here for booty and wealth as mediocre knights and feudal rulers of Europe sough the wealth of the east and a higher status for themselves while hiding behind religion! why are you calling it a Muslim army if it was a battle between nomadic and sedentary societies! He said Saladin wasn't a champion as he is promoted to be but he fought fellow Muslims more than Christians and then he says that was necessary to create enough power and momentum to face the crusader states which hows his ultimate goal was the crusaders!. if there was no religious element, why didn't "Foreign Turkic"mercenaries who were only interested in booty and plunder agree with the crusaders and just get along together maintaining the status quo? why did they had to go through the pains of fighting?!
The use of sources was biased, relying heavily on christian sources and using Muslim sources when convenient and when they confirm what the christian sources say.
I felt the author was an apologist just like the Muslim sources he criticized. Compare this to the disciplined work of "Crusading Warfare, 1097 1193" by R.C. Smail and you see the difference.
كتاب متحيز و متناقض لكن به تفاصيل ووصف ممتاز. أتمنى لو تتم ترجمته والتعليق عليه من احد المتخصصين العرب لتفنيده ولتعظم الاستفادة.
October 6, 2018
Solid enough work that reacts against many popular misconceptions of the crusades but does not really bring enough new material to the table. Sets itself around the idea that that the crusades were more about population movements and the conflict between sedentary and nomadic peoples. At least from a battlefield standpoint Tibble makes the point well. However, one might expect that for a book that gives so much attention to how the Franks had to come to grip with the military tactics of steppe nomads it might actually feature the steppe.
May 31, 2021
This is a detailed investigation of the Crusader armies and their opponents over a period of slightly less than a century. To its great merit, it makes the connection between the way in which the battles and sieges were contested, and the societies that the soldiers originated from. As Tibble convincingly documents, the small battleground in the Middle East became a crossroads for fighting men from the Eurasian steppe, Europe, Armenia, Kurdistan, and even the Sudan. While some of the active participants actually lived in the contested area, or chose to settle there, the ruling warlords and their armies were dominated by foreigners, a condition that must have contributed to the ruthlessness of the destruction. Tibble investigates in detail how the conflicting cultural backgrounds shaped the nature of warfare at the high point of the Crusader states, as each side sought to develop solutions to the challenges posed by the other.
It is possible that at times, the author is too attached to his simplifications, even if these are useful to understand events. Several times he contrasts the mode of warfare of the sedentary societies of the Franks and Egyptians with the nomadic societies of the Turkic warriors from the steppe. It is convincing enough that this is a useful perspective, and it does generate new insights, but the reader nevertheless develops a suspicion that the author might be over-using this single viewpoint.
The author has, much like anyone, his likes and dislikes, but he makes an effort at an objective, rational analysis of the actions and decisions. Rather more important than his judgment in specific cases, which after such a long time comes with inevitable question marks, is his firm belief that these eleven and twelfth century people were mostly intelligent strategists with a good insight in their own situation. Tibble has respect for the people whose history he is writing, and he manages to convince the reader that it is well deserved.
It is possible that at times, the author is too attached to his simplifications, even if these are useful to understand events. Several times he contrasts the mode of warfare of the sedentary societies of the Franks and Egyptians with the nomadic societies of the Turkic warriors from the steppe. It is convincing enough that this is a useful perspective, and it does generate new insights, but the reader nevertheless develops a suspicion that the author might be over-using this single viewpoint.
The author has, much like anyone, his likes and dislikes, but he makes an effort at an objective, rational analysis of the actions and decisions. Rather more important than his judgment in specific cases, which after such a long time comes with inevitable question marks, is his firm belief that these eleven and twelfth century people were mostly intelligent strategists with a good insight in their own situation. Tibble has respect for the people whose history he is writing, and he manages to convince the reader that it is well deserved.
August 6, 2023
Il libro ha ormai una decina di anni, ma rappresenta lo stato dell'arte per i problemi militari e geopolitici delle crociate, almeno per gli storici non specialisti in faccende militari (come il sottoscritto).
Le conclusioni più interessanti, almeno per me, sono paradossalmente quelle riguardanti gli aspetti non necessariamente militari: le crociate, al di là di come le si voglia vedere, non sono fenomeni che vanno staccati da geopolitica di grande respiro, che traccia il suo confine nelle migrazioni turche. Escludendo una prospettiva eurocentrica, fattore che ormai è standard nella storiografia occidentale, si nota questo passaggio dalla domanda "come mai gli stati crociati sono stati battuti?" a "come hanno fatto a durare così tanto di fronte a forze sproporzionate?".
Inoltre cadono anche moltissimi luoghi comuni come la tendenza a vedere le forze crociate come imperialisti, colonizzatrici o cunicoli inseriti a forza presso popolazioni islamiche.
Rimane una delle obiezioni classiche di Runciman, ossia l'inutilità delle crociate per la cultura europea, per l'arte militare o come "ritorno". È un'obiezione che ho sempre trovato colma di teleologismo e fondamentalmente inutile (la storia non può avete un fine, così come non ha una conclusione), ma il testo risponde anche a questa, anche se in modo obliquo.
Le conclusioni più interessanti, almeno per me, sono paradossalmente quelle riguardanti gli aspetti non necessariamente militari: le crociate, al di là di come le si voglia vedere, non sono fenomeni che vanno staccati da geopolitica di grande respiro, che traccia il suo confine nelle migrazioni turche. Escludendo una prospettiva eurocentrica, fattore che ormai è standard nella storiografia occidentale, si nota questo passaggio dalla domanda "come mai gli stati crociati sono stati battuti?" a "come hanno fatto a durare così tanto di fronte a forze sproporzionate?".
Inoltre cadono anche moltissimi luoghi comuni come la tendenza a vedere le forze crociate come imperialisti, colonizzatrici o cunicoli inseriti a forza presso popolazioni islamiche.
Rimane una delle obiezioni classiche di Runciman, ossia l'inutilità delle crociate per la cultura europea, per l'arte militare o come "ritorno". È un'obiezione che ho sempre trovato colma di teleologismo e fondamentalmente inutile (la storia non può avete un fine, così come non ha una conclusione), ma il testo risponde anche a questa, anche se in modo obliquo.
July 30, 2024
An excellent study, cuts through the modern assumptions and accepted wisdom about the Crusades and that time in the Middle East and goes back to the original sources to make a fresh analysis. And that analysis clearly debunks a lot of the modern assumptions about the politics and events of that time.
May 21, 2025
التاريخ لا يحصل فجأة، التاريخ تراكم واختلاط لأمور كثيرة! مهم جداً أن نقرأ تاريخ منطقتنا وبالذات تاريخ الصراعات التي تتكرر في نفس الأرض، بلاد الشام عموماً وفلسطين خصوصاً. وهذا كتاب عن التاريخ العسكري للحملات الصليبية. وككل كتاب جيد فهو يلقي الضوء على مناطق كانت مظلمة لدى القارئ، بل ويصحح ويغير أفكار تقليدية عن تلك الحقبة، ولا يكتفي بسرد وتحليل عسكري بل ويشرح لماذا حصل ما حصل من وجهة نظر ديمغرافية واقتصادية وحتى مناخية!
هذا الجودة العالية من البحث التاريخي غير موجودة الآن باللغة العربية، لا الجامعات قادرة، ولا الباحثين ولا مراكز الأبحاث، رغم أن الكتاب يتناول جزء مهم وحساس من تاريخ المنطقة العربية… مجبرين على قراءة تاريخنا لدى غيرنا!
يجب ترجمته!
هذا الجودة العالية من البحث التاريخي غير موجودة الآن باللغة العربية، لا الجامعات قادرة، ولا الباحثين ولا مراكز الأبحاث، رغم أن الكتاب يتناول جزء مهم وحساس من تاريخ المنطقة العربية… مجبرين على قراءة تاريخنا لدى غيرنا!
يجب ترجمته!
April 6, 2021
The lower rating was due to my own, unmet expectations rather than the merits of the book itself. I was looking forward to reading a good overview on the crusades and general information about the warfare and social life of the times. Tibble's approach was a bit different: at first he did go general, but he quickly started to pore into the minutiae of military strategy and geography.
I'm generally not good at absorbing lots of new things if the foundation is not familiar to me. I knew next to nothing about Middle Eastern geography, the notable personages of the times or even the main battles, so getting into the book was rather difficult when it began to particularise. I also had no idea that all of those things would be delved into (and even explained) at the very final chapter of the book, which disorientated me to an extent.
There was also something very... glib about Tibble's way of writing. He would repeat same rhetoric techniques again and again: establish a "common, mistaken view" and crush it by stating that the polar opposite is true. He would also repeat some of his major tenets throughout the book, and of course there is nothing wrong in repeating your main point - the problem is simply the way Tibble did it: it seemed a bit copy paste instead of a carefully constructed argument. I must also say I was surprised at how the main ideas championed by the book were relegated to a secondary position as the somewhat boringly narrated action bits came to the fore.
Yet the sheer attention to detail and the wealth of sources Tibble have used show that he is far from a hack. In fact, I fully believe in what he propounds - and I'm willing to fault myself rather than him on most points. I guess I simply was not properly prepared for this book.
I'm generally not good at absorbing lots of new things if the foundation is not familiar to me. I knew next to nothing about Middle Eastern geography, the notable personages of the times or even the main battles, so getting into the book was rather difficult when it began to particularise. I also had no idea that all of those things would be delved into (and even explained) at the very final chapter of the book, which disorientated me to an extent.
There was also something very... glib about Tibble's way of writing. He would repeat same rhetoric techniques again and again: establish a "common, mistaken view" and crush it by stating that the polar opposite is true. He would also repeat some of his major tenets throughout the book, and of course there is nothing wrong in repeating your main point - the problem is simply the way Tibble did it: it seemed a bit copy paste instead of a carefully constructed argument. I must also say I was surprised at how the main ideas championed by the book were relegated to a secondary position as the somewhat boringly narrated action bits came to the fore.
Yet the sheer attention to detail and the wealth of sources Tibble have used show that he is far from a hack. In fact, I fully believe in what he propounds - and I'm willing to fault myself rather than him on most points. I guess I simply was not properly prepared for this book.
February 23, 2022
For better understanding the broader picture for events on the ground between the 1st and 2nd, 2nd and 3rd crusades, this book was very illuminating to my understanding of the crusades. Extremely informative of how the armies functioned and worked vs other history books which give a broad bird's eye view of events.
October 4, 2021
Good and readable for somebody new to the Crusaders. The first chapter can be a bit grating with the author continuously stating his thesis statement but after it doesn't it mention it until later parts of each chapter after he made his points which is far better.
August 21, 2023
Steve Tibble's book *The Crusader Armies, 1099-1187* provides a detailed account of the armies that took part in the Crusades, a series of religious wars that lasted for nearly two centuries. The book covers the period from the First Crusade in 1099 to the fall of Jerusalem in 1187.
Tibble's account of the Crusader armies is an exemplary piece of work, thoroughly researched and meticulously documented. In his study, he not only outlines the political and military contexts in which the Crusader armies operated, but he also delves deeper into the social and cultural factors that shaped these armies. For instance, he explores the role of religion in motivating the Crusaders, as well as the influence of regional customs and traditions on their tactics and strategies. Moreover, Tibble's work sheds light on the challenges that the Crusader armies faced, both on and off the battlefield, and offers a nuanced perspective on how they coped with these challenges. Overall, Tibble's study is an essential resource for anyone interested in the history of the Crusades and the medieval period in general.
Tibble's book is a comprehensive analysis of the military tactics and strategies employed by the Crusader armies. He delves deep into the details of major battles and campaigns to provide a vivid account of the Crusaders' military organization and leadership. In addition to this, Tibble goes beyond just a military analysis to explore the broader political and cultural impact of the Crusaders in the Middle East during their campaigns. He highlights the ways in which the Crusader armies shaped the existing political and cultural landscape of the region, leaving a lasting impact that continues to be felt today. Overall, Tibble's work is an insightful and thought-provoking examination of the Crusades, providing readers with a comprehensive understanding of this complex and fascinating period in history.
Overall, *The Crusader Armies, 1099-1187* is a well-researched and comprehensive account of the Crusader armies. It will be of interest to scholars and students of medieval history, as well as to general readers interested in the history of the Crusades.
Tibble's account of the Crusader armies is an exemplary piece of work, thoroughly researched and meticulously documented. In his study, he not only outlines the political and military contexts in which the Crusader armies operated, but he also delves deeper into the social and cultural factors that shaped these armies. For instance, he explores the role of religion in motivating the Crusaders, as well as the influence of regional customs and traditions on their tactics and strategies. Moreover, Tibble's work sheds light on the challenges that the Crusader armies faced, both on and off the battlefield, and offers a nuanced perspective on how they coped with these challenges. Overall, Tibble's study is an essential resource for anyone interested in the history of the Crusades and the medieval period in general.
Tibble's book is a comprehensive analysis of the military tactics and strategies employed by the Crusader armies. He delves deep into the details of major battles and campaigns to provide a vivid account of the Crusaders' military organization and leadership. In addition to this, Tibble goes beyond just a military analysis to explore the broader political and cultural impact of the Crusaders in the Middle East during their campaigns. He highlights the ways in which the Crusader armies shaped the existing political and cultural landscape of the region, leaving a lasting impact that continues to be felt today. Overall, Tibble's work is an insightful and thought-provoking examination of the Crusades, providing readers with a comprehensive understanding of this complex and fascinating period in history.
Overall, *The Crusader Armies, 1099-1187* is a well-researched and comprehensive account of the Crusader armies. It will be of interest to scholars and students of medieval history, as well as to general readers interested in the history of the Crusades.
October 10, 2024
The author makes good points about the fact that the crusader armies consisted of Armenians, Turkic Cavalry, and mixed race local people. The Muslim armies meanwhile, contained Kurdish, local Arab Bedouins and Turks off the steppes. He also points out that the armies of the Ayyubid Dynasty and those following ( Ottomans) were as foreign to the Middle East as the Crusaders were.
The book talks mainly about the 1100s. Saladin and his strategies are talked about along with the battle of Hattin. Lots of contemporary sources are used and there was a lot of research done. While he tried to be fair to the Muslim side, such as when he talks of what they did right at Hattin, but he tends to veer to the West, not enough to be annoying.
The book talks mainly about the 1100s. Saladin and his strategies are talked about along with the battle of Hattin. Lots of contemporary sources are used and there was a lot of research done. While he tried to be fair to the Muslim side, such as when he talks of what they did right at Hattin, but he tends to veer to the West, not enough to be annoying.
November 10, 2024
Very informative
I have read several books about the crusaders and crusading and this must have been the best one so far. It draws on all or most of the relevant historical sources but approaches them critically. Be warned that the book is written like a PhD thesis, which might not appeal to all. However, the resulting in-depth analysis is worth it. I have learned more from this book than from other books on the crusades.
I have read several books about the crusaders and crusading and this must have been the best one so far. It draws on all or most of the relevant historical sources but approaches them critically. Be warned that the book is written like a PhD thesis, which might not appeal to all. However, the resulting in-depth analysis is worth it. I have learned more from this book than from other books on the crusades.
February 18, 2025
A must read for anyone interested in this period. Tibble works to reveal truths about a period full of modern misconceptions. Going into wonderful depth about the construction, demographics, and tactics of crusader armies and their opponents.
Lia here - Will really liked this one if you can’t tell. Raved about it all while he was reading it. Been hearing much about the crusades as of late. Yay me.
Lia here - Will really liked this one if you can’t tell. Raved about it all while he was reading it. Been hearing much about the crusades as of late. Yay me.
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March 5, 2022Excellent book😁
December 1, 2023
This was a fascinating new take on the crusades. Better maps showing the course of military campaigns, vice battles, would have been helpful
February 1, 2025
Excellent
Excellent overview of the armies in the era of the Crusader states and gives great context and an overview of the Latin states in Outremer.
Excellent overview of the armies in the era of the Crusader states and gives great context and an overview of the Latin states in Outremer.
December 2, 2024
Tibble starts off the book with his proposed thesis that the Crusades were not a conflict of Islam vs. Christianity, but rather a conflict of migratory vs. sedentary societies. While, I feel that he fails to convince me of his main thesis, since this does not come up frequently, I think that he does an excellent job of dispelling a lot of misconceptions about Medieval warfare in the Levant and Syria.
He covers topics such as the actual polyglot, multi-ethnic composition of armies at the time, their relevant strengths and weaknesses, how they evolved to meet the demands of a near-constant state of warfare, and more. The book was well-paced and sufficiently thorough in its coverage and Tibble provides plenty of battle overviews to support his main arguments. Overall, one of my favorite reads in the area of military history and one that I hope to read again.
He covers topics such as the actual polyglot, multi-ethnic composition of armies at the time, their relevant strengths and weaknesses, how they evolved to meet the demands of a near-constant state of warfare, and more. The book was well-paced and sufficiently thorough in its coverage and Tibble provides plenty of battle overviews to support his main arguments. Overall, one of my favorite reads in the area of military history and one that I hope to read again.
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