Un continent fracturat. Europa, 1950-2017

Penguin History of Europe #9

by Ian Kershaw, Alexandru Țîrdea (Translator)

Dupa ororile coplesitoare ale primei jumatati a secolului XX, descrise de Ian Kershaw in volumul anterior, Drumul spre iad, anii 1950-2017 au adus pace si relativa prosperitate in majoritatea tarilor Europei. Imbunatatirile economice importante au transformat continentul. Era catastrofala a celor doua razboaie mondiale s-a transformat intr-un trecut ceva mai indepartat, desi umbra sa lunga a continuat sa influenteze mentalitati.

Europa era acum un continent divizat, traind sub amenintarea nucleara, intr-o perioada marcata intermitent de anxietate. Europenii au trait senzatiile unui adevarat montagne russe, implicati intr-o serie de evenimente care amenintau sa se transforme in dezastru, nemaifiind stapanii propriilor destine: pentru o mare parte a perioadei, SUA si URSS i-au redus efectiv la niste figuri neajutorate, ale caror destine erau dictate de cerintele Razboiului Rece. Au existat succese rasunatoare - dizolvarea blocului sovietic, disparitia dictaturilor si reunificarea cu succes a Germaniei. Dar accelerarea globalizarii a adus noi vulnerabilitati. Impactul crizelor de dupa, 2008 a reprezentat cel mai clar avertisment pentru europeni ca nu exista nici o garantie de pace si de stabilitate.

In aceasta carte remarcabila, Ian Kershaw creeaza o adevarata panorama a lumii in care traim. Inspirandu-se din exemple de pe tot continentul, Un continent fracturat ne va face sa regandim ideea de Europa si ce inseamna sa fii european.

Ian Kershaw este autorul lui Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris si al lui Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, volume care au primit Wolfson Literary Award pentru istorie si Premiul Bruno Kreisky din Austria pentru cartea de politica a anului. De asemenea, a mai scris Making Friends with Hitler, care a castigat Elizabeth Longford Prize pentru biografie istorica, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940-44, si The End: Germany 1944-45. Ian Kershaw este considerat unul dintre expertii de frunte ai lumii in istoria Germaniei naziste si in personalitatea lui Adolf Hitler. Membru al Academiei Britanice si al Societatii Regale de Istorie, a primit titlul de cavaler in anuI 2002, pentru serviciile aduse in calitate de istoric. La Editura Litera, de acelasi autor, a aparut "Drumul spre iad. Europa, 1914-1949".

Genres: History, Nonfiction, European History, Politics, World History, Audiobook, 20th Century

816 pages, Paperback

First published August 30, 2018

About the author

Ian Kershaw is a British historian, noted for his biographies of Adolf Hitler.
Ian Kershaw studied at Liverpool (BA) and Oxford (D. Phil). He was a lecturer first in medieval, then in modern, history at the University of Manchester. In 1983-4 he was Visiting Professor of Modern History at the Ruhr University in Bochum, West Germany. From 1987 to 1989 he was Professor of Modern History at the University of Nottingham, and since 1989 has been Professor of Modern History at Sheffield. He is a fellow of the British Academy, of the Royal Historical Society, of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, and of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung in Bonn. He retired from academic life in the autumn semester of 2008.

Reviews

[Geevee · Rating 3 out of 5]

A book that offers much but with significant gaps and an absence of analysis.

Europe's story since 1950 is one of threat, change, success, challenge and improvement - perhaps lost opportunity too - and so promises a rollercoaster of a ride for the reader.

Ian Kershaw's book was, in the main, a pleasure to read and covers a great deal in its pages but like the aforementioned rollercoaster it has dips and can feel uneven at times.

The early years leading to the 1960s is very well done and as the story moves from the 1970s I started to feel the book was only partly delivering on its sub-title of Europe 1950-2017.

I was disappointed not to see significant or more detailed mention of tourism, trade and culture. The impact on Europe's nations and its fabric from tourism has changed economies, lives and indeed coastlines and other infrastructure with construction of resorts, roads, and airports. Yet little is discussed. Likewise trade: there's - naturally - mention of East and West and their differences and changes in traditional industry, but nothing on the success, for example, of the German car industry worldwide and how this drove and used technology. Nothing on say high-tech or global European brands and how these contributed to wealth and global trade. How design, manufacturing techniques and supply chains evolved. Nothing on say Rotterdam's place in world shipping and logistics: nothing on fishing, and the political and environmental impacts (exhausted stocks and quotas). Nothing on Russia's supply of energy to much of western Europe. There is sparse mention of sport; so nothing on the Olympic games or football, skiing or say motor sport - all again supporting international jobs in design, construction, technology and reaching far into and across Europe for dependent and interdependent industries. Likewise, culture and arts. Music is near ignored and yet its place in people's lives and as commercial ventures with performers on world stadium filling tours or classical concerts. Not even a mention of the Eurovision song contest - an annual televised extravaganza that sees numerous European nations compete. Nothing on how art has become and architecture draw people to museums, galleries and cities.

The internet gets a simple single mention - it was invented by Tim Berners-Lee. So nothing on how it (the internet) changed how people, governments and companies trade, work and speak with each other. In this book it has no impact or influence on Europe - there is nothing on social media and how this is used or influences politics, discussion and people's beliefs or ability to view and challenge news and opinion.

Surprising too was no mention whatsoever of the European Space Agency, or other European bodies who have played central roles in Europe and wider. Nothing on Europe's work to help medicine (Red Cross/MSF), disease (Ebola or Polio) and famine (Ethiopia, Biafra) or less palatably how crime and criminals in Europe responded to world, social and technological trends or indeed helped create global criminality - no mention of drugs, modern slavery or cyber crime; no mention on intelligence work (yet NATO for example gets lots of mentions). Not a single word on Europol or Interpol.

All in all it was a useful book, but with much missing, including any sources or references, and the odd tiresome opinion from the author. One wonders if this would have been a better book had it been split at say 1973 (oil crisis) or 1989 (collapse of the Soviet Union).

[Henk · Rating 3 out of 5]

A broad reaching history that looks at European development post World War II. The pre-1989 chapters, except for the cultural angle, are quite good and insightful, but the narrative on decades I lived through myself I found less impressive

Despite its size I felt Roller-Coaster: Europe, 1950-2017 chews off a bit too much, even for >700 pages plus book.
Ian Kershaw takes a high level approach, showing how the continent recovered from the Second World War, got divided between West and East, the collapse of colonial empires, dependency on oil, fall of communism, the European project, how economic growth created more opportunities for people, the 2008 great financial crisis and the Euro-crisis, all the way up to 2017.

Later parts of the book feels so much more eventful but less detailed in execution, with HIV-AIDS only getting one paragraph, and the internet and social media nearly completely lacking in the story of Kershaw. Also the financial crisis is much better tackled in Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World by Adam Tooze.

A brave effort all in all to capture the complete transformation of the continent in little more than 70 years, but a more logical approach for me had been to end the narrative at 1989 and have a full volume really diving into the more recent time period.

Observations and interesting factoids:
Korean war costing 3 million lives and the hydrogen bomb leading to a quadrupling of military budget of the US

1955 leading to the neutrality of Austria and the ascension of West Germany to NATO, with the Warschau Pact starting as a counter to the alliance of the West

2.6m East Germans leaving to the West via Berlin in 1949-1961, 15% of the population

A 1959 UK poll showing only 8% of people expecting nuclear war by 1980

10 million refugees in West Germany after the war.

Socialism losing against (Christian) conservatives all over Europe between 1950 and 1964

Stalin offering reunification of Germany to keep West Germany out of NATO. Denazification in 1950 failing under Adenauer

13 million refugees and 1 million dead in the India partition and Britain unable to maintain its empire after the Suez canal fiasco

25 million refugees and 15 million dead in the Soviet Union after the war
Chruchev denouncing Stalin creating opportunities for dissent in East Germany, Poland and Hungary
Polands secret police having files on 1/3 of the adult population

Golden age of economic growth between 1950 and 1973

Benelux already having a customs union and common outer tariffs in 1948, well before the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Britain declining the invitation to join. In 1952 Nordic Council being founded, consisting of Scandinavian countries

Decline of Britain from a world empire to a middling European power.

University attendence quadrupled between 1950 and 1970 in most European countries

Student protest emerging from bad funding and morphing into terrorist attacks

1973 and 1979 oilshocks leading to a pull towards the right in Europe and to the fall of dictatorship in Greece, Portugal and Spain

HIV AIDS epidemic only getting a paragraph

Fall of Warschau Pact and role of Gorbatsjov

Tsjernobyl contributed to both fall of communism and the rise of environmentalism

4% of East Germans leaving to West Germany between 1989 and 1991 and industrial output falling by 75% due to shock therapy to the economy

$27b of loans from the IMF for Germany
The collective business of East Germany losing over 250b D-Mark in the years of reunification.

European trade increasing 6 fold between the fall of the Berlin wall and 1999

Three quarters of workers of Dutch multinational companies situated outside of The Netherlands, harbinger of outsourcing

Terrorism being not really impactful in the end
High level handling of financial crisis
Asylum crisis leading to Germany taking in 60% of all Syrian refugee
Populist movements

Crimean annexation even approved by Gorbatsjov

Importance for citizens to live in countries with strong, competent government

NATO as an aegis, providing stability

From 2/3 of people in Europe living in dictatorships in 1940 to widespread pluralistic democracy on much of the continent

Fall of economic dynamism versus China and US

[Marc Lamot · Rating 3 out of 5]

It must be not easy to write a history of Europe that spans no less than 60 years, and about a period that is also so close to us. All praise therefore to Ian Kershaw, who presents this book as a sequel to his previous To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949. As is fitting, the Cold War and the Golden Sixties, the fall of the Berlin Wall and European integration steal the lion’s share of attention. And another merit: unlike many other syntheses, Eastern Europe is well represented. And finally, Kershaw also has an eye for the broad cultural and mental changes, with 1968 inevitably as a symbolic turning point. So certainly meritorious.

Only, if you have previously read Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 by Tony Judt, this one pales in comparison. Judt’s book is now 20 years old, but it still appeals to the imagination. Judt himself placed accents, gave personal interpretation to the events and developments, which made his story come much more to life (even if you do not necessarily agree with Judt's vision). Kershaw mainly sticks to an event-based history, and - probably because he also seems a gracious man as a person - he also avoids harsh judgments. It will therefore come as no surprise that his final conclusion remains very general: "No straightforward linear development adequately describes the complexity of European history since 1950. This is rather a story of twists and turns, of ups and downs, of volatile shifts, of a great and accelerating speed of transformation. Europe since 1950 has been a roller-coaster ride, complete with thrills and scares." Of course, that is true, but then I think that this is a statement that probably applies to all regions and almost all times.

[Marks54 · Rating 5 out of 5]

I first read Ian Kershaw’s work with his superb two volume biography of Hitler. He is a fine historian and has written an excellent book - the latest volume in Penguin’s history of Europe series.

How one approaches a volume like this will depend on one’s age when encountering it. Younger readers may well run into a volume like this in an assigned seminar or advanced course or a preparation for some form of comprehensive examination. As a text, it succeeds admirably and is well written and organized and fairly thorough in its coverage. While Kershaw admits his limitations up front, his coverage of the wide range of difficult areas in the book is astonishing while at the same time not overdone. I especially liked the section on the Yugoslav Civil War. Readers will likely need additional work if they want to follow up on nuances in technological change or the financial/economic background to the “Great Recession” but that was to be expected - and there is a huge recent literature to go to for these topics.

When one comes on a volume like this at a later age, the thought is to moan about just how much one remembers from this broad span of events and see whether one’s memories match with the accounts of the book. This was enjoyable, since the accounts that were relevant ring true and start to move from news accounts and columns in the Economist to historical writing.

Another important issue is the general perspective of a massive work like this - in particular how does it compare with Tony Judt’s work “Postwar”. I am not getting rid of my copy of Judt, but this is also a fine work. Kershaw is especially convincing at drawing together the ways in which Europe by 2017 was immeasurably better than it was in 1950, even when the entire continent seems in decline. How “The Global Age” fits with “Postwar” will require a bit more thought but I remain hopeful, as Kershaw does at the end of the book.

[Sense of History]

Why do solid historians dare to tackle a historical story up to the present day? They should know better than anyone that it is almost impossible to extract the real main lines from the follies of the day. That requires distance. Apparently, Ian Kershaw, a widely respected British historian, author of many historical works that are really worth mentioning (think of his famous Hitler biography, Hitler), could not resist the temptation: his history of post-war Europe runs up to 2017, so he just managed to include Brexit and Donald Trump. But you can tell: the period of the Cold War is well developed, with a lot of attention to the events in Eastern Europe, while Kershaw's story after the fall of the Berlin Wall is less profound, more superficial and more journalistic. Not that he writes wrong things, certainly not, but you can tell from everything that he lacks the distance to expose real deep tendencies. And that is a pity.

Even more regrettable is that even Kershaw ventures to make predictions about how Europe will continue. That too, apparently, is a flaw that historians cannot resist. He is very well aware of that: “History offers only the most indistinct guide to what cannot be foreseen. Not just long-term structural processes but unpredictable events can produce momentary changes. It is easy to underestimate the role of contingency in historical change. Yet history is replete with issues that have a dramatic impact but hinge upon contingency – the outcome of a battle, unexpected political upheaval, the personality of a ruler, for example.” And yet he ventures to look ahead with a list of the challenges facing Europe and the positive signals that exist at that time (2017). As might be expected, this can only result in generalities: “What will happen in the decades to come is impossible to know. The only certainty is uncertainty. Insecurity will remain a hallmark of modern life. Europe’s dips and turns, the ups and downs that have characterized its history, are sure to continue.” No, of course this is not a bad book, but I had expected more from a historian of Kershaw’s caliber.

[Tristram Shandy · Rating 4 out of 5]

“The European Union could nevertheless point to significant achievements. A framework of international cooperation, the extension of the rule of law, the upholding of human rights, the establishment of a security network, and the creation of a single currency for a majority of member states, had all helped to widen prosperity and to dilute the nationalism that had once poisoned Europe, to strengthen civil society and to build solid democratic foundations.”

Writing a European history about the second half of the 20th century is a challenge in many respects, one of which may lie in the need to find a suitable focus in order to organize the whole narration. Without such a focus a historian would simply end up amassing data and frustrating his readers by sending them into an endless number of blind alleys. Nevertheless, there is also an obvious danger in such a focal point, namely teleological historiography, which selects events according to whether they fit into the perceived pattern or not, or which cannot refrain from offering the reader value judgements on the developments described along the way. Ian Kershaw’s history of Europe from 1950 to 2017, which he calls Roller-Coaster because of the ups and downs the story takes, is focused on the road towards European unification, a process which he regards as mostly beneficial in that it prevented the individual states from trying to steer through the various economic and political crises arising in the late 20th century and the early years of the new millennium with only their national interests before their eyes. Kershaw gives ample evidence of how past economic crises could be tackled through European cooperation, and his assumption that Europe might once again have slithered into war or authoritarian regimes without such cooperation has a lot to go for it. On the other hand, even though he sees the European Union as a common good that has influenced the development of our continent, and of world history, for the better, he does not turn a blind eye to the instances in which European cooperation was, at best, lukewarm or non-existent, as in the refugee crisis.

Kershaw also largely avoids teleology as when in the final part of the book he compares the present to a barred gate through the cracks of whose door you might spot various paths leading into the realm of the future, some of which seeming broader and less crooked than others – even though the Peeping Tom in front of the door may not know which of these paths is going to be the one we will all have to tread, but still you can read his European history as a plea for European unification, and it is this leading assumption – which does not really pervade Kershaw’s tale in its entirety, but which becomes dominant in the last chapter – with which I have some issues.

Kershaw argues that the EU helped many countries of the former eastern bloc to deal with the imminent problems they had to deal with after the fall of the Iron Curtain and offered them a future vision that overcame internal strife and kept populism from the right at bay, and he claims that civil liberties and democratic principles thrived best within the framework guaranteed by the Union, whereas the labels he sticks on national thinking are best summarized with the word “poisonous”. Even the failures of the EU in dealing with the Yugoslavian war or the refugee crisis, among others, do not make him sway from this judgement. It would have been interesting to know whether Kershaw might see the EU in a more ambiguous light, had the current Covid crisis been part of his history. In one passage of his book, he concedes that the EU – I am using the term as synonymous with any of its predecessors here – has a legitimation problem in that a political union and the transference of national rights to the Union has never been agreed upon in elections or plebiscites, and in that hardly any of the Union’s institutions is elected, but this only happens once within roughly 560 pages of text. At the same time, however, I think this is a crucial point: Up to the present, we know of no level of viable democratic participation larger than the nation-state (if you set aside examples like Belgium or Switzerland, which work on a smaller level), and given the increase in multiculturalism and individualism as well as the loss of attraction experienced by the Christian churches, there is hardly anything that could inspire people with a European identity. It is such an identity, though, also on the emotional level, that enables people to forego some of their own personal advantages in favour of a common goal – and I cannot see this development happening in the present EU, which I perceive as mostly neoliberal, elitist and distrustful of “the people”. What is more, current crises have shown how brittle the rule of law and civic liberties – linked by Kershaw with a strengthening EU – are, and now we are going through a time where governments intervene into the most private spheres of their citizens’ lives in the name of a war against a virus. This development started well before the pandemic – and examples like Australia show that we are still comparatively well off – but it is definitely linked with a Union that shies away from offering its citizens opportunities of direct democratic participation and from legitimizing its trend towards supranational structures via plebiscite and elections. Brexit would have offered a chance here, but it was ignored.

I must confess that reading the last chapter of Kershaw’s book temporarily galled the entire experience for me, giving me the feeling I was being worked upon in favour of condoning with an elitist supranational European state that failed to guarantee democratic participation rights, but then, taking two or rather a dozen steps aside after finishing the book, I remembered that the bulk of the book was informative, well-structured and mostly well-argued. Especially the first half, which looked at European history up to the 70s, is perfect in its balance, its detail and its conclusiveness. Unfortunately, Kershaw does not quite maintain his exceptionally high standard for the second part of the book, probably because this would have meant incorporating a lot more of data and material – for example with regard to a history of mentalities (which was excellent in the first part) or to a history of media development and how it shaped people’s perception of policy and their private lives. Still, Kershaw’s history remains erudite and, overall, comprehensive even here.

It is probably that the closer a period of history is to you chronologically, the more your reception of its historiography depends on whether you happen to share the writer’s underlying assumptions or not. Nevertheless, with my caveat against seeing a supranational union of Europe as the be-all and end-all of Europe’s history, I would still regard Kershaw’s work as a exemplary piece of history-writing.

[Dave Schoettinger · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this book as an American who has been aware of changing perceptions of Europe on the part of Americans during the time period (1950-2017) covered. If you look at American movies from prior to 1970, you find Europeans portrayed either as the embodiment of sophistication, culture and style, or as mysterious and sinister. These stereotypes have faded in the 21st century and now many Americans, to the extent they think about Europe at all, seem to consider Europe a continent of decadent, irreligious welfare states who are perennially ungrateful for the assistance the US provided during the first half of the 20th century to Europeans in their attempts to exterminate each other and then in rebuilding their countries from the resulting rubble.

Personally, I have long considered pizza, the Beatles, and the Eurostep as adequate recompense for the Marshall Plan, however Americans in general, Republicans in particular, and Donald Trump specifically are unaware of the difference between the terms ally and vassal, and are therefore perplexed by the temerity of European countries which ignore our instructions on how to run their countries.

Professor Kershaw provides in this book an overview of the political and economic history of postwar Europe. He emphasizes the splitting of Europe by the Iron Curtain and the developments resulting from the curtain’s fall. He delves into the attempts by European countries to achieve economic, and to a lesser extent political union. The economic prosperity is covered as well as its impact on the differences between the haves and have-nots. And finally he discusses the impact of the massive immigration into Europe in the past decade and how that is changing political calculations in much of Europe.

Although the book is not a page-turner, it is sufficiently interesting to keep the attention of a readers who appreciate general history, especially at a time when the discontinuation of NATO may soon be on the table.

[Daniel Schotman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perhaps better than Judt's Post War. According to Kershaw himself, the most difficult book he ever wrote but arguably also the best book he ever wrote. It should be mandatory reading for every European politician or individual that thinks Europe, or the EU should be dismantled.

Though quite a lot of ground to cover in 700 pages, the book is extremely well balances, never rushes a subject and dealt with all the major events in the last 75 years.

Sometimes his own preferences can be read clearly through the lines and ovbiously not a fan of the Brexit, Johnson, Putin, Neo-Liberalism or people that actively seek to disolve the EU, but as he shares this with myself, I did not find it frustrating. Rather do I believe that it is good that an intellectual of his stature speaks out against this madness.

Extremely highly recomanded.

[Justin Evans · Rating 2 out of 5]

I'm very surprised at the praise this is getting on GR; as other dissenters have pointed out, it reads like newspaper articles strung together, and generally exhibits the kind of two-cheers-for-liberalism thinking that caused the catastrophes--GFC, reactionary nationalism, and so on--of the early twenty-first century. Perhaps he just tried to include too much; I imagine writing a book like this is quite a difficult task. But it certainly doesn't live up to Kershaw's earlier volume on Europe during the war years.

[Hadrian · Rating 3 out of 5]

Broad history of Europe (from 30,000 feet) from the immediate post-war era to the recent past, although 2017 feels like about ten years ago at this point. The UK edition of this book is titled "Roller-Coaster" and that is a summary of the author's approach.

Curiously, Kershaw starts with the Korean War as a start of the Cold War, and the approach makes sense - the threat of area bombing and land warfare across contested areas becoming a security threat. Kershaw is also sure to devote sections of each chapter to the Soviet bloc as well, although as a historian of Germany, Kershaw is sure to emphasize both Germanys' central role in the postwar period, and the one Germany's increasing influence post-reunification.

This is largely a political and social history, with some asides on cultural issues or intellectual debates. Given that this is supposed to be a history of some hundreds of millions of people on an entire content in one volume, what Kershaw chooses to emphasize and what he omits are critical. He is also a small-l liberal; one who speaks of the goals of economic and personal liberties, yet also someone who at the very least publicly voices his sympathies for the underdog or with the casualties of other events. He views the project of European integration as a qualified success, although he knows well enough to recognize that gains are fragile and that any hope for a peaceful and democratic society is fragile and must be defended.

"The only certainty is uncertainty. Insecurity will remain a hallmark of modern life. Europe’s dips and turns, the ups and downs that have characterized its history, are sure to continue." That is the last word here.

[Frau Becker · Rating 3 out of 5]

Das las sich in gewisser Weise wie der Schulaufsatz des Klassenstrebers: Solide, kenntnisreich auch in den Details, aber etwas unorginell, ohne große These, ohne besonders spannendes theoretisches Fundament. Mehr als eine seriöse Gesamtdarstellung will das Buch allerdings auch nicht sein. Im Bezug auf Europas "große drei" GB, Frankreich und BRD erfährt man wenige Neues, und vieles aus den letzten Kapiteln hat man vor ein paar Jahren noch in der Zeitung gelesen. Aber das vordringlichste Verdienst Kershaw ist es hier, den Blick zu weiten auf weniger politisch dominante Staaten an der europäischen Peripherie. Insbesondere indem er den "Ostblock" nicht als monolithisches Gebilde darstellt, sondern die einzelnen Staaten in ihren unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen beschreibt, zeichnet er ein differenziertes Bild von einem in Kultur und Tradion diversen Kontinent, der wohl trotz aller Integrationsbemühungen nie die Einheitlichkeit eines Bundesstaates erreichen wird.
Man muss dabei aber zugute halten: Im Gegensatz zum Vorgänger "Höllensturz" sind die Entwicklungen des betrachteten Zeitraums auch schwer unter einen Hut zu bringen. Wie in einer "Achterbahn" ging es eben auf und ab mit Europa, auch das Vorhaben, die Betrachtung bis auf die unmittelbare Gegenwart auszudehnen (Ende 2017 im Hardcover, das Taschenbuch enthält noch ein Nachwort zu den Geschehnissen bis April 2020) erleichtert das Vorhaben nicht unbedingt. Auch der Fokus auf der Wirtschaftspolitik leuchtet zwar ein, bestimmen doch die Lebensumstände das politische und gesellschaftliche Denken (oder das Sein das Bewusstsein, um mit Marx zu sprechen), aber ich hätte mir gewünscht, dass demgegenüber gesellschaftliche Entwcklungen noch einen größeren Raum einnehmen. Dies hat etwa zur Folge, dass Kershaw die Zäsur der europäischen Nachkriegsgeschichte mit der ersten Ölkrise von 1973 ansetzt, während sozialgeschichtlicher orientierte Autoren wie Frank Bösch oder Phillip Sarasin diese erst in den stäten 70er Jahren verorten. Zudem vernachlässigt Kershaw nach meinem Eindruck arg die Entwicklung der Massenmedien und später des Internets und der sozialen Medien, die er weniger als Motor denn als Indikator sozialer Entwicklungen betrachtet. Deren Bedeutung für den nationalen Populismus im neuen Jahrtausend kann nicht überschätzt werden.
Insgesamt ist dies ein informatives Werk, das den Blick über den zentraleuropäischen Tellerrand ermöglicht, eine Überblick ohne große Ideen oder kontroverse Thesen bietet.

[Jeroen Vandenbossche · Rating 4 out of 5]

Roller-Coaster is the sequel to To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949 and shares some of the same qualities (see my review here)

Like its predecessor, the book is well-written and covers a lot of ground, both in geographical terms and in terms of substance. It deals with the history of the continent since the start of the Cold War in 1949 up and until the Russian annexation of Crimea, the migration crisis and the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum. Kershaw's Europe extends from Ireland in the West to Russia and the former member states of the Soviet Union in the East (although Turkey gets only scant attention). Whenever appropriate, Kershaw puts the history of Europe in a global context and recalls the major world events that have shaped the history of the continent (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis, decolonization, the Vietnam War, 9/11, the Arab Spring).

Roller-Coaster discusses the most important political, economic and social developments of the period extensively. The cultural and intellectual history of the continent, however, is dealt with less elaborately. Kershaw has a number of interesting things to say about literature, popular culture and intellectual life in the 1950s and 1960s and devotes a dedicated chapter to the topic, but the few pages on the "post-modern" spirit of the 1970s and 1980s are disappointingly shallow.

Like in To Hell and Back, Kershaw is not content to merely recount what has happened but invites us to reflect on the contingency and the meaning of the past. He does so less often, however, than in his previous book. As the title of this second volume suggests, the narrative pace is quite high and the plot is marked by many "twists and turns, ups and downs." As time progresses and the present approaches, the story even accelerates further, leaving less and less space for the more reflective asides I appreciated so much in Kershaw's previous book.

That said, I very much admired the balanced tone throughout the book. While Kershaw makes no secret of what his core values are, he does not moralize excessively and avoids the temptation of judging with hindsight. Instead, he focuses on trying to understand the interplay between individual decisions and anonymous historical forces. The chapters in the book about the role of Gorbachev in the dismantling the Soviet Union are exemplary in that respect. In them, Kershaw depicts Gorbachev as a typical case of Marx' famous insight (from The 18th Brumaire of Napoléon Bonaparte) that "men do indeed make their own history, but under circumstances which they find before them (and, it might be added, with consequences that they did not foresee.)"

This balanced understanding of the human condition, which neither underestimates the role of history's most powerful individuals nor exaggerates their control over events, pervades the entire book, setting it clearly apart from other accounts of the same period such as Hobsbawm's "Age of Extremes" or Judt's Postwar (I reviewed the latter here).

For this reason alone, it is a book I would definitely recommend.

[Xander · Rating 4 out of 5]

Contemporary historian Ian Kershaw had to write a book on twentieh century Europe for the Penguin History of Europe-series - he decided to write two books. The first book, To Hell and Back, covers the period 1919 to 1949, while the second book, Roller-Coaster, covers the period 1950-2017 (year of publishing).

Before going into Roller-Coaster, I'd like to comment on the whole Penguin series. I have been a big fan of this series, which focuses on Europe from the time of pre-classical Greece up to 2017. Each book deals with a specific era and is written by a different author. The problem with this is the huge imbalance it creates. Some authors are, frankly, better writers, than others, which means that some books are simply better than others. Also, each author is a historian, bringing his own attitude and convictions to the book, which means, in effect, that each part of the story is written from a different angle. Lastly, the timespan covered in each book differs tremendously, meaning that some historical periods are glossed over while other periods are covered in-depth.

As to this last point, I am aware of the scarcity of evidence-problem for the historian - in general, the further we go back in time, the more scarce our historical resources become, the less we can write about the period. But this problem simply doesn't cover the whole ground of imbalances inherent in the Penguin-series. For example, the period from pre-classical Greece to the fall of the western Roman Empire (ca. 1000 BC - 400 AD), is described in one meagre book of about 300 pages. Consider the period 1919-2017, which is covered in two (!) books, preceding the 1000 pages mark (!).

I don't mention this to be a sour grape, but - havinbg read the whole series of books - I can make up the balance, and I have to conclude that the further, chronologically, the series progresses, the more pages are needed to cover smaller spans of time. For me, this is a big minus, especially since the historical material doesn't warrant this approach.

Anyway, back to Kershaw's book.

Kershaw has an accessible and attractive style of writing (he's gifted), and his approach to the twentieth century - covering all political, economic, social, etc. perspectives from all different European angles - deserves applause. He sketches the developments in the Western and Eastern European blocs in relation to the background of developments in the USSR and the USA.

The content of the first 2/3 book (in general, up to 2001) is extremely interesting. Me, having been born in 1988, I grew up in a globalized world in which liberal democracy was deemed to be the golden standard for individual happiness. A unipolar world in which the USA was the shining light of freedom. So, reading about Europe's post-World War past offers me gems of insight which are very helpful to put contemporary phenomena in perspective.

For example, the concept of an 'ever closer union' is a key thought in European integration movements - such as the EU, the Eurozone, etc. - and which has to be explained in terms of massive World War II-trauma. Also, the history of Eastern European countries, which had to resist terrible bureaucratic centralized oppression - and paid dearly for it - explains why countries like Poland and Hungary are so opposed to ever-increasing centralization in the EU and the Eurozone. And to understand the Brexit, one has to take into account Great Britain's god-complex as well as their perception of European integration (the term 'common market' is illustrating).

Kershaw's beautiful description of what happened to all the Soviet states after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 enlightens a lot of things. In general, all over the world countries were plugged into the neoliberal deregulated free-market, which created some winners but even more losers. Some success stories - Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, most of all Germany - are significant, but many other countries suffered a massive fall into criminal anarcho-capitalism, in which certain individuals and groups took control over vital resources, such as oil or steel, and were able to become overnight billionaires, at the expense of immense economic suffering by the masses. Putin's popularity and his attitude towards the 'West' is entirely explainable (and understandable) in light of these events.

Another insight Kershaw illustrates clearly is how certain regions developed throughout the period covered, and how seeds of later horrors were planted in post-World War II settings. Some regions, like Yugoslavia, were able to suppress these seeds for many many years, due to charismatic or despotic leaders such as Tito, whose personality cults unified their fragmented countries - albeit only superficially. For example, when Tito finally came down in 1980, the civil war that erupted in the early 1990's - and which cost the lives of over 100.000 people and created huge displacements (resembling the aftermath of both World Wars - was almost inevitable.

Kershaw not only is able to illustrate political developments, but he is also a magnificent story-teller about the underlying economic and social structures, which were in many respects more determining and important in driving changes. For example, the de facto bankruptcy of communist economic planning ensured that the first leader who started reforming - Gorbachev in this case - would usher in the end of the biggest political experiment humanity has ever experienced. When Gorbachev decided that perestroika was the way to go, the fate of all the Soviet states, including Russia, was effectively sealed.

Behind these events, in the background, were developing economic ideas. After World War II - which whiped out much and enable Europe, with the help of US Marshall Aid - to start from scratch - a conservative consensus allowed the continent to recover. Government, companies and people realized that they had to work together to rebuild their nations, which meant in effect that social democratic ideals - access to housing, education and health care, higher wages, etc. - were put into practice. This Keynesian world was a world of boom and prosperity, which was partly fuelled by new technology, but also partly by fear of World War II. It was only after 1973 that this 'golden age' was done away with, mostly due to stagnating productivity and huge inflation ('stagflation').

These problems could only be tackled within a new economic framework, which focused on liberalizing and deregulating all products and services, including government services, and cutting government expenditures, including social welfare and healthcare. This neoliberal age saw the de-coupling of currencies from the gold standard and the dollar, severe austerity measures to cut government debts and the boom of deregulated financial markets (enabled by new information and communication technologies).

This dominant neoliberal framework spread all across the globe and forced post-communist countries to plunge into huge shortages, unemployment and massive social and economic suffering - euphemistically labeled 'shock therapy' - which they only left behind them after a decade of problems. This framework is also the main explanation for the financial crisis in 2008, that plunged economies into serious problems. It is ironic that the same framework that caused to problem was used to solve the problem (austerity, quantitive easing, etc.).

These are some of the main developments that chracterize the era 1950-2017. Of course, there's more to be said (the islamic threat, the rise of populism, etc.), but it is impossible to do justice to such a huge work (600+ pages), so I rather leave it at that.

It's an incredibly interesting book and Kershaw is a truly gifted writer, yet I found the last 1/3 of the book (dealing with post-9/11 Europe) to be a bit tiresome. This period is too fresh in our memories to offer an interesting story in such a book. Also, the more we approach here and now, the more ideology and interpretation becomes involved. For example, Kershaw fulminates against populism (populist-nationalism), which characterizes much of contemporary European politics and led to Trump, Brexit, European populist parties, etc. I don't agree with him on that - populism is a reaction to growing income and wealth inequalities in the West due to policies of globalization, neoliberalism and unchecked democracy. Not seeing this, hinders one's understanding of the situation - you can't understand Trump or Brexit without understanding the consequences of neoliberalism post-1973.

What people like Trump and Farage offer might not be likeable to academics nor be solutions to the problem, yet one has to acknowledge that all the mainstream media and parties offer now solution either, while refusing to agree on the obvious analysis. People inherently feel this misleading of the people - parties that used to exist for protecting the worker have now adopted a neoliberal framework in which they look for solutions to problems. Trump and Brexit offer people the only available tangible alternatives to the current status quo by which they are injured. Former left- and rightwing parties have become mainstream technocrats, trying to look for solutions within the current system. But more and more people feel like we need a new system to begin with - which damages the interests of the mainstream parties and media, etc. I find it extremely frustrating that academics and intellectuals refuse to face these facts; the cognitive dissonance might be too much for people who grew up within the system and who have been conditioned to look at the current system as intrinsically 'good'.

A second issue is Kershaw's own ideological stance when it comes to economics: it is easy to read he rejects neoliberalism (especially Thatcher), while accepting that Keynes offers no solution (anymore) either. Even though I agree with him, I don't like to read politics in a book on history - also neoliberalism was a natural product of economic developments in the period 1950-1973. By now it has become more a hindrance to progress, but it will itself be the fountain of a new economic development.

In short: it's a good book, highly recommendable and readable, yet the timespan (1950-2017) is a bit too limited to justify a book of 600+ pages. The last two chapters (100 pages) could have been left out, as well as Kershaw's personal views - besides this: I have nothing to complain!


---------------------------------

EDIT: I have found a sort of appendix to his book, written in 2018, in which he reviews the big recent trends and tries to sketch some (very borad) future outlines for Europe. In this afterword, Kershaw does acknowledge the gradual destruction of the social contract through neoliberalism; the continuing individualization & automation and the toll both take on the social sides of our societies; the problems with the shift to a multipolar world, especially with relation to the fragmentary nature of Europe itself; and the bibbest future threats to European safety and prosperity.

In short: this afterwords shows me that Kershaw does get the points I mentioned above, and that I was much too hasty to condemn him as someone that doesn't see the problems for what they are. And with this, I raise my review of this book with one star - I'm even more impressed by Kershaw's witty analysis and his sharp remarks!

[Carlos Wang · Rating 4 out of 5]

《激盪時代》跟它的姊妹作《地獄之行》，是《企鵝歐洲史》系列的最後兩部，作者都是伊恩‧克肖(Ian Kershaw)。這系列幾年前由中國的中信新思出版社率先引進，除了當時尚在撰寫的文藝復興篇跟本書之外，全部都一口氣推出。而過了幾年，可能是出於成本跟銷售考慮，八旗只選擇了這兩本。《地獄之行》早先已經拜讀並寫了一篇心得，而當本書推出時，我也毫不猶豫地購入。讀完之後，可以肯定，這本簡體版應該是不會生出來了，就算有，也是大量刪減，既有完全版，何必選劣本？而作者克肖是當代最知名的納粹德國研究者，簡體書市引進了其兩大卷《希特勒傳》跟另外一本《命運攸關的抉擇》，我皆已拜讀，都是口碑作。


關於戰後歐洲史，其實繁體書市有三部佳作可供選擇，其一是著名英國左派史家霍布斯邦的《極端的年代》。這部成書較早，帶有濃郁的時代背景與作者個人色彩。霍老選擇了論述而非敘事的寫法，雖然他自述說受眾是「一般大學生」，不過個人認為他說的應該是「大學還是菁英教育時代」的大學生吧。至少，個人是覺得《極端的年代》對讀者基本素養要求是挺高的。如果你能做到其要求，就可以沉浸在這位大師的對二十世紀的理解之中，中文譯本水準也不差。

其二是東尼‧賈德(Tony Judt)的《戰後歐洲六十年》。賈德的寫法是敘事性，但常常有作者個人的論述混在其中，他對許多史事有其個人的批判，而且都非常有教益。雖然中文譯本四大本看上去似乎令人生畏，但其實會手不釋卷，一不小心就看完了，至少我個人是拜讀了兩次。

其三就是本書《激盪時代》，成書最晚，敘及的年代也是最近的2017年，採敘事手法，特色是時不時有作者「親身經驗」。不過個人覺得，可能是因為後半部較非作者本身專長，本書的整體感覺是略遜於其姊妹作《地獄之行》，克肖對戰後很多史事的描述都沒搔到癢處，也沒太特別的見地。到了接近當代的部分，他對歐洲的變化與隱憂的討論倒還是值得一看的，特別是在今時今日，可以略做對照。個人倒是挺好奇他又是如何看待經歷疫情跟面對烏俄戰爭威脅下的當代。

總的來說，如果可以，上述三部都看完，二十世紀以後的歐洲史基本上至少也通了個七八成了。如果說非要我比個優劣，這是不容易的，但時間有限要選的話，我還是會先推賈德的作品吧。

但是，在如今風雲變色的年代，其實個人有一種深深的夢迴1930年代之感；當此時也，細讀一下克肖這兩部作品，是有其意義的。

[Stefania · Rating 5 out of 5]

Να μελετάτε το παρελθόν. Το παρελθόν είναι πρόλογος.
Η Ιστορία παρέχει απλώς κάποιες πληροφορίες που βοηθούν να διαμορφώσουμε μια άποψη για αυτό που δεν είμαστε σε θέση να προβλέψουμε.
Πόσο αδιανόητα σημαντικό είναι έστω και αυτό.

[Schopfi · Rating 5 out of 5]

"this is where we are now" is a sentence no serious historian utters lightly. A balanced view of the past, unobscured by the emotional distortion that always accompanies present experience is hard enough to obtain. Writing a book about the most recent chapter of history, bordering on the present, while remaining a balanced observer intending to create a truthful narrative is in my opinion a monumental task. Kershaw takes on the challenge and offers the reader (if he/she is an inhabitant (citizen?) of Europe) a rare gift: a view from above onto the territory one has to navigate. Agree with the authors expressed opinions at times or don't. It is not a book that is supposed to put forward a specific political perspective. It does not offer solutions. However it offers something we are in great need for if we are to find solutions: it offers perspective.

[Liviu · Rating 5 out of 5]

The usual "God's view" of European history in the given period but very well written and keeping one turning pages until the end; highly recommended and arguably among the best in the series - The Pursuit of Glory and The Pursuit of Power are the other truly outstanding books in the series, though all 9that i read at least) were interesting

[carl theaker · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good introduction to the happenings in Europe for this contemporary era. 562 pages an introduction? 67 years for couple dozen countries is a lot to cover. Fortunately Author Kershaw writes in an engaging style, however as with a history of this nature you have to cover economics, so unless you’re fasciated that Hungary’s GDP was 1.5% higher than Romania’s in 1957, you may want to power read a few sections.

In the forward Kershaw notes his own peculiar situation with constructing this volume, which is despite being the author of dozens of books on European history, he has never written a history on a period in which he was alive. He fears the lack of objectivity and the problem of one’s own experiences intruding on the story.

To add my take on this noted peculiarity, this is exactly what the book suffers from, that is, it reads like Kershaw’s own personal take on events, more of an opinion piece. With his knowledge and experience he of course has great insight to the many important events, it just seems like he is cheering for things to go a certain way.

He has a problem with Triumphalism, a word only an historian could love, or make up, which means he really dislikes it when something goes right for some country, and immediately starts to tear it down.

This is connected to that whenever an outside force has an effect on the region, say the USA, China, Russia or the Middle East, if the effect is negative for Europe, there is a full explanation, if it positive, a one-liner seems to do.

When the story moves to more contemporary times, say after 2000, it feels like I’m reading the news. I don’t entirely fault the author, it is that his opinions sound like any other one may read or see comments about. One can wonder, when does history start, or end?

[Jake Brown · Rating 2 out of 5]

I’m not finished with this book. I will finish it, and I’ll correct this if I’m wrong, but here’s the experience so far (I’ve reached the 1968 protests): we are told Western capitalist countries do bad things in spite of being good and Eastern communist countries do bad things all the time, every day, because they are bad, and when they do good things occasionally it is because of realpolitik and in spite of their overall badness.

This thesis has certainly found legs in Mr. Kershaw, even if those legs have a few sprains and possess a certain tendency to retread the same ground. Kershaw discusses the untangling of European empires and contrasts it with the Soviet control of its sphere of influence. We’re told the English and French let go of their empire easily, the former having suspiciously good trade deals with its former colonies and the last having a protracted colonialist war against Algeria as it fought for its independence. Wait. That’s not... But Kershaw informs us that, really, the French really did think Algeria was their possession and were really just confused about the whole thing. And thought they were having an oversea’s civil war. It might be the historian’s job to present the viewpoints of the time but it surely isn’t their prerogative to convince us they had a point, it really makes you think, etc. It doesn’t matter really though because Kershaw doesn’t spend a lot of time talking about the 8 year war that decimated Algeria while they struggled against their colonial abusers, he’s too busy writing pages on pages about how the Soviets made it a monthly vacation to park tanks on Czech land. Of course the Soviet attempts to reign in their satellites should be documented and it’s fair to document them harshly. However, Kershaw’s prose is heavy-handed and clearly biased. France overturns it’s own government and gives de Gaulle expanded presidential powers that he would use for 10 years until he chose to resign and we’re told they got overzealous in their democracy and accusations of leaning back towards autocracy are unfounded. West Germany elects a former Nazi who creates a bill that would strip many freedoms in a state of emergency and protestors are described as whiny students who were unfair to call West Germany—which allowed many prominent Nazis power in its government—an extension of Nazism!

And now in 1968, Western students with socialist or communist beliefs who fought against their respective capitalist regimes are described in many uncharitable terms, but mostly as whiny and all of them as loud minorities. The protestors in the Soviet block of the same year are members of the silent majority, even though many of the lay folk didn’t side with them either! But we must take it to be so, because the Soviet state is bad and all those who lived under it must have seen it as bad.

Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin speech is both cynical and misleading while being on the whole factually correct. Kershaw is able to accept this into the evidence because it furthers what he takes to be true. I’m sure I wouldn’t want to live under Stalin’s USSR but I think the guy who you know to be fudging the numbers to legitimize his own rule, and who would in fact backstab the very liberalizing he promised within the month, should be treated with more skepticism than “damn he sucks but also we live in a society that makes you think.”

Kershaw probably should have just written a cultural examination of the 50s-70s, by which I mean just a history of its pop-culture, because it’s both the most interesting part so far and also when he seems to be actually enjoying himself. He gets to use italics and write in French. He gets to ignore how the Marshall plan was a cynical way to buy Western Europe out of being communist. He doesn’t have to deal with Francoist and the post-Franco dictatorship of Spain and Portugal, fascist regimes propped up by American and European capital, which, come to think of it, he still has yet to do. Well, he did call them “hangovers of yesteryear,” which, you know, is a very fun and sexy way to dismiss the brutal authoritarianism that terrorized the Iberian region. He spends more ink on left-wing terrorists that killed a few dozen at most and operated for ten years than he does on regimes that committed mass slaughter and shoveled their heaps of victims into unmarked, crowded graves. Quite the fucking hangover, eh, Ian?

Don’t read this book. Just read a couple of those “google Venezuela” memes, and that one picture of a superstore that says “Why would you be socialist when we have this?” It’ll save you time, money, and you don’t miss out on much.

Edit: Oh fuck I just remembered he does not list his sources. He has a selected bibliography section, but which fact corresponds to which source is your fucking guess.

[Dvd (#) · Rating 4 out of 5]

20/11/2021 (****)
Un ottimo saggio, estremamente corposo e denso, che ripercorre la storia d'Europa dal 1950 al 2019.
Lo consiglierei per una panoramica completa e piuttosto imparziale sulla storia europea fino agli anni novanta; gli ultimi capitoli, troppo ravvicinati a livello temporale per potersi essere sedimentati, si trasformano sostanzialmente in cronaca e quindi li si può leggere con la stessa impostazione con cui si affronta un lungo articolo di giornale (o un istant book, come ce ne sono molti e che vanno molto di moda), poiché non sappiamo quanto di quello che noi oggi consideriamo importante rimarrà raccontato nei futuri libri di storia.

Il saggio, che come detto è molto denso e quindi richiede rigore e interesse per essere affrontato, ha due punti deboli.
Il primo deriva dal campo di studio e dalla biografia dell'autore, inglese di Manchester che si è occupato primariamente di storia tedesca del Novecento. Evidentemente, anche questo libro - come il precedente (All'inferno e ritorno: Europa 1914-1949) - è focalizzato in misura largamente maggioritaria su quanto avvenuto in Germania e Gran Bretagna; poi in Francia e in Italia; poi in tutti gli altri paesi (anche se ampissime parti sono riservate agli accadimenti nei paesi del blocco sovietico). Il rischio, che mi pare Kershaw corra, è di far sembrare gli eventi europei una sorta di regolare e prevedibile conseguenza di quanto avvenuto prima in Germania, facendo risalire sempre a questo paese e ai suoi rapporti con le altre nazioni europee (e, ovviamente, con le superpotenze del tempo) le cause di tutti i cambiamenti.
La realtà a parer mio è diversa, e riporta sempre a quella constatazione, vera ieri come oggi, che vedeva nella Germania un gigante economico ma un nano politico, assolutamente incapace e/o inadatto a prendere decisioni di natura diplomatica e inerente gli affari esteri, in particolare quando confliggono con il proprio, complesso equilibrio interno.
Il comportamento della Germania, e lo dice anche l'autore nella parte finale del saggio, tende all'immobilismo, alla preservazione di una Unione europea largamente imperfetta e malfunzionante ma che garantisca la tenuta della sua politica interna e ne favorisca gli sviluppo confacenti, evitando il più possibile brusche sterzate o nette prese di posizione. Non c'è nulla, purtroppo, che lasci trapelare in quel grande paese l'ambizione di governare e gestire con razionalità il cambiamento che sarebbe necessario per portare il continente a una vera unione politica. Le ombre del passato pesano, sia in terra tedesca che nelle altre nazioni e manca del tutto, lì e nel resto d'Europa, una visione che trascenda il mero utilitarismo scivonista nonché una classe politica anche solo vagamente capace di imbastire qualcosa del genere. Infine e soprattutto, tutti evitano accuratamente di parlare della tigre nell'armadio quando si parla di unificazione europea, ossia che la stessa porterebbe automaticamente alla sparizione degli stati nazionali (che non potrebbero in nessun modo rimanere in vita anche solo come stati federali).
Ciò detto, e considerata l'inadeguatezza di Italia e Francia nel prendere l'iniziativa, mi pare che il libro tenda a sopravvalutare il reale peso politico della Germania nella seconda metà del Novecento, compreso il periodo attuale.

Il secondo punto debole è che il saggio si ferma al '19, al racconto del populismo rampante, dei riflussi della crisi economica e della crisi migranti. Non ha quindi potuto recepire l'avvento nel 2020 dell'imponderabile cigno nero dei nostri tempi. La crisi generata da questo sarà, credo, immensamente più profonda e duratura di tutte le altre crisi, economiche o politiche, e potrebbe delineare scenari inaspettati e accelerazioni improvvise, di solito verso terre inesplorate esacerbando fenomeni già in atto in precedenza (la sparizione dei partiti politici, ad esempio, e a cosa porterà solo gli Dei lo sanno - anche se io qualche ipotesi ce l'ho).

Ciò detto, il libro è ben scritto ed è particolarmente meritevole nelle pagine dedicate al blocco sovietico, mettendone in evidenza le poche luci e le molte ombre; altro punto a favore, una equilibrata sintesi dialettica fra i punti di vista dei due grandi sistemi economici (e politici) del nostro tempo, quello a impostazione keynesiana e quello a impostazione neoliberista (di cui non amo affatto le fondamente ideologiche, piuttosto aberranti, ma che in alcuni aspetti è necessario per mediare le storture degli estremismi ideologici dell'altra corrente). Molto ben descritto anche il collasso dell'Unione Sovietica e il ruolo decisivo delle politiche di Gorbaciov.

Consigliato.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really well written History of Europe since the Second World War. Having lived through the majority of the post-war period myself, it was quite jarring to read such a broad sweep of history. This is because, as a politically aware teenager in the 80s, the existence of a cold war seemed interminable and destined to last for ever. However, reading it in this way, the division of Europe between East and West, the existence of the Warsaw Pact, the GDR etc seem like a brief aberration. The book ends with the twin shocks of Trump becoming US president and the Leave victory in the EU referendum and, as such, paints a bleak and uncertain prognosis for the future of Europe in the short term. A very sobering read.

[Andrew Morin · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's not Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, but its still enjoyable.

I liked the Global Age, but it still seems to have gaps. This is understandable given that Kershaw has another decade to cover and hundreds of pages less to work with than did Judt, but he still seems to leave major themes minimally (for example, regionalism: touched on in Scotland and Spain, totally disregarded in Corsica). The book is also largely lacking in the intellectual and cultural history that Judt excels at, though this is less of a fault and more of a stylistic choice. There's also a bigger step back from the history: while the author includes some footnotes of his own experiences of major events, in the main, his analysis is less personal and more objective.

Still, there are things I think Kershaw did better. He does a better job in my mind of tying together trends and movements between the East and West of the continent, creating a more firmly "European" history of the entire continent especially during the first 400 pages, the Cold War. The last hundred pages of the book also give a good indication of contemporary Europe, from the period immediately before Judt's publication in 2005 to this book's, in 2017. He also does much better at integrating the Eastern periphery of the continent, integrating Soviet and Russian history as a critical part of the book's narrative.

The book is significantly shorter than both of its non-Kershaw predecessors in the Penguin History of Europe series, as well as Judt's work, its most direct competitor. Given the complexity of the period and the many threads that need to be tracked, I think it could certainly have benefited from the extra length. Possibly as a result, I don't like this one as much as Evan's The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815-1914 or Blanning's The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648-1815.Still, the book does give an accessible overview of political, economic, and social trends over the last 70 years of European history: a difficult task that it largely accomplishes.

[Lefki Sarantinou · Rating 5 out of 5]

Πολύ αξιόλογη περιπλάνηση στα ιστορικά ευρωπαϊκά μονοπάτια του εικοστού αιώνα και του εικοστού πρώτου.
Καίριες παρατηρήσεις για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, για τη σημερινή κατάσταση στην Ουκρανία και για το Brexit.
Το συνιστώ ανεπιφύλακτα!

[Stefanos · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well written and researched, as expected by a leading scholar in the field. Despite being a tad outside his subject specialism, Ian Kershaw wrote a compelling, fascinating, insightful account of post-war Europe. Reservations and difficulties notwithstanding, especially in regard to the author's standpoint (purportedly middle ground), this is a damn good book.

[Illiterate · Rating 1 out of 5]

Journalistic narrative history. Having lived through much of it, it seems familiar and cliched.

[Gerbrand · Rating 4 out of 5]

In dit deel beschrijft Kershaw de geschiedenis van Europa vanaf 1950. En net als het eerste deel, Afdaling in de hel, Europa 1914 – 1948: veel feiten en relatief weinig citaten. Maar wel erg gedetailleerd en compleet. Voor een sappiger maar minder compleet verhaal over de recente geschiedenis van Europa moet je toch echt In Europa van Geert Mak lezen.

Toch bijzonder om te lezen deze samenvatting van de moderne geschiedenis, vooral omdat je het grootste deel daarvan zelf heb meegemaakt! Dus inderdaad veel herkenning: bijvoorbeeld Oost- en West-Berlijn, het IJzeren Gordijn, de Koude Oorlog, de oliecrisis, glasnost en Joegoslavië. En mensen als Helmut Kohl, Willy Brandt, Margaret Thatcher en Gorbatsjov passeren de revue. Kortom je geheugen wordt weer helemaal opgefrist! En ook goed om de huidige en komende tijd van een behoorlijk historisch kader te voorzien.

7/10, een halve ster aftrek omdat het wat smeuïger had gemogen.

[Jemma · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good overview of the postwar years, which most of us will benefit from reading. The surprise however was that it was often dull, as many criticise history for being. This is not typical of Kershaw's usual work, which has more verve.

Part of the problem is that it starts with the Cold War's early years. This is sensible but makes for a dry start and many will lose interest. Anti Communist protests in the GDR and Poland are interesting if you already know about the later Hungarian and Czech uprisings but a bit obscure for general readers

The main problem however is there is no overarching theme here, giving coherence to the whole. The publishers have been overly ambitious in covering the whole of the time since the war, which doesn't have a clear narrative. It would've been far better to tackle the postwar years in two volumes, probably splitting the story in 1973, 1989, 1992 or 2000.

[Thomas Rotthier · Rating 5 out of 5]

Vlot geschreven overzicht van de naoorlogse Europese geschiedenis.
Kershaw is geen specialist in de naoorlogse geschiedenis maar heeft zich er uitgebreid voor ingelezen. Dat maakt zijn prestatie indrukwekkend.

Ik heb vooral veel bijgeleerd over de grote staatsmannen in Duitsland (Adenauer, Schmidt, Kohl), over de DDR, over de regimes in het Oostblok (Hongarije, Polen, Roemenië), over Joegoslavië onder Tito en de vreselijke oorlogen daarna, over de cruciale rol van Gorbatsjov bij het razendsnelle uiteenvallen van de Sovjetunie, de invloed van het neoliberalisme vanaf de jaren '80.

Kershaw behoudt een neutrale positie, maar blijft desalniettemin betrokken. Het is geen kil boek. In de voetnoten vind je een aantal persoonlijke anekdotes uit zijn eigen leven.

Het boek is ook een goeie aanzet om verder te lezen over de vele thema's en landen die erin worden besproken.

Warm aanbevolen.

[Andres Felipe Contreras Buitrago · Rating 4 out of 5]

Escribir libros de un tema tan denso y complejo a veces resulta difícil, muchas veces se puede caer en ser muy denso, haciéndo de la lectura algo aburrida; sin embargo, siento que Kershaw logra hacer una buena narración, sin centrarse solo en Europa occidental, puesto que también menciona la otra parte oriental. El libro también es bastante objetivo, en comparación con otros como El siglo de la revolución de Joseph Fontana.

El relato inicia luego de la segunda guerra mundial, tenemos un contexto de una Europa que se está reconstruyendo gracias a Estados Unidos qué quiere tener su influencia en el continente, esto lo hace a través de la OTAN y una gran inversión militar, el tener armas nucleares en Francia y gran Bretaña es una medida de disuasión y mostrar autoridad frente a las otras naciones, la gente se sienten más seguras con estas.

La Unión Soviética, por su parte, expande su esfera de poder hacia la Europa del este, aunque no lo consigue en Yugoslavia donde hay un sentimiento muy fuerte anti- Stalin, el socialismo en esta república es muy diferente, y toda su estabilidad recae en el general Tito, el cual consigue calmar los ánimos de un país tan dividido etnicamente.

Alemania, es dividida en dos, al igual que Berlín, aunque la parte occidental es mucho más próspera que la oriental, esto generó una gran migración de esta última a la primera, es así que la Unión Soviética procede a la construcción de un muro, mismo que no es muy repudiado por occidente, pero que si dejo una estela de muerte para la gente que intentara escapar. En la parte occidental triunfa su democracia gracias a su milagro económico, su enemigo comunista y una nueva constitución más democrática; por otra parte, en gran parte de Europa Occidental sus imperios colonialistas verán su declive, luego de que fracasara su intervención en el canal de Suez, ahora Europa debería preocuparse más por ella.

Un milagro económico también se ciñe en la Europa occidental, que desde 1950 hasta la década de lo setenta vive años dorados gracias a un proceso de reconstrucción acelerada y un gran proceso de libre mercado, la mano de obra también ayuda. Este auge económico ayudó a crear políticas sociales para las personas. En el Europa del este, el crecimiento económico no están acelerado, pero aún así la gente vive mejor que antes de la guerra; sin embargo, la Urss las está controlando constantemente, cuando un país como un Hungría o Polonia (1956), diciden protestar o hacer cambios los soviéticos la invaden, está protestas eran más comunes en países con una mayor identidad nacional y con un mayor sentir anti-soviético.

También hay cambios culturales en Europa donde hay un mayor pensamiento nihilista y existencial, los temas de la guerra y el holocausto no son tan tocados, la memoria que reina es la victoria y resistencia de cada nación ante la Alemania hitleriana, se masifica el uso de la televisión, la lavadora y la nevera. La música que suena es el Rock y el pop; el cine de Hollywood inunada Europa y las mujeres luchan por derechos sexuales y reproductivos.

El mayor acceso a los estudios universitarios y el surgimiento de una nueva juventud cansada de los viejos líderes llevo a protestas en 1968, en Italia, Alemania Occidental y Francia, en Checoslovaquia se vive su propia revolución donde se dan políticas más autónomas de la Urss, estos proceden a invadir este país, sirviendo de recordatorio de quien manda en este lado del telón de acero.

En 1973 y 1979, hay una crisis en el petróleo haciendo que el precio del barril aumente mucho, generado que los países aumente la inflación, el desempleo y se recorten las prestaciones sociales, todo esto generó en muchas protestas de la clase obrera; en Grecia, España y Portugal se caen los últimos gobiernos autoritarios dando pasó a más a democracias occidentales. En Inglaterra, con Margaret thatcher, se lleva a cabo un proceso de privatización durante los ochenta que afectó mucho a los trabajadores mineros, en esta década el neoliberalismo poco a poco se irá asentado en los países.

Por su parte en el este de Europa, la llegada de Gorbachov, iniciaría un proceso para restrcuturar y reformar el régimen soviético, ante esto varios países del este iniciarán muchas protestas y alzarán su voz para exigir la independencia de su país, esto se podía hacer gracias a que Gorbachov no tenía pensado invadir países y por el contrario ahogaba por una mayor autonomía, la caída del muro de Berlín, gracias a la presión social y a las políticas más liberales de Gorbachov, conllevo a que muchos países se liberarán de la influencia soviética. Con el intento golpe de estado hacia el dirigente soviético se mostró una vez la debilidad de este, generado más independencias dentro de la Urss como la de Ucrania y Bielorusia.

La década de los noventa se mostraba como una que traería paz y mayor estabilidad gracias al fin de la guerra fría; no obstante, las guerras en Yugoslavia mostraron todo lo anterior, las muerte de Tito trajo consigo un gran sentimiento nacionalista entre serbios, croatas y bosnios, existiendo un gran guerra entre los tres, siendo los primeros los más despiadados, Europa fue incapaz de hacer algo, y nuevamente Estado Unidos intervino por medio de bombardeos en los que mueren muchos civiles.

Por otra parte, las políticas neoliberales se estaban llevando a cabo, en unos países eran más exitosas, por lo general en los que tenían unas mejores condiciones previas, como una mejor industria y comercio. Está fue la forma en que los países del este se unieron a occidente. También Europa se estaba uniendo lentamente bajo la unión europea.

Tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre, Europa ayudó a Estados Unidos a apoyar la invasión en Afganistán, pero en la Irak fue mayor el rechazo ante el temor de una mayor radicalización de grupos musulmanes, cosa que pasó. El terrorismo en Europa, género muchos ataques en los que morían muchos civiles, Frente a esto surge una mayor vigilancia en todos los aspectos y toman fuerza partidos de extrema derecha, culpando a los migrantes de los atentados; y es que entre 2015-2016 hubo una crisis se refugiados que mostró la xenofobia que aún había en Europa, fue Alemania la que más albergó a estos, pero Inglaterra usuaria está migración, más otros aspectos, con el fin de salirse de la Unión europea con el brexit del 2016.

La crisis económica del 2008 golpeó a toda Europa, cada país salió de una forma distinta, pero siguiendo el caso anterior sirvió para una mayor fuerza de partidos de extrema derecha y nacionalistas, se debieron tomar medidas austeras y también el estado debió de rescatar a los bancos en quiebra, mientras que los ciudadanos recibían el mayor impacto conllevando a protestas. Con la invasión de Rusia de Crimea en el 2014, era claro que llegaban un nuevo aire de guerra fría, en el que una Rusia humillada y con un mayor sentimiento nacional desafiara a occidente.

Ya en las conclusiones, pese a todo, Europa consiguió una paz y prosperidad más duradera, pese a las diferencias de los países, lo une un pasado en común de guerras y valores democráticos estrechos, es cada vez más importante una mayor unión alejando a Estados Unidos de la influencia que puede tener en el continente, aún hay problemas ambientales y de desigualdad que deben solucionarse en el antiguo continente.

Un buen libro para saber muy bien la historia de Europa y entender muchos fenómenos que nos atañen hoy en día.

[Roo Marshall · Rating 3 out of 5]

The early chapters were interesting and a good read. Well constructed and bringing together the main themes around the continent.
I thought the last couple of chapters suffered from being too recent. They became rather lacking in theme and structure and rather too much focus on the UK. Would have been better to stop around the millennium.
The Afterword also does not stand up well following COVID and Putin’s invasion.