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If a Lion Could Talk: Animal Intelligence and the Evolution of Consciousness
How many of us have caught ourselves gazing into the eyes of a pet, wondering what thoughts lie behind those eyes? Or fallen into an argument over which is smarter, the dog or the cat? Scientists have conducted elaborate experiments trying to ascertain whether animals from chimps to pigeons can communicate, count, reason, or even lie. So does science tell us what we assume -- that animals are pretty much like us, only not as smart? Simply, no. Now, in this superb book, Stephen Budiansky poses the fundamental "What is intelligence?" His answer takes us on the ultimate wildlife adventure to animal consciousness. Budiansky begins by exposing our tendency to see ourselves in animals. Our anthropomorphism allows us to perceive intelligence only in behavior that mimics our own. This prejudice, he argues, betrays a lack of imagination. Each species is so specialized that most of their abilities are simply not comparable. At the mercy of our anthropomorphic tendencies, we continue to puzzle over pointless issues like whether a wing or an arm is better, or whether night vision is better than day vision, rather than discovering the real world of a winged nighthawk, a thoroughbred horse, or an African lion. Budiansky investigates the sometimes bizarre research behind animal intelligence from horses who can count or ace history quizzes, and primates who seem fluent in sign language, to rats who seem to have become self-aware, he reveals that often these animals are responding to our tiny unconscious cues. And, while critically discussing scientists' interpretations of animal intelligence, he is able to lay out their discoveries in terms of what we know about ourselves. For instance, by putting you in the minds of dogs or bees who travel by dead reckoning, he demonstrates that this is also how you find your way down a familiar street with almost no conscious awareness of your navigation system. Modern cognitive science and the new science of evolutionary ecology are beginning to show that thinking in animals is tremendously complex and wonderful in its variety. A pigeon's ability to find its way home from almost anywhere has little to do with comparative intelligence; rather it is due to the pigeon's very different perception of the world. That's why, as Wittgenstein said, "If a lion could talk, we would not understand him." In this fascinating book, Budiansky frees us from the shackles of our ideas about the natural world, and opens a window to the astounding worlds of the animals that surround us.
256 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1998
5 people are currently reading
182 people want to read
About the author
Stephen Budiansky
25 books113 followersHistorian and journalist Stephen Budiansky is the author of twelve books about military history, science, and nature.
His latest book is The Bloody Shirt: Terror After Appomattox, which chronicles the struggles of five courageous men in the post-Civil War South as they battled a rising tide of terrorist violence aimed at usurping the newly won rights of the freedmen.
His latest book is The Bloody Shirt: Terror After Appomattox, which chronicles the struggles of five courageous men in the post-Civil War South as they battled a rising tide of terrorist violence aimed at usurping the newly won rights of the freedmen.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
September 4, 2019
A fascinating discussion of anthropomorphism when investigating animal cognition. Budiansky intelligently questions the interpretation of animal behaviour, and the apparent human need to attribute human qualities to animals, by discussing our own cognition using things such as the Turing test and the Chinese Room Problem; if you can only ever observe outward behaviour can you really ever prove that something thinks? Budiansky discusses the difference between conscious and unconscious behaviour and how behaviourism can be misinterpreted as cognition; just because a dog sits upon command does not mean it understands the concept of sit, even though this is the behaviour it is demonstrating. There is also the difficulty of speciesism as humans often judge animals to be less intelligent as they do not demonstrate language, however they have many evolutionarily adapted skills that increase their fitness to survive. Budiansky suggests that animals’ seemingly intelligent behaviours are innate and have evolved in response to the environment and thus are not as intelligent as they seem or a rival to our cognition. When comparing species this needs to be taken into account, for example rats may seem less intelligent than monkeys but this could simply be because often visual tasks are used and their visual systems are less sophisticated; when olfactory tasks have been used they show much greater intelligence. This therefore demonstrates the problems with testing and comparing different species. Budiansky also discusses language, communication and how animals do not demonstrate theory of mind and an ability to grasp others’ intentions.
September 14, 2019
It's been a few years since I read this, but from memory it's a behaviourist's view of the mentation and emotional world of animals and of the human capacity to anthropomorphise, projecting conscious intent and emotional values on mechanistic stimulus/response processes.
I vacillated about buying into the 'animal as machine' concept, but ultimately it doesn't fit with my experience of animals, at least not the higher ones. While I wouldn't impute the full human range of emotions to animals, I do believe that they are on a spectrum of feeling with us, and not in a completely different order of experiencing. Perhaps I'm deluding myself.
My understanding of evolution is that it proceeds in incremental steps, building on previous developments to produce more adaptive characteristics. It therefore seems unlikely to me that the human way of perceiving the world is entirely without precedent. The alternative, I guess, is that humans, too, are stimulus/response mechanisms with delusions of grandeur but, again, that doesn't entirely match my own experience which, in the end, is all I have upon which to base a judgement.
I vacillated about buying into the 'animal as machine' concept, but ultimately it doesn't fit with my experience of animals, at least not the higher ones. While I wouldn't impute the full human range of emotions to animals, I do believe that they are on a spectrum of feeling with us, and not in a completely different order of experiencing. Perhaps I'm deluding myself.
My understanding of evolution is that it proceeds in incremental steps, building on previous developments to produce more adaptive characteristics. It therefore seems unlikely to me that the human way of perceiving the world is entirely without precedent. The alternative, I guess, is that humans, too, are stimulus/response mechanisms with delusions of grandeur but, again, that doesn't entirely match my own experience which, in the end, is all I have upon which to base a judgement.
February 7, 2019
Very much worthwhile, but contentious
This is a very slippery book on a very slippery subject. What Stephen Budiansky is trying to do is demonstrate from his reading of the literature, including experiments published in peer-reviewed journals, that there is a distinction to be made between the minds of humans and all other animals. Budiansky seems not to believe that intelligence and consciousness are matters of degree, but matters of threshold. Following philosopher Daniel Dennett he attributes this nearly absolute difference between us and them to our ability to use symbolic language.
The reason the subject is so slippery is that an adequate definition of both intelligence and consciousness is lacking. The reason the book is contentious naturally follows from this, but additionally Budiansky seems to have an agenda or, call it a thesis. He writes: "Consciousness is a wonderful gift and a wonderful curse that, all the evidence suggests, is not in the realm of the sentient experiences of other creatures." (p. 194)
How true or not his statement may be really depends on the definition of consciousness. Unfortunately Budiansky does not give one, and so all his conclusions about the differences in consciousness between humans and other creatures are murky at best. The closest he comes to a definition is on page 193 where he asserts that "...language is so intimately tied to consciousness that the two seem inseparable." Using this "definition" it is only a matter of demonstrating that animals do not have language in order to demonstrate that they don't have consciousness.
However even in this I don't think Budiansky is successful. Much of the book is given over to showing how so many experiments using chimps and monkeys, pigeons and dogs, etc., that seem to demonstrate that language use by animals is just signaling. This position is well known. The argument is that humans are the only animals with grammatical, syntactical and symbolic ability built into their brains. Other animals cannot construct sentences because they have no syntax. They have no "theory of mind" because they cannot think symbolically.
But this is not proven, as Budiansky acknowledges. What is obvious is that whatever language ability other animals have is rudimentary compared to that of humans. And almost everyone would agree that the consciousness demonstrated by animals varies considerably. By the way, here's a quick definition of consciousness: awareness including self-awareness, identify, and experience or sensation: the feelings we get when we experience the world, like the taste of ice cream. A lot of confusion results because when people talk about consciousness, one person may have in mind "awareness," while another may be talking about "self-awareness" only, or about "self-identity," while another may be talking about what it feels like to be in love. Awareness includes past, present and future events, and places here and elsewhere. We are very good at all of this, whereas other creatures are apparently not so good at anything other than the here and now. Because of our extended awareness, people like Budiansky are persuaded that we are on a consciousness level above other animals that should be recognized as different in kind.
Notice, by the way, that the idea that consciousness depends on language is by this definition obviously false. Sentient beings can be aware of many things without using language. Also there are different kinds of languages. Budiansky is talking about the kind of language that linguists study, the kind of language that Norm Chomsky analyzed to come up with his discovery that syntax is innate. But mathematics is a language, and when mathematicians are thinking about equations, they are conscious to the same extent that I am when I am thinking about how to put an idea into a sentence. Ditto for chess players and musicians. The languages that humans use are of one kind. We do not yet understand the language the whales and dolphins speak.
What I don't like about Budiansky's insistence on a difference in kind is that when you stop to think about it, such a difference would be surprising since all life forms on this planet evolved from a single ancient ancestor--unless of course you believe in a divine and separate creation.
Some other points at issue:
Budiansky wants to debunk the idea that animals are "worthy of special consideration" because their "behavior resembles" that of humans (see, e.g., p. xiii). I agree. We should appreciate other living things for what they are and not for how much they resemble us.
Consider the example of a chimpanzee holding out her hand to another in an appeasement gesture only to attack the other when he got near. Budiansky writes that a "theory of mind" interpretation would be that the tricky female knew the male would be misled in approaching and took advantage. But the "behaviorist spoilsport" interpretation is that the female had done this in the past and it worked and so did it again without recourse to reading the other's mind. (p. 182) This example illustrates just how difficult it is to say what is going on in another's mind. Personally I think the notion of a "theory of mind" should stay in the philosophy department except as demonstrated empirically.
One of the things that Budiansky makes clear is why some animals cry out when a predator appears. (See Chapter 6, "Speak!") Such calls seem altruistic to the point of being impossible from an evolutionary perspective; however Budiansky argues that such cries actually help the crier because their pitch either fools the attacking hawk so that it looks in the wrong direction, or the calls bring out other victims who go running about, thereby confusing the attacker or giving the attacker targets other than the crier.
Another nice thing that Budiansky does is show in sharp detail that the language accomplishments of chimpanzees and gorillas in some famous studies reveal not so much a human-like ability, but demonstrate the great gulf that exists between our use of language and theirs, which is not the kind of truth some people want to read.
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
This is a very slippery book on a very slippery subject. What Stephen Budiansky is trying to do is demonstrate from his reading of the literature, including experiments published in peer-reviewed journals, that there is a distinction to be made between the minds of humans and all other animals. Budiansky seems not to believe that intelligence and consciousness are matters of degree, but matters of threshold. Following philosopher Daniel Dennett he attributes this nearly absolute difference between us and them to our ability to use symbolic language.
The reason the subject is so slippery is that an adequate definition of both intelligence and consciousness is lacking. The reason the book is contentious naturally follows from this, but additionally Budiansky seems to have an agenda or, call it a thesis. He writes: "Consciousness is a wonderful gift and a wonderful curse that, all the evidence suggests, is not in the realm of the sentient experiences of other creatures." (p. 194)
How true or not his statement may be really depends on the definition of consciousness. Unfortunately Budiansky does not give one, and so all his conclusions about the differences in consciousness between humans and other creatures are murky at best. The closest he comes to a definition is on page 193 where he asserts that "...language is so intimately tied to consciousness that the two seem inseparable." Using this "definition" it is only a matter of demonstrating that animals do not have language in order to demonstrate that they don't have consciousness.
However even in this I don't think Budiansky is successful. Much of the book is given over to showing how so many experiments using chimps and monkeys, pigeons and dogs, etc., that seem to demonstrate that language use by animals is just signaling. This position is well known. The argument is that humans are the only animals with grammatical, syntactical and symbolic ability built into their brains. Other animals cannot construct sentences because they have no syntax. They have no "theory of mind" because they cannot think symbolically.
But this is not proven, as Budiansky acknowledges. What is obvious is that whatever language ability other animals have is rudimentary compared to that of humans. And almost everyone would agree that the consciousness demonstrated by animals varies considerably. By the way, here's a quick definition of consciousness: awareness including self-awareness, identify, and experience or sensation: the feelings we get when we experience the world, like the taste of ice cream. A lot of confusion results because when people talk about consciousness, one person may have in mind "awareness," while another may be talking about "self-awareness" only, or about "self-identity," while another may be talking about what it feels like to be in love. Awareness includes past, present and future events, and places here and elsewhere. We are very good at all of this, whereas other creatures are apparently not so good at anything other than the here and now. Because of our extended awareness, people like Budiansky are persuaded that we are on a consciousness level above other animals that should be recognized as different in kind.
Notice, by the way, that the idea that consciousness depends on language is by this definition obviously false. Sentient beings can be aware of many things without using language. Also there are different kinds of languages. Budiansky is talking about the kind of language that linguists study, the kind of language that Norm Chomsky analyzed to come up with his discovery that syntax is innate. But mathematics is a language, and when mathematicians are thinking about equations, they are conscious to the same extent that I am when I am thinking about how to put an idea into a sentence. Ditto for chess players and musicians. The languages that humans use are of one kind. We do not yet understand the language the whales and dolphins speak.
What I don't like about Budiansky's insistence on a difference in kind is that when you stop to think about it, such a difference would be surprising since all life forms on this planet evolved from a single ancient ancestor--unless of course you believe in a divine and separate creation.
Some other points at issue:
Budiansky wants to debunk the idea that animals are "worthy of special consideration" because their "behavior resembles" that of humans (see, e.g., p. xiii). I agree. We should appreciate other living things for what they are and not for how much they resemble us.
Consider the example of a chimpanzee holding out her hand to another in an appeasement gesture only to attack the other when he got near. Budiansky writes that a "theory of mind" interpretation would be that the tricky female knew the male would be misled in approaching and took advantage. But the "behaviorist spoilsport" interpretation is that the female had done this in the past and it worked and so did it again without recourse to reading the other's mind. (p. 182) This example illustrates just how difficult it is to say what is going on in another's mind. Personally I think the notion of a "theory of mind" should stay in the philosophy department except as demonstrated empirically.
One of the things that Budiansky makes clear is why some animals cry out when a predator appears. (See Chapter 6, "Speak!") Such calls seem altruistic to the point of being impossible from an evolutionary perspective; however Budiansky argues that such cries actually help the crier because their pitch either fools the attacking hawk so that it looks in the wrong direction, or the calls bring out other victims who go running about, thereby confusing the attacker or giving the attacker targets other than the crier.
Another nice thing that Budiansky does is show in sharp detail that the language accomplishments of chimpanzees and gorillas in some famous studies reveal not so much a human-like ability, but demonstrate the great gulf that exists between our use of language and theirs, which is not the kind of truth some people want to read.
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
October 24, 2009
Budiansky's book cautions against anthropocentrism in interpreting animal behavior. It's a fair caution. But that's not what this book is about. Budiansky cites all alternative evidence to discount or discredit any "sentimental" interpretation of animal motivation. Seeming animal intelligence is mere "association." A dog's bark is "cognitively neutral." Captive apes really don't do language. Jane Goodall is not a primatologist or expert, but is "of chimpanzee fame." Having thus put animals (and their sympathizers) in their place, he then engages in his own form of anthropocentrism (humans as the most significant entity in the universe) by removing us from the animal world through consciousness and language. Most won't argue that humans have mental capacities that other animals don't have. Why Budiansky needs to write a full book on this topic is unclear.
Even with these evident differences between humans and animals, an animal that knows where to go for food, water and sex is engaging in intelligent behavior, just as we do (albeit, aided immensely by thought). Now, instead pounding a wedge between humans and animals, we see similarities with other beings who want to live, beings who want to eat, beings who seek sex, beings who do not want pain and, for social animals, beings who want to be with their kind. It could be that animals want none of these things, but that would put us in the realm of science fiction. Given his Darwinian perspective, Budiansky himself would have to agree that at our core, all of life is moved by "self interest" that is manifested differently by each species. Yet Budiansky strays from that principle when he makes an exception for humans. Language (and associated consiousness) he says, is like a rocket that has escaped the gravitational pull of adaptation. We become free beings. Through mind, we can live in a moral realm where we transcend our individually competitive relations with other members of our group. Budiansky thereby escapes Darwinian biology through the rational control of behavior. Given the "selfish gene" premise of evolutionary biology, it's not clear how Budiansky can assure us that our high-powered rational capacity will be used as a tool of cooperation rather than self-interest at the expense of the other. Given history's track record, the more relevant focus for discussion is not how animals differ from us, but how much animal is within us. And, while we think about these thoughts and the dog barks at the patio door, we should let the dog in. The meaning of the dog's bark should seem evident enough.
Even with these evident differences between humans and animals, an animal that knows where to go for food, water and sex is engaging in intelligent behavior, just as we do (albeit, aided immensely by thought). Now, instead pounding a wedge between humans and animals, we see similarities with other beings who want to live, beings who want to eat, beings who seek sex, beings who do not want pain and, for social animals, beings who want to be with their kind. It could be that animals want none of these things, but that would put us in the realm of science fiction. Given his Darwinian perspective, Budiansky himself would have to agree that at our core, all of life is moved by "self interest" that is manifested differently by each species. Yet Budiansky strays from that principle when he makes an exception for humans. Language (and associated consiousness) he says, is like a rocket that has escaped the gravitational pull of adaptation. We become free beings. Through mind, we can live in a moral realm where we transcend our individually competitive relations with other members of our group. Budiansky thereby escapes Darwinian biology through the rational control of behavior. Given the "selfish gene" premise of evolutionary biology, it's not clear how Budiansky can assure us that our high-powered rational capacity will be used as a tool of cooperation rather than self-interest at the expense of the other. Given history's track record, the more relevant focus for discussion is not how animals differ from us, but how much animal is within us. And, while we think about these thoughts and the dog barks at the patio door, we should let the dog in. The meaning of the dog's bark should seem evident enough.
September 14, 2025
Definirlo un libro sul linguaggio animale sarebbe riduttivo, in realtà è un panorama sulle varie teorie evolutive e comportamentalistiche del mondo animale. Pur avendo, suppongo, intenti divulgativi, è un libro difficile, quasi da studiare, costruito su solide basi scientifiche come dimostra l'imponente e precisa bibliografia.
July 8, 2025
Este ensayo combina ciencia y filosofía de forma excelente, ofreciendo una visión científica sobre la conciencia e inteligencia animal, planteando interrogantes sobre si la inteligencia implica necesariamente formas de conciencia. Examina diferentes especies y sus comportamientos, y sugiere que muchos animales pueden tener formas de conciencia diferentes a la humana, ya que esta presenta diferentes grados dentro de su espectro evolutivo. Las interacciones sociales complejas y la resolución de problemas podrían, en algunos casos, ofrecer a los animales una comprensión básica sobre sí mismos, pero no necesariamente implican una conciencia reflexiva como la humana.
Basándose en estudios de etología, psicología y neurociencia, analiza la evolución de la inteligencia en el reino animal, destacando su papel en la supervivencia y adaptación, y señala que no es atributo garantía de autoconciencia. Así, examina las formas en que la cognición humana es distinta a la de los animales, y demuestra que, si bien los humanos pueden ser únicos en su pensamiento simbólico y en el uso de un lenguaje complejo, los animales tienen una inteligencia extremadamente adaptada.
La conciencia tampoco se escapa a ese análisis evolucionista, y sugiere que, conforme las capacidades cognitivas de los animales se volvieron más complejas, también lo hizo su grado de conciencia. Se muestra escéptico con la idea clásica de que la conciencia humana simboliza la cumbre del desarrollo cognitivo.
Budiansky difiere de los enfoques antropocéntricos tradicionales y aborda las capacidades cognitivas animales con seriedad y rigor científico. Evita la simplificación de tratar a los animales como autómatas sin conciencia, pero tampoco exagera las similitudes con los humanos.
Sin embargo, el libro también tiene sus limitaciones, ya que algunas de sus conclusiones son demasiado cautelosas o conservadoras, manteniéndose sumamente escéptico respecto a las atribuciones de conciencia y lenguaje a los animales.
Basándose en estudios de etología, psicología y neurociencia, analiza la evolución de la inteligencia en el reino animal, destacando su papel en la supervivencia y adaptación, y señala que no es atributo garantía de autoconciencia. Así, examina las formas en que la cognición humana es distinta a la de los animales, y demuestra que, si bien los humanos pueden ser únicos en su pensamiento simbólico y en el uso de un lenguaje complejo, los animales tienen una inteligencia extremadamente adaptada.
La conciencia tampoco se escapa a ese análisis evolucionista, y sugiere que, conforme las capacidades cognitivas de los animales se volvieron más complejas, también lo hizo su grado de conciencia. Se muestra escéptico con la idea clásica de que la conciencia humana simboliza la cumbre del desarrollo cognitivo.
Budiansky difiere de los enfoques antropocéntricos tradicionales y aborda las capacidades cognitivas animales con seriedad y rigor científico. Evita la simplificación de tratar a los animales como autómatas sin conciencia, pero tampoco exagera las similitudes con los humanos.
Sin embargo, el libro también tiene sus limitaciones, ya que algunas de sus conclusiones son demasiado cautelosas o conservadoras, manteniéndose sumamente escéptico respecto a las atribuciones de conciencia y lenguaje a los animales.
September 5, 2017
Okay first let me say this. I've read many reviews that tend to rip apart every sentence this person wrote. And I do understand where the critics are coming from.
But, for me, the takeaway here is not in the details. It's in the overall reach that they alone ( in my experience ), has achieved.They are taking the god complex out of humanity and is teach us to be less anthromorphic and celebrate what each species brings. In the entire world and the life around us, we soend our time to teach a gorilla to speak instead of trying to learn how SHE speaks- her language. Because we are so caught up in our own mentality that we should be able to do this. why? Even though every day we fight infections and bacteria. If we took a moment to comprehend the intelligence that resides in every single organism that has evolved to their environment. Just like we did. It might give us pause to understand what I think he is trying to get us to understand. That if we spent less time trying to get them more like us and understand what it is that makes them "them"...Then we might learn something. I've likened a lot of science fiction books that talk about humanity's next step to this book. And I stand, maybe alone, in this book changing my view about animal intelligence and the remarkable aspects of it. From goldfish to hummingbirds to bats to even gorillas. So to all the naysayers...hell.. just step back and realize the takeaway is not in the details... it is in the overall mind-numbing aspect that we're looking at it from one perspective and the author is trying to look at it from another. Forget the details and look at the message ffs.
But, for me, the takeaway here is not in the details. It's in the overall reach that they alone ( in my experience ), has achieved.They are taking the god complex out of humanity and is teach us to be less anthromorphic and celebrate what each species brings. In the entire world and the life around us, we soend our time to teach a gorilla to speak instead of trying to learn how SHE speaks- her language. Because we are so caught up in our own mentality that we should be able to do this. why? Even though every day we fight infections and bacteria. If we took a moment to comprehend the intelligence that resides in every single organism that has evolved to their environment. Just like we did. It might give us pause to understand what I think he is trying to get us to understand. That if we spent less time trying to get them more like us and understand what it is that makes them "them"...Then we might learn something. I've likened a lot of science fiction books that talk about humanity's next step to this book. And I stand, maybe alone, in this book changing my view about animal intelligence and the remarkable aspects of it. From goldfish to hummingbirds to bats to even gorillas. So to all the naysayers...hell.. just step back and realize the takeaway is not in the details... it is in the overall mind-numbing aspect that we're looking at it from one perspective and the author is trying to look at it from another. Forget the details and look at the message ffs.
February 29, 2008
well, one thing it would definitely say is "I actually am now not a lion anymore at all because language is an extremely specialized type of activity that requires both the prehistorical development of certain suites of social skills and the anatomical development of certain brain lobes, and requires complex neural connections that only humans appear to have developed based on their evolutionary history, so I am really not a lion anymore i am a human and I have no possible idea of what lions think cause I don't have that kind of brain anymore, and instead I would like to go to the sporting goods store with you and play on the treadmill machines just like you do, at least until the snotty sporting goods chick comes up and tells us to get off unless we are going to buy that one, which we are not cause they are like $2000 for what is essentially a cheap-ass walkman glued to a large conveyer belt - we could pretty much stand on top of the check out counter at Costco and sing really loud and have literally the exact same experience without paying anything like $2000 so that is a total joke. By the way, did i tell you that I am not a lion so quit asking me what it is like to be one? However I will watch Beastmaster II with a much more open mind than would a guy who wasn't a lion until someone magically made him talk".
March 7, 2013
This is an in-depth analysis of animal consciousness with an attempt to compare it to our own. But I take issue with the way the author scrutinizes the information with which he is working. For instance, in the (lengthy) introduction he expounds on the book's title by saying "If a lion could talk, we could probably understand him. He just would not be a lion any more; or rather, his mind would no longer be a lion's mind." Well, sure, if a lion had the ability to speak and understand English he would be a very different creature, but that's not what is meant when one thinks out loud, "Hmm, if that lion could speak right now, what would he say?" I feel the author is too hung up on semantics, and that was pervasive throughout the book. I would have loved to instead see this same basic material presented by someone who wasn't so obviously out to discount it all.
January 14, 2010
My hopes that animals do have human-like thoughts/skills have been dealt a healthy dose of reality. Budiansky soundly refuted many research studies with common sense logic -- successfully explaining results as evolution. But, he was heavy with praise for animals' natural instincts/evolutionary abilities -- animals definitely can do a lot, and a lot more than we can do in some regards (eg, dogs' sense of smell, pigeons' navigation). We should accept that animals are intelligent for their environments and their physical bodies; we should not be testing them for human abilities as a measure of their intelligence.
February 4, 2014
Very readable layman's book on theories of consciousness and their relationship to AI and anthropomophism in common-sense thought and scientific research into biology, physiology and psychology of "mind". Published twenty years ago (1994, my copy says) but still very interesting and thought provoking on the subject. Well researched (at the time).
December 7, 2010
It should be subtitled the evolution of "consciousness" because the entire book pokes holes in animal research studies that preceded it. It puts prior research into a reasoned perspective that is, I think, appropriate; unfortunately that doesn't make it all that interesting of a read.
August 30, 2011
Parts were very interesting, but by and large the book was to text bookish. Not a lot of fun to read. The book is all about intelligence and consciousness in animals. An interesting topic not well presented.
August 21, 2016
A unique book in trying to distinguish animals from humans - by empathy. Autists are animals here, but the reasoning self-destruct.
Great writer, though
Great writer, though
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews