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Douglas Haig: From the Somme to Victory
After the 1918 Armistice and until his death in 1928, Douglas Haig was hailed as a British national hero; by the mid 1930s, his reputation lay in ruins, with Lloyd Georges war memoirs in particular portraying him as an incompetent general. In this major biography, based on Haigs writings, official documents and the writings of contemporaries, Professor Sheffield offers a more rounded portrait, and combines conventional biography with an examination of Haigs role within the British Army of the First World War.
480 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2011
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About the author
Gary D. Sheffield
43 books32 followersGary Sheffield is Professor of War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. He is President of the International Guild of Battlefield Guides and a Vice President of the Western Front Association. He has published widely on the First World War and regularly broadcasts on television and radio as well as contributing to numerous journals, magazines and newspapers. Previous books include the acclaimed Forgotten Victory and The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, which was shorlisted for the presigious Duke of Westminster's Medal.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
September 18, 2024
A century after WWI broke out and the controversy rages on. Were the soldiers of the British Army "lions led by donkeys" in that war? Professor Sheffield sets out to rehabilitate the reputation of Douglas Haig (as he did with the entire army in his "Forgotten Victory") who, from 1915 until the end of the fighting was the donkey-in-chief and does a pretty good job. While not the perfect soldier or one of the "great captains," Haig had a man-sized job to do and, in the end, won the war. One must always remember that not only was he faced with the task of defeating the best army in the world that was in heavily fortified positions, Haig also had to deal with the fact that the antebellum British Army was very small, and experienced exclusively in brush-fire wars around the perimeter of empire, so a whole new mass army (and the means to equip it) had to be created out of thin air. One must also keep in mind that Haig and the Brits were essentially the junior partner in a coalition with the French, and that their wishes had to be taken into account. Haig would probably not have attacked on the Somme in the summer of 1916 had not the French been in dire straits at Verdun. Were the casualties immense? Absolutely, but so they were for all the armies that fought in this war. The smart thing to do was for the belligerents to make peace at the end of the fighting in 1915 based on the pre-war borders, but that wasn't Haig's job. One must always keep in mind that Haig was born in a different era, and that his and his contemporaries' outlooks and values were different from ours, something modern critics tend to forget. Did he have his weak points? Absolutely. He was, as Sheffield puts it, a "glass half-full" kind of man, and always thought that his offensives could break through the German lines, restore mobility to the fighting (Haig was a cavalryman, and always kept a cavalry reserve) and perhaps win the war. He was certainly not the military Luddite that some claim him to be, being very supportive of the development and use of tanks, gas and air power to enhance the fighting power of the army. In fact, he was usually a little too sanguine as to their effects. All in all, Sheffield does a pretty convincing job in painting the portrait of a military leader doing the best job possible, under the circumstances and given the era.
August 23, 2012
As a secondary school history teacher, I am well aware of the narrative of 'lions led by donkeys' that Sheffield rails against in this book. Amongst military historians I am sure that his view is well established, but it is commonly held that Haig was incompetent, a blunderer who had little concern for the lives of his men. However, I feel that Sheffield portrays the alternative perspective fairly, and, whilst perhaps pausing on the criticisms a little lightly (maybe due to the views already being so well established), I feel that he makes a series of compelling arguments against the charges levelled at Haig. I won't spoil it all here, but I think that this book was well worth reading and has dramatically altered my view of Haig.
April 15, 2024
A readable and well-written work.
The book is heavily focused on Haig’s campaigns in the Great War. Sheffield depicts Haig as an innovative commander and a reformer, if not a military genius or even an intellectual. He also argues that Haig was more concerned about the lives of his men than the popular image suggests.
Sheffield also argues that Haig was successful in waging the war he was given, though he concedes that Haig made terrible mistakes, was often overly ambitious, and often demonstrated too much confidence in subordinates. He also notes that Haig was up against one of the most formidable armies in the world, an army that had spent considerable time and resources in building one of the toughest defensive lines in history, and that Haig was subordinate to a massive French army that bore the brunt of the fighting in a war against an enemy occupation army on their soil. He also explains Haig’s broad and weighty responsibilities in leading, training and supplying the biggest army in British history.
Sheffield does a good job explaining the challenges of command at the time, with generals reliant on runners, carrier pigeons, primitive radios, and telephones. To launch an assault, an army needed to destroy the enemy’s artillery and machine guns first. To destroy these weapons, they had to be located. Devising a system to coordinate infantry, artillery, planes, tanks, etc. would of course, require time and costly lessons. Sheffield notes that many of the British army’s skilled leaders were killed or wounded in 1914, with the BEF literally holding the line as the “New Army” expanded and improved.
Some readers will wonder if the death of so many men weighed on Haig during or after the war, but the book doesn’t cover this much. Other readers may wish for more background on the British army, on Haig’s military education, or Haig’s replacement of John French. There could have been more maps, too. The narrative, however, is thoughtful and moves along at a good pace.
An insightful, balanced and well-researched work.
The book is heavily focused on Haig’s campaigns in the Great War. Sheffield depicts Haig as an innovative commander and a reformer, if not a military genius or even an intellectual. He also argues that Haig was more concerned about the lives of his men than the popular image suggests.
Sheffield also argues that Haig was successful in waging the war he was given, though he concedes that Haig made terrible mistakes, was often overly ambitious, and often demonstrated too much confidence in subordinates. He also notes that Haig was up against one of the most formidable armies in the world, an army that had spent considerable time and resources in building one of the toughest defensive lines in history, and that Haig was subordinate to a massive French army that bore the brunt of the fighting in a war against an enemy occupation army on their soil. He also explains Haig’s broad and weighty responsibilities in leading, training and supplying the biggest army in British history.
Sheffield does a good job explaining the challenges of command at the time, with generals reliant on runners, carrier pigeons, primitive radios, and telephones. To launch an assault, an army needed to destroy the enemy’s artillery and machine guns first. To destroy these weapons, they had to be located. Devising a system to coordinate infantry, artillery, planes, tanks, etc. would of course, require time and costly lessons. Sheffield notes that many of the British army’s skilled leaders were killed or wounded in 1914, with the BEF literally holding the line as the “New Army” expanded and improved.
Some readers will wonder if the death of so many men weighed on Haig during or after the war, but the book doesn’t cover this much. Other readers may wish for more background on the British army, on Haig’s military education, or Haig’s replacement of John French. There could have been more maps, too. The narrative, however, is thoughtful and moves along at a good pace.
An insightful, balanced and well-researched work.
May 26, 2015
There has been a particularly obdurate myth – emerging hesitatingly in the 1920s, but with almost irresistible force in the 1960s – that the British Army during the Great War was a force comprising “lions lead by donkeys”. A key element of this myth is that Field Marshal Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force from 1915 onwards, was the iconic donkey – a dimwitted, hidebound, callous leader almost diabolically indifferent to the suffering his men and pig-headedly committed to an anachronistic search for a “breakthrough-followed-by-cavalry-exploitation” victory that was better suited to the 19th century than the 20th. Although not the first to attempt to dispel this myth – and historically insupportable myth it is – Gary Sheffield’s is the latest and to my mind most effective.
Sheffield carefully removes plank after plank from the bridge of lies that leads us from Lloyd George’s self-serving near-slander in the 1920s to the Blackadderesque parodies of Haig’s leadership in from the 1960s through the 1980s. Haig, Sheffield painstakingly demonstrates, was a thinker, an innovator, a forward-looking army (and cavalry) reformer and – within the bounds of military propriety – a man deeply concerned with the wellbeing of the officers, NCOs and other ranks who served under him. To be sure, as Sheffield points out, he had grasped the character of war in the early twentieth century – he knew that defeating the Germans would require “wearing them down” through attritional battles like the Somme, Messines and Paschendaele. And he had sufficient imagination to grasp that that the butcher’s bill would be very steep indeed. But he also believed (correctly) that the cost of defeat would be intolerable for Britain and that everything possible had to be done to defeat the German foe. To that end, he devoted all of his considerable energies to fighting and winning not some imagined or hoped-for war, but the actual war at hand -- the only war possible given the technical realities of the time.
Was he successful? Sheffield argues yes. Contrary to the myth of the hidebound cavalryman, Haig is portrayed in The Chief as a careful military innovator promoting all sorts of technical, tactical and operational innovations that eventually proved decisive on the battlefield. And at the strategic level, Haig certainly adapted and learned from his early experiences (the Somme in particular), but right from the start he knew what had to be done to win the war. And on more than one occasion, his campaign strategy nearly paid dividends. If you don’t believe this, consider that two successive German commanders-in-chief reported, during and after the war, that Haig’s offensives more than once came close to breaking the German army in the West. They were probably in a better position to know than Lloyd George or the subsequent armchair critics of Haig.
Sheffield is at pains to point out, however, that Haig was far from perfect. He was a man – and indeed a man of his times – and as such made some very costly mistakes. Sometimes these were just the kind of mistakes limited human beings inevitably make when confronted with shockingly new challenges and the fog of war. But if Haig had one enduring flaw it was that throughout almost his whole tenure as C-in-C he adhered to closely to the doctrine of trusting his subordinate commanders – of not interfering with the “man on the spot”. Sometimes this worked very well indeed. But at other times the man on the spot was not up to the challenge and failed to implement Haig’s operational vision -- with terrible consequences.
Bottom line: this is a very well-written and illuminating book. If you are at all interested in grasping or participating in the debates – especially lively in the UK this year – regarding how the war should be remembered, this is essential reading.
Sheffield carefully removes plank after plank from the bridge of lies that leads us from Lloyd George’s self-serving near-slander in the 1920s to the Blackadderesque parodies of Haig’s leadership in from the 1960s through the 1980s. Haig, Sheffield painstakingly demonstrates, was a thinker, an innovator, a forward-looking army (and cavalry) reformer and – within the bounds of military propriety – a man deeply concerned with the wellbeing of the officers, NCOs and other ranks who served under him. To be sure, as Sheffield points out, he had grasped the character of war in the early twentieth century – he knew that defeating the Germans would require “wearing them down” through attritional battles like the Somme, Messines and Paschendaele. And he had sufficient imagination to grasp that that the butcher’s bill would be very steep indeed. But he also believed (correctly) that the cost of defeat would be intolerable for Britain and that everything possible had to be done to defeat the German foe. To that end, he devoted all of his considerable energies to fighting and winning not some imagined or hoped-for war, but the actual war at hand -- the only war possible given the technical realities of the time.
Was he successful? Sheffield argues yes. Contrary to the myth of the hidebound cavalryman, Haig is portrayed in The Chief as a careful military innovator promoting all sorts of technical, tactical and operational innovations that eventually proved decisive on the battlefield. And at the strategic level, Haig certainly adapted and learned from his early experiences (the Somme in particular), but right from the start he knew what had to be done to win the war. And on more than one occasion, his campaign strategy nearly paid dividends. If you don’t believe this, consider that two successive German commanders-in-chief reported, during and after the war, that Haig’s offensives more than once came close to breaking the German army in the West. They were probably in a better position to know than Lloyd George or the subsequent armchair critics of Haig.
Sheffield is at pains to point out, however, that Haig was far from perfect. He was a man – and indeed a man of his times – and as such made some very costly mistakes. Sometimes these were just the kind of mistakes limited human beings inevitably make when confronted with shockingly new challenges and the fog of war. But if Haig had one enduring flaw it was that throughout almost his whole tenure as C-in-C he adhered to closely to the doctrine of trusting his subordinate commanders – of not interfering with the “man on the spot”. Sometimes this worked very well indeed. But at other times the man on the spot was not up to the challenge and failed to implement Haig’s operational vision -- with terrible consequences.
Bottom line: this is a very well-written and illuminating book. If you are at all interested in grasping or participating in the debates – especially lively in the UK this year – regarding how the war should be remembered, this is essential reading.
April 5, 2013
The Chief is a balanced and fully refined version of Sheffield's excellent academic rebuttal (First exposed in his superb 'Forgotten Victory (2002)) of the now discredited 'Lions led by Donkeys' myth. Douglas Haig was the most prominent, but far from the only British General of the Great War whose reputation was assailed by the truly ignorant (Alan Clark, John Laffin), the spiteful (David Lloyd-George), the ambitious (Lidell-Hart, Fuller) and the theatrical (Chilton, Raffles, Littlewood). As another reviewer points out, our schoolchildren continue to be taught that the cream of British manhood was squandered in an unnecessary war, through the profligacy of stupid, uncaring chateau-bound generals wedded to the archaic - an understanding that continues to be fostered by the likes of Curtis and Elton's superbly entertaining but woefully inaccurate Blackadder Goes Forth. This pernicious cycle needs to be broken and the British national curriculum needs a thoroughly good review, which will clean out the fictional nonsense and teach history as it should be taught - with the benefit of academic discussion.
Sheffield's contention that Haig was no donkey is absolutely convincing. As a strategic commander in an international coalition he fought not the battles he wanted to fight, but the battles he had to fight; and given the constraints he faced and an enemy of strength, he fought when and how he had to fight them. Certainly he made mistakes, but Haig learned by them and by 1918 he was Commander in Chief of the only army on the Western Front capable of winning the Great War. In the summer of 1918, While the politicians and military staffs in Whitehall made their preparations for winning the war in the next 18 months, Haig led the Army that he had built to victory in 100 days. This, the most stunning victory ever won by British arms, could not have been achieved without the grinding attritional preliminaries of 1916-1917.
Churchill, perhaps Haig's most widely read critic (See The World Crisis), was not one to readily admit to being wrong - but in November 1926 in conversation with Lord Beaverbrook he conceded that his "subsequent study of the war has led me to think a good deal better of Haig than I did at the time." Sheffield's excellent and accessible work should be taught in our schools. By all means study the cultural legacy - but history should be based on fact and not on the theatre.
Sheffield's contention that Haig was no donkey is absolutely convincing. As a strategic commander in an international coalition he fought not the battles he wanted to fight, but the battles he had to fight; and given the constraints he faced and an enemy of strength, he fought when and how he had to fight them. Certainly he made mistakes, but Haig learned by them and by 1918 he was Commander in Chief of the only army on the Western Front capable of winning the Great War. In the summer of 1918, While the politicians and military staffs in Whitehall made their preparations for winning the war in the next 18 months, Haig led the Army that he had built to victory in 100 days. This, the most stunning victory ever won by British arms, could not have been achieved without the grinding attritional preliminaries of 1916-1917.
Churchill, perhaps Haig's most widely read critic (See The World Crisis), was not one to readily admit to being wrong - but in November 1926 in conversation with Lord Beaverbrook he conceded that his "subsequent study of the war has led me to think a good deal better of Haig than I did at the time." Sheffield's excellent and accessible work should be taught in our schools. By all means study the cultural legacy - but history should be based on fact and not on the theatre.
January 20, 2014
Sheffield presents a brief for Haig as an intelligent, thoughtful soldier, one of the leading military professionals of his generation. He was a moderate progressive in terms of new technology. Drawing upon the seminal work of Stephen Badsey on the British cavalry, Sheffield argues that Haig intended to use cavalry in two ways on the Western Front: first as part of a combined arms force to pass through the infantry and exploit success tactically---that is to make the bites taken out of the German lines by the infantry larger and, second, as an operational reserve capable of deep penetration in the wake of a breakthrough and destabilization of an entire enemy front. The first use of cavalry proved feasible and successful on numerous occasions. By the summer and fall of 1918 when conditions on the Western Front at last made operational level actions feasible, the cavalry corps was so reduced that it lacked the strength to carry out them out. Sheffield is not blind to Haig's faults. He waited far too long to create a common doctrine for the British Expeditionary Force and to establish an effective training organization. Sheffield does not see that planning for success---that is to exploit a German defeat---was anything other than good staff work. Nevertheless, Haig was too optimistic and tended to persist in offensives longer than he should. But alliance politics and an inadequate logistical system (until the advent of Sir Eric Geddes) often left Haig with few viable alternatives to continuing the offensives prior to 1918. Finally, Haig was too representative of British Army's Edwardian command culture that favored consensual agreement rather than forceful, well thought out orders. Too often he offered suggestions and advice to his principal subordinates rather than issue them orders. He did this with General Sir Henry Rawlinson on the Somme in 1916 and General Sir Hubert Gough at Passchendaele in 1917. This is an important book by the co-editor of Haig's papers that is well grounded in both primary sources and the massive historiography on the war. I highly recommend it.
December 6, 2025
Excellent & balanced biography of an often misrepresented historical figure. I have reading a number of books on World War One reason in order to increase my understanding of this momentous series of events. It is quite clear that how it ended & how it was perceived to have ended in Germany most especially led to another huge bloodletting World War Two.
Douglas Haig was, of course, a central figure in World War One for us British. The lens he has been clearly a distorted one which biography seeks to rectify. It makes him & events involving more believable from the cartoon version we are so often fed by either the ignorant or those with an axe to grind. The military descriptions & analysis are first rate. The generation that fought that war deserve a better hearing than they have largely thus far had.
Douglas Haig was, of course, a central figure in World War One for us British. The lens he has been clearly a distorted one which biography seeks to rectify. It makes him & events involving more believable from the cartoon version we are so often fed by either the ignorant or those with an axe to grind. The military descriptions & analysis are first rate. The generation that fought that war deserve a better hearing than they have largely thus far had.
August 21, 2020
Good weighing of the historical evidence, fights the literary battle with every resource he has and puts Haig's evaluation in the proper historical context. Also, he does not go for a black and white image of Haig, but looks to put a better balance on our understanding of his generalship in the First World War. Definitely a good addition to the historiography.
September 9, 2017
Having learned most of what I know about the Great War by watching 'Blackadder', I had the opportunity to check the accuracy of the programme after receiving this book as a gift.
The author, at the outset, lets the reader know that the book is neither a hatchet job, nor an attempt at redeeming, or elimination of, the popular image of Douglas Haig - perhaps as the Chief Donkey leading the Lions, also known as the Tommies, and being one of chief architects of the huge, some say needless, loss of their lives.
We learn about his early years, and I didn't spot anything remarkable or traumatic, except perhaps the picture of him as a furious toddler in a pretty dress, which apparently was quite normal in Victorian times, shorts or trousers being awarded when the required standard of toilet training had been completed.
Haig's military service is exhaustively detailed, as I would expect, and again there was nothing to suggest, to me anyway, that high rank and achievement would follow. We are taken through his involvement in campaigns around the turn of the century, including South Africa and India, and I was pleased to be reminded of his declining the application of a young Sublatern to join his troops to get some experience, perhaps even glory and/or medals - someone called Winston Churchill. Whatever became of him I wonder. Soon though, we get to the main event and subject: World War One. Haig is initially under the command of a man called French, and the author presents French as not quite up to the job, to say the least. Haig, prior to taking this post, had been heavily involved in the training of soldiers, and the study and development of tactics including one of his favourites - Field Service Regulations. These seemed to me to be the 'how to do it' manual for all ranks of the military, and included a big role to be played by Cavalry in many parts of battles and campaigns. French's services are, in time, dispensed with, and Haig takes charge. We are taken through the conduct, and results of many battles, some famous, and few of these seem to be anything like successful. Any victories, or advances, come at a high price and are often reversed. The message that I took from these accounts is that Haig, who set out the objectives for these actions, was justified in his decision making most of the time. We learn that, on a number of occasions, Haig's subordinate officers don't do exactly what they are supposed to, and halt the attack short of the actual mission. But we are then told that Haig is often less than specific in his orders, trusting that the officers will deliver. In a similar vein, Haig seems, on a number of occasions, to be unjustifiably optimistic about the intelligence available, which would play a part in the many setbacks that are met. He doesn't exactly enjoy full and unqualified support and approval either from His Majesty's Government, headed by David Lloyd George, the author uses many references and examples of this politician's doublespeak, and sniping. Haig, however, puts the ball back in Lloyd George's court with a politely put 'back me or sack me'. The accepted view seemed to be that, for all Haig's supposed faults, he was the best they had.
Haig had the unpleasant task of confirming the execution of deserters, and other soldiers who had gone through judicial process leading to death sentences. Figures show that the vast majority appeals and decisions resulted in commutation, but Haig didn't shrink from sending men to the firing squad when he felt that was correct. Which could be interpreted as his attitude in most matters concerning the war. He had a job to do - defeat the enemy. He used the means at his disposal - the Tommies being part of them - to do it. They had to do more than fire from their trenches if this was going to happen, and he was the man in charge. With reinforcements, better logistics, and the collapse of the enemy, victory was achieved. The cost is well known, and rightly commemorated. In the latter part of the book, we see another, often forgotten side of Haig, namely his support and commitment towards ex soldiers in a number of ways, not least in giving his name to the fund and cause that we associate with the yearly poppy appeal. In the intervening years between his death and Blackadder, Haig's conduct has been discussed ad nauseum, and it would be a brave person that suggested he did a great job in WW1. This book provides a thorough, readable and fair view that, given the circumstances, no-one could have done the job, or served his country better, than Douglas Haig.
The author, at the outset, lets the reader know that the book is neither a hatchet job, nor an attempt at redeeming, or elimination of, the popular image of Douglas Haig - perhaps as the Chief Donkey leading the Lions, also known as the Tommies, and being one of chief architects of the huge, some say needless, loss of their lives.
We learn about his early years, and I didn't spot anything remarkable or traumatic, except perhaps the picture of him as a furious toddler in a pretty dress, which apparently was quite normal in Victorian times, shorts or trousers being awarded when the required standard of toilet training had been completed.
Haig's military service is exhaustively detailed, as I would expect, and again there was nothing to suggest, to me anyway, that high rank and achievement would follow. We are taken through his involvement in campaigns around the turn of the century, including South Africa and India, and I was pleased to be reminded of his declining the application of a young Sublatern to join his troops to get some experience, perhaps even glory and/or medals - someone called Winston Churchill. Whatever became of him I wonder. Soon though, we get to the main event and subject: World War One. Haig is initially under the command of a man called French, and the author presents French as not quite up to the job, to say the least. Haig, prior to taking this post, had been heavily involved in the training of soldiers, and the study and development of tactics including one of his favourites - Field Service Regulations. These seemed to me to be the 'how to do it' manual for all ranks of the military, and included a big role to be played by Cavalry in many parts of battles and campaigns. French's services are, in time, dispensed with, and Haig takes charge. We are taken through the conduct, and results of many battles, some famous, and few of these seem to be anything like successful. Any victories, or advances, come at a high price and are often reversed. The message that I took from these accounts is that Haig, who set out the objectives for these actions, was justified in his decision making most of the time. We learn that, on a number of occasions, Haig's subordinate officers don't do exactly what they are supposed to, and halt the attack short of the actual mission. But we are then told that Haig is often less than specific in his orders, trusting that the officers will deliver. In a similar vein, Haig seems, on a number of occasions, to be unjustifiably optimistic about the intelligence available, which would play a part in the many setbacks that are met. He doesn't exactly enjoy full and unqualified support and approval either from His Majesty's Government, headed by David Lloyd George, the author uses many references and examples of this politician's doublespeak, and sniping. Haig, however, puts the ball back in Lloyd George's court with a politely put 'back me or sack me'. The accepted view seemed to be that, for all Haig's supposed faults, he was the best they had.
Haig had the unpleasant task of confirming the execution of deserters, and other soldiers who had gone through judicial process leading to death sentences. Figures show that the vast majority appeals and decisions resulted in commutation, but Haig didn't shrink from sending men to the firing squad when he felt that was correct. Which could be interpreted as his attitude in most matters concerning the war. He had a job to do - defeat the enemy. He used the means at his disposal - the Tommies being part of them - to do it. They had to do more than fire from their trenches if this was going to happen, and he was the man in charge. With reinforcements, better logistics, and the collapse of the enemy, victory was achieved. The cost is well known, and rightly commemorated. In the latter part of the book, we see another, often forgotten side of Haig, namely his support and commitment towards ex soldiers in a number of ways, not least in giving his name to the fund and cause that we associate with the yearly poppy appeal. In the intervening years between his death and Blackadder, Haig's conduct has been discussed ad nauseum, and it would be a brave person that suggested he did a great job in WW1. This book provides a thorough, readable and fair view that, given the circumstances, no-one could have done the job, or served his country better, than Douglas Haig.
March 2, 2023
4/5 Not much to say about it. Solid, fair biography of Douglas Haig. Defends him against unfair criticism but also criticises hims when he deserved it. Overall quite positive about Haig. Worth a read if interested in the WWI British Army.
Edit - Additional thoughts after a few days
When it comes to technology the author argues against the view that Haig was old-fashioned and didn't understand new technology. Instead he says the opposite, that if anything Haig was way too optimistic about how effective new weapons like gas and tanks would be.
For Haig's continued planning on a breakthrough Sheffield also defends this quite a bit. For a start it was politically difficult to do otherwise, the French wouldn't have accepted the British doing only small scale attacks and that the British public wouldn't have accepted neverending yet still costly bite and hold battles - hope of a eventual breakthrough the German lines was needed for morale. Additionally it would have been irresponsible of Haig to not have a plan if an offensive did have major success.
There is a lot of focus on the background and adminstrative stuff which led the British forces to be highly effective by the end of the war.
There is a also a lot on Haig's relationship with his subordinates. In these bits the author is quite critical of some of his Haig's commmanders like Gough and Rawlinson but also criticises Haig for not getting a strong grip on these men and making it clear what his intentions were.
Edit - Additional thoughts after a few days
When it comes to technology the author argues against the view that Haig was old-fashioned and didn't understand new technology. Instead he says the opposite, that if anything Haig was way too optimistic about how effective new weapons like gas and tanks would be.
For Haig's continued planning on a breakthrough Sheffield also defends this quite a bit. For a start it was politically difficult to do otherwise, the French wouldn't have accepted the British doing only small scale attacks and that the British public wouldn't have accepted neverending yet still costly bite and hold battles - hope of a eventual breakthrough the German lines was needed for morale. Additionally it would have been irresponsible of Haig to not have a plan if an offensive did have major success.
There is a lot of focus on the background and adminstrative stuff which led the British forces to be highly effective by the end of the war.
There is a also a lot on Haig's relationship with his subordinates. In these bits the author is quite critical of some of his Haig's commmanders like Gough and Rawlinson but also criticises Haig for not getting a strong grip on these men and making it clear what his intentions were.
October 19, 2025
A good book, providing a largely sympathetic assessment of Field Marshal Douglas Haig’s role in World War I. The author, historian Gary Sheffield, focuses most of the book on Haig’s conduct as commander of the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front. By framing Haig as a representative figure of generalship in an era defined by technological stalemate and strategic uncertainty, the author is able to present a positive view of a General attempting to adapt. The result is a book with a fair, though at times overly supportive, evaluation of Haig’s leadership, emphasizing the evolving nature of warfare rather than dwelling on individual flaws. The book’s broader argument on adaptation could apply to many senior commanders of the time, which occasionally makes Haig feel interchangeable with other figures. Despite this, Sheffield succeeds in contextualizing the immense challenges of adapting to industrialized warfare, managing mass armies under unprecedented conditions, and dealing with a political establishment lacking unity of effort. A great book for readers interested in the operational, strategic, and policy dilemmas of World War I. Highly recommended for those seeking a deeper understanding of command in the age of attrition.
October 25, 2020
The book is very well researched and written. It does what it promises, namely explaining how and why Haig acted the way he did. Most importantly, the author illustrates the difficulties which First World War generals faced, especially regarding command & communication. This helps the reader to get a better understanding of the realities of that war.
However, while not ignoring Haig's flaws or mistakes, the author glosses over their human cost. For example, Sheffield's account of the first day on the Somme focuses on the partial success of Rawlinson's Army, while almost ignoring the fact that 20,000 soldiers died, another 40,000 were wounded. Ironically, such treatment is in line with Haig's supposed callousness.
Lastly, while Haig might not have been a "donkey", his record for most of the war, most notably the butcher's bill paid by men under his command, does not support Sheffield's attempts to present him as a particularly successful general.
However, while not ignoring Haig's flaws or mistakes, the author glosses over their human cost. For example, Sheffield's account of the first day on the Somme focuses on the partial success of Rawlinson's Army, while almost ignoring the fact that 20,000 soldiers died, another 40,000 were wounded. Ironically, such treatment is in line with Haig's supposed callousness.
Lastly, while Haig might not have been a "donkey", his record for most of the war, most notably the butcher's bill paid by men under his command, does not support Sheffield's attempts to present him as a particularly successful general.
March 27, 2023
In recent years scholars have revolutionised Great War Studies, debunking old and sadly persistent myths about the causes and futility of the conflict, and the quality of the generals, in particular British Generals (the 'Donkeys') and par excellence, Field Marshal Douglas Haig. This fine biography is another welcome contribution to thje debate. , It aslso has the merit of nbeing balanced and unpolemical. That does not make it unintersting.
Sheffield is one of the leading experts on the Great War, and his views are both balanced and based on sound research and in depth knowledge of his subject (he edited Haig's diaries). While by no means uncritical of his subject he also sees his virtues and determination to keep going until ultimate victory over the agressor that had wrecked Europe was achieved, which it was spectacularly - and primarily by Haig's British Army - in the great 'advance to victory' in 1918
Sheffield is one of the leading experts on the Great War, and his views are both balanced and based on sound research and in depth knowledge of his subject (he edited Haig's diaries). While by no means uncritical of his subject he also sees his virtues and determination to keep going until ultimate victory over the agressor that had wrecked Europe was achieved, which it was spectacularly - and primarily by Haig's British Army - in the great 'advance to victory' in 1918
June 11, 2018
So much thinking & talking about world war 1 is evolved around little stereotypes, little current world views & not a little judging in hynesight. It is therefor absolutely vital to read works like this to try and get as close as possible to the historical truth. Sheffield didn’t simply write a biography about one of Britain’s most controversial Generals. He wrote a narrative of all the things that influenced the way people look at his achievements & downfalls. This narrative involves the views of many important politicians & generals as well as the former servicemen that loved him so dearly in the years directly following the Great War.
October 6, 2019
Very good account of Haig's life from a highly knowledgeable biographer. Traces how he grew in knowledge and appreciation of what was needed on the Western Front, and how he supervised imaginative explorations that transformed the British Army from its colonial heritage to a European-scale service, successful though at a huge cost. A great correction to the popular Blackadder myth. Well worth reading for anyone interested in WW1 and/or British military history.
November 4, 2019
A broad narration and review of Haig's performance as Field Marshall in the Great War. I found it virtually unreadable: the style was very dry. I would like to have learnt more about Haig the man, for instance how he squared his Christian faith with his fighting strategy. This was touched on by the author, but merited a whole chapter rather than half a page. Very much a niche book for military obsessives than a full biography.
September 6, 2017
a great read, always a pleasure to read books by Gary Sheffield. This book looked at a different view of Haig, with as well using balanced arguments throughout. It was easy to read and wanted more of it !
December 29, 2019
Utilises Haig's diaries to give some insight into his strengths and weaknesses as a commander. A well rounded examination of a controversial figure in modern military history. Sheffield examines many criticisms of Haig and attempts to evaluate the validity of them.
November 30, 2022
I acknowledge that my star rating may be unfair, because I cherry picked bits and pieces of the book, rather than read it in entirety. But I can't leave the book without leaving an opinion of Haig. My fear is that with the passage of time even the blackest of historical figures will look grey rather than black. It's what rose-coloured glasses of a new generation do. My opinion of Haig (paint him black, not pink, not grey) is based on the tens of thousands he sent to unnecessary death, and above all on two of his revealing diary entries at the battle of the Somme.
On June 30, the night before he sent his infantry on a futile attack on the German trenches he wrote:
“The men are in splendid spirits… The wire has never been so well cut nor the artillery preparation so thorough"
He was dead wrong about the barbed wire being cut. How he could be so stupidly, bone-headedly wrong on a life and death issue like that boggles the imagination. On July 1, thousands of his infantry reached the German barbed wire wall that blocked their advance, and there they died, swept by machine gun fire.
George Coppard, a British machine gunner wrote the next day (July 2):
"... . From the way the [British] dead were equally spread out, whether on the wire or lying in front of it, it was clear that there were no gaps in the wire at the time of the attack. Concentrated machine gun fire from sufficient guns to command every inch of the wire, had done its terrible work. The Germans must have been reinforcing the wire for months. It was so dense that daylight could barely be seen through it. Through the glasses it looked a black mass. The German faith in massed wire had paid off. How did our planners imagine that Tommies, having survived all other hazards - and there were plenty in crossing No Man’s Land - would get through the German wire? Had they studied the black density of it through their powerful binoculars? Who told them that artillery fire would pound such wire to pieces, making it possible to get through? Any Tommy could have told them that shell fire lifts wire up and drops it down, often in a worse tangle than before."
Haig's second diary entry that turns my stomach concerns a visit he made to two casualty clearing stations on July 1 [behind the front lines], the first day of the attack. It states
“They were very pleased at my visit, the wounded were in wonderful spirits… The A.G. reported today that total casualties are estimated at over 40,000. This cannot be considered severe in view of numbers engaged and the length of front of attack… Rode home.”
In my army experience, no working unit is pleased by a top brass visit. You have to suspend all normal duties; waste time on spit and polish for a grand show; watch the local brass and NCOs panic, scream and shout; hide the skeletons and bring out only the happy stories. In a casualty clearing station, this would likely mean staging a show at the expense of real treatment; hiding the worst cases and prepping the least injured to smile and say, “I’m proud to be doing my duty for King and country, Sir. My only wish is to get back to active duty, Sir, and I never needed my legs anyway, Sir.”
Haig’s belief that the clearing stations were pleased to see him while also coping with an unprecedented flood of casualties is delusional.
His belief that the wounded were truly in good spirits (aside perhaps from the lucky few who were happy to be shipped away from the front with no lasting damage) is idiotic as well as delusional.
His belief that 40,000 casualties (an underestimate) “cannot be considered severe” is psychopathic as well as delusional.
The final macabre touch to this diary entry is: “Rode home.”
Haig’s headquarters was a chateau behind the front lines. He had a great attachment to his daily horse ride throughout WWI. Even if he motored to visit something like a casualty clearing station, he would usually have assistants meet him with his horse on the return so that he could ride home. Imagine the self-centred gall of presiding over a catastrophe with over 57,000 casualties and still diarising your pleasure in your daily horse ride.
["Honey, I'm home!"
"Oh- how was your day, Dear?"
"Good news and bad."
"Oh? Tell me about the bad part first."
"You remember that Somme thing I told you about?"
"Oh, yes."
"The bad news is the troops had their worst day of casualties in British military history."
"Any one we know?"
"Don't think so, dear."
"Ah, well. It's a shame you don't have better staff to organize these things. I have the same problem at home. And the good news?"
"I had a wonderful ride back to the chateau. The horses have never been in better shape."
"How lovely for you, Dear."]
On June 30, the night before he sent his infantry on a futile attack on the German trenches he wrote:
“The men are in splendid spirits… The wire has never been so well cut nor the artillery preparation so thorough"
He was dead wrong about the barbed wire being cut. How he could be so stupidly, bone-headedly wrong on a life and death issue like that boggles the imagination. On July 1, thousands of his infantry reached the German barbed wire wall that blocked their advance, and there they died, swept by machine gun fire.
George Coppard, a British machine gunner wrote the next day (July 2):
"... . From the way the [British] dead were equally spread out, whether on the wire or lying in front of it, it was clear that there were no gaps in the wire at the time of the attack. Concentrated machine gun fire from sufficient guns to command every inch of the wire, had done its terrible work. The Germans must have been reinforcing the wire for months. It was so dense that daylight could barely be seen through it. Through the glasses it looked a black mass. The German faith in massed wire had paid off. How did our planners imagine that Tommies, having survived all other hazards - and there were plenty in crossing No Man’s Land - would get through the German wire? Had they studied the black density of it through their powerful binoculars? Who told them that artillery fire would pound such wire to pieces, making it possible to get through? Any Tommy could have told them that shell fire lifts wire up and drops it down, often in a worse tangle than before."
Haig's second diary entry that turns my stomach concerns a visit he made to two casualty clearing stations on July 1 [behind the front lines], the first day of the attack. It states
“They were very pleased at my visit, the wounded were in wonderful spirits… The A.G. reported today that total casualties are estimated at over 40,000. This cannot be considered severe in view of numbers engaged and the length of front of attack… Rode home.”
In my army experience, no working unit is pleased by a top brass visit. You have to suspend all normal duties; waste time on spit and polish for a grand show; watch the local brass and NCOs panic, scream and shout; hide the skeletons and bring out only the happy stories. In a casualty clearing station, this would likely mean staging a show at the expense of real treatment; hiding the worst cases and prepping the least injured to smile and say, “I’m proud to be doing my duty for King and country, Sir. My only wish is to get back to active duty, Sir, and I never needed my legs anyway, Sir.”
Haig’s belief that the clearing stations were pleased to see him while also coping with an unprecedented flood of casualties is delusional.
His belief that the wounded were truly in good spirits (aside perhaps from the lucky few who were happy to be shipped away from the front with no lasting damage) is idiotic as well as delusional.
His belief that 40,000 casualties (an underestimate) “cannot be considered severe” is psychopathic as well as delusional.
The final macabre touch to this diary entry is: “Rode home.”
Haig’s headquarters was a chateau behind the front lines. He had a great attachment to his daily horse ride throughout WWI. Even if he motored to visit something like a casualty clearing station, he would usually have assistants meet him with his horse on the return so that he could ride home. Imagine the self-centred gall of presiding over a catastrophe with over 57,000 casualties and still diarising your pleasure in your daily horse ride.
["Honey, I'm home!"
"Oh- how was your day, Dear?"
"Good news and bad."
"Oh? Tell me about the bad part first."
"You remember that Somme thing I told you about?"
"Oh, yes."
"The bad news is the troops had their worst day of casualties in British military history."
"Any one we know?"
"Don't think so, dear."
"Ah, well. It's a shame you don't have better staff to organize these things. I have the same problem at home. And the good news?"
"I had a wonderful ride back to the chateau. The horses have never been in better shape."
"How lovely for you, Dear."]
May 31, 2020
From The Somme to Victory is a good, balanced biography of Douglas Haig which does well to straddle the line between beatification and demonising the man largely held responsible for the losses at the Somme and the 3rd Battle of Ypres. Clearly argued, with a strong base in Haig's correspondance, it's certainly a useful tool for historians and those looking for scholarly debate on such a controversial figure.
Of particular note is Sheffield's focus on Haig's early career in the military, the shaping factors in his approach to command and the challenging of certain specific myths, such as Haig's apparent Luddism when it came to using new technology or embracing new tactics. It also does a good job of highlighting Haig's work and reputation after the war, and does an excellent job of establishing a full portrait of such a man.
That being said, I will admit I did find it hard going in places. The narrative keeps going at a relatively strong pace, but it does at times get bogged down into minutiae which don't necessarily advance Sheffield's argument and which hold up the narrative flow. At the same time, the sharp focus on Haig and his actions does leave the characterisation of the other figures in high command a little limited and underdeveloped, which both renders the narrative a little lifeless, and makes it hard to properly evaluate some of the arguments Sheffield puts forward due to a lack of knowledge of the alternatives.
The work also suffers a little from assuming that the reader knows more about the military tactics and certain battles than they might do, with some important terms and ideas being thrown around without complete explanation. At the same time, I would also have found it useful to have a bit more perspective from the troops themselves when looking at Haig's decisions - having a more vivid, human understanding of the differences between a successful Haig plan and a failed one would have enriched the narrative and helped puncutate Sheffield's argument nicely.
Overall, I would certainly recommend this as a good, balanced judgement on command in WW1, but one which I would perhaps not recommend reading for pleasure without some existing understanding of WW1 military doctrine.
Of particular note is Sheffield's focus on Haig's early career in the military, the shaping factors in his approach to command and the challenging of certain specific myths, such as Haig's apparent Luddism when it came to using new technology or embracing new tactics. It also does a good job of highlighting Haig's work and reputation after the war, and does an excellent job of establishing a full portrait of such a man.
That being said, I will admit I did find it hard going in places. The narrative keeps going at a relatively strong pace, but it does at times get bogged down into minutiae which don't necessarily advance Sheffield's argument and which hold up the narrative flow. At the same time, the sharp focus on Haig and his actions does leave the characterisation of the other figures in high command a little limited and underdeveloped, which both renders the narrative a little lifeless, and makes it hard to properly evaluate some of the arguments Sheffield puts forward due to a lack of knowledge of the alternatives.
The work also suffers a little from assuming that the reader knows more about the military tactics and certain battles than they might do, with some important terms and ideas being thrown around without complete explanation. At the same time, I would also have found it useful to have a bit more perspective from the troops themselves when looking at Haig's decisions - having a more vivid, human understanding of the differences between a successful Haig plan and a failed one would have enriched the narrative and helped puncutate Sheffield's argument nicely.
Overall, I would certainly recommend this as a good, balanced judgement on command in WW1, but one which I would perhaps not recommend reading for pleasure without some existing understanding of WW1 military doctrine.
September 29, 2016
This is an update on a previous edition of the book and published to coincide with the 100th anniversary of the Somme battle so the book's title is misleading .
The book is basically a bit of biography sandwiched around Haig's role in the Western Front in Belgium and France which is the meat of the story . If you are interested in the minute details of soldiering and military strategy then this is for you but I was looking for a broader sweep .
The writer intended to rescue Haig's reputation as a leader of complete incompetence who was responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in a senseless battle for a few miles of Flanders bog . He died a national hero . I was not totally convinced . It was senseless and Haig and other army leaders and politicians of the time seemed blind to the futility of the war . Of course he looked like the atypical Edwardian gent with his bravery and buttoned upright stance and bristly moustache and his christian faith and wealthy backgound nowadays counts against him but he seemed to lack imagination and was bogged down in the fine detail of the campaign rather than the bigger picture but I suppose that was not his responsibility .
I was bored after a while and the lack of detailed maps of the areas of fighting made it impossible to follow what was going on .
For miltary fanatics only .
The book is basically a bit of biography sandwiched around Haig's role in the Western Front in Belgium and France which is the meat of the story . If you are interested in the minute details of soldiering and military strategy then this is for you but I was looking for a broader sweep .
The writer intended to rescue Haig's reputation as a leader of complete incompetence who was responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in a senseless battle for a few miles of Flanders bog . He died a national hero . I was not totally convinced . It was senseless and Haig and other army leaders and politicians of the time seemed blind to the futility of the war . Of course he looked like the atypical Edwardian gent with his bravery and buttoned upright stance and bristly moustache and his christian faith and wealthy backgound nowadays counts against him but he seemed to lack imagination and was bogged down in the fine detail of the campaign rather than the bigger picture but I suppose that was not his responsibility .
I was bored after a while and the lack of detailed maps of the areas of fighting made it impossible to follow what was going on .
For miltary fanatics only .
December 28, 2024
A fitting successor to John Terraine's 'The Educated Soldier', Sheffield has crafted a strong biography that defends Haig and his efforts during the First World War. Over time, Sheffield and the actions of the Western Front Association have pioneered the growing post-1990s concensus that Haig was not alone in his failings during the conflict and he actually did more good than many earlier historians claimed. Still, Sheffield's work is not a balanced account but it certainly leans in closer to the 'true' Haig than works before it. As a contribution to the 'Donkey or Hero' historiography though, this is a strong piece of work strengthening the once neglected position that maybe, just maybe, Haig and other leaders were not entirely incompetent.
November 10, 2014
A good biography of one of the most controversial figures in 20th century British history. Whilst Sheffield is sympathetic he is not blind to Haig's faults. Perhaps Sheffield's great strength is to try to explain the reasons for Haig's decisions rather than dismissing him as bungling blunderer. He also reminds us of the importance of not measuring Haig by the values of our times.
November 3, 2016
A fascinating and revealing study of one of the most controversial and misunderstood generals of all time. Haig was not a "donkey"as characterized by Alan Clark, nor was he blameless for much of the slaughter in the closing years of World War One. However, this book goes a ling way to correct the record, and is well-written and engaging.
A worthwhile read.
A worthwhile read.
October 27, 2011
well written examination of douglas haig and his command of the army in WW1 and re-examination of the the repuation of the modern infamous general from the battle of the somme to the victory gained in the 100 days battles in 1918 , well worth reading
November 5, 2013
Interest topic, horrible read.
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