What do you think?
Rate this book
Dare Call it Treason: The True Story of the French Army Mutinies of 1917
On the Western Front, mutiny was everywhere in the air. "The operation must be postponed," one general wrote. "We risk having the men refuse to leave the assault trenches." French soldiers cursed their commanders, drank openly in the trenches, singing ditties about war profiteers and wooden graveyard crosses. Their commanders were unable to stem the distribution of papillons, the pacifist leaflets that filled French barracks like white spring snow. As May 1917 approached, commanders adjusted to the troop upheavals, coining a euphemism ("collective indiscipline") to substitute for the more terrifying "mutiny". Long out of print, Richard M. Watt's engulfing narrative of the calamitous French army mutinies throws fresh light on the weakness of the Army of France in the last years of the war and, indirectly, on the importance of American intervention. Its argument dovetails smoothly with that of John Mosier's THE MYTH OF THE GREAT WAR, which has drawn so much recent attention.
344 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1963
105 people want to read
About the author
Richard M. Watt
10 books15 followersRichard Martin Watt was born in 1930 in La Grange, IL but spent the majority of his childhood and adult years living in northern New Jersey. He graduated from Dartmouth College in 1952 and was commissioned an ensign in the US Navy, subsequently promoted to lieutenant junior grade. Following the Navy, he worked as an executive for 45 years at Crossfield Products Corp., a construction industry manufacturing firm, in Roselle Park, NJ, retiring as President and then serving as Chairman of the Board of Directors until his death in 2015. He authored several books on the subject of European history: "Dare Call It Treason," (pub.,1963) about the French Army mutinies in World War I; "The Kings Depart," (pub.,1969) about Germany between the wars, and "Bitter Glory," (pub.,1979) the history of a free Poland from 1918 to 1939. His books were published in eight different languages and were reviewed favorably by The New York Times, Time magazine and others. He also wrote over 200 book reviews for The New York Times, The London Review of Book, The Christian Science Monitor and others. He was awarded the prestigious Waclaw Jedrzejewics History Medal in 1996 from The Pilsudski Institute of America.
While he would say he was lucky to have never experienced the "starving author desperate to be published" he did feel the work of writing, while something he loved and found immensely satisfying, was hard work. He passed away on January 26, 2015 in Glen Ridge, NJ.
While he would say he was lucky to have never experienced the "starving author desperate to be published" he did feel the work of writing, while something he loved and found immensely satisfying, was hard work. He passed away on January 26, 2015 in Glen Ridge, NJ.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
May 14, 2021
This book recounts the events of the mutiny in the French Army that occurred in 1917. Many regiments had rebellious soldiers who in some cases deserted into nearby forests or temporarily took over small villages, some threatened officers, many refused to go on the offensive… They had had enough of being decimated and maimed. Some soldiers were executed.
The author acknowledges that we will never know the full extent of this mutiny – the number of executions, the killings by the mutinous soldiers, the full number involved. No army, more so during wartime, wants to acknowledge that a significant number of its troops are rebelling. The author points out that when the Germans were on the verge of entering Paris in 1940 during World War II there were huge bonfires of government documents burnt prior to fleeing – it is possible that some of these were records of the mutiny of 1917.
The author gives us the history with vivid images of the military and political personalities involved in the denouement of 1917. So, in effect, we are presented with a history of World War I from the French point of view. Prior to the mutiny there was a failed and disastrous offensive by General Robert Nivelle He had promised his troops a major breakthrough and hopes were high. But it was the same old thing – a vast butchering of France’s young men.
Page 194 (my book)
Throughout the Zone of the Armies the units which could be persuaded to march forward were baaing in imitation of lambs led to the slaughter, and their officers were helpless to prevent it.
It was at this stage that the government put Henri Philippe Petain in charge of the French Army. He was far more conservative militarily and had no grandiose offensive plans. He visited the troops and listened to the complaints of the poilu (the ordinary French soldier, the equivalent of grunt in the U.S.). They had much to complain of - many had not had leave for months, the medical facilities were scandalous, when going on leave it was difficult to board trains, the destinations and accommodations for leave were awful… Petain did much to ameliorate these conditions.
Also, when Clemenceau took over the French Government, he made it clear that his aim was victory – to defeat the Germans and remove them from French soil, there were to be no negotiations for peace. There was no more waffling like in the previous governments.
This is an excellent book describing this critical period during France’s wartime history.
The author acknowledges that we will never know the full extent of this mutiny – the number of executions, the killings by the mutinous soldiers, the full number involved. No army, more so during wartime, wants to acknowledge that a significant number of its troops are rebelling. The author points out that when the Germans were on the verge of entering Paris in 1940 during World War II there were huge bonfires of government documents burnt prior to fleeing – it is possible that some of these were records of the mutiny of 1917.
The author gives us the history with vivid images of the military and political personalities involved in the denouement of 1917. So, in effect, we are presented with a history of World War I from the French point of view. Prior to the mutiny there was a failed and disastrous offensive by General Robert Nivelle He had promised his troops a major breakthrough and hopes were high. But it was the same old thing – a vast butchering of France’s young men.
Page 194 (my book)
Throughout the Zone of the Armies the units which could be persuaded to march forward were baaing in imitation of lambs led to the slaughter, and their officers were helpless to prevent it.
It was at this stage that the government put Henri Philippe Petain in charge of the French Army. He was far more conservative militarily and had no grandiose offensive plans. He visited the troops and listened to the complaints of the poilu (the ordinary French soldier, the equivalent of grunt in the U.S.). They had much to complain of - many had not had leave for months, the medical facilities were scandalous, when going on leave it was difficult to board trains, the destinations and accommodations for leave were awful… Petain did much to ameliorate these conditions.
Also, when Clemenceau took over the French Government, he made it clear that his aim was victory – to defeat the Germans and remove them from French soil, there were to be no negotiations for peace. There was no more waffling like in the previous governments.
This is an excellent book describing this critical period during France’s wartime history.
April 29, 2020
Dare call it a good book? Yes I will.
I ordered this book after I read The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916. There were a few pages about the 1917 mutiny in the epilogue. I was in awe of the massive human meat grinder that was Verdun and I wondered how long the human psyche could withstand the terror of trench warfare before breaking down from combat fatigue. I wanted to learn more. In short, the mutiny was due to incompetence at the front and corruption and treachery in the rear.
This is an outstanding book for the military historian, the professional soldier, and for leaders from all walks of life. This book is an outstanding case study of how actions by politicians, activist newspapers, and the French high command nearly led to the downfall of France. It is also a story of how two men – Petain and Clemenceau - would make a difference that would bring the military and the country back from the brink of disaster.
This book contains 304 pages. The May mutinies occur on the tail end of the 1917 Nivelle offenses, in Chapter 11 on page 175. The first few chapters review pre-war scandals and intrigue and explain how they would later contribute to the downfall. The book visits acts of military incompetence such as the Dreyfus affair and the emergence of “the cult of the offensive” and the complete lack of tactics or strategy by arrogant and incompetent men that took hold of the French military leading up to the war. I’ve read about Boulanger, the Agadar crises, the Dryfuss affair, the Madame Caillux murder scandal but I didn’t understand how they contributed to the downfall of France until I read this book. Chapter 5 entitled "1915" ends with “During 1915 the French Army suffered casualties…totaling 1,549,000 men.” Chapter 8, entitled "1916" ends with “during the first 10 months of 1916 the French Army suffered casualties totaling 861,000 men.” These losses are unfathomable to me.
On the military front, one man fixed this mess and his name was Petain – the hero of Verdun. He was one of the few Frenchmen that understood modern warfare. Petain would say “firepower ruled the battlefield and infantry occupied it.” He never bought into the cult of the offensive and predicted that the Nivelle offensives would not succeed. Petain’s firm grasp of reality kept him from succeeding Joffre as the Grand Quarter General even after saving Verdun. Finely, with Petain summoned to save the army once again, there would be no more pipedreams of a massive breakthrough carried by the bayonet. The mutiny was somehow kept quiet. Petain met with Haig and convinced the British to mount an offensive to take the pressure off the French sector. Petain bluffed the Germans with massive artillery preparatory bombardments and then looked to suppress the mutiny.
Petain’s approach was genius. He did the most logical things first. The poilus (French soldiers) were obsessed with leave. They were promised a measly 7 days per quarter but in reality, front-line infantry were getting 7-days every year and a half. Leave kept being interrupted and put-off because of the next great offensive. Petain made sure the men got their leave as promised and he worked out the logistics of getting men home to see their families in an efficient manner. Next, he increased the quality of the chow and actually had chefs come in and teach cooks how to cook properly. He curtailed excessive drinking and put cots and shelter in the rear areas so when the men came off the line they had a place to rest. He made sure that when they got there they weren’t forced to spend their days in endless drill by some rear echelon martinet. In fact, he put a formula together: The first 4 days was uninterrupted rest and then training was slowly introduced in intervals and the men were rotated back in a timely fashion and were not allowed to linger in the rear area too long. He visited the front line units and addressed the men and promised no more bloodbaths. In one case, he shared the danger of the front and shook his fist at the enemy. As he visited front line infantry, he decorated them with medals that the poilus complained were mostly awarded to rear echelon staffers and even created a fourragere to wear on the uniform for units that served with distinction.
The men bought into their new leader. Petain would not make promises that he could not keep and he coached his officers not to do so as well (one unit mutinied because French high command reneged on the promise of a break after a successful attack they had made.) As Petain addressed the men they wept with shame for their insubordination. Petain saw this and cried out to their officers while pointing at the men “You see this? You see? These are good men. They need better leadership.” If there was ever a man for that time, I am convinced it was Petain! As I write this I feel tears flowing down my cheek from the inspiration of the words on the pages. This was an Army suffering with fatigue and Petain was the medicine.
There was the carrot and there was also the stick. After correcting what was wrong, Petain told his officers to tolerate no more mutinies and gave them the broad authority to put down all further insurrections with swift summary executions.
There were also problems in the rear. The same year of the mutinies there were Paris newspapers printing left wing anti-war propaganda and leaflets. One paper was found out to be secretly funded by the Germans! Poilus were given these newspapers and pamphlets for free and when on leave, were invited to leftist anti-war rallies. Evil men such as Lenin and Trotsky and a grandson of Marx were meeting with Paris Socialists. There was a Socialist rally in Switzerland and the Left Wing Paris politicians wanted passports so that they could attend. The question was put to Petain: will the army survive if we allow the French Left attend the meeting? Petain’s one word answer was “No!” In stepped Clemenceau, the Tiger and several long-term ministers were imprisoned and men running the German-funded newspapers were shot.
In all, the official body count to quell the mutiny was only 23 but unofficially the number was probably much higher. There was also a very interesting story about a Russian Battalion made up of men from Moscow who refused to fight and were a cancer to the morale of the French units that they came in contact with. They refused to cooperate and then refused to be disarmed. They were surrounded by a loyal Russian unit with French 75mm cannons. Some 800 shells were fired into this unit before they surrendered and were dealt with.
The Great War was an incredible ordeal that will make one feel blessed to be born 100 years too late.
I ordered this book after I read The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916. There were a few pages about the 1917 mutiny in the epilogue. I was in awe of the massive human meat grinder that was Verdun and I wondered how long the human psyche could withstand the terror of trench warfare before breaking down from combat fatigue. I wanted to learn more. In short, the mutiny was due to incompetence at the front and corruption and treachery in the rear.
This is an outstanding book for the military historian, the professional soldier, and for leaders from all walks of life. This book is an outstanding case study of how actions by politicians, activist newspapers, and the French high command nearly led to the downfall of France. It is also a story of how two men – Petain and Clemenceau - would make a difference that would bring the military and the country back from the brink of disaster.
This book contains 304 pages. The May mutinies occur on the tail end of the 1917 Nivelle offenses, in Chapter 11 on page 175. The first few chapters review pre-war scandals and intrigue and explain how they would later contribute to the downfall. The book visits acts of military incompetence such as the Dreyfus affair and the emergence of “the cult of the offensive” and the complete lack of tactics or strategy by arrogant and incompetent men that took hold of the French military leading up to the war. I’ve read about Boulanger, the Agadar crises, the Dryfuss affair, the Madame Caillux murder scandal but I didn’t understand how they contributed to the downfall of France until I read this book. Chapter 5 entitled "1915" ends with “During 1915 the French Army suffered casualties…totaling 1,549,000 men.” Chapter 8, entitled "1916" ends with “during the first 10 months of 1916 the French Army suffered casualties totaling 861,000 men.” These losses are unfathomable to me.
On the military front, one man fixed this mess and his name was Petain – the hero of Verdun. He was one of the few Frenchmen that understood modern warfare. Petain would say “firepower ruled the battlefield and infantry occupied it.” He never bought into the cult of the offensive and predicted that the Nivelle offensives would not succeed. Petain’s firm grasp of reality kept him from succeeding Joffre as the Grand Quarter General even after saving Verdun. Finely, with Petain summoned to save the army once again, there would be no more pipedreams of a massive breakthrough carried by the bayonet. The mutiny was somehow kept quiet. Petain met with Haig and convinced the British to mount an offensive to take the pressure off the French sector. Petain bluffed the Germans with massive artillery preparatory bombardments and then looked to suppress the mutiny.
Petain’s approach was genius. He did the most logical things first. The poilus (French soldiers) were obsessed with leave. They were promised a measly 7 days per quarter but in reality, front-line infantry were getting 7-days every year and a half. Leave kept being interrupted and put-off because of the next great offensive. Petain made sure the men got their leave as promised and he worked out the logistics of getting men home to see their families in an efficient manner. Next, he increased the quality of the chow and actually had chefs come in and teach cooks how to cook properly. He curtailed excessive drinking and put cots and shelter in the rear areas so when the men came off the line they had a place to rest. He made sure that when they got there they weren’t forced to spend their days in endless drill by some rear echelon martinet. In fact, he put a formula together: The first 4 days was uninterrupted rest and then training was slowly introduced in intervals and the men were rotated back in a timely fashion and were not allowed to linger in the rear area too long. He visited the front line units and addressed the men and promised no more bloodbaths. In one case, he shared the danger of the front and shook his fist at the enemy. As he visited front line infantry, he decorated them with medals that the poilus complained were mostly awarded to rear echelon staffers and even created a fourragere to wear on the uniform for units that served with distinction.
The men bought into their new leader. Petain would not make promises that he could not keep and he coached his officers not to do so as well (one unit mutinied because French high command reneged on the promise of a break after a successful attack they had made.) As Petain addressed the men they wept with shame for their insubordination. Petain saw this and cried out to their officers while pointing at the men “You see this? You see? These are good men. They need better leadership.” If there was ever a man for that time, I am convinced it was Petain! As I write this I feel tears flowing down my cheek from the inspiration of the words on the pages. This was an Army suffering with fatigue and Petain was the medicine.
There was the carrot and there was also the stick. After correcting what was wrong, Petain told his officers to tolerate no more mutinies and gave them the broad authority to put down all further insurrections with swift summary executions.
There were also problems in the rear. The same year of the mutinies there were Paris newspapers printing left wing anti-war propaganda and leaflets. One paper was found out to be secretly funded by the Germans! Poilus were given these newspapers and pamphlets for free and when on leave, were invited to leftist anti-war rallies. Evil men such as Lenin and Trotsky and a grandson of Marx were meeting with Paris Socialists. There was a Socialist rally in Switzerland and the Left Wing Paris politicians wanted passports so that they could attend. The question was put to Petain: will the army survive if we allow the French Left attend the meeting? Petain’s one word answer was “No!” In stepped Clemenceau, the Tiger and several long-term ministers were imprisoned and men running the German-funded newspapers were shot.
In all, the official body count to quell the mutiny was only 23 but unofficially the number was probably much higher. There was also a very interesting story about a Russian Battalion made up of men from Moscow who refused to fight and were a cancer to the morale of the French units that they came in contact with. They refused to cooperate and then refused to be disarmed. They were surrounded by a loyal Russian unit with French 75mm cannons. Some 800 shells were fired into this unit before they surrendered and were dealt with.
The Great War was an incredible ordeal that will make one feel blessed to be born 100 years too late.
August 20, 2019
This is an original and well-researched book centering on the mutinies and near-collapse of the French Army in mid-1917, though the author is careful to give the reader context: the growth and problems of the French Army, and the Third Republic, starting with the defeat in 1871 and the re-creation of the army and the state. We learn of the prewar crisis of the Dreyfus Affair and the damage it wrought on both institutions and we watch as prewar planning would cause horrific losses once war began in 1914. We learn of pervasive and growing defeatism in French society, in the army and in government as pointless casualties fell, month after month. We learn of intrigue, even treason, in the French governments, and of the cabinets' weaknesses. We learn of flawed, clumsy generals -- notably Joffre and Nivelle -- as the military leadership struggled to understand this new and frightful form of warfare. The triggering event -- the bloody, bungled Nivelle Offensive in spring 1917 -- would, we are told, be simply the final straw, the culmination of years of bloody futility.
We do learn of some surprising details, notably how close the French army came to a complete collapse in 1917, on the scale of Italy after Caporetto, if not Russia after the revolution began. Indeed, we learn of two Russian brigades in the French trenches, who themselves would mutiny, as well as influence the French soldiery with revolutionary and pacifist ideas. We learn just how much power that rumor had over the mutineers, and how uneven and arbitrary the French leadership would be in crushing the mutinies. We see vivid personalities in all their complexity and weaknesses -- politicians like Joseph Caillaux, Raymond Poincaré, Paul Painlevé -- and the eventual saviors of France, Georges Clemenceau in government and Philippe Pétain in the army. We learn just how crucial these last two would be.
In all, a major work on a critical point in the First World War, told from the French point of view, and a gripping story.
We do learn of some surprising details, notably how close the French army came to a complete collapse in 1917, on the scale of Italy after Caporetto, if not Russia after the revolution began. Indeed, we learn of two Russian brigades in the French trenches, who themselves would mutiny, as well as influence the French soldiery with revolutionary and pacifist ideas. We learn just how much power that rumor had over the mutineers, and how uneven and arbitrary the French leadership would be in crushing the mutinies. We see vivid personalities in all their complexity and weaknesses -- politicians like Joseph Caillaux, Raymond Poincaré, Paul Painlevé -- and the eventual saviors of France, Georges Clemenceau in government and Philippe Pétain in the army. We learn just how crucial these last two would be.
In all, a major work on a critical point in the First World War, told from the French point of view, and a gripping story.
May 3, 2016
Well researched, especially considering the lack of resources available when the author wrote the book in 1960's... nobody in France, from the army to the politicians to the surviving soldiers really wanted to dwell upon what was a very dark time for their country.
Watt tells a compelling story of disaster, slaughter, deceit and, yes, treason that brought France to the brink of disintegration during the bleak days of 1917. Verdun had bled France nearly white, and throughout the war, many poorly conceived and executed offensives had come close to destroying the French army's will to continue the fight. Additionally, the Allies in general were in a tight spot, with Russia dissolving into civil war, and America not yet ready to come to the rescue. In these times, "traitorous" politicians and left win trade unionists conspired to bring an end to France's participation in the war.
And this is where the reader might have pause to ask a couple of questions. Watt fully supports the continuation of the war and the draconian measures taken to keep France from suing for peace. The left wing politicians, trade unionists and mutinous soldiers are "traitors" and must be stopped (and it was true that certain politicians were in fact in the sway of Germany, so yes, traitors)... BUT what about looking at it from the other side? Maybe the traitors were the French industrialists, profiteers, militarists and right wing nationalists who were more than happy to kill millions of their fellow countrymen in order to line their pockets and further their political and social agendas. Maybe an end to the slaughter in 1917 would have been a good thing. Hundreds of thousands on both sides would not have died in that instance. And it could be argued that Germany winning WWI would not have been a bad thing after all... no Hitler, no holocaust, no WWII. Worth considering, at least.
And while the defeat of France in WWI would have ended them as a world power (and perhaps set them up for a "stabbed it the back fascist revolution), a victory only set them up for an even bigger fall.
Anyway, an interesting and thought provoking read. Worth checking out.
Watt tells a compelling story of disaster, slaughter, deceit and, yes, treason that brought France to the brink of disintegration during the bleak days of 1917. Verdun had bled France nearly white, and throughout the war, many poorly conceived and executed offensives had come close to destroying the French army's will to continue the fight. Additionally, the Allies in general were in a tight spot, with Russia dissolving into civil war, and America not yet ready to come to the rescue. In these times, "traitorous" politicians and left win trade unionists conspired to bring an end to France's participation in the war.
And this is where the reader might have pause to ask a couple of questions. Watt fully supports the continuation of the war and the draconian measures taken to keep France from suing for peace. The left wing politicians, trade unionists and mutinous soldiers are "traitors" and must be stopped (and it was true that certain politicians were in fact in the sway of Germany, so yes, traitors)... BUT what about looking at it from the other side? Maybe the traitors were the French industrialists, profiteers, militarists and right wing nationalists who were more than happy to kill millions of their fellow countrymen in order to line their pockets and further their political and social agendas. Maybe an end to the slaughter in 1917 would have been a good thing. Hundreds of thousands on both sides would not have died in that instance. And it could be argued that Germany winning WWI would not have been a bad thing after all... no Hitler, no holocaust, no WWII. Worth considering, at least.
And while the defeat of France in WWI would have ended them as a world power (and perhaps set them up for a "stabbed it the back fascist revolution), a victory only set them up for an even bigger fall.
Anyway, an interesting and thought provoking read. Worth checking out.
May 10, 2013
Mr Watts knows how to tell a complex story and make it easier to understand. Although I adored "Bitter Glory" and "Kings Depart", this is my favorite one of his books. Although I had read some about the 1917 mutinies in the French Army, this rendering puts more things into a broader perspective than any French author can. As far as I'm concerned, this is the best version of any telling of those tragic events especially because, contrary to French renditions, this one is non-judgemental. An absolute must-read for anyone interested in WW I. Written like a novel, reads like a charm, as is usual in Mr Watt's books.
March 20, 2017
I'll grant the date of publication as partly responsible but there are three issues I had with this book that prevented my bothering to finish it.
First, Watt argues that Louis Malvy shares some responsibility for the collapse of the French army by Malvy's failure to arrest those 'political undesirables' compiled prior to the outbreak of war. That's a remarkably absurd judgment considering that he also acknowledges the Entente debacles at the Somme, Verdun, et al on the very same page. I'd argue that any acts by the individuals on the list were nothing compared to the gross incompetency of the entire French Army command. You can only throw men against heavily fortified positions in frontal assaults so many times before they themselves realize that they're being slaughtered for no gain it doesn't take any "rabble rousing" to see that reality.
Second, Watt overplays the German army reservists. He is correct that the German army reserves were considered competent enough to be used in the initial campaign through Flanders. He does not mention that these reservists were trained on parade ground maneuvers only and were thus unceremoniously mowed down by the extremely well trained BEF. The apocryphal story has it that these units reported breaking before British machine guns when it was in actuality well concentrated rifle fire. The story's false, but the Germans were only able to advance by artillery bombardment.
Finally Watt is quiet as for German casualties which rivaled France's. Verdun while sucking in the entire French Army in rotating shifts also cost Germany a half million casualties of its own. France was not after all the only nation willing to toss away its youth.
First, Watt argues that Louis Malvy shares some responsibility for the collapse of the French army by Malvy's failure to arrest those 'political undesirables' compiled prior to the outbreak of war. That's a remarkably absurd judgment considering that he also acknowledges the Entente debacles at the Somme, Verdun, et al on the very same page. I'd argue that any acts by the individuals on the list were nothing compared to the gross incompetency of the entire French Army command. You can only throw men against heavily fortified positions in frontal assaults so many times before they themselves realize that they're being slaughtered for no gain it doesn't take any "rabble rousing" to see that reality.
Second, Watt overplays the German army reservists. He is correct that the German army reserves were considered competent enough to be used in the initial campaign through Flanders. He does not mention that these reservists were trained on parade ground maneuvers only and were thus unceremoniously mowed down by the extremely well trained BEF. The apocryphal story has it that these units reported breaking before British machine guns when it was in actuality well concentrated rifle fire. The story's false, but the Germans were only able to advance by artillery bombardment.
Finally Watt is quiet as for German casualties which rivaled France's. Verdun while sucking in the entire French Army in rotating shifts also cost Germany a half million casualties of its own. France was not after all the only nation willing to toss away its youth.
August 16, 2015
The French Army revolted? Like, for serious? WHATTTTTT??!
I really enjoyed this book. Like, really enjoyed it. It was on a subject I knew NOTHING about during a war I thought I new quite a bit about, which made it really great. Watt is an amazing writer of historical non-fiction; I would even say on par with David McCullough.
An incredible book.
I really enjoyed this book. Like, really enjoyed it. It was on a subject I knew NOTHING about during a war I thought I new quite a bit about, which made it really great. Watt is an amazing writer of historical non-fiction; I would even say on par with David McCullough.
An incredible book.
June 4, 2019
Well researched and written. The French are a weird society. But we all knew that. Good description of trench warfare. With maps, photos, and diagrams.
November 23, 2023
Excellent account published in 1963 of the French political situation in the lead-up to the Great War, the Nivelles offensive of 1917 which led to mutiny in the French army Recommended.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews